People v. Stenson
Annotate this Case
April 17, 1998
No. 3--96--0875
_________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
THIRD DISTRICT
A.D., 1998
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
OF ILLINOIS, ) of the 10th Judicial Circuit,
) Peoria County, Illinois
Plaintiff-Appellee, )
)
v. ) No. 88--CF--111
)
CAESAR STENSON, ) Honorable
) Robert Manning
Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, Presiding
_________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE LYTTON delivered the opinion of the court:
_________________________________________________________________
After a jury trial, defendant, Caesar Stenson, was found
guilty of burglary (720 ILCS 5/19--1 (West 1996)). On December 2,
1988, the circuit court entered judgment on the jury verdict and
sentenced defendant to a 10-year prison term. We affirm.
On August 2, 1996, defendant filed a pro se petition for
relief under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act) (725 ILCS 5/122-
-1 et seq. (West 1996)). Along with his petition, defendant filed
a supporting affidavit. In the affidavit, defendant states that
the delay in filing was attributable to his reliance on inmate law
clerks, who advised him that under the Act, he had 10 years from
the date of his conviction to file a petition. The circuit court
sua sponte dismissed defendant's petition on the ground that it had
not been filed within the time prescribed by law. On appeal,
defendant contends the circuit court erred in dismissing his
petition as untimely and in failing to consider his averments
related to the delay in filing his petition.
The Act provides a three-stage process for adjudication of
post-conviction petitions: (1) in the first stage the trial court,
within 90 days after the filing and docketing of the petition, is
required to determine whether the petition is frivolous or patently
without merit, in which case it is dismissed; (2) if the petition
is not dismissed during the first stage, it moves to the second
stage where the court shall appoint counsel if requested by an
indigent defendant, counsel may amend the petition, and the State
may file a motion to dismiss the petition; and (3) during the third
and final stage, if the petition survives the second stage
proceedings, the court conducts an evidentiary hearing and
considers the petition on the merits. 725 ILCS 5/122--1 et. seq.
(West 1996); see People v. Lemons, 242 Ill. App. 3d 941, 613 N.E.2d 1234 (1993).
Defendant does not dispute he filed his post-conviction
petition outside the limitations period found in section 122--1(c)
of the Act. 725 ILCS 5/122--1(c) (West 1996). Defendant contends,
however, that this limitations period is a procedural, not a juris-
dictional, bar to the petition. If the limitation is procedural,
section 122--1(c) should not have been invoked at the first stage
of the adjudicatory process under section 122--2.1 of the Act. 725
ILCS 5/122--2.1 (West 1996). Instead, he argues that only a proper
motion to dismiss by the State at the second stage of the process
would be appropriate. 725 ILCS 5/122--5 (West 1996).
A statute of limitations fixes the time within which a remedy
for a particular wrong may be sought. Such a limitations period is
an affirmative defense that may be waived by the parties and may be
rebutted by a plea of estoppel. Eschbaugh v. Industrial Commis-
sion, 286 Ill. App. 3d 963, 677 N.E.2d 438 (1996). On the other
hand, where a statute creates a substantive right unknown at common
law and provides the time within which the action must be com-
menced, failure to commence the action within the prescribed period
is a jurisdictional bar to relief. Fredman Brothers Furniture Co.
v. Department of Revenue, 109 Ill. 2d 202, 486 N.E.2d 893 (1985).
Subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived, stipulated to, or
consented to by the parties. The lack of subject matter jurisdic-
tion may be raised at any time, in any court, directly or collater-
ally, by the parties or on the court's own motion. Eschbaugh, 286
Ill. App. 3d 963, 677 N.E.2d 438.
In People v. Heirens, 271 Ill. App. 3d 392, 648 N.E.2d 260
(1995), the court held that a defendant's failure to file a
petition within the limitations period prescribed in the Act is a
jurisdictional bar to his or her action. While defendant concedes
that Heirens apparently contradicts his position, he contends the
court's reference to the limitations period as a "procedural bar"
at two points in its discussion renders the court's holding
"diminished" and "clouded." These references, however, lie within
a larger discussion of the Act's waiver of claims provision,
laches, the doctrine of res judicata as well as the Act's time
limitations period. Heirens, 271 Ill. App. 3d at 400-402, 648 N.E.2d at 266-67. The court stated unequivocally that "[the
limitations period] is jurisdictional and cannot cure defendant's
failure to comply with its terms." Heirens, 271 Ill. App. 3d at
402, 648 N.E.2d at 267. Thus, the time limitations of the Act
directly affects the subject matter jurisdiction of the circuit
court. Accordingly, the trial judge properly dismissed the
petition at the first stage of the post-conviction process.
Defendant also contends the circuit court erred by failing to
consider his explanation for the delay in filing his petition.
Section 122--1(c) allows the defendant to escape the effect of his
late filing if he presents facts in the petition which show that
the delay was not due to the defendant's culpable negligence 725
ILCS 5/122--1(c). The record does not contain a finding by the
circuit court concerning defendant's explanation. Although defen-
dant points to the circuit court's silence in support of his claim,
a presumption of regularity attaches to trial court proceedings in
the absence of error demonstrated in the record. People v. Majer,
131 Ill. App. 3d 80, 475 N.E.2d 269 (1985). Although it is
advisable for the trial court to state its reasons for dismissal,
it is not mandatory. People v. Porter, 122 Ill. 2d 64, 82, 521 N.E.2d 1158, 1165 (1988). The issue on appeal is the correctness
of the trial court's ruling, rather than the validity of its ratio-
nale. People v. Paarlberg, 243 Ill. App. 3d 731, 612 N.E.2d 106
(1993).
Here, defendant alleges that he received advice from inmate
law clerks that he had ten years to file his petition. Even if
these statements concerning the delay in filing his petition are
true (People v. Caballero, 126 Ill. 2d 248, 533 N.E.2d 1089
(1989)), they are insufficient to show a lack of culpable negli-
gence. See People v. Lee, 292 Ill. App. 3d 941, 688 N.E.2d 673
(1997) (affidavit alleging defendant was misinformed by appellate
counsel as to limitations period for post-conviction petition did
not show lack of culpable negligence).
The judgment of the circuit court of Peoria County is
affirmed.
Affirmed.
McCUSKEY and SLATER, JJ., concur.
No. 3--96--0875
_________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
THIRD DISTRICT
A.D., 1998
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
OF ILLINOIS, ) of the 10th Judicial Circuit,
) Peoria County, Illinois
Plaintiff-Appellee, )
)
v. ) No. 88--CF--111
)
CAESAR STENSON, ) Honorable
) Robert Manning
Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, Presiding
_________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE LYTTON delivered the opinion of the court:
_________________________________________________________________
After a jury trial, defendant, Caesar Stenson, was found
guilty of burglary (720 ILCS 5/19--1 (West 1996)). On December 2,
1988, the circuit court entered judgment on the jury verdict and
sentenced defendant to a 10-year prison term. We affirm.
On August 2, 1996, defendant filed a pro se petition for
relief under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act) (725 ILCS 5/122-
-1 et seq. (West 1996)). Along with his petition, defendant filed
a supporting affidavit. In the affidavit, defendant states that
the delay in filing was attributable to his reliance on inmate law
clerks, who advised him that under the Act, he had 10 years from
the date of his conviction to file a petition. The circuit court
sua sponte dismissed defendant's petition on the ground that it had
not been filed within the time prescribed by law. On appeal,
defendant contends the circuit court erred in dismissing his
petition as untimely and in failing to consider his averments
related to the delay in filing his petition.
The Act provides a three-stage process for adjudication of
post-conviction petitions: (1) in the first stage the trial court,
within 90 days after the filing and docketing of the petition, is
required to determine whether the petition is frivolous or patently
without merit, in which case it is dismissed; (2) if the petition
is not dismissed during the first stage, it moves to the second
stage where the court shall appoint counsel if requested by an
indigent defendant, counsel may amend the petition, and the State
may file a motion to dismiss the petition; and (3) during the third
and final stage, if the petition survives the second stage
proceedings, the court conducts an evidentiary hearing and
considers the petition on the merits. 725 ILCS 5/122--1 et. seq.
(West 1996); see People v. Lemons, 242 Ill. App. 3d 941, 613 N.E.2d 1234 (1993).
Defendant does not dispute he filed his post-conviction
petition outside the limitations period found in section 122--1(c)
of the Act. 725 ILCS 5/122--1(c) (West 1996). Defendant contends,
however, that this limitations period is a procedural, not a juris-
dictional, bar to the petition. If the limitation is procedural,
section 122--1(c) should not have been invoked at the first stage
of the adjudicatory process under section 122--2.1 of the Act. 725
ILCS 5/122--2.1 (West 1996). Instead, he argues that only a proper
motion to dismiss by the State at the second stage of the process
would be appropriate. 725 ILCS 5/122--5 (West 1996).
A statute of limitations fixes the time within which a remedy
for a particular wrong may be sought. Such a limitations period is
an affirmative defense that may be waived by the parties and may be
rebutted by a plea of estoppel. Eschbaugh v. Industrial Commis-
sion, 286 Ill. App. 3d 963, 677 N.E.2d 438 (1996). On the other
hand, where a statute creates a substantive right unknown at common
law and provides the time within which the action must be com-
menced, failure to commence the action within the prescribed period
is a jurisdictional bar to relief. Fredman Brothers Furniture Co.
v. Department of Revenue, 109 Ill. 2d 202, 486 N.E.2d 893 (1985).
Subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived, stipulated to, or
consented to by the parties. The lack of subject matter jurisdic-
tion may be raised at any time, in any court, directly or collater-
ally, by the parties or on the court's own motion. Eschbaugh, 286
Ill. App. 3d 963, 677 N.E.2d 438.
In People v. Heirens, 271 Ill. App. 3d 392, 648 N.E.2d 260
(1995), the court held that a defendant's failure to file a
petition within the limitations period prescribed in the Act is a
jurisdictional bar to his or her action. While defendant concedes
that Heirens apparently contradicts his position, he contends the
court's reference to the limitations period as a "procedural bar"
at two points in its discussion renders the court's holding
"diminished" and "clouded." These references, however, lie within
a larger discussion of the Act's waiver of claims provision,
laches, the doctrine of res judicata as well as the Act's time
limitations period. Heirens, 271 Ill. App. 3d at 400-402, 648 N.E.2d at 266-67. The court stated unequivocally that "[the
limitations period] is jurisdictional and cannot cure defendant's
failure to comply with its terms." Heirens, 271 Ill. App. 3d at
402, 648 N.E.2d at 267. Thus, the time limitations of the Act
directly affects the subject matter jurisdiction of the circuit
court. Accordingly, the trial judge properly dismissed the
petition at the first stage of the post-conviction process.
Defendant also contends the circuit court erred by failing to
consider his explanation for the delay in filing his petition.
Section 122--1(c) allows the defendant to escape the effect of his
late filing if he presents facts in the petition which show that
the delay was not due to the defendant's culpable negligence 725
ILCS 5/122--1(c). The record does not contain a finding by the
circuit court concerning defendant's explanation. Although defen-
dant points to the circuit court's silence in support of his claim,
a presumption of regularity attaches to trial court proceedings in
the absence of error demonstrated in the record. People v. Majer,
131 Ill. App. 3d 80, 475 N.E.2d 269 (1985). Although it is
advisable for the trial court to state its reasons for dismissal,
it is not mandatory. People v. Porter, 122 Ill. 2d 64, 82, 521 N.E.2d 1158, 1165 (1988). The issue on appeal is the correctness
of the trial court's ruling, rather than the validity of its ratio-
nale. People v. Paarlberg, 243 Ill. App. 3d 731, 612 N.E.2d 106
(1993).
Here, defendant alleges that he received advice from inmate
law clerks that he had ten years to file his petition. Even if
these statements concerning the delay in filing his petition are
true (People v. Caballero, 126 Ill. 2d 248, 533 N.E.2d 1089
(1989)), they are insufficient to show a lack of culpable negli-
gence. See People v. Lee, 292 Ill. App. 3d 941, 688 N.E.2d 673
(1997) (affidavit alleging defendant was misinformed by appellate
counsel as to limitations period for post-conviction petition did
not show lack of culpable negligence).
The judgment of the circuit court of Peoria County is
affirmed.
Affirmed.
McCUSKEY and SLATER, JJ., concur.
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