Metropolitan Alliance of Police v. Labor Relations Bd.
Annotate this Case
October 9, 1998
No. 3--97--0865
_________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
THIRD DISTRICT
A.D., 1998
METROPOLITAN ALLIANCE OF ) Petition for Review of
POLICE, Coal City Police ) an order of the illinois
Chapter #186, No. 6 ) State Labor Relations Board
)
Plaintiff-Appellant, )
)
v. ) No. S-VR-97-13
)
ILLINOIS STATE LABOR RELATIONS )
BOARD, Executive Director BRIAN )
REYNOLDS and VILLAGE OF COAL )
CITY, ILLINOIS )
)
Defendants-Appellees. )
_________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE BRESLIN delivered the opinion of the court:
_________________________________________________________________
Plaintiff Metropolitan Alliance of Police (Metropolitan
Alliance) appeals from a decision of the Illinois State Labor
Relations Board (Board). In that decision, the Board sustained a
ruling by its Executive Director (Director) that denied
Metropolitan Alliance's request for voluntary recognition
certification of a proposed "bargaining unit" under the Illinois
Public Labor Relations Act (Act)(5 ILCS 315/1 et seq. (West 1996)).
Based on the following discussion, we affirm and hold that the Act
is inapplicable to the Village of Coal City (City) because the City
employs less than 35 employees. We further hold that the Act, in
excluding governmental units that employ less than 35 people, is
not unconstitutional.
FACTS
The Act, among other things, gives state employees the right
to voluntarily join a union and to bargain collectively with their
employer over issues concerning wages, hours of work, and other
terms of employment. 5 ILCS 315/1 et seq. (West 1996). In order to
be covered under the Act, a union's bargaining unit must be
certified by the Board. 5 ILCS 315/9 (West 1996).
In June of 1997, Metropolitan Alliance and the City filed a
request for voluntary recognition certification with the Board. In
that request, the parties stated that the proposed bargaining unit
would consist of 10 police officers employed by the City. The
parties stipulated that the City currently employed no more than
29 employees. The Director dismissed the request because the City
did not employ 35 people-- the requisite number of employees
required under the Act. Subsequently, Metropolitan Alliance
appealed the dismissal to the Board, which in turn sustained the
ruling of the Director. On appeal to this court, Metropolitan
Alliance argues both that the Board improperly interpreted the Act
and that the Act itself is unconstitutional. The constitutional
question was not raised before the Board.
DISCUSSION
I
It is a well-settled principle of administrative law that
courts must give substantial weight and deference to the
interpretation placed upon a statute by the agency charged with the
statute's administration and enforcement. County of Whiteside v.
Property Tax Appeal Board, 276 Ill. App. 3d 182, 658 N.E.2d 481
(1995). Such deference is proper because of the agency's enhanced
ability to make informed judgments based upon its unique experience
and expertise. Illinois Consolidated Telephone Co. v. Illinois
Commerce Comm'n, 95 Ill. 2d 142, 447 N.E.2d 295 (1983).
Section 20(b) of the Act states in part: "[t]his Act shall not
be applicable to units of local government employing less than 35
employees." 5 ILCS 315/20(b) (West 1996). The Board asserts that
this section functions as an absolute bar to the Act's application
to governmental units that employ less than 35 employees. This
explication of the Act finds further support in the decision of the
Illinois Supreme Court in Village of Winfield v. Illinois State
Labor Relations Board, 176 Ill. 2d 54, 678 N.E.2d 1041 (1997), in
which the court held that the Act does not apply to governmental
units employing less than 35 employees. 176 Ill. 2d at 59, 678 N.E.2d at 1043. Given this interpretation of the plain language of
the Act by both the Board and the supreme court, and considering
the fact that both parties have stipulated that the City employs
only 29 people, we hold that the Act is inapplicable to the City.
II
Having held that the Act is inapplicable to the City, the only
other issue presented in this case is whether the Act is
unconstitutional. As a general proposition of administrative law,
issues or defenses not placed before the administrative agency will
not be considered for the first time on administrative review. Metz
v. Illinois State Labor Relations Board, 231 Ill. App. 3d 1079, 596 N.E.2d 855 (1992). Although it is true that administrative
agencies lack the authority to invalidate a statute on
constitutional grounds or even to question its validity, it is
"[n]onetheless *** advisable to assert a constitutional challenge
on the record before the administrative tribunal." Texaco-Cities
Service Pipeline Co. v. McGaw, 182 Ill. 2d 262, 278-79, 695 N.E.2d 481, 489 (1998).
The Solicitor General argues that the holding in Texaco-Cities
should prevent Metropolitan Alliance from raising a constitutional
argument because such an argument was not raised until Metropolitan
Alliance's brief to this court. It is unclear, however, whether
the supreme court meant to adopt a bright line rule on this point
or not. Nonetheless, we need not reach this issue because it is
evident that Metropolitan Alliance's constitutional arguments are
wholly without merit.
A. Freedom of Association
The United States Supreme Court has held that the freedom to
associate is among the rights guaranteed by the first amendment of
the United States Constitution. U.S. Const., amend. I; National
Ass'n for the Advancement of Colored People v. State of Alabama ex
rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1488, 78 S. Ct. 1163
(1958). Although public employees have a fundamental right to join
a union, (Chicago Division of Illinois Education Ass'n v. Board of
Education, 76 Ill. App. 2d 456, 222 N.E.2d 243 (1966)), there is no
fundamental right to collective bargaining. University
Professionals of Illinois, Local 4100 v. Edgar, 114 F.3d 665 (7th
Cir. 1997). The Board's inability to certify the bargaining unit
simply prevents the Board from becoming involved in the collective
bargaining process between the City and the union. It does not
prevent the City police officers from joining the union itself.
Therefore, their first amendment rights to associate have not been
infringed.
B. Equal Protection Clause
The fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution
forbids a state to deny any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws. U.S. Const., amend. XIV; Williams v.
Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 26 L. Ed. 2d 586, 90 S. Ct. 2018 (1970).
The level of scrutiny applied in reviewing laws, which include
legislative classifications, varies depending upon the nature of
the classification. Classifications based on race or natural
origin, or affecting fundamental rights, receive a heightened level
of review under the strict scrutiny standard, while economic and
social welfare legislation is reviewed under the rational basis
test. In re A.A., 181 Ill. 2d 32, 690 N.E.2d 980 (1998). As
articulated above, there is no fundamental right at issue, nor is
there a classification based on race or natural origin. Hence, the
statute must be analyzed under the rational basis test. Under this
test, the statute need only have a rational basis for
distinguishing the class to which the law applies from the class to
which the law does not apply. People v. Hamm, 149 Ill. 2d 201, 595 N.E.2d 540 (1992). If any set of facts reasonably can be conceived
to justify the classification, it must be upheld. In re A.A., 181 Ill. 2d at 38, 690 N.E.2d at 982.
The Solicitor General offers a multitude of reasons why the
legislature exempted governmental units with less than 35 employees
from the Act. Those reasons include conserving the Board's
resources, reducing the Board's caseload, and a smaller city's
enhanced ability to interact more closely with its union members.
Any one of these justifications is enough to overcome a rational
basis challenge to the Act. Accordingly, the Act does not violate
the equal protection clause.
C. Special Legislation Clause
Article 4, section 13, of the Illinois Constitution provides
"[t]he General Assembly shall pass no special or local law when a
general law is or can be made applicable." Ill. Const. 1970, art.
4, 13. The purpose of this special legislation clause is to
prevent arbitrary legislative classifications that discriminate in
favor of a select group without a sound, reasonable basis. Best v,
Taylor Machine Works, 179 Ill. 2d 367, 689 N.E.2d 1057 (1997). A
special legislation challenge is generally judged under the same
standards applicable to an equal protection challenge. Best, 179 Ill. 2d at 393, 689 N.E.2d at 1070-71. Consequently, in light of
the analysis above, the Act is not violative of the special
legislation clause of the Illinois Constitution.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Illinois State
Labor Relations Board is affirmed.
Affirmed.
HOMER, P. J., and SLATER, J., concur.
No. 3--97--0865
_________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
THIRD DISTRICT
A.D., 1998
METROPOLITAN ALLIANCE OF ) Petition for Review of
POLICE, Coal City Police ) an order of the illinois
Chapter #186, No. 6 ) State Labor Relations Board
)
Plaintiff-Appellant, )
)
v. ) No. S-VR-97-13
)
ILLINOIS STATE LABOR RELATIONS )
BOARD, Executive Director BRIAN )
REYNOLDS and VILLAGE OF COAL )
CITY, ILLINOIS )
)
Defendants-Appellees. )
_________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE BRESLIN delivered the opinion of the court:
_________________________________________________________________
Plaintiff Metropolitan Alliance of Police (Metropolitan
Alliance) appeals from a decision of the Illinois State Labor
Relations Board (Board). In that decision, the Board sustained a
ruling by its Executive Director (Director) that denied
Metropolitan Alliance's request for voluntary recognition
certification of a proposed "bargaining unit" under the Illinois
Public Labor Relations Act (Act)(5 ILCS 315/1 et seq. (West 1996)).
Based on the following discussion, we affirm and hold that the Act
is inapplicable to the Village of Coal City (City) because the City
employs less than 35 employees. We further hold that the Act, in
excluding governmental units that employ less than 35 people, is
not unconstitutional.
FACTS
The Act, among other things, gives state employees the right
to voluntarily join a union and to bargain collectively with their
employer over issues concerning wages, hours of work, and other
terms of employment. 5 ILCS 315/1 et seq. (West 1996). In order to
be covered under the Act, a union's bargaining unit must be
certified by the Board. 5 ILCS 315/9 (West 1996).
In June of 1997, Metropolitan Alliance and the City filed a
request for voluntary recognition certification with the Board. In
that request, the parties stated that the proposed bargaining unit
would consist of 10 police officers employed by the City. The
parties stipulated that the City currently employed no more than
29 employees. The Director dismissed the request because the City
did not employ 35 people-- the requisite number of employees
required under the Act. Subsequently, Metropolitan Alliance
appealed the dismissal to the Board, which in turn sustained the
ruling of the Director. On appeal to this court, Metropolitan
Alliance argues both that the Board improperly interpreted the Act
and that the Act itself is unconstitutional. The constitutional
question was not raised before the Board.
DISCUSSION
I
It is a well-settled principle of administrative law that
courts must give substantial weight and deference to the
interpretation placed upon a statute by the agency charged with the
statute's administration and enforcement. County of Whiteside v.
Property Tax Appeal Board, 276 Ill. App. 3d 182, 658 N.E.2d 481
(1995). Such deference is proper because of the agency's enhanced
ability to make informed judgments based upon its unique experience
and expertise. Illinois Consolidated Telephone Co. v. Illinois
Commerce Comm'n, 95 Ill. 2d 142, 447 N.E.2d 295 (1983).
Section 20(b) of the Act states in part: "[t]his Act shall not
be applicable to units of local government employing less than 35
employees." 5 ILCS 315/20(b) (West 1996). The Board asserts that
this section functions as an absolute bar to the Act's application
to governmental units that employ less than 35 employees. This
explication of the Act finds further support in the decision of the
Illinois Supreme Court in Village of Winfield v. Illinois State
Labor Relations Board, 176 Ill. 2d 54, 678 N.E.2d 1041 (1997), in
which the court held that the Act does not apply to governmental
units employing less than 35 employees. 176 Ill. 2d at 59, 678 N.E.2d at 1043. Given this interpretation of the plain language of
the Act by both the Board and the supreme court, and considering
the fact that both parties have stipulated that the City employs
only 29 people, we hold that the Act is inapplicable to the City.
II
Having held that the Act is inapplicable to the City, the only
other issue presented in this case is whether the Act is
unconstitutional. As a general proposition of administrative law,
issues or defenses not placed before the administrative agency will
not be considered for the first time on administrative review. Metz
v. Illinois State Labor Relations Board, 231 Ill. App. 3d 1079, 596 N.E.2d 855 (1992). Although it is true that administrative
agencies lack the authority to invalidate a statute on
constitutional grounds or even to question its validity, it is
"[n]onetheless *** advisable to assert a constitutional challenge
on the record before the administrative tribunal." Texaco-Cities
Service Pipeline Co. v. McGaw, 182 Ill. 2d 262, 278-79, 695 N.E.2d 481, 489 (1998).
The Solicitor General argues that the holding in Texaco-Cities
should prevent Metropolitan Alliance from raising a constitutional
argument because such an argument was not raised until Metropolitan
Alliance's brief to this court. It is unclear, however, whether
the supreme court meant to adopt a bright line rule on this point
or not. Nonetheless, we need not reach this issue because it is
evident that Metropolitan Alliance's constitutional arguments are
wholly without merit.
A. Freedom of Association
The United States Supreme Court has held that the freedom to
associate is among the rights guaranteed by the first amendment of
the United States Constitution. U.S. Const., amend. I; National
Ass'n for the Advancement of Colored People v. State of Alabama ex
rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1488, 78 S. Ct. 1163
(1958). Although public employees have a fundamental right to join
a union, (Chicago Division of Illinois Education Ass'n v. Board of
Education, 76 Ill. App. 2d 456, 222 N.E.2d 243 (1966)), there is no
fundamental right to collective bargaining. University
Professionals of Illinois, Local 4100 v. Edgar, 114 F.3d 665 (7th
Cir. 1997). The Board's inability to certify the bargaining unit
simply prevents the Board from becoming involved in the collective
bargaining process between the City and the union. It does not
prevent the City police officers from joining the union itself.
Therefore, their first amendment rights to associate have not been
infringed.
B. Equal Protection Clause
The fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution
forbids a state to deny any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws. U.S. Const., amend. XIV; Williams v.
Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 26 L. Ed. 2d 586, 90 S. Ct. 2018 (1970).
The level of scrutiny applied in reviewing laws, which include
legislative classifications, varies depending upon the nature of
the classification. Classifications based on race or natural
origin, or affecting fundamental rights, receive a heightened level
of review under the strict scrutiny standard, while economic and
social welfare legislation is reviewed under the rational basis
test. In re A.A., 181 Ill. 2d 32, 690 N.E.2d 980 (1998). As
articulated above, there is no fundamental right at issue, nor is
there a classification based on race or natural origin. Hence, the
statute must be analyzed under the rational basis test. Under this
test, the statute need only have a rational basis for
distinguishing the class to which the law applies from the class to
which the law does not apply. People v. Hamm, 149 Ill. 2d 201, 595 N.E.2d 540 (1992). If any set of facts reasonably can be conceived
to justify the classification, it must be upheld. In re A.A., 181 Ill. 2d at 38, 690 N.E.2d at 982.
The Solicitor General offers a multitude of reasons why the
legislature exempted governmental units with less than 35 employees
from the Act. Those reasons include conserving the Board's
resources, reducing the Board's caseload, and a smaller city's
enhanced ability to interact more closely with its union members.
Any one of these justifications is enough to overcome a rational
basis challenge to the Act. Accordingly, the Act does not violate
the equal protection clause.
C. Special Legislation Clause
Article 4, section 13, of the Illinois Constitution provides
"[t]he General Assembly shall pass no special or local law when a
general law is or can be made applicable." Ill. Const. 1970, art.
4, 13. The purpose of this special legislation clause is to
prevent arbitrary legislative classifications that discriminate in
favor of a select group without a sound, reasonable basis. Best v,
Taylor Machine Works, 179 Ill. 2d 367, 689 N.E.2d 1057 (1997). A
special legislation challenge is generally judged under the same
standards applicable to an equal protection challenge. Best, 179 Ill. 2d at 393, 689 N.E.2d at 1070-71. Consequently, in light of
the analysis above, the Act is not violative of the special
legislation clause of the Illinois Constitution.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Illinois State
Labor Relations Board is affirmed.
Affirmed.
HOMER, P. J., and SLATER, J., concur.
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