City of Rock Island v. Human Rights Comm'n

July 9, 1998

No. 3--97--0395
(Consolidated with No. 3--97--0560)
_________________________________________________________________

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

THIRD DISTRICT

A.D., 1998

CITY OF ROCK ISLAND, ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
ILLINOIS, ) of the 14th Judicial Circuit,
) Rock Island County, Illinois,
Plaintiff-Appellant, )
)
v. ) No. 96--CH--171
)
ILLINOIS HUMAN RIGHTS )
COMMISSION, and DANA ADAMS, ) Honorable
) Martin E. Conway, Jr.,
Defendants-Appellees. ) Judge, Presiding.
_________________________________________________________________

JUSTICE SLATER delivered the opinion of the court:
_________________________________________________________________

Plaintiff City of Rock Island (City) filed a complaint
against defendants Illinois Human Rights Commission (Commission)
and Dana Adams seeking an order of prohibition and a permanent
injunction to prevent defendants from litigating Adams'
discrimination claim. The circuit court granted the City's
request for a temporary restraining order on January 3, 1997, and
entered a preliminary injunction order on January 21, 1997. On
May 14, 1997, the circuit court dismissed the City's complaint
and terminated the preliminary injunction. The City's subsequent
motion for a stay of the circuit court's order was denied. The
City filed separate appeals from the court's May 14, 1997,
dismissal of its complaint (No. 3--97--0395) and the denial of
its motion for a stay (No. 3--97--0560), which were consolidated
by this court. The primary issue raised on appeal is whether the
jurisdiction of the Human Rights Commission over claims of
discrimination is preempted by a collective bargaining agreement
that includes an anti-discrimination clause and a grievance
procedure culminating in binding arbitration. We believe that
the Commission's jurisdiction is not preempted and we therefore
affirm.
Facts
Defendant Adams was an employee of the City from June of
1979, until February 22, 1995, when he was discharged. Adams was
a member of the bargaining unit represented by the American
Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, Council 31,
AFL-CIO, Local #988 (Union). The collective bargaining agreement
(Agreement) between the Union and the City provided that it would
be administered fairly and without regard to an employee's race,
religion, sex, handicap or political affiliation. The Agreement
also provided for a five-step grievance procedure, with binding
arbitration as the fifth step.
After he was fired, Adams filed a grievance which proceeded
through step four of the grievance procedure. The grievance did
not, however, proceed to the fifth and final step of binding
arbitration, for reasons which are not clear from the record. On
July 6, 1995, Adams filed a charge of discrimination with the
Illinois Department of Human Rights (Department). On December 2,
1996, the Department presented a complaint to the Commission
alleging racial discrimination based on the charge filed by
Adams. Thereafter, the City filed its complaint for an order of
prohibition and an injunction to prohibit the Commission from
proceeding on the complaint. The City claimed that the
Commission was precluded from hearing the claim under the terms
of the Agreement and pursuant to section 8 of the Illinois Public
Labor Relations Act (Act). 5 ILCS 315/8 (West 1996). The
circuit court dismissed plaintiff's complaint, finding that the
Commission could proceed with the complaint because neither Adams
nor the Union requested arbitration.
Analysis
Under Illinois law, for an order of prohibition to be issued
a party must show: (1) that the action sought to be prohibited is
judicial in nature; (2) that the jurisdiction of the tribunal is
inferior to that of the issuing court; (3) that the action sought
to be prohibited is either outside the jurisdiction of the
tribunal, or beyond its legitimate authority; and (4) that the
party seeking the order of prohibition is without an adequate
remedy. Board of Trustees v. Illinois Human Rights Comm'n, 141
Ill. App. 3d 447, 490 N.E.2d 232 (1986). The standard of review
for a denial of injunctive relief based upon questions of law is
de novo. Butler v. USA Volleyball, 285 Ill. App. 3d 578, 673 N.E.2d 1063 (1996).
The crux of this appeal centers around the third
prerequisite for a writ of prohibition--that the action sought to
be prohibited must be outside the jurisdiction of the Commission
or beyond its authority. The City maintains that because the
Agreement addresses racial discrimination, the sole and exclusive
forum for determination of Adams' claim is governed by the
Agreement. The Commission asserts that Adams' rights under the
Agreement are distinct from his statutory rights. Thus, his
claim before the Commission should not be prohibited. We agree
with the Commission.
Section 8 of the Act requires that collective bargaining
agreements contain grievance procedures which provide for binding
arbitration unless mutually agreed otherwise. 5 ILCS 315/8 (West
1996). If a conflict arises between the provisions of the Act
and any other law, "the provisions of [the] Act or any collective
bargaining agreement negotiated thereunder shall prevail and
control." 5 ILCS 315/15(a) (West 1996). In addition, the
Illinois Human Rights Act states that it does not affect the
rights of employees under a collective bargaining agreement. 775
ILCS 5/9-101(A)(2) (West 1996).
The City contends that the Act, when read in conjunction
with the Agreement, mandates arbitration of a public employee's
discrimination claim and deprives the Commission of jurisdiction
over that claim. We disagree.
Section 8 of the Act does not require that all labor
agreements must contain a mandatory arbitration provision.
Instead, that section requires a grievance procedure which
provides for binding arbitration "unless mutually agreed
otherwise." 5 ILCS 315/8 (West 1996). In our opinion, the City
and the Union have "agreed otherwise." The fifth step of the
grievance procedure is described in the Agreement as follows:
"Only a grievance which is a dispute or
difference of opinion raised by an employee
*** covered by this agreement against the
City involving as to him the meaning,
interpretation or application of the express
provisions of this agreement may be referred
to binding arbitration. Grievances which are
not so defined shall be decided by the City
Manager and shall not be referred to binding
arbitration.
An employee may refer an eligible
grievance to binding arbitration by
submitting a written notice to the City
Manager within seven calendar days of receipt
of the City Manager's decision. Only
grievances which have been authorized by
Local #988 shall be referred to binding
arbitration." (Emphasis added.)
As the language emphasized above indicates, an employee is
not required to submit to binding arbitration. Moreover, even if
the employee chooses arbitration, he must secure authorization
from the Union or no arbitration will occur. Such a scheme
clearly does not mandate the arbitration of grievances. If
arbitration is not mandatory, section 15 of the Act, which grants
precedence to the Act and to collective bargaining agreements
over other laws, is irrelevant. That section applies only in
cases of conflict. Since the Agreement does not mandate
arbitration of Adams' claim, it does not conflict with the
Illinois Human Rights Act (775 ILCS 5/1-101 et seq.), which
provides a comprehensive scheme to secure freedom from
discrimination for all individuals within Illinois (Baker v.
Miller, 159 Ill. 2d 249, 636 N.E.2d 551 (1994)).
The City argues, however, that allowing a "two-track" system
whereby an employee can pursue his claim through binding
arbitration and thereafter file a claim with the Department could
lead to inconsistent decisions by the arbitrator and the
Commission. The short answer to the City's argument is that no
arbitration took place here and we will not speculate about
hypothetical conflicts in non-existent cases. Even if such a
case were to arise, however, we believe that any perceived
inconsistency might simply be the result of the difference
between an employee's contractual and statutory rights. In
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 39 L. Ed. 2d 147,
94 S. Ct. 1011 (1974), the Supreme Court held that an employee's
statutory right under title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
(42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq.) to assert a claim of racial
discrimination was not foreclosed by prior submission of his
claim to final arbitration under a nondiscrimination clause of a
collective bargaining agreement. The Court stated:
"In submitting his grievance to
arbitration, an employee seeks to vindicate
his contractual right under a collective-
bargaining agreement. By contrast, in filing
a lawsuit under Title VII, an employee
asserts independent statutory rights accorded
by Congress. The distinctly separate nature
of these contractual and statutory rights is
not vitiated merely because both were
violated as a result of the same factual
occurrence. And certainly no inconsistency
results from permitting both rights to be
enforced in their respectively appropriate
forums. *** [T]he relationship between the
forums is complementary since consideration
of the claim by both forums may promote the
policies underlying each." Alexander, 415 U.S. at 49-51, 39 L. Ed. 2d at 159, 94 S. Ct. at 1020-21.
As in Alexander, in this case Adams has a right to assert a
claim of racial discrimination under the Human Rights Act that is
independent of his contractual rights under the collective
bargaining agreement. To hold otherwise ignores the "distinctly
separate nature" of those rights and would deny Adams a forum to
fully adjudicate either of them. See Moss-American, Inc. v.
Illinois Fair Employment Practices Comm'n., 22 Ill. App. 3d 248,
317 N.E.2d 343 (1974) (relying on Alexander in holding that Fair
Employment Practices Commission was not deprived of jurisdiction
over claim of racial discrimination despite arbitration of
grievance under collective bargaining agreement).
Finally, with regard to the City's concern that Adams would
be getting "a second bite of the apple," we note that the same
argument was raised in Ryherd v. General Cable Co., 124 Ill. 2d 418, 530 N.E.2d 431 (1988). In Ryherd, a union employee filed a
grievance claiming that she had been fired because she had filed
a workers' compensation claim. The grievance was submitted to
arbitration and the arbitrator found in favor of the employer.
The employee then filed a complaint for retaliatory discharge in
the circuit court. In holding that the employee's claim was not
preempted by section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act
(29 U.S.C. 185(a) (1982)), the court stated:
"It is true, in some sense, that an
employee who subsequently litigates his
retaliatory discharge claim is getting a
'second bite of the apple.' But a section
301 grievance and a retaliatory discharge
claim are simply not the same 'apple'; they
are different, and fundamentally unrelated,
claims. And while there is some danger that
a State court will make a factual
determination which conflicts with the
earlier decision of the arbitrator in the
same case, this danger is outweighed by the
need to assure consistency of legal
determinations, both as to retaliatory
discharge claims and as to claims of
discharge in breach of a labor agreement."
(Emphasis in original.) Ryherd, 124 Ill. 2d
at 432, 530 N.E.2d at 438.
Similarly, Adams' claim that he was terminated in violation
of the collective bargaining agreement and his statutory claim of
discrimination under the Human Rights Act are not the "same
apple." This is because the source and nature of each right is
different (see Kraft, Inc., Dairy Group v. City of Peoria, 177
Ill. App. 3d 197, 531 N.E.2d 1106 (1988) (claim of discrimination
has its origins in public policy of Illinois and does not depend
on the existence of a collective bargaining agreement) and
because adjudication of those rights involves separate inquiries
(see Alexander, 415 U.S. at 53, 39 L. Ed. 2d at 161, 94 S. Ct. at
1022 (role of arbitrator is to effectuate intent of parties by
interpreting collective bargaining agreement in accordance with
"industrial common law of the shop"; he has no general authority
to invoke public laws)).
We hold, therefore, that the jurisdiction of the Human
Rights Commission over Adams' claim of discrimination is not
preempted by the collective bargaining agreement or by the Labor
Relations Act. Accordingly, the circuit court's order dismissing
the City's complaint is affirmed. We further find that the
circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying the City's
motion for a stay of judgment. See generally Kaden v. Pucinski,
263 Ill. App. 3d 611, 635 N.E.2d 468 (1994) (decision to deny
stay is reviewed under abuse of discretion standard).
For the reasons stated above, the judgment of the circuit
court is affirmed.
Affirmed.
BRESLIN and HOLDRIDGE, J.J., concur.