Grundy Co. Nat'l Bank v. Property Tax Appeal Bd.
Annotate this Case
July 9, 1998
No. 3--97--0845
_____________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
THIRD DISTRICT
A.D., 1998
_________________________________________________________________
GRUNDY COUNTY NATIONAL BANK, ) Appeal from the Circuit
as trustee under an agreement ) Court of the 13th
Judicial
dated the 26th day of June, ) Circuit, Grundy County,
1989, Known as Land Trust ) Illinois
#1163, KEITH ROSELAND, JOHN W. )
HYNDS and DONALD N. CLAUSEN )
TRUST, HENRIETTA U. CLAUSEN. )
Trustee, Beneficial Owners, )
)
Plaintiffs-Appellants ) No. 94--TX--10
)
v. )
)
STATE OF ILLINOIS PROPERTY TAX )
APPEAL BOARD and GRUNDY COUNTY )
BOARD OF REVIEW, ) The Honorable
) James L. Brusatte,
Defendants-Appellees. ) Judge Presiding
_________________________________________________________________
PRESIDING JUSTICE HOMER delivered the opinion of the court:
_________________________________________________________________
Plaintiffs, the trustee bank and beneficiaries in a land
trust, appealed a decision of the Grundy County Board of Review
to reassess plaintiffs' property from farmland to residential
property. The Property Tax Appeal Board, and later the circuit
court, upheld the reassessment and the plaintiffs have appealed
to this court. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
FACTS
Grundy County National Bank, as trustee, was the record
owner of real property in Grundy County consisting of 18.896
acres. The property had been used for the production of corn and
soybeans. The trustee purchased the property for development
into a residential subdivision.
The trustee submitted a preliminary plat of the subdivision
to the Village of Coal City. The plat divided the property into
54 lots and was approved by the village.
In August 1989, a final plat with 11 lots and containing
4.381 acres was recorded. In August 1990, plaintiffs recorded a
second final plat with an additional 12 lots containing 3.842
acres. In March 1991, after a third final plat with 9 lots
containing 3.307 acres was recorded, there remained 22 lots
containing 7.366 acres which had not been finally platted.
For the 1991 tax year, the Grundy County supervisor of
assessments increased the assessment on 22 of the vacant lots
contained within the three final plats after reclassifying those
lots from farmland to residential. Plaintiffs filed a complaint
with the Grundy County Board of Review (Board), contending that
these lots were entitled to a preferential assessment pursuant to
section 20g-4 of the Revenue Act of 1939 because at the time of
the preliminary platting the land was vacant and in excess of 10
acres, or land used for farming or agricultural purposes. Ill.
Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 120, par. 501g-4.
When the Board rejected plaintiffs' argument, plaintiffs
appealed to the Property Tax Appeal Board (PTAB). The PTAB ruled
that section 20g-4 of the Revenue Act did not apply to
plaintiffs' property because the section requires in excess of 10
acres to be platted at a single time and recorded under the Plat
Act. The PTAB did allow plaintiffs relief for the 9 lots
contained in the third final plat because that plat was filed
after the commencement of the 1991 assessment year.
Plaintiffs filed for review in the circuit court which
upheld the decision of the PTAB, and they now seek relief in this
court. At issue is the Board's reassessment of 13 vacant lots
contained within the first two final plats. We must decide
whether these 13 lots meet the criteria under section 20g-4 of
the Revenue Act of 1939 for preferential property tax assessment.
ANALYSIS
Plaintiffs contend that their lots were subject to valuation
as subdivided agricultural land in accordance with section 20g-4
of the Revenue Act of 1939 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, Ch. 120, par.
501g-4). They argue that the PTAB erred in its interpretation of
section 20g-4.
Courts must give substantial weight and deference to the
interpretation placed on a statute by the agency charged with its
administration and enforcement. Central City Education
Association v. Illinois Educational Labor Relations Board, 149 Ill. 2d 496, 599 N.E.2d 892 (1992). Where an agency's decision
involves the interpretation of a statutory provision, the meaning
of which is subject to debate, courts will rely on the agency's
interpretation of the statute's meaning. Board of Education of
Plainfield v. Illinois Education Labor Relations Board, 143 Ill.
App. 3d 898, 493 N.E.2d 1130 (1986). However, the PTAB's
interpretation of a statute is not binding if it is erroneous or
if it limits or extends the scope of the statute. Martin Oil
Service, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 49 Ill. 2d 260, 273 N.E.2d 823 (1971).
Section 20g-4 was enacted to protect real estate developers
from rising assessments which result from initial platting and
dividing of farmland. Kennedy Brothers, Inc. v. Property Tax
Appeal Board, 158 Ill. App. 3d 154, 160, 510 N.E.2d 1275, 1279
(1987). Section 20g-4 provides, inter alia:
"(a) In all counties containing less
than 2,000,000 inhabitants, the platting and
subdivision of land into separate lots and
the development of such subdivided land with
streets, sidewalks, curbs, gutters, sewer,
water and utility lines shall not increase
the assessed valuation of all or any part of
the land so platted and subdivided provided
that:
(1) Such land is platted and subdivided
in accordance with [the Plat Act];
(2) Such platting occurs after January
1, 1978; and
(3) At the time of such platting such
land is vacant land in excess of 10 acres, or
land used for farming or agricultural
purposes within the meaning of Section 20a-1.
***" Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 120, par.
501g-4.
Plaintiffs argue that the Plat Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991,
ch. 109, par. 1, et seq.) makes no distinction between
preliminary and final plats of a subdivision, and that the
election to finally plat the development in phases should not
affect their entitlement to the protection afforded by section
20g-4. Plaintiffs contend that their preliminary plat was
sufficient to satisfy the requirements of 20g-4 since the
preliminary plat consisted of 18.896 acres.
However, section 20g-4 specifically requires the platting to
be done in conformity with the Plat Act which provides, inter
alia:
"The statement of the Registered Land
Surveyor and of acknowledgement, together
with the plat, must be recorded *** in the
recorder's office of the county in which the
land is situated ***." Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991,
ch. 109, par. 2.
In the instant case, the preliminary plat was submitted to
the village for approval but was not recorded in the recorder's
office. Therefore, the plain language of section 20g-4(a)(1) and
section 2 of the Plat Act compel us to agree with the PTAB's
determination that the only time the subject lots were platted
and subdivided in conformity with section 2 of the Plat Act was
when the final plats in which they are located were recorded.
Alternatively, plaintiffs argue that the repeal of section
20a-1 of the Revenue Act of 1939 eliminated the 10-acre threshold
requirement for subdivided farmland. Before its repeal in 1983,
section 20a-1, which established an alternative valuation of
farmland, stated inter alia:
"Real property is used for farming or
agricultural purposes within the meaning of
this Section if it is more than 10 acres in
area and devoted primarily to the raising and
harvesting of crops ***." Ill. Rev. Stat.
1981, ch. 120, par. 501a-1 (repealed by Pub.
Act 83-347 effective Sept. 14, 1983).
It is well-settled that a statute which adopts by specific
reference provisions of another statute is not affected by a
subsequent amendment or repeal of the incorporated statute.
Libertyville v. Continental Illinois National Bank, 187 Ill.
App. 3d 84, 90, 543 N.E.2d 350, 354 (1989). Plaintiffs argue,
without citation to authority, that this rule of statutory
construction should not apply here, because section 20a-1 was
repealed prior to the effective date of section 20g-4 and at no
time did the two sections have a common existence. Section 20a-
1 was repealed effective September 14, 1983, while section 20g-4
became effective September 26, 1983. At a minimum, plaintiffs
contend, this legislative sequence creates an ambiguity, which
must be construed against the government and in favor of the
taxpayer. We disagree. Although section 20a-1 was repealed,
the definition of farmland contained therein survives as
incorporated in 20g-4. The definition is readily ascertainable
and unambiguous. Therefore, the plaintiffs' distinction does
not undermine the application of the rule in this case.
Thus, under either of the criteria of section 20g-4(a)(3),
that the land must be vacant or used for farming or agricultural
purposes as defined in 20a-1, the land must be in excess of 10
acres at the time of such platting. Because the land in neither
of the recorded final plats at issue in this appeal was in excess
of 10 acres, the 13 reassessed lots were not entitled to the
preferential treatment provided by section 20g-4.
Therefore, we conclude that the PTAB's decision was not
erroneous, and the judgment of the trial court upholding the
PTAB's decision must be affirmed.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court
of Grundy County is affirmed.
Affirmed.
BRESLIN and SLATER, JJ., concur.
No. 3--97--0845
_____________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
THIRD DISTRICT
A.D., 1998
_________________________________________________________________
GRUNDY COUNTY NATIONAL BANK, ) Appeal from the Circuit
as trustee under an agreement ) Court of the 13th
Judicial
dated the 26th day of June, ) Circuit, Grundy County,
1989, Known as Land Trust ) Illinois
#1163, KEITH ROSELAND, JOHN W. )
HYNDS and DONALD N. CLAUSEN )
TRUST, HENRIETTA U. CLAUSEN. )
Trustee, Beneficial Owners, )
)
Plaintiffs-Appellants ) No. 94--TX--10
)
v. )
)
STATE OF ILLINOIS PROPERTY TAX )
APPEAL BOARD and GRUNDY COUNTY )
BOARD OF REVIEW, ) The Honorable
) James L. Brusatte,
Defendants-Appellees. ) Judge Presiding
_________________________________________________________________
PRESIDING JUSTICE HOMER delivered the opinion of the court:
_________________________________________________________________
Plaintiffs, the trustee bank and beneficiaries in a land
trust, appealed a decision of the Grundy County Board of Review
to reassess plaintiffs' property from farmland to residential
property. The Property Tax Appeal Board, and later the circuit
court, upheld the reassessment and the plaintiffs have appealed
to this court. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
FACTS
Grundy County National Bank, as trustee, was the record
owner of real property in Grundy County consisting of 18.896
acres. The property had been used for the production of corn and
soybeans. The trustee purchased the property for development
into a residential subdivision.
The trustee submitted a preliminary plat of the subdivision
to the Village of Coal City. The plat divided the property into
54 lots and was approved by the village.
In August 1989, a final plat with 11 lots and containing
4.381 acres was recorded. In August 1990, plaintiffs recorded a
second final plat with an additional 12 lots containing 3.842
acres. In March 1991, after a third final plat with 9 lots
containing 3.307 acres was recorded, there remained 22 lots
containing 7.366 acres which had not been finally platted.
For the 1991 tax year, the Grundy County supervisor of
assessments increased the assessment on 22 of the vacant lots
contained within the three final plats after reclassifying those
lots from farmland to residential. Plaintiffs filed a complaint
with the Grundy County Board of Review (Board), contending that
these lots were entitled to a preferential assessment pursuant to
section 20g-4 of the Revenue Act of 1939 because at the time of
the preliminary platting the land was vacant and in excess of 10
acres, or land used for farming or agricultural purposes. Ill.
Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 120, par. 501g-4.
When the Board rejected plaintiffs' argument, plaintiffs
appealed to the Property Tax Appeal Board (PTAB). The PTAB ruled
that section 20g-4 of the Revenue Act did not apply to
plaintiffs' property because the section requires in excess of 10
acres to be platted at a single time and recorded under the Plat
Act. The PTAB did allow plaintiffs relief for the 9 lots
contained in the third final plat because that plat was filed
after the commencement of the 1991 assessment year.
Plaintiffs filed for review in the circuit court which
upheld the decision of the PTAB, and they now seek relief in this
court. At issue is the Board's reassessment of 13 vacant lots
contained within the first two final plats. We must decide
whether these 13 lots meet the criteria under section 20g-4 of
the Revenue Act of 1939 for preferential property tax assessment.
ANALYSIS
Plaintiffs contend that their lots were subject to valuation
as subdivided agricultural land in accordance with section 20g-4
of the Revenue Act of 1939 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, Ch. 120, par.
501g-4). They argue that the PTAB erred in its interpretation of
section 20g-4.
Courts must give substantial weight and deference to the
interpretation placed on a statute by the agency charged with its
administration and enforcement. Central City Education
Association v. Illinois Educational Labor Relations Board, 149 Ill. 2d 496, 599 N.E.2d 892 (1992). Where an agency's decision
involves the interpretation of a statutory provision, the meaning
of which is subject to debate, courts will rely on the agency's
interpretation of the statute's meaning. Board of Education of
Plainfield v. Illinois Education Labor Relations Board, 143 Ill.
App. 3d 898, 493 N.E.2d 1130 (1986). However, the PTAB's
interpretation of a statute is not binding if it is erroneous or
if it limits or extends the scope of the statute. Martin Oil
Service, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 49 Ill. 2d 260, 273 N.E.2d 823 (1971).
Section 20g-4 was enacted to protect real estate developers
from rising assessments which result from initial platting and
dividing of farmland. Kennedy Brothers, Inc. v. Property Tax
Appeal Board, 158 Ill. App. 3d 154, 160, 510 N.E.2d 1275, 1279
(1987). Section 20g-4 provides, inter alia:
"(a) In all counties containing less
than 2,000,000 inhabitants, the platting and
subdivision of land into separate lots and
the development of such subdivided land with
streets, sidewalks, curbs, gutters, sewer,
water and utility lines shall not increase
the assessed valuation of all or any part of
the land so platted and subdivided provided
that:
(1) Such land is platted and subdivided
in accordance with [the Plat Act];
(2) Such platting occurs after January
1, 1978; and
(3) At the time of such platting such
land is vacant land in excess of 10 acres, or
land used for farming or agricultural
purposes within the meaning of Section 20a-1.
***" Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 120, par.
501g-4.
Plaintiffs argue that the Plat Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991,
ch. 109, par. 1, et seq.) makes no distinction between
preliminary and final plats of a subdivision, and that the
election to finally plat the development in phases should not
affect their entitlement to the protection afforded by section
20g-4. Plaintiffs contend that their preliminary plat was
sufficient to satisfy the requirements of 20g-4 since the
preliminary plat consisted of 18.896 acres.
However, section 20g-4 specifically requires the platting to
be done in conformity with the Plat Act which provides, inter
alia:
"The statement of the Registered Land
Surveyor and of acknowledgement, together
with the plat, must be recorded *** in the
recorder's office of the county in which the
land is situated ***." Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991,
ch. 109, par. 2.
In the instant case, the preliminary plat was submitted to
the village for approval but was not recorded in the recorder's
office. Therefore, the plain language of section 20g-4(a)(1) and
section 2 of the Plat Act compel us to agree with the PTAB's
determination that the only time the subject lots were platted
and subdivided in conformity with section 2 of the Plat Act was
when the final plats in which they are located were recorded.
Alternatively, plaintiffs argue that the repeal of section
20a-1 of the Revenue Act of 1939 eliminated the 10-acre threshold
requirement for subdivided farmland. Before its repeal in 1983,
section 20a-1, which established an alternative valuation of
farmland, stated inter alia:
"Real property is used for farming or
agricultural purposes within the meaning of
this Section if it is more than 10 acres in
area and devoted primarily to the raising and
harvesting of crops ***." Ill. Rev. Stat.
1981, ch. 120, par. 501a-1 (repealed by Pub.
Act 83-347 effective Sept. 14, 1983).
It is well-settled that a statute which adopts by specific
reference provisions of another statute is not affected by a
subsequent amendment or repeal of the incorporated statute.
Libertyville v. Continental Illinois National Bank, 187 Ill.
App. 3d 84, 90, 543 N.E.2d 350, 354 (1989). Plaintiffs argue,
without citation to authority, that this rule of statutory
construction should not apply here, because section 20a-1 was
repealed prior to the effective date of section 20g-4 and at no
time did the two sections have a common existence. Section 20a-
1 was repealed effective September 14, 1983, while section 20g-4
became effective September 26, 1983. At a minimum, plaintiffs
contend, this legislative sequence creates an ambiguity, which
must be construed against the government and in favor of the
taxpayer. We disagree. Although section 20a-1 was repealed,
the definition of farmland contained therein survives as
incorporated in 20g-4. The definition is readily ascertainable
and unambiguous. Therefore, the plaintiffs' distinction does
not undermine the application of the rule in this case.
Thus, under either of the criteria of section 20g-4(a)(3),
that the land must be vacant or used for farming or agricultural
purposes as defined in 20a-1, the land must be in excess of 10
acres at the time of such platting. Because the land in neither
of the recorded final plats at issue in this appeal was in excess
of 10 acres, the 13 reassessed lots were not entitled to the
preferential treatment provided by section 20g-4.
Therefore, we conclude that the PTAB's decision was not
erroneous, and the judgment of the trial court upholding the
PTAB's decision must be affirmed.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court
of Grundy County is affirmed.
Affirmed.
BRESLIN and SLATER, JJ., concur.
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