Tilonda Annae Thomas v. State of Indiana (NFP)

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Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as precedent or cited before any court except for the purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, collateral estoppel, or the law of the case. ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE: STANLEY L. CAMPBELL Fort Wayne, Indiana GREGORY F. ZOELLER Attorney General of Indiana JODI KATHRYN STEIN Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana FILED Dec 15 2010, 10:08 am IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA TILONDA ANNAE THOMAS, Appellant-Defendant, vs. STATE OF INDIANA, Appellee-Plaintiff. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) No. 02A03-1002-CR-97 APPEAL FROM THE ALLEN SUPERIOR COURT The Honorable Frances C. Gull, Judge Cause No. 02D04-0903-FD-246 December 15, 2010 MEMORANDUM DECISION NOT FOR PUBLICATION RILEY, Judge CLERK of the supreme court, court of appeals and tax court STATEMENT OF THE CASE Appellant-Defendant, Tilonda Annae Thomas (Thomas), appeals her conviction for residential entry, a Class D felony, Ind. Code § 35-43-2-1.5. We affirm. ISSUE Thomas raises one issue on appeal, which we restate as follows: Whether the State presented sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Thomas committed residential entry. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY On September 30, 2008, Thomas, along with Tyresha Thomas, Lacrueshia Walker, and Shimeka Thomas visited Gwendolyn Rogers (Rogers) apartment around 10 p.m. One of the women knocked on the door and asked for Woogie, which is Rogers nickname. Rogers opened the door a crack, and then the four women outside pushed the door open and began fighting Rogers in her apartment. According to Rogers, the women s hands were hitting [her] face, [her] arms whatever they could hit. (Transcript p. 93). Lacrueshia told Rogers that she had lied on her brother and got her brother locked up. (Tr. p. 95). Based on this comment, Rogers interpreted the women s attack as a retaliation for Rogers telling the police four days earlier that Lacrueshia s brother had raped her. During the fight, Rogers and an eyewitness saw Thomas standing about a foot inside or half way in the apartment. (Tr. p. 95, 134). Although Rogers cannot remember exactly which women participated in the fight, witnesses heard Thomas state afterwards that 2 she tried to break that bitch s toe and that she stomped that bitch in her private area, and it should hurt. (Tr. p. 116, 123, 139, 152, 160). After leaving the scene, Thomas warned the others not to say anything to the police about what happened and to tell the police no one was there if asked. On March 12, 2009, the State filed an Information charging Thomas with Count I, residential entry, a Class D felony, I.C. § 35-43-2-1.5, and Count II, battery, a Class A misdemeanor, I.C. § 35-42-2-1. On December 15, 2009, a jury trial was held. At the close of evidence, the jury found Thomas guilty on Count I, but not on Count II. Subsequently, on January 19, 2010, the trial court sentenced Thomas to two years executed at the Indiana Department of Correction. Thomas now appeals. Additional facts will be provided as necessary. DISCUSSION AND DECISION On appeal, Thomas argues that the State failed to provide sufficient evidence that she committed residential entry. The standard of review for a sufficiency of the evidence claim is that a court should only reverse a conviction when reasonable persons would not be able to form inferences as to each material element of the offense. Perez v. State, 872 N.E.2d 208, 212-213 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied. This court does not reweigh evidence or judge the credibility of witnesses. Id. at 213. In addition, this court only considers the evidence most favorable to the verdict and the reasonable inferences stemming from that evidence. Id. To commit residential entry, a person must knowingly or intentionally break and enter the dwelling of another person. I.C. § 35-43-2-1.5. Here, Thomas argues specifically that 3 the State did not produce any evidence to show that she broke into Rogers apartment. In order to satisfy the breaking element of residential entry, the State must introduce evidence from which the jury could reasonably infer that at least slight force was used to gain entry. McKinney v. State, 653 N.E.2d 115, 127 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995). This evidence, though, may be entirely circumstantial. Id. Thomas does not dispute that there is evidence she entered Rogers apartment. Instead, she argues that the State did not introduce evidence that she individually used force to enter the apartment. In making this argument, Thomas ignores Rogers testimony that all four women pushed against the door. Rogers stated that four people rushed her and that they pushed [her] door in. (Tr. p. 92)(emphasis added). When Rogers statement is viewed in the light most favorable to the trial court s verdict, there is sufficient evidence that reasonable minds could have determined that Thomas was included in the they that used force against Rogers door, and therefore committed residential entry. CONCLUSION Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the State presented sufficient evidence to convict Thomas of residential entry. Affirmed. KIRSCH, J., and BAILEY, J., concur. 4

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