Valenti v. Swanson

No. 3--97--0371

_________________________________________________________________

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

THIRD DISTRICT

A.D., 1998

THOMAS P. VALENTI, P.C., ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
) of the 18th Judicial Circuit,
Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Du Page County, Illinois
)
)
v. ) No. 96--AR--71
)
LORRAINE SWANSON and )
ARTHUR SWANSON, ) Honorable
) Richard A. Lucas
Defendants-Appellants. ) Judge, Presiding
_________________________________________________________________

Justice BRESLIN delivered the opinion of the court:
_________________________________________________________________

In this case we are asked to rule that an attorney may not
recover legal fees in a common law action in under a theory of
quantum meruit if he fails to comply with the Personal Injury
Representation Agreement Act (Act), 815 ILCS 640/0.01 et seq.
(West 1996). We disagree that such a holding is required by
Illinois law and thus affirm the trial court's judgement.
FACTS
The facts are relatively undisputed. On October 7, 1994,
Lorraine and Arthur Swanson were involved in an automobile acci-
dent. Four days later, they hired Attorney Valenti to represent
them on a contingent fee basis. Valenti did not provide the
Swansons with a copy of the Act. About eight months later, the
contingent fee agreement was terminated at the Swansons' request.
The Swansons subsequently settled their personal injury claim.
Valenti then filed suit against the Swansons seeking $8,475
(28.25 hours at $300 per hour) in damages under a quantum meruit
theory. Following a hearing, the trial court awarded Valenti
$3,150 (14 hours at $225 per hour) plus court costs. The
Swansons appeal.
BACKGROUND
In Illinois, clients may discharge their attorney at any
time, with or without cause. Warner v. Basten, 118 Ill. App. 2d
419, 255 N.E.2d 72 (1969). In the past, the discharged attorney
was entitled to full contract fees if the dismissal was without
cause. See Town of Mt. Vernon v. Patton, 94 Ill. 65 (1879);
Warner, 118 Ill. App. 2d 419, 255 N.E.2d 72; Miller v. Solomon,
49 Ill. App. 2d 156, 199 N.E.2d 660 (1964). However, awarding
full contract fees to a discharged attorney encouraged the
unseemly practice of "ambulance chasing." Thus, in 1971 in an
effort to curb such unsavory conduct, the legislature passed the
Act. It provides that any agreement for representation in a
personal injury case which is made within five days of the injury
may be avoided by the injured party. 815 ILCS 640/1 (West 1996).
One of the requirements is that the attorney provide the clients
with a copy of the Act at the time the contingent fee agreement
is entered into. 810 ILCS 640/1 (West 1996).
Subsequently, in 1979 our supreme court rejected the old
rule that a discharged attorney is entitled to full contract fees
if the dismissal was without cause. Rhoades v. Norfolk & Western
Railway Co., 78 Ill. 2d 217, 399 N.E.2d 969 (1979). Instead, an
attorney discharged without cause may only be entitled to recov-
ery under the common law a theory of quantum meruit. Rhoades, 78 Ill. 2d at 230, 399 N.E.2d at 975. The Swansons argue that,
regardless, the Act prohibits a noncomplying attorney from recov-
ering not only under the representation agreement, but also under
a by quantum meruit theory.
ANALYSIS
"The common law is a beautiful system; containing the wisdom
and experience of ages." Penny v. Little, 4 Ill. 301, 304 (1841).
It will not be deemed abrogated by statute unless it clearly
appears that such was the legislative intent. Chu v. Bowers, 275
Ill. App. 3d 861, 656 N.E.2d 436 (1995). The only legitimate
function of the courts is to interpret the law as enacted by the
legislature, not to annex new provisions or substitute different
ones. Belfield v. Coop, 8 Ill. 2d 293, 134 N.E.2d 249 (1956).
In construing a statute, it is presumed that the legislature did
not intend unjust, absurd or unreasonable consequences. People v.
Wireman, 181 Ill. App. 3d 385, 536 N.E.2d 1346 (1989). The Act
provides:
"Any person who makes an agreement with
any other person to represent him in his
claim for settlement of a personal injury
claim within 5 days after the occurrence
which gave rise to the claim may, within a 10
day period after the occurrence elect to
avoid the agreement by notifying the other
person in writing of the election by regis-
tered or certified mail, return receipt re-
quested.
The person undertaking the representa-
tion of the injured party by such an agree-
ment must, at the time of the agreement,
furnish the party with whom the agreement is
made [with] a copy of the agreement and the
address to which the notice may be sent and a
copy of this Act, and obtain written acknowl-
edgement of receipt of such from the party
represented. If he fails to do so, the 10
day period provided for in this Act does not
commence to run until the agreement, address
and a copy of this act are furnished." 815
ILCS 640/1 (West 1996).
It is undisputed that under the Act's plain language, the
Swansons were allowed to avoid the agreement because Valenti did
not provide them with a copy of it. However, the Act makes no
reference to quantum meruit recovery and we can glean no intent
to bar such recovery from its language.
Furthermore, we find no intent to bar quantum meruit recov-
ery in the legislative history. The Senate floor debates regard-
ing the Act reveal that it is intended to discourage "ambulance
chasing" by giving the injured person time to consider his
injuries and his options. There is no mention of quantum meruit
in any discussions of the Act. Accordingly, we are unable to say
that there is an express legislative intent to preclude such
recovery.
Additionally, after carefully reviewing the Act and the
attendant policy considerations, we are unable to say that it is
necessary to read a prohibition against quantum meruit recovery
into the Act to avoid absurd results. It is readily apparent
that the purpose of the Act is to shield injured people who
hastily enter into personal injury representation agreements
without due consideration of all the relevant facts. But pre-
cluding attorneys from recovering fees for legal services provid-
ed within the first 10 days of an injury, a time period in which
sound legal advice may be extremely important, would discourage
attorneys from providing such services. This result would be
contrary to the spirit of the Act.
The Swansons argue that allowing quantum meruit recovery
would encourage attorneys to delay giving notice of the Act until
such time as the attorney's potential recovery under quantum
meruit makes a client's election to avoid the agreement finan-
cially punitive. Such a circumstance is not likely. There are
strong financial incentives for attorneys to comply with the Act
because noncompliance would limit them to quantum meruit recovery
rather than full recovery. Additionally, the trial courts will
carefully scrutinize such claims with the view that quantum
meruit recovery is equitable in nature and is limited to the
reasonable value of the services provided. That is exactly what
the trial court did in this case.
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, we hold that quantum merit recovery may
be attained even though the attorney failed to comply with the
requirements of the Act. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of
the circuit court of Du Page County.
Affirmed.
MC CUSKEY, P.J., and SLATER, J., concur.