Hall v. Village of Bartonville Police Dept.

No. 4--97--0935
_________________________________________________________________

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

THIRD DISTRICT

A.D., 1998

CLEATA HALL, ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
) for the 10th Judicial Circuit
Plaintiff-Appellant, ) Peoria County, Illinois
)
v. )
)
THE VILLAGE OF BARTONVILLE POLICE ) No. 96--L--641
DEPARTMENT, OFFICER R. HARTZELL, )
as an Agent/Employee of the )
Village of Bartonville Police )
Department, KINGSTON MINES )
HOMECOMING CORPORATION and )
CLAUDIA TINNEY, ) Honorable
) John A. Barra
Defendants-Appellees. ) Judge, Presiding
___________________________________________________________________

JUSTICE LYTTON delivered the opinion of the court:
___________________________________________________________________

Officer Ron Hartzell of the Bartonville Police Department was
pursuing a truck driven by Chad Courtwright, when the truck collided
with a car driven by Cleata Hall. Courtwright died, and Hall was
injured. Hall filed suit against the officer and department,
alleging violations of department procedures, willful and wanton
conduct, and reckless disregard for the safety of others.[fn1] The
department and officer filed a motion for summary judgment (735 ILCS
5/2--1005 (West 1996)), and the trial court granted the motion.
On appeal, Hall asserts that: (a) the trial judge erred in
granting summary judgment because a genuine issue of material fact
exists as to whether Officer Hartzell's conduct constituted reckless
disregard for the safety of others, (b) in chasing Courtwright at
such high speeds, the officer "provided the fuel behind the rocket,"
and (c) the officer had the option of halting the chase and locating
the driver through the truck's license plate number. We affirm.
A motion for summary judgment should be granted only when the
pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as
a matter of law. 735 ILCS 5/2--1005(c) (West 1996); Wells v. Enloe,
282 Ill. App. 3d 586, 589, 669 N.E.2d 368, 371 (1996). When
reviewing an order granting summary judgment, this court conducts a
de novo review. Jewish Hospital of St. Louis v. Boatmen's National
Bank of Belleville, 261 Ill. App. 3d 750, 755, 633 N.E.2d 1267, 1272
(1994).
FACTS
On September 2, 1994, Officer Hartzell witnessed the lights
flashing on and off on a truck heading eastbound on Route 24, near
Bartonville, Illinois. The truck was dark in color, and Hartzell
feared that another vehicle might hit it. The officer then observed
the truck weave in its lane, cross the white lines, and almost hit
a guard rail. Hartzell thought he had probable cause to believe
that the driver was under the influence of alcohol or drugs. The
officer activated his lights and siren in an attempt to initiate a
stop of the vehicle.
The truck, driven by Chad Courtwright, pulled into the parking
lot of the Jubilee Trucking Company. The officer noted the truck's
license plate number. The truck then accelerated and headed
westbound on Route 24, its tires squealing and throwing gravel.
Officer Hartzell followed and chased the truck through Bartonville
at 90 m.p.h.; speeds eventually reached 105 m.p.h. During the
chase, the truck weaved between lanes, and the squad car was
approximately 6 car lengths behind the truck. Hartzell considered
terminating the pursuit, but seconds later the truck collided with
Hall's car.
DISCUSSION
The parties disagree as to the appropriate standard of care to
be applied to an officer engaged in the pursuit of a fleeing
suspect. Plaintiff asserts that under the Illinois Vehicle Code
(Code) (625 ILCS 5/1-100 et seq. (West 1994)), the issue is whether
an officer was "reckless". Specifically, although sections 11--
205(b) and (c) of the Code authorize drivers of emergency vehicles
to exceed the speed limit while pursuing suspects (625 ILCS 5/11--
205(b), (c) (West 1994)), section 11--205(e) states that the driver
is not protected "from the consequences of his reckless disregard
for the safety of others" (625 ILCS 5/11--205(e) (West 1994)).
Defendants, on the other hand, rely on the "willful and wanton"
standard found in the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees
Tort Immunity Act (Act) (745 ILCS 10/1--101 et seq. (West 1994)).
Section 2--202 of the Act provides that a public employee is not
liable for his act or omission in the execution or enforcement of
any law unless that act or omission constitutes willful and wanton
conduct. 745 ILCS 10/2--202 (West 1994). "Willful and wanton
conduct" is defined as "a course of action which shows an actual or
deliberate intention to cause harm or which, if not intentional,
shows an utter indifference to or conscious disregard for the safety
of others or their property." 745 ILCS 10/1--210 (West 1994).
Section 2--109 provides that where an employee of a local public
entity is not liable for injuries, then the public employer is not
liable. 745 ILCS 10/2--109 (West 1994).
The appellate court is divided over the relationship between
these statutory provisions. In Postich v. Henrichs, 267 Ill. App.
3d 236, 244, 641 N.E.2d 975, 980 (1994), the court stated that while
section 11--205(e) of the Vehicle Code affects the issue of
comparative liability in suits filed by drivers of emergency
vehicles, it does not purport to limit the applicability of
sovereign immunity. In a different case filed by an injured party
against a municipality (Bradshaw v. City of Metropolis, 293 Ill.
App. 3d 389, 688 N.E.2d 332 (1997)), the majority held that the
specificity of the Motor Vehicle Code's provisions should prevail
over the general protections found in the Tort Immunity Act
(Bradshaw, 293 Ill. App. 3d at 395, 688 N.E.2d at 335). One justice
dissented on the ground that the Vehicle Code's duty-of-care
provisions were not intended to alter the laws of sovereign
immunity. Bradshaw, 293 Ill. App. 3d at 395, 688 N.E.2d at 336
(Maag, J., dissenting).
We need not resolve the dispute as to whether the reckless
standard or willful and wanton standard should apply in pursuit
cases. Under either standard, the facts presented in this case show
that the officer did not disregard the safety of others. The
officer observed conduct that led him to reasonably believe that the
truck driver was under the influence of alcohol or drugs. Faced
with this apparent danger to public safety, he decided to intervene.
The Illinois Supreme Court has declared that driving under the
influence is "a serious problem in Illinois" and that drunk drivers
pose "a substantial threat to the welfare of the citizenry of
Illinois." People v. Bartley, 109 Ill. 2d 273, 286, 285, 486 N.E.2d 880, 886, 885 (1985). Drunk driving is particularly disturbing
because it results in the loss of innocent life. Bartley, 109 Ill. 2d at 286, 486 N.E.2d at 885-86. Indeed, the supreme court has
determined that "the carnage caused by drinking and then driving is
so serious it warrants both types of apprehension--stopping
automobiles which are being driven erratically and roadblocks to
detect drunken drivers before they drive in an erratic manner."
Bartley, 109 Ill. 2d at 287, 486 N.E.2d at 886.
In Breck v. Cortez, 141 Ill. App. 3d 351, 360, 490 N.E.2d 88,
94 (1986), the appellate court held that where an officer was
confronted with reckless driving by a driver under the influence, "a
failure on the part of the police to act would have presented a
substantial threat to public safety * * * [even though] all high
speed pursuits of suspected law violators involve risk to other
motorists and pedestrians on the road."
Here, in addition to the seriousness of the truck driver's
perceived condition, we cannot ignore several other important facts.
These include: (1) the officer activated his lights and sirens, (2)
the chase occurred on a four-lane highway, (3) the location of the
chase was not a densely populated urban area, (4) the weather was
clear, (5) the road was dry, and (6) the duration of the chase was
relatively brief. Given these circumstances, the officer did not
act in disregard for the safety of others.
When evaluating claims for pursuit-related injuries, Illinois
courts have expressed policy concerns about unduly restricting the
authority of police to pursue suspects. In Urban v. Village of
Lincolnshire, 272 Ill. App. 3d 1087, 1096, 651 N.E.2d 683, 689
(1995), the court expressed reluctance to "tie the hands" of police
officers where a suspect-driver's conduct creates danger for himself
and others. In Laco v. City of Chicago, 154 Ill. App. 3d 498, 506,
507 N.E.2d 64, 69 (1987), the court said that to hold that police
should discontinue pursuit of speeders and reckless drivers might
result in a situation where drivers know that all they need to do is
go faster and there will be no chase.
Given the dangers of high-speed pursuit, we may have declined
to engage in such a chase if we were in Officer Hartzell's position;
indeed, we question whether the officer would do so if given another
opportunity. Yet, the benefit of hindsight and the luxury of
deliberation give us pause. When confronted with a motorist's
decision to flee, an officer's response is often "instinctive".
County of Sacramento v. Lewis, ___ U.S. ___, ___, ___ L. Ed. 2d ___,
___, ___ S. Ct. ___, ___ (1998).[fn2] "While prudence would have
repressed the reaction, the officer's instinct was to do his job as
a law enforcement officer, not to induce [the suspect's]
lawlessness, or to terrorize, cause harm, or kill". Lewis, ___ U.S.
at ___, ___ L. Ed. 2d at ___, ___ S. Ct. at ___. The officer and
department are entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
The judgment of the circuit court of Peoria County is affirmed.
Affirmed.
BRESLIN and SLATER, JJ., concur.
[fn1]Hall also filed suit against Kingston Mines Homecoming
Corporation and Claudia Tinney, but they are not parties to this
appeal.
[fn2]In Lewis, the U.S. Supreme Court held that when a death
results from a police pursuit, a plaintiff filing suit under 42
U.S.C.  1983 must show that the officer's conduct shocks the
conscience -- a standard that "points clearly away from liability."
Lewis, ___ U.S. at ___, ___ L. Ed. 2d at ___, ___ S. Ct. at ___.
Comparing the decision to pursue a fleeing suspect with that of
confronting a prison riot, the Court stated:
"A police officer deciding whether to give chase must
balance on one hand the need to stop a suspect and show
that flight from the law is no way to freedom, and, on the
other hand, the high-speed threat to everyone within the
stopping range, be they suspects, their passengers, other
drivers, or bystanders." Lewis, ___ U.S. at ___, ___ L.
Ed. 2d at ___, ___ S. Ct. at ___.