Justia.com Opinion Summary: At the February 2010 primary, there was no name printed on the Republican ballot for the office of member of the St. Clair County board of review, and no candidate was nominated as a write-in. In March, the Republican Party central committee appointed plaintiff as its candidate, and, in April, made a filing with the county clerk, entitled “resolution/certificate of appointment.” Plaintiff circulated and filed nominating petitions and other required documents, pursuant to Election Code section 7–61. The electoral board sustained an objection so that plaintiff’s name did not appear on the November ballot. Trial and appellate courts affirmed. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, first holding that it could address the moot issue under the exception for matters of public interest. The lower courts applied the wrong section of the statute, which contains different sections for different situations.
Receive FREE Daily Opinion Summaries by Email Court description: At the general primary of February 2, 2010, there was no name printed on the Republican ballot
for the office of member of the St. Clair County board of review, and no candidate was nominated
as a write-in. On March 25, 2010, the Republican Party’s central committee appointed Whitney
Wisnasky-Bettorf to be its candidate, and, on April 1, 2010, made a filing so indicating with the
county clerk, utilizing a document entitled “resolution/certificate of appointment.” This designated
individual then went out and circulated nominating petitions and filed them, along with her notice
of appointment and other required documents, with the clerk. This petition-circulation procedure is
described in paragraph 9 of the Election Code’s section 7–61 on vacancies, having been added to that
statute effective January 1, 2010, just before the primary in question.
Wisnasky-Bettorf’s name never did appear on the ballot for the November 2, 2010, general
election. On April 26, 2010, objections were filed with the electoral board by Peggy Pierce,
complaining that the Republican Party’s resolution was not filed within three days of its making,
purportedly as required by another paragraph of section 7–61, namely, paragraph 3. The electoral
board sustained the objection and entered a written decision on May 3, 2010, removing Wisnasky-Bettorf’s name from the ballot. The would-be candidate then sought judicial review in the circuit
court of St. Clair County, but it confirmed the decision of the electoral board, and the appellate court
affirmed on August 19, 2010. Wisnasky-Bettorf appealed to the supreme court.
Because the election in question is over, this matter could be considered moot, but the supreme
court addressed it under the exception for matters of public interest.
In this decision, the Illinois Supreme Court held that the statutory provisions had been
misconstrued below. The section of the Election Code at issue, 7–61, consists of multiple
undesignated paragraphs which address different circumstances. The situation here is that no party
candidate’s name was printed on the primary ballot and no one was nominated as a write-in. This
is dealt with in paragraph 9, which requires the appointee to circulate and file nominating petitions,
in order, the supreme court said here, to make a showing of “grass roots” support after an
appointment is made. Paragraph 9 says nothing about a “resolution” or its filing. Language regarding
a resolution designating a candidate is found in paragraph 3, which deals with vacancies that occur
because of death or resignation after there has been a name on the primary ballot. The requirement
of filing a resolution within three days is found in paragraph 3, but that paragraph is not applicable
here.
The circuit and appellate courts’ judgments were reversed. No request had been made for a new
election.
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2012 IL 111253
IN THE
SUPREME COURT
OF
THE STATE OF ILLINOIS
(Docket No. 111253)
WHITNEY WISNASKY-BETTORF, Appellant, v. PEGGY PIERCE
et al., Appellees.
Opinion filed March 22, 2012.
JUSTICE FREEMAN delivered the judgment of the court, with
opinion.
Chief Justice Kilbride and Justices Thomas, Garman, Karmeier,
Burke, and Theis concurred in the judgment and opinion.
OPINION
¶1
Petitioner, Whitney Wisnasky-Bettorf, appeals from the circuit
court’s order sustaining petitioner’s removal from the ballot for the
general election held on November 2, 2010. A divided panel of the
appellate court affirmed (403 Ill. App. 3d 1080), and we granted leave
to appeal (Ill. S. Ct. R. 315 (eff. Feb. 26, 2010)). We now reverse the
judgments of the circuit and appellate courts.
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Background
At the Republican Party’s general primary election held on
February 2, 2010, no candidate’s name for the office of board of
review for St. Clair County, Illinois, was printed on the ballot, and no
candidate was nominated as a write-in for that office. Accordingly, on
March 25, 2010, the St. Clair County central committee of the
Republican Party (the committee) held a meeting at which it passed
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a motion designating petitioner as the appointee for candidacy for the
office of board of review member.
On April 1, 2010, the committee filed a “resolution/certificate of
appointment” with the county clerk of St. Clair County, indicating
that the executive committee of the Republican Party in St. Clair
County had voted to nominate petitioner for the office of board of
review member as required pursuant to section 7-61 of the Election
Code (10 ILCS 5/7-61 et seq. (West 2010)). On April 16, 2010,
petitioner filed her nominating petitions with the clerk together with
the notice of appointment, her statement of candidacy and her receipt
for filing a statement of economic interests.
On April 26, 2010, the objector, Peggy Pierce, filed a verified
objector’s petition requesting that petitioner’s name not appear on the
ballot for election to the office of board of review member because
the resolution was not filed within three days as required by section
7-61. On April 30, 2010, the St. Clair County electoral board held a
hearing on the objection. At the conclusion of the hearing, the St.
Clair County electoral board sustained the objection and removed
petitioner’s name from the ballot for the general election to be held
on November 2, 2010. In doing so, the St. Clair County electoral
board stated the committee was required to file a resolution under
section 7-61 in order to fill the vacancy in nomination and that this
resolution was to be filed within three days after the committee’s
meeting on March 25, 2010.
On May 3, 2010, the St. Clair County electoral board entered a
written decision, ordering that petitioner’s name was to be removed
from the ballot for the November 2, 2010, general election. On May
10, 2010, petitioner sought judicial review in the circuit court of St.
Clair County, arguing that: (1) the committee was not required to file
a resolution under section 7-61 in order for petitioner to fill the
general primary vacancy, and (2) even if the committee were required
to file a resolution, the objections in this case were untimely.
On June 2, 2010, the circuit court held a hearing on the petition.
Petitioner asked the court for relief, specifically to have her name
placed back on the ballot for that election. At the conclusion of the
hearing, the circuit court confirmed the decision of the St. Clair
County electoral board.
A divided panel of our appellate court affirmed, holding section
7-61 required the filing of a resolution under the circumstances. 403
Ill. App. 3d 1080. The dissenting justice concluded that the amended
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portion of section 7-61 sets forth a distinct procedure for situations
such as the case at hand and specifically substitutes a “notice of
appointment” for the filing of a resolution. 403 Ill. App. 3d at 1091
(Spomer, J., dissenting). Petitioner seeks reversal of the judgment of
the appellate court.
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ANALYSIS
Mootness
We must initially address the contention that this matter is moot
given that the November 2010 election has already occurred and the
petitioner does not request a new election if she were to prevail in this
appeal.
One exception to the mootness doctrine allows a court to resolve
an otherwise moot issue if the issue involves a substantial public
interest. Petitioner invokes this exception specifically requesting that
this court clarify this area of the law for future elections. The criteria
for application of the public interest exception are: (1) the public
nature of the question, (2) the desirability of an authoritative
determination for the purpose of guiding public officers, and (3) the
likelihood that the question will recur. In re A Minor, 127 Ill. 2d 247,
257 (1989); People ex rel. Wallace v. Labrenz, 411 Ill. 618, 622
(1952). A clear showing of each criterion is required to bring a case
within the public interest exception. See Kohan v. Rimland School for
Autistic Children, 102 Ill. App. 3d 524, 527 (1981).
The present case meets this test. Issues regarding the filling of
vacancies in nomination of a public office are of substantial public
interest. The appellate court correctly observed that issues regarding
this subject are long-standing and have not been addressed by courts
or the legislature (Phelan v. County Officers Electoral Board, 240 Ill.
App. 3d 368, 371, 381 (1992)). See Thurston v. State Board of
Elections, 76 Ill. 2d 385, 387-88 (1979); Administrative Office of the
Illinois Courts, 1981 Annual Report to the Supreme Court of Illinois
22. An authoritative guide for future controversies is needed; the
issue will likely recur. We therefore will address the merits of this
cause.
Election Code
The question before us is whether an established political party
must file a resolution pursuant to section 7-61 of the Election Code
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(10 ILCS 5/7-61 (West 2010)) in order to fill a vacancy in nomination
when no candidate appeared on the primary ballot and no write-in
candidate was nominated. Regarding our standard of review, factual
findings made by an electoral board will not be disturbed unless they
are against the manifest weight of the evidence. Girot v. Keith, 212
Ill. 2d 372, 378-79 (2004). We are not bound, however, by the
board’s interpretation of a statute. King v. Justice Party, 284 Ill. App.
3d 886, 888 (1996). The construction of a statute is a question of law,
which we review de novo. Sylvester v. Industrial Comm’n, 197 Ill. 2d
225, 232 (2001).
The primary rule of statutory interpretation and construction, to
which all other canons and rules are subordinate, is to ascertain and
effectuate the true intent and meaning of the legislature. People ex rel.
Hanrahan v. White, 52 Ill. 2d 70, 73 (1972). In interpreting a statute,
a court must give the legislative language its plain and ordinary
meaning. Illinois Power Co. v. Mahin, 72 Ill. 2d 189 (1978). If the
language of the statute is plain, clear, and unambiguous, and if the
legislative intent can be ascertained therefrom, it must prevail and
will be given effect by the courts without resorting to other aids for
construction. In re Marriage of Logston, 103 Ill. 2d 266 (1984). Also,
the statute should be evaluated as a whole; each provision should be
construed in connection with every other section. Bonaguro v. County
Officers Electoral Board, 158 Ill. 2d 391, 397 (1994). Statutes should
be construed, if possible, so that no term is rendered superfluous or
meaningless. Bonaguro, 158 Ill. 2d at 397.
The objection in this case was based on section 7-61 of the
Election Code. We note that section 7-61 consists of multiple
paragraphs which address different circumstances in which vacancies
in nomination occur. According to the objection, section 7-61
requires the filing of resolution in this case. In so arguing, the
objector relied upon paragraph 3, which states:
“Any vacancy in nomination under the provisions of this
Article 7 occurring on or after the primary and prior to
certification of candidates by the certifying board or officer,
must be filled prior to the date of certification. Any vacancy
in nomination occurring after certification but prior to 15 days
before the general election shall be filled within 8 days after
the event creating the vacancy. The resolution filling the
vacancy shall be sent by U.S. mail or personal delivery to the
certifying officer or board within 3 days of the action by
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which the vacancy was filled; provided, if such resolution is
sent by mail and the U.S. postmark on the envelope
containing such resolution is dated prior to the expiration of
such 3 day limit, the resolution shall be deemed filed within
such 3 day limit. Failure to so transmit the resolution within
the time specified in the Section shall authorize the certifying
officer or board to certify the original candidate. Vacancies
shall be filled by the officers of a local municipal or township
political party as specified in subsection (h) of Section 7-8,
other than a statewide political party, that is established only
within a municipality or township and the managing
committee (or legislative committee in case of a candidate for
State Senator or representative committee in the case of a
candidate for State Representative in the General Assembly
or State central committee in the case of a candidate for
statewide office, including but not limited to the office of
United States Senator) of the respective political party for the
territorial area in which such vacancy occurs.” 10 ILCS 5/761 (West 2010).
In response, petitioner maintains that paragraph 3 does not apply to
the situation present in this case—where no name had appeared on
the primary ballot—and that paragraph 9 controls in such situations.
We agree.
The plain language of section 7-61, when read in its entirety,
reveals that paragraph 3, quoted above, does not apply where no
established political party candidate was printed on the general
primary ballot for a particular office and no person was nominated as
a write-in candidate at the general primary election. Rather, paragraph
3 applies to situations where a candidate has been nominated at the
primary and a vacancy in nomination occurs as a result of the death
or resignation of that person nominated. There are four paragraphs in
section 7-61 which address the “resolution to fill the vacancy”:
paragraphs 3, 4, 5, and 6. There is language in two of those
paragraphs that makes it clear that the filing of the resolution refers
to situations where a candidate was nominated at a primary. For
example, the fourth sentence in paragraph 3 states: “Failure to so
transmit the resolution within the time specified in this Section shall
authorize the certifying officer or board to certify the original
candidate.” 10 ILCS 5/7-61 (West 2010). Moreover, paragraph 4 of
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the statute, which sets forth the information that must be included in
the resolution, states:
“The resolution to fill a vacancy in nomination shall be
duly acknowledged before an officer qualified to take
acknowledgments of deeds and shall include, upon its face,
the following information:
(a) the name of the original nominee and the office
vacated;
(b) the date on which the vacancy occurred;
(c) the name and address of the nominee selected to fill
the vacancy and the date of selection.” 10 ILCS 5/7-61 (West
2010).
These references to the “original candidate” and the “original
nominee” make no sense in cases such as this where no original
candidate or nominee existed.
In contrast, paragraph 9 specifically sets forth the procedure to be
followed in situations such as those here, i.e., where no name was put
forth on the primary ballot and no write-in candidate was nominated
by primary voters. Paragraph 9 states:
“If the name of no established political party candidate
was printed on the consolidated primary ballot for a particular
office and if no person was nominated as a write-in candidate
for such office, a vacancy in nomination shall be created
which may be filled in accordance with the requirements of
this Section. If the name of no established political party
candidate was printed on the general primary ballot for a
particular office and if no person was nominated as a write-in
candidate for such office, a vacancy in nomination shall be
filled only by a person designated by the appropriate
committee of the political party and only if that designated
person files nominating petitions with the number of
signatures required for an established party candidate for that
office within 75 days after the day of the general primary. The
circulation period for those petitions begins on the day the
appropriate committee designates that person. The person
shall file his or her nominating petitions, statements of
candidacy, notice of appointment by the appropriate
committee, and receipt of filing his or her statement of
economic interests together. The electoral boards having
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jurisdiction under Section 10-9 to hear and pass upon
objections to nominating petitions also shall hear and pass
upon objections to nomination petitions filed by candidates
under this paragraph.” 10 ILCS 5/7-61 (West 2010).
We note that the current paragraph 9 was amended in 2009. The
amendment, which went into effect on January 1, 2010, added
specific requirements for a vacancy in nomination when no
established political party candidate was printed on the general
primary ballot.1
In such situations, paragraph 9 provides that the vacancy in
nomination may be filled only when the following four conditions are
met: (1) the person to fill the vacancy in nomination has been
“designated by the appropriate committee of the political party” in
question, (2) the designated person obtains nominating petitions with
the number of signatures required for an established party candidate
for that office, with the circulation period to begin “on the day the
appropriate committee designates that person,” (3) the designated
person has filed, together, the following required documents, within
75 days after the day of the general primary: “his or her nominating
petitions, statements of candidacy, notice of appointment by the
appropriate committee, and receipt of filing his or her statement of
economic interests,” and (4) “[t]he electoral boards having
jurisdiction under Section 10-9 to hear and pass upon objections to
nominating petitions also shall hear and pass upon objections to
nomination petitions filed by candidates under [paragraph 9].” 10
1
A review of the preamended version of paragraph 9 of section
reinforces our interpretation. We provide it as a means of comparison:
“If the name of no established political party candidate was printed
on the consolidated primary ballot for a particular office and if no
person was nominated as a write-in candidate for such office, a
vacancy in nomination shall be created which may be filled in
accordance with the requirements of this Section. If the name of no
established political party candidate was printed on the general primary
ballot for a particular office and if no person was nominated as a writein candidate for such office, a vacancy in nomination shall be created,
but no candidate of the party for the office shall be listed on the ballot
at the general election unless such vacancy is filled in accordance with
the requirements of this Section within 60 days after the date of the
general primary.”10 ILCS 5/7-61 (West 2008).
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ILCS 5/7-61 (West 2010). We note that the requirement that the
candidate who is filling a vacancy created by reason of a lack of
candidate on the primary ballot must file nomination petitions with
the number of signatures required for an established party is
inconsistent with the requirements set forth in paragraphs 3 through
8, which do not require that nomination petitions be filed. Finally,
paragraph 9 does not include the word “resolution”; thus it is
reasonable to conclude that paragraph 9 does not require the filing of
a resolution in the case at bar.
The amended language of paragraph 9 makes clear that the
legislature intended that in situations where there is no original
candidate on the ballot and no write-in, a candidate must now show,
basic level, “grassroots” support by complying with the requirements
in paragraph 9 that were not previously included in paragraph 9 prior
to the amendment. To hold otherwise would be clearly against the
legislative intent in making this amendment and against this state’s
position in favor of ballot access for candidates running for public
office. See Hossfeld v. Illinois State Board of Elections, 398 Ill. App.
3d 737, 743 (2010).
Our conclusion that paragraph 3 does not apply to a vacancy
created by reason of a lack of candidate on the primary ballot is
further strengthened by the legislative history of Public Act 86-809,
which amended paragraph 9. The statements from the House debate
indicate that the legislature intended to provide specific requirements
exclusive to a candidate who fills a vacancy when no one was
nominated in the primary to serve as that party’s candidate
nomination. 96th Ill. Gen. Assem., House Proceedings, April 2, 2009,
at 7, 10 (statements of Representatives Fortner and Graham). These
same comments further reveal that the legislature viewed the
requirements in paragraphs 3 through 8 to apply to those candidates
who fill a vacancy when there was a candidate on the primary ballot.
Id.
Finally, we note that the appellate court relied upon dicta
contained in Forcade-Osborn v. Madison County Electoral Board,
334 Ill. App. 3d 756, 759 (2002). However, Forcade-Osborn was
decided prior to the amendment of paragraph 9, and whatever
persuasiveness Forcade-Osborn’s dicta might have once had is now
extinguished.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the judgments of the circuit and
appellate courts are reversed.
Judgments reversed.
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