People v. Watford
Annotate this Case
No. 3-96-0315
_________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
THIRD DISTRICT
A.D., 1998
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ) Appeal from the Circuit
ILLINOIS, ) Court of the 21st Judicial
) Circuit, Kankakee County,
Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Illinois
)
v. ) No. 95-CF-556
)
JASON L. WATFORD, )
) Honorable
Defendant-Appellant. ) Gordon L. Lustfeldt
) Judge, Presiding
MODIFIED OPINION UPON DENIAL OF PETITION FOR REHEARING
JUSTICE HOLDRIDGE DELIVERED THE OPINION OF THE COURT
After a bench trial, defendant, Jason Watford, was convicted
of attempted first degree murder, aggravated battery with a fire
arm, and unlawful use of a weapon. He was sentenced to a term of
10 years of imprisonment for attempted first degree murder, and a
concurrent 3 year term for the offence of unlawful use of a
weapon. At sentencing, the trial judge informed the public that
the defendant must serve 85% of the sentence imposed, pursuant to
certain provisions of the recently enacted Public Act 89-404
(referred to in part as the Truth-in-Sentencing Act). The
defendant maintains on appeal that his sentence is void as
Public Act 89-404 was unconstitutional. We affirm the
defendant's sentence.
Specifically, the defendant contends that Public Act 89-404,
in which the "truth-in-sentencing" provisions were enacted by the
legislature, violated the single subject rule of Article IV,
section 8(d) of the Illinois Constitution of 1970. Thus, he
argues that his sentence is void and he asks this court to order
that he receive day for day good time credit as provided by
section 3-6-3 of the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/3-6-
3 (Michie 1994)), prior to it being amended by Public Act 89-404.
The People maintain, however, that the defendant cannot
appeal this issue in conjunction with the direct appeal and
sentence because the application of the truth-in-sentencing
legislation is not a condition of his sentence. The People
further maintain that the defendant must seek relief of the
nature he seeks from this court by filing a habeas corpus
petition or a mandamus action directed at the Illinois Department
of Corrections. We agree with the People, and thus affirm
defendant's sentence.
The truth-in-sentencing law referred to by the defendant is
a change in the statutory method by which the Department of
Corrections calculates and awards "good-time" credit to inmates
remanded to its custody. A review of the plain language of
section 3-6-3(a)(1) of the Unified Code of Corrections, states
that "[t]he Department of Corrections shall prescribe rules and
regulations for the early release on account of good conduct of
persons committed to the Department which shall be subject to
review by the Prison Review Board." 730 ILCS 5/3-6-3(a)(1)
(Michie 1994). Therefore, the application of "good-time" credit
is a condition of an inmate's continued incarceration, and is not
intended to be a condition of the defendant's sentence.
Further support for our conclusion is found in the statutory
requirements regarding sentencing hearings, set forth in section
5-4-1 of the Unified Code of Corrections. 730 ILCS 5/5-4-1
(Michie 1994). Public Act 89-404 amended the Code to require a
sentencing judge to inform the public at the time of sentencing
of the anticipated term of years that a defendant will serve with
the application of "good-time" credit, and whether that credit be
day for day credit or the 85 percent rule. This statement was
made by the trial judge in the matter at hand. However, the
statement by the sentencing judge, according to the statute, "has
no legal effect on the defendant's actual release and may not be
relied upon by the defendant upon appeal." 730 ILCS 5/5-4-1(c-2)
(Michie 1994). It is clear from the statute that the application
of "good time" credit is not ordered by the trial judge, and thus
the defendant cannot challenge the constitutionality of the act
codifying the truth-in-sentencing law in a direct appeal of his
sentence as that law has no legal effect on the sentencing
proceeding.
Additional indication of the fact that the truth-in-
sentencing provisions are not a condition of sentencing is found
in the statutory provision read to the public by the judge that
"[t]he actual period of prison time served is determined by the
statutes of Illinois as applied to this sentence by the Illinois
Department of Corrections and the Illinois Prison Review Board."
730 ILCS 5/5-4-1(c-2)(Michie 1994).
Based upon the clear statutory language discussed above, we
hold that the defendant cannot challenge the constitutionality of
the act codifying the truth-in-sentencing laws in a direct appeal
as the application of these laws is a matter outside the scope of
the sentencing proceedings. In order to challenge the
application of "good time" credit by the Department of
Corrections, the defendant must file either a habeas corpus
petition, a petition for writ of mandamus, or an action for
declaratory judgment directed at the Department of Corrections,
alleging that the Department is improperly calculating his "good
time" credit by implementing an unconstitutional statute when
determining the time he has remaining to serve before his
release.
Defendant cites to several cases wherein the trial court
considers credit for time served when determining sentence. We
find each case to be distinguishable for the case at hand. In
People v. Russell, 237 Ill. App. 3d 310 (1992), the trial court
stated as a condition of a six month sentence for indirect
criminal contempt that the defendant would receive no credit for
"good time" under the County Jail Good Behavior Allowance Act
(County Jail Act) (730 ILCS 130/3 (Michie 1994)), even though the
defendant was entitled to the credit under the County Jail Act.
Similarly, in People v. Bailey, 235 Ill. App. 3d 1 (1992), the
trial court added as a condition of sentence for indirect
criminal contempt that the defendant not be given credit under
the County Jail Act. In both Russell and Bailey, the appellate
court reversed, holding that the trial court had no authority to
countermand the statutory provision for "good time" credit under
the County Jail Act. Russell, 237 Ill. App. 3d at 315; Bailey,
235 Ill. App. 3d at 4-5. Thus in Russell and Bailey, unlike the
instant matter, the defendants appealed the action of the trial
judge in making denial of good time credit a condition of the
sentence. Here no such condition of sentence is present.
Other cases cited by the defendant, including People v.
Johnson, 23 Ill. App. 3d 886 (1974), People v. Watts, 195 Ill.
App. 3d 899 (1990), and Moore v. Strayhorn, 114 Ill. 2d 538
(1986), each address the issue of the trial court improperly
crediting for time served in pre-trial and presentence custody.
Again, unlike the instant matter, appeal involved an order of the
trial court making denial of credit for time served a condition
of the sentence.
For the foregoing reasons, the sentence imposed on the
defendant by the circuit court of Kankakee County is affirmed.
Affirmed.
McCUSKEY, J., concurs.
LYTTON, J., dissents.
JUSTICE LYTTON dissenting:
I dissent from the majority's refusal to address the merits of
this appeal. The majority correctly concludes that the defendant
can file a habeas corpus petition, petition for writ of mandamus or
an action for declaratory judgment in order to challenge the
validity of the Public Act 89-404 (Act); however, the majority
fails to cite any authority that holds that these are the only
avenues for mounting such a challenge. The majority attempts to
distinguish "condition of incarceration" from "condition of
sentence," yet the appellate court has considered a similar issue
on direct appeal. People v. Burton, 100 Ill. App. 3d 1021 (1981)
(what "good time" credit should apply to a defendant's sentence).
Whether or not the Act is constitutional, the majority's
decision will cause unnecessary delays in the resolution of this
question. Under the majority's decision, thousands of defendants,
subject to different sentences, scattered in prisons throughout the
state, could challenge the Act. The prospect of needless and
costly piecemeal litigation will only serve to hinder the effective
administration of justice. On the other hand, a decision today on
the constitutionality of the Act would apply uniformly to all
prisoners affected by its reach. Both the Department of
Corrections and its inmates would benefit from an early and
conclusive determination of the constitutional issue presented in
this case.
_________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
THIRD DISTRICT
A.D., 1998
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ) Appeal from the Circuit
ILLINOIS, ) Court of the 21st Judicial
) Circuit, Kankakee County,
Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Illinois
)
v. ) No. 95-CF-556
)
JASON L. WATFORD, )
) Honorable
Defendant-Appellant. ) Gordon L. Lustfeldt
) Judge, Presiding
MODIFIED OPINION UPON DENIAL OF PETITION FOR REHEARING
JUSTICE HOLDRIDGE DELIVERED THE OPINION OF THE COURT
After a bench trial, defendant, Jason Watford, was convicted
of attempted first degree murder, aggravated battery with a fire
arm, and unlawful use of a weapon. He was sentenced to a term of
10 years of imprisonment for attempted first degree murder, and a
concurrent 3 year term for the offence of unlawful use of a
weapon. At sentencing, the trial judge informed the public that
the defendant must serve 85% of the sentence imposed, pursuant to
certain provisions of the recently enacted Public Act 89-404
(referred to in part as the Truth-in-Sentencing Act). The
defendant maintains on appeal that his sentence is void as
Public Act 89-404 was unconstitutional. We affirm the
defendant's sentence.
Specifically, the defendant contends that Public Act 89-404,
in which the "truth-in-sentencing" provisions were enacted by the
legislature, violated the single subject rule of Article IV,
section 8(d) of the Illinois Constitution of 1970. Thus, he
argues that his sentence is void and he asks this court to order
that he receive day for day good time credit as provided by
section 3-6-3 of the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/3-6-
3 (Michie 1994)), prior to it being amended by Public Act 89-404.
The People maintain, however, that the defendant cannot
appeal this issue in conjunction with the direct appeal and
sentence because the application of the truth-in-sentencing
legislation is not a condition of his sentence. The People
further maintain that the defendant must seek relief of the
nature he seeks from this court by filing a habeas corpus
petition or a mandamus action directed at the Illinois Department
of Corrections. We agree with the People, and thus affirm
defendant's sentence.
The truth-in-sentencing law referred to by the defendant is
a change in the statutory method by which the Department of
Corrections calculates and awards "good-time" credit to inmates
remanded to its custody. A review of the plain language of
section 3-6-3(a)(1) of the Unified Code of Corrections, states
that "[t]he Department of Corrections shall prescribe rules and
regulations for the early release on account of good conduct of
persons committed to the Department which shall be subject to
review by the Prison Review Board." 730 ILCS 5/3-6-3(a)(1)
(Michie 1994). Therefore, the application of "good-time" credit
is a condition of an inmate's continued incarceration, and is not
intended to be a condition of the defendant's sentence.
Further support for our conclusion is found in the statutory
requirements regarding sentencing hearings, set forth in section
5-4-1 of the Unified Code of Corrections. 730 ILCS 5/5-4-1
(Michie 1994). Public Act 89-404 amended the Code to require a
sentencing judge to inform the public at the time of sentencing
of the anticipated term of years that a defendant will serve with
the application of "good-time" credit, and whether that credit be
day for day credit or the 85 percent rule. This statement was
made by the trial judge in the matter at hand. However, the
statement by the sentencing judge, according to the statute, "has
no legal effect on the defendant's actual release and may not be
relied upon by the defendant upon appeal." 730 ILCS 5/5-4-1(c-2)
(Michie 1994). It is clear from the statute that the application
of "good time" credit is not ordered by the trial judge, and thus
the defendant cannot challenge the constitutionality of the act
codifying the truth-in-sentencing law in a direct appeal of his
sentence as that law has no legal effect on the sentencing
proceeding.
Additional indication of the fact that the truth-in-
sentencing provisions are not a condition of sentencing is found
in the statutory provision read to the public by the judge that
"[t]he actual period of prison time served is determined by the
statutes of Illinois as applied to this sentence by the Illinois
Department of Corrections and the Illinois Prison Review Board."
730 ILCS 5/5-4-1(c-2)(Michie 1994).
Based upon the clear statutory language discussed above, we
hold that the defendant cannot challenge the constitutionality of
the act codifying the truth-in-sentencing laws in a direct appeal
as the application of these laws is a matter outside the scope of
the sentencing proceedings. In order to challenge the
application of "good time" credit by the Department of
Corrections, the defendant must file either a habeas corpus
petition, a petition for writ of mandamus, or an action for
declaratory judgment directed at the Department of Corrections,
alleging that the Department is improperly calculating his "good
time" credit by implementing an unconstitutional statute when
determining the time he has remaining to serve before his
release.
Defendant cites to several cases wherein the trial court
considers credit for time served when determining sentence. We
find each case to be distinguishable for the case at hand. In
People v. Russell, 237 Ill. App. 3d 310 (1992), the trial court
stated as a condition of a six month sentence for indirect
criminal contempt that the defendant would receive no credit for
"good time" under the County Jail Good Behavior Allowance Act
(County Jail Act) (730 ILCS 130/3 (Michie 1994)), even though the
defendant was entitled to the credit under the County Jail Act.
Similarly, in People v. Bailey, 235 Ill. App. 3d 1 (1992), the
trial court added as a condition of sentence for indirect
criminal contempt that the defendant not be given credit under
the County Jail Act. In both Russell and Bailey, the appellate
court reversed, holding that the trial court had no authority to
countermand the statutory provision for "good time" credit under
the County Jail Act. Russell, 237 Ill. App. 3d at 315; Bailey,
235 Ill. App. 3d at 4-5. Thus in Russell and Bailey, unlike the
instant matter, the defendants appealed the action of the trial
judge in making denial of good time credit a condition of the
sentence. Here no such condition of sentence is present.
Other cases cited by the defendant, including People v.
Johnson, 23 Ill. App. 3d 886 (1974), People v. Watts, 195 Ill.
App. 3d 899 (1990), and Moore v. Strayhorn, 114 Ill. 2d 538
(1986), each address the issue of the trial court improperly
crediting for time served in pre-trial and presentence custody.
Again, unlike the instant matter, appeal involved an order of the
trial court making denial of credit for time served a condition
of the sentence.
For the foregoing reasons, the sentence imposed on the
defendant by the circuit court of Kankakee County is affirmed.
Affirmed.
McCUSKEY, J., concurs.
LYTTON, J., dissents.
JUSTICE LYTTON dissenting:
I dissent from the majority's refusal to address the merits of
this appeal. The majority correctly concludes that the defendant
can file a habeas corpus petition, petition for writ of mandamus or
an action for declaratory judgment in order to challenge the
validity of the Public Act 89-404 (Act); however, the majority
fails to cite any authority that holds that these are the only
avenues for mounting such a challenge. The majority attempts to
distinguish "condition of incarceration" from "condition of
sentence," yet the appellate court has considered a similar issue
on direct appeal. People v. Burton, 100 Ill. App. 3d 1021 (1981)
(what "good time" credit should apply to a defendant's sentence).
Whether or not the Act is constitutional, the majority's
decision will cause unnecessary delays in the resolution of this
question. Under the majority's decision, thousands of defendants,
subject to different sentences, scattered in prisons throughout the
state, could challenge the Act. The prospect of needless and
costly piecemeal litigation will only serve to hinder the effective
administration of justice. On the other hand, a decision today on
the constitutionality of the Act would apply uniformly to all
prisoners affected by its reach. Both the Department of
Corrections and its inmates would benefit from an early and
conclusive determination of the constitutional issue presented in
this case.
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