People v. Dainty

No. 4--97--0221
________________________________________________________________

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

SECOND DISTRICT
________________________________________________________________

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
OF ILLINOIS, ) of Fulton County.
)
Plaintiff-Appellee, )
)
v. ) No. 95--CF--280
)
LONNIE C. DAINTY, ) Honorable
) Patricia A. Walton,
Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, Presiding.
_________________________________________________________________

PRESIDING JUSTICE GEIGER delivered the opinion of the court:
Following a jury trial, the defendant, Lonnie C. Dainty, was
convicted of armed violence (720 ILCS 5/33A--2 (West 1994)) and
sentenced to 10 years' imprisonment. On appeal, the defendant
argues that [Nonpublishable material under Supreme Court Rule 23
omitted.] Public Act 88--680 (Pub. Act 88--680, eff. January 1,
1995) is unconstitutional because it violates the single subject
rule of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. IV,
8(d)).

FACTS
The following facts are relevant to this appeal. On December
30, 1995, the defendant was charged by information with attempted
murder (720 ILCS 5/8--4(a), 9--1 (West 1994)), aggravated battery
(720 ILCS 5/12--4(a) (West 1994)), and armed violence (720 ILCS
5/33A--2 (West 1994)). The information alleged that, on December
29, 1995, the defendant stabbed Steve Thornhill in the chest, head,
back, and body with a knife with a blade of at least three inches
in length.
[Nonpublishable material under Supreme Court Rule 23 omitted.]
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF PUBLIC ACT 88--680
We now address the defendant's argument that section 33--A--
3(a--5) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (Criminal Code) (720 ILCS
5/33A--3(a--5) (West 1996)), which increased the minimum sentence
for the offense of armed violence from 6 years to 10 years, is
unconstitutional and therefore invalid. In support of his
argument, the defendant contends that Public Act 88--680, in which
the legislature enacted section 33A--3(a--5), violates the single
subject rule of the Illinois Constitution of 1970 (Ill. Const.
1970, art. IV, 8(d)). The State urges us not to consider the
defendant's constitutional challenge to Public Act 88--680 because
this act has already been codified. See State v. Mabry, 460 N.W.2d 472, 475 (Iowa 1990). However, as noted above, a challenge to
the constitutionality of a statute can be raised at any time.
People v. Bryant, 128 Ill. 2d 448, 454 (1989). We therefore turn
to the merits of this issue.
1. Single Subject Rule
The single subject rule is a substantive requirement for the
passage of bills and is therefore subject to judicial review.
Johnson v. Edgar, 176 Ill. 2d 499, 514 (1997). The rule exists to
prevent the passage of legislation that, standing alone, could not
muster the votes necessary for passage. People v. Reedy, 295 Ill.
App. 3d 34, 41 (1998). The rule also serves to facilitate orderly
legislative procedure. Reedy, 295 Ill. App. 3d at 41.
The term "subject" is comprehensive in scope and must be
construed liberally. Reedy, 295 Ill. App. 3d at 41. So long as
the provisions of a bill have a "natural and logical connection,"
the subject matter of that bill may be as broad as the legislature
chooses. Reedy, 295 Ill. App. 3d at 41. The legislature violates
the single subject rule only when it includes within a single bill
incongruous and unrelated matters that by no fair intendment have
any legitimate relation to each other. Reedy, 295 Ill. App. 3d at
41.
In Fuehrmeyer v. City of Chicago, 57 Ill. 2d 193 (1974), our
supreme court held that Public Act 77--1818 was unconstitutional
because it violated the single subject rule. The act at issue in
Fuehrmeyer purported to exclusively grant to the State the power to
regulate certain professions and occupations listed in 30 separate
acts, ranging from architects to funeral directors to water well
contractors. Fuehrmeyer, 57 Ill. 2d at 195. The supreme court
held that this act violated the single subject rule because each of
the 30 regulated professions and occupations was a separate
subject. Fuehrmeyer, 57 Ill. 2d at 203-05.
The supreme court recently revisited the issue of the single
subject rule in Johnson v. Edgar, 176 Ill. 2d 499 (1997). At issue
in Johnson was whether Public Act 89--428, which was entitled "An
Act in relation to public safety," violated the single subject
rule. Johnson, 176 Ill. 2d at 503. As enacted, Public Act 89--428
contained six articles and encompassed subjects including child sex
offenders, employer eavesdropping, and environmental impact fees
imposed on the sale of fuel. Johnson, 176 Ill. 2d at 517.
The supreme court determined that the act violated the single
subject rule because the discordant provisions contained therein
did not possess a natural and logical connection. Johnson, 176 Ill. 2d at 517. The court noted that the act amended a multitude
of provisions in over 20 different acts and created several new
laws. Johnson, 176 Ill. 2d at 516-17. In addition, the supreme
court rejected the defendants' argument that the provisions of the
act were confined to the single subject of public safety. Johnson,
176 Ill. 2d at 517. The court noted that, if it were to conclude
that the discordant provisions contained in the act were related
under the subject of public safety, it would be eliminating the
single subject rule as a meaningful check on the legislature's
actions. Johnson, 176 Ill. 2d at 517-18.
Similarly, in People v. Reedy, 295 Ill. App. 3d 34 (1998),
this court found that Public Act 89--404 violated the single
subject rule. In its enacted form, Public Act 89--404 contained 10
sections covering subjects such as the removal of the homestead
exemption from property subject to certain civil forfeiture; the
burden of proof for a criminal defendant asserting the insanity
defense; truth-in-sentencing legislation; and new procedures for
the perfection and attachment of hospital liens. Reedy, 295 Ill.
App. 3d at 42. The State in Reedy argued that the act embraced the
single subject of governmental matters. Reedy, 295 Ill. App. 3d at
43. However, after reviewing the act, this court found the alleged
"subject" to be too broad to satisfy the Illinois Constitution's
mandates. Reedy, 295 Ill. App. 3d at 43. We were unable to
identify the natural and logical connection uniting civil
forfeiture, criminal sentencing, and hospital liens and therefore
held that the act violated the single subject rule. Reedy, 295
Ill. App. 3d at 42.
2. Public Act 88--680
Turning to the instant case, Public Act 88--680 was introduced
as Senate Bill 1153 on January 12, 1994. Entitled "A Bill for an
Act to amend the Criminal Code of 1961," Senate Bill 1153
originally amended the Criminal Code to require a trial court to
impose a sentence of community service on any person convicted of
or placed on supervision for assault, criminal damage to property,
certain weapons violations, mob action, or disorderly conduct. On
April 13, 1994, the Senate amended the bill to provide that, if
imprisonment is imposed upon a defendant convicted of or placed on
supervision for the aforementioned crimes, a community service
sentence was not required. On April 14, 1994, the Senate passed
the bill as amended.
When Senate Bill 1153 reached the House of Representatives,
amendment 13 was placed on the bill. Amendment 13, entitled the
"Safe Neighborhoods Bill," addressed a different array of subjects
including gun trafficking, exploitation of children, and enhanced
penalties for (1) providing alcohol to minors; (2) the assault of
a police officer; and (3) drive-by shootings. With this amendment,
the House of Representatives passed Senate Bill 1153, and the bill
was sent back to the Senate.
The Senate and the House could not agree on which provisions
of Amendment 13 should stand. As a result, a conference committee
was formed. In its final form, the bill was entitled the "Safe
Neighborhoods Law," and it covered a wide array of subjects
contained in 9 articles and 161 pages.
Specifically, article 5 of the act, entitled "Juvenile
Justice," amended the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (Juvenile Court
Act) (705 ILCS 405/1--1 et seq. (West 1992)) to (1) expand the
types of offenses for which a minor can be tried as an adult; (2)
extend the time period that the State can continue adjudicatory
hearings; (3) require imprisonment for minors adjudicated
delinquent for first degree murder; and (4) extend the automatic
termination date of wardship proceedings for minors.
Article 15, entitled "Gangs," amended the Criminal Code (720
ILCS 5/1--1 et seq. (West 1992)) to increase the penalties for the
offense of intimidation. Article 15 also amended the Unified Code
of Corrections (Unified Code) (730 ILCS 5/1--1--1 et seq. (West
1992)) to allow extended-term sentences for defendants who commit
felonies in furtherance of an organized gang and to require that
defendants sentenced to probation, conditional discharge, or
supervision for a gang related crime perform community service.
Article 20, entitled "Alcohol Abuse," amended the Illinois
Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/1--100 et seq. (West 1992)) to provide for
both minimum and increased penalties for driving with a revoked or
suspended license and to increase the penalty for aggravated
driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs (DUI).
Article 25, entitled "Drug Abuse," amended the Cannabis
Control Act (720 ILCS 550/1 et seq. (West 1992)) and the Illinois
Controlled Substances Act (720 ILCS 570/100 et seq. (West Supp.
1993)) to (1) specify a 24-month term of probation for first time
offenders; (2) require certain conditions of probation; and (3)
allow evidence at sentencing hearings of a person's prior drug
convictions that were discharged or dismissed.
Article 30, entitled "Firearms," amended the Criminal Code to
(1) create the offense of gunrunning; (2) increase the penalty for
defacing identification marks of firearms; (3) prevent a sheriff
from trading or selling a confiscated weapon; and (4) provide that
possession of a firearm in violation of bail conditions is a
felony.
The remaining articles of Public Act 88--680 were untitled.
Article 35 amended the Criminal Code to (1) increase the penalty
for attempted murder, aggravated battery with a firearm, and
aggravated discharge of a firearm. Article 35 also amended the
Rights of Crime Victims and Witnesses Act (725 ILCS 120/1 et seq.
(West 1994)) to expand the duties of the State's Attorney and the
Prisoner Review Board to give victims and witnesses in juvenile
cases involving a violent crime various types of information
relating to the case. In addition, Article 35 amended the Unified
Code to require notification of a person's escape, parole, release,
or placement in a halfway house to victims, witnesses, prosecutors,
and law enforcement officials.
Article 40 amended the Criminal Code to increase the penalty
for compelling the membership of persons in an organization through
the use of unlawful means.
Article 45 created the Secure Residential Youth Care Facility
Licensing Act (730 ILCS 175/45--1 et seq. (West 1994)), which
requires the Department of Corrections to establish a licensing
system for secure residential youth facilities. Article 45 also
amended (1) the State Finance Act (30 ILCS 105/1 et seq. (West
1994)) by adding the Secure Residential Youth Care Facility Fund to
the list of special funds; (2) the Unified Code to establish an
interagency review committee to determine whether a minor placed
with the Department of Children and Family Services should be
committed to the Department of Corrections; and (3) the Private
Correctional Facility Moratorium Act (730 ILCS 140/1 et seq. (West
1994)) to create an exemption from the general prohibition against
privately run correctional facilities for juvenile residential
facilities.
Article 50 amended the WIC Vendor Management Act (WIC Act)
(410 ILCS 255/1 et seq. (West 1992)) to (1) expand the types of
business entities that may be subject to monetary penalties for
violations of the Act; (2) delete language allowing investment of
penalty money; (3) delete language requiring that money received in
penalties by the Department of Public Health may only be used to
administer the Act; and (4) require the Department of Public Health
to make rules concerning administrative appeals from sanctions
imposed upon the new business entities subject to sanctions under
the Act.
Article 50 also amended the Firearm Owners Identification
(FOID) Card Act (430 ILCS 65/0.01 et seq. (West 1992)) to (1)
require that each FOID card applicant certify that he is not an
illegal alien; (2) give the Department of State Police the
authority to deny an application for a FOID card or to revoke and
seize a FOID card if it finds that the person is an illegal alien;
(3) require that FOID card expiration dates be conspicuously
displayed on the card's face; and (4) increase the penalties for
possession of a firearm without a valid FOID card.
Article 50 also amended the Juvenile Court Act to provide
that, in juvenile cases where the minor is not sent to prison and
where the court finds that the delinquent conduct was gang related
or involved an illegal use of a firearm, the court shall require 30
to 120 hours of community service as a condition of supervision.
Article 50 further amended the Criminal Code to expand the scope of
the offenses of prostitution, solicitation of a sexual act,
pandering, pimping, juvenile pimping, and exploitation of a child.
Additionally, article 50 created the offense of Women,
Infants, Children (WIC) Benefits Fraud (720 ILCS 5/17B--1(West
1994)) and established a range of penalties and required forfeiture
of items of value either obtained through WIC fraud or used to
commit WIC fraud. Article 50 also increased the penalties for
unlawful use of weapons, unlawful sale of firearms, unlawful
possession of firearms, and armed violence. Furthermore, article
50 amended the Wrongs to Children Act (720 ILCS 150/0.01 et seq.
(West 1994)) to expand the scope of the act pertaining to the
sexual exploitation of a child.
Senate Bill 1153 was passed by both the House and the Senate
and was signed into law on December 15, 1994.
3. Analysis
After careful review of these articles, we hold that Public
Act 88--680 violates the single subject rule and is
unconstitutional in its entirety. As indicated above, Public Act
88--680 began as a narrowly tailored bill that imposed a sentence
of community service for certain types of criminal offenses.
However, Senate Bill 1153 became the "Safe Neighborhoods Law,"
which (1) created the new crime of gunrunning; (2) established a
licensing system for secure residential youth facilities; and (3)
created the new crime of WIC Benefits Fraud. This bill expanded
the types of business entities that could be subject to monetary
penalties for violations of the WIC Act. The bill also changed the
penalties for driving with a revoked or suspended license and for
aggravated DUI. Additionally, the bill prevented a sheriff from
trading or selling a confiscated weapon and required the Department
of Corrections to provide notification of the escape, parole, or
release of a criminal to victims, witnesses, prosecutors, and law
enforcement officials. In sum, Public Act 88--680 contained a
multitude of provisions and created several new laws in unrelated
matters.
We do not believe that the many discordant provisions in
Public Act 88--680 can be considered to possess a natural and
logical connection to neighborhood safety. See Johnson, 176 Ill. 2d at 517. We fail to see the relationship between such subjects
as the imposition of monetary penalties upon business entities for
the violation of the WIC Act, the creation of a Secure Residential
Youth Care Facility Licensing Act, and the imposition of enhanced
criminal penalties. Moreover, if we were to conclude that the many
discordant provisions contained in this act were nonetheless
related because of a greater connection to the notion of
neighborhood safety, we essentially would be eliminating the single
subject rule as a meaningful constitutional check on the
legislature's actions. Johnson, 176 Ill. 2d at 517-18.
The legislative debates regarding Senate Bill 1153 support our
conclusion. When Senate Bill 1153 was sent to the House, the bill
purported to impose a sentence of community service for certain
offenses. When Senate Bill 1153 returned from the House, it
contained nine articles addressing a broad range of subjects. In
presenting the bill to the Senate for final action, Senator Dudycz
stated to his colleagues that the bill contained three major
components. The first component dealt with prostitution, juvenile
pimping, child pornography, fraud in the WIC program, the criminal
use of firearms, and community service sentencing. The second
component dealt with the transfer of minors to secure residential
facilities. The third component contained 14 proposals from the
"Mayor's Illinois Safe Neighborhoods" bill. 88th Ill. Gen. Assem.,
Senate Proceedings, December 1, 1994, at 45-46 (statements of
Senator Dudycz). Such comments would appear to contradict the
State's assertions that the entire Act relates to neighborhood
safety.
Furthermore, during the debate, Senator Molaro indicated that
he intended to vote in favor of the bill but stated, "I don't like
the privatization part of this bill. *** [B]ut the rest of the bill
is terrific." 88th Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate Proceedings, December
1, 1994, at 67 (statements of Senator Molaro). In addition,
Representative Black stated, "I fully intend to vote 'aye,' but ***
[w]hat I have some problem with is requiring a mandatory jail
sentence for a repeat DUI offender." 88th Ill. Gen. Assem., House
Proceedings, December 1, 1994, at 87 (statements of Representative
Black).
As mentioned above, the purpose of the single subject rule is
to " 'prevent the combination of unrelated subjects in one bill to
obtain support for the package as a whole, when the separate parts
could not succeed on their individual merits.' " Reedy, 295 Ill.
App. 3d at 43, quoting County of Kane v. Carlson, 116 Ill. 2d 186,
214 (1987). Although we have no way of knowing whether the
separate parts of Senate Bill 1153 could have succeeded on their
individual merits, the comments made by Senator Molaro and
Representative Black confirm that, with respect to Senate Bill
1153, the purposes of the single subject rule were not served. See
generally Reedy, 295 Ill. App. 3d at 43.
In so ruling, we note that the Illinois Appellate Court, First
District, recently addressed a single subject challenge to Public
Act 88--680 in People v. Wiggins, No. 1--97--0961 (August 17,
1998). In Wiggins, the defendant argued that the amendments to the
WIC Act were not related to the amendments made to the Criminal
Code or the Juvenile Court Act. Wiggins, slip op. at 2. The court
in Wiggins rejected the defendant's argument and held that Public
Act 88--680 did not violate the single subject rule of our state
constitution. Wiggins, slip op. at 4.
In so ruling, the court stated:
"The legislature's inclusion of amendments to the WIC
Vendor Management Act and the creation of article 17B of the
Criminal Code dealing with WIC fraud is a 'natural and logical
connection' to the issue of safe neighborhoods. The WIC
program provides eligible recipients with vouchers, used like
cash, to purchase food and other necessities for themselves
and their children. Unfortunately, some recipients exchange
the vouchers for illegal controlled substances peddled by drug
dealers on neighborhood street corners. *** Accordingly, the
amendments in [Senate Bill] 1153 addressing WIC fraud address
drug- and gang-related activities threatening neighborhood
safety and depriving children of WIC benefits." Wiggins, slip
op. at 3.
The court further noted that the remainder of the amendments
contained in Senate Bill 1153 "naturally and logically promote
neighborhood safety." Wiggins, slip op. at 3.
However, as noted above, we fail to see the "natural and
logical connection" uniting such matters as monetary penalties for
certain business entities in violation of the WIC Act, the
licensing of secure residential youth facilities, and enhanced
criminal penalties for certain offenses. In fact, our review of
the various provisions of the act indicates that the legislature
included several incongruous and unrelated matters that by no fair
intendment have any legitimate relation to each other. See
Johnson, 176 Ill. 2d at 517. Although legislative enactments
generally enjoy a presumption of constitutionality (see Reedy, 295
Ill. App. 3d at 41), we are compelled to declare Public Act 88-680
unconstitutional as it fails to comport with the mandate of the
Illinois Constitution's single subject rule.
In addition, we reject the State's reliance upon People v.
Pitts, 295 Ill. App. 3d 182 (1998). Rather, we believe that the
holding in Pitts, in fact, supports our conclusion. In Pitts, the
Appellate Court of Illinois, Fourth District, held that, although
the first nine sections of Public Act 89--404 (Pub. Act 89--404,
eff. August 20, 1995) concerned some aspect of the criminal justice
system, the act as a whole violated the single subject rule because
the last section of the act instead pertained to criminal law or
criminal procedure. Pitts, 295 Ill. App. 3d at 185-90.
Accordingly, we hold that Public Act 88--680 was enacted in
violation of the single subject rule of our state constitution and
is therefore invalid. While we certainly hesitate to invalidate
this comprehensive legislative act, we are nonetheless bound to
abide by the requirements of our constitution. We therefore remand
the cause for a new sentencing hearing. The trial court is ordered
to sentence the defendant according to the sentencing provisions in
effect prior to the enactment of Public Act 88--680. We note that
our ruling does not address the substantive constitutionality of
Public Act 88--680's individual provisions. Rather, our ruling
goes only to the structure of the act and manner in which it was
enacted. Therefore, the legislature is free to revisit Public Act
88--680's various provisions in future legislation. See Reedy, 295
Ill. App. 3d at 44.
CONCLUSION
We conclude that [Nonpublishable material under Supreme Court
Rule 23 omitted.] Public Act 88--860 is unconstitutional in its
entirety, and the defendant must be resentenced according to the
sentencing provisions in effect prior to the enactment of Public
Act 88--680. The cause is therefore remanded for a new sentencing
hearing in conformity with this opinion.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court
of Fulton County is affirmed in part and vacated in part, and the
cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
Affirmed in part and vacated in part; cause remanded.
BOWMAN and RAPP, JJ., concur.