People v. Davis
Annotate this Case
No. 2--97--0946
_________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
THIRD DISTRICT
A.D., 1998
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
ILLINOIS, ) of the 14th Judicial Circuit,
) Whiteside County, Illinois,
Plaintiff-Appellant, )
)
v. ) No. 97--DT--24
)
ANTHONY T. DAVIS, ) Honorable
) John L. Hauptman,
Defendant-Appellee. ) Judge, Presiding.
_________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE SLATER delivered the opinion of the court:
_________________________________________________________________
This case presents a single issue: whether the results of a
preliminary breath screening test (PBT) obtained pursuant to
section 11-501.5 of the Illinois Vehicle Code (Code) (625 ILCS
5/11-501.5 (West 1996)) are admissible by the State at a hearing
on defendant's motion to suppress evidence and quash his arrest
for driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI) (625 ILCS 5/11-
501 (West 1996))? We hold that such results are admissible.
Facts
On January 22, 1997, a van driven by defendant Anthony T.
Davis was stopped by officer Thomas Hochbaum of the Fulton police
department because of an equipment violation. According to
Hochbaum, the defendant's eyes were bloodshot, his breath smelled
of alcohol and he admitted that he had "had a few." Hochbaum
administered three field sobriety tests which, in Hochbaum's
opinion, the defendant either failed or failed to complete.
Defendant also failed a PBT. After the defendant was arrested
for DUI, he submitted to a breathalyzer examination which showed
a blood alcohol concentration of 0.15.
Defendant subsequently filed a petition to rescind his
statutory summary suspension in which he argued, inter alia, that
officer Hochbaum did not have reasonable grounds to believe that
defendant was under the influence of alcohol. At the hearing on
the motion, the State sought to introduce the fact that defendant
had failed the PBT. However, defendant's objection on the basis
of lack of foundation was sustained. The trial court later
granted defendant's rescission motion. The State did not appeal
from that decision and it is not at issue here.
Thereafter, defendant filed a motion to quash arrest and
suppress evidence, contending that officer Hochbaum did not have
probable cause to arrest him and that the results of the
breathalyzer test should be suppressed. At the hearing on the
motion, the parties stipulated that the evidence presented at the
recision hearing would be admitted and considered as evidence on
the motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence. In addition,
the State introduced Illinois Department of Public Health
regulations which listed the type of instrument used by officer
Hochbaum as an approved PBT device. Officer Hochbaum testified
that he requested a breath sample from the defendant prior to
arrest to help him determine whether or not the defendant was
under the influence of alcohol.
The trial court found that, although the State had
established a sufficient foundation, the results of the PBT were
nevertheless inadmissible. The court ruled that the language of
section 11-501.5 did not authorize use of the results of a PBT to
determine whether probable cause existed. The court also noted
that while section 11-501.5 expressly allows a defendant to use
the results of a PBT in any administrative or court proceeding,
no similar authorization is given to the State. Because this
additional evidence was ruled inadmissible, the court found that
officer Hochbaum did not have probable cause to arrest the
defendant and the defendant's motion was granted. On appeal, the
sole issue raised by the State is whether the trial court erred
in ruling that the results of the PBT were inadmissible.
Analysis
The primary rule of statutory construction, to which all
other rules are subordinate, is to ascertain and give effect to
the intent of the legislature. People ex rel. Baker v. Cowlin,
154 Ill. 2d 193, 607 N.E.2d 1251 (1992). The most reliable
indicator of legislative intent is the language of the statute
(People v. Tucker, 167 Ill. 2d 431, 657 N.E.2d 1009 (1995)), and
any inquiry should begin with that language (People v. Zaremba,
158 Ill. 2d 36, 630 N.E.2d 797 (1994); Baker, 154 Ill. 2d 193,
607 N.E.2d 1251). Where the statutory language is clear, it will
be given effect without relying on other aids for construction.
Where the language is ambiguous, however, it is appropriate to
consider the legislative history. Zaremba, 158 Ill. 2d 36, 630 N.E.2d 797; Baker, 154 Ill. 2d 193, 607 N.E.2d 1251. In
addition, a court should consider the reason and necessity for
the law, the evils it was intended to remedy and the objects and
purposes to be obtained. Tucker 167 Ill. 2d 431, 657 N.E.2d 1009; People v. Garrett, 136 Ill. 2d 318, 555 N.E.2d 353 (1990).
Statutory construction is a question of law to be decided by the
reviewing court independent of, and without deference to, the
judgment of the trial court. Advincula v. United Blood Services,
176 Ill. 2d 1, 678 N.E.2d 1009 (1996).
Section 11-501.5 of the Code states:
"Preliminary Breath Screening Test. If
a law enforcement officer has reasonable
suspicion to believe that a person is
violating or has violated Section 11-501 or a
similar provision of a local ordinance, the
officer, prior to an arrest, may request the
person to provide a sample of his or her
breath for a preliminary breath screening
test using a portable device approved by the
Department of Public Health. The results of
this preliminary breath screening test may be
used by the law enforcement officer for the
purpose of assisting with the determination
of whether to require a chemical test as
authorized under Sections 11-501.1 and 11-
501.2, and the appropriate type of test to
request. Any chemical test authorized under
Section 11-501.1 and 11-501.2 may be
requested by the officer regardless of the
result of the preliminary breath screening
test, if probable cause for an arrest exists.
The result of a preliminary breath screening
test may be used by the defendant as evidence
in any administrative or court proceeding
involving a violation of Section 11-501 or
11-501.1." 625 ILCS 5/11-501.5 (West 1996).
We first consider whether the language of the statute is
reasonably clear or whether some ambiguity exists. Section 11-
501.5 provides that a police officer who reasonably suspects that
a person is DUI may request that person to submit to a PBT. The
results of the PBT may be used by the officer to assist in
determining "whether to require a chemical test as authorized
under Sections 11-501.1 [statutory summary suspension; implied
consent] and 11-501.2 [concerning admissibility of chemical test
results in DUI prosecutions], and the appropriate type of test to
request." 625 ILCS 5/11-501.5 (West 1996). The defendant
maintains that this language limits use of PBT results to the
purposes expressed in the statute and does not permit their use
for any other purpose. The State contends, however, that since
the chemical tests authorized under sections 11-501.1 and 11-
501.2 require a determination by the officer of probable cause to
arrest for DUI, the purpose of section 11-501.5 is to assist the
officer in making the probable cause determination. In that
case, the State argues, the PBT results are necessarily
admissible in a proceeding challenging the existence of probable
cause.
"A statute is ambiguous when it is capable of being
understood by reasonably well-informed persons in two or more
different senses, thus warranting the consideration of other
sources to ascertain the legislative intent." Advincula, 176 Ill. 2d at 18, 678 N.E.2d at 1018. We find that section 11-501.5
is ambiguous concerning the purpose of a PBT and whether the
results of a PBT may be used by the State to establish probable
cause. Faced with this ambiguity, we consider the legislative
history of the statute.
Representative Matijevich, the House sponsor of Senate Bill
1283, which became section 11-501.5, stated on the floor of the
House that PBTs would be particularly helpful in rural areas
where police officers might have to transport a DUI suspect long
distances to an evidentiary test site. When asked whether the
test results were admissible in court, Matijevich responded that
a defendant could use the results in court or at an
administrative hearing. He was then asked, "Can the prosecution
use them in court?" and he answered, "Yes." (85th Ill. Gen.
Assem., House Proceedings, June 26, 1987, at 397 (statements of
Representative Matijevich and Young).
Section 11-501.5, as it was originally enacted, required a
police officer to have probable cause to believe that a person
was DUI before administering a PBT. This was changed to the
current requirement of reasonable suspicion by House Bill 2294,
which according to Representative Parke's statement on the House
floor, placed the PBT "in its intended place in the DUI arrest
process. These tests are used to develop probable cause for the
arrest ***." (Emphasis added.) 88th Ill. Gen. Assem., House
Proceedings, April 20, 1993, at 22 (statement of Representative
Parke).
While the comments by Representatives Matijevich and Parke
do not provide a definitive explanation of the "reason and
necessity for the law, the evils to be remedied, and the objects
and purposes to be obtained" (Garrett, 136 Ill. 2d at 329, 555
N.E.2d at 358), they are sufficiently indicative of legislative
intent to resolve the issue presented here. We believe that the
primary purpose of section 11-501.5 is, as the State suggests, to
aid police officers in determining the existence of probable
cause to arrest. This is evident from Representative Parke's
statement concerning the amendment to section 11-501.5. That
amendment lowered the threshold requirement for a PBT from
probable cause to reasonable suspicion, thereby allowing it to be
used as an investigative tool, similar to field sobriety tests.
Our conclusion in this regard is consistent with that of the
court in People v. Rose, 268 Ill. App. 3d 174, 180, 643 N.E.2d 865, 869-70 (1994):
"Based on legislative remarks concerning
section 11-501.5, it seems its primary
purpose is to aid police officers in
assessing probable cause to arrest. ***
Section 11-501.5 allows a police officer to
make an initial determination regarding the
blood-alcohol content of a person so the
officer will know whether to arrest a person,
whether to take the time necessary to drive
the person to the evidential test site, and
whether to administer a test for alcohol or
some other drug. It appears, then, that the
results of a PBT would be admissible to show
probable cause existed at the time of arrest.
This interpretation is consistent with the
understanding of the legislators that the
results would be admissible by the
prosecution." (Emphasis in original.)
We also agree with the Rose court that the results of a PBT
are admissible on the issue of probable cause. Since the purpose
of a PBT is to aid a police officer in determining the existence
of probable cause, the results of the PBT must be admissible in a
proceeding where that determination is challenged. Probable
cause exists where the facts and circumstances known to the
arresting officer are sufficient to warrant a man of reasonable
caution to believe an offense was committed. People v. Bulman,
212 Ill. App. 3d 795, 571 N.E.2d 850 (1991). Section 11-501.5
allows an officer to consider PBT results as one of those "facts
and circumstances." Therefore, when the issue is the correctness
of the officer's probable cause determination, he must be allowed
to demonstrate the bases for his belief, including PBT results.
To hold otherwise renders the statute ineffectual. When the
language of a statute permits two constructions, one of which
would make an enactment absurd and illogical, while the other
renders it reasonable and sensible, the construction which leads
to an absurd result must be avoided. People v. Stanciel, 153 Ill. 2d 218, 606 N.E.2d 1201 (1992).
Defendant argues that the statutory language allowing a
defendant to use PBT results in any administrative or court
proceeding indicates that similar use by the State is prohibited.
However, the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, which
means that the expression of one thing implies the exclusion of
another (Black's Law Dictionary 581 (6th ed. 1990)), is a rule of
construction, not a rule of law (Baker v. Miller, 159 Ill. 2d 249, 636 N.E.2d 551 (1994)). It should never be applied to
defeat the purpose of a statute. Paxson v. Board of Education of
School District No. 87, 276 Ill. App. 3d 912, 658 N.E.2d 1309
(1995).
We find that the trial court erred in ruling that the PBT
results were inadmissible at the hearing on defendant's motion to
quash his arrest and suppress evidence. We reverse the judgment
granting defendant's motion and remand for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
JUSTICE HOLDRIDGE, dissenting:
I repectfully dissent. Unlike the majority, I see no
ambiguity in Section 11-501.5 of the Code. The statute clearly
states that the sole purpose for which law enforcement may employ
preliminary breath screening tests is "the purpose of assisting
[the officer] with the determination of whether to require a
chemical test as authorized under Sections 11-501.1 and 11-501.2,
and the approprate type of test to request." (Emphasis added.) 625
ILCS 5/11-501.5 (Michie 1996). The statute is equally clear in
authorizing only the defendant, not the People, to use the results
of the preliminary breath screening test in a court proceeding
involving a charge of driving under the influence of alcohol in
violation of section 11-501 of the Code. 625 ILCS 5/11-501.5
(Michie 1996).
As the majority noted, the most reliable indicator of
legislative intent is the language of the statute, (People v.
Tucker, 167 Ill. 2d 431 (1995), and where the language of the
statute is clear, it will be given effect without relying upon
other aids for construction. People v. Zaremba, 158 Ill. 2d 36
(1994). In construing the words of the statute, we must give them
their plain and ordinary meaning. Hernon v. E.W. Corrigan
Construction Co., 149 Ill. 2d 190, 194-95 (1992).
Unlike the majority, I see no need to resort to the abyss of
legislative history. The plain and ordinary meaning of the words
in the PBT statute are clear. The test may be used in only two
situations: (1) by a law enforcement officer to assist him or her
in determining whether to require certain chemical tests authorized
by statute, and (2) by a defendant as evidence in any
administrative or court proceeding involving a charge of driving
under the influence of alcohol or drugs, or in an implied consent
hearing under section 11-501.1 of the Code.
If, as the majority suggests, the legislative intent of the
PBT statute was actually contrary to the clear and unambiguous
language enacted into law, and the legislature actually intended
other unstated purposes and uses for the test, it should have taken
care to accurately express its intent.
_________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
THIRD DISTRICT
A.D., 1998
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
ILLINOIS, ) of the 14th Judicial Circuit,
) Whiteside County, Illinois,
Plaintiff-Appellant, )
)
v. ) No. 97--DT--24
)
ANTHONY T. DAVIS, ) Honorable
) John L. Hauptman,
Defendant-Appellee. ) Judge, Presiding.
_________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE SLATER delivered the opinion of the court:
_________________________________________________________________
This case presents a single issue: whether the results of a
preliminary breath screening test (PBT) obtained pursuant to
section 11-501.5 of the Illinois Vehicle Code (Code) (625 ILCS
5/11-501.5 (West 1996)) are admissible by the State at a hearing
on defendant's motion to suppress evidence and quash his arrest
for driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI) (625 ILCS 5/11-
501 (West 1996))? We hold that such results are admissible.
Facts
On January 22, 1997, a van driven by defendant Anthony T.
Davis was stopped by officer Thomas Hochbaum of the Fulton police
department because of an equipment violation. According to
Hochbaum, the defendant's eyes were bloodshot, his breath smelled
of alcohol and he admitted that he had "had a few." Hochbaum
administered three field sobriety tests which, in Hochbaum's
opinion, the defendant either failed or failed to complete.
Defendant also failed a PBT. After the defendant was arrested
for DUI, he submitted to a breathalyzer examination which showed
a blood alcohol concentration of 0.15.
Defendant subsequently filed a petition to rescind his
statutory summary suspension in which he argued, inter alia, that
officer Hochbaum did not have reasonable grounds to believe that
defendant was under the influence of alcohol. At the hearing on
the motion, the State sought to introduce the fact that defendant
had failed the PBT. However, defendant's objection on the basis
of lack of foundation was sustained. The trial court later
granted defendant's rescission motion. The State did not appeal
from that decision and it is not at issue here.
Thereafter, defendant filed a motion to quash arrest and
suppress evidence, contending that officer Hochbaum did not have
probable cause to arrest him and that the results of the
breathalyzer test should be suppressed. At the hearing on the
motion, the parties stipulated that the evidence presented at the
recision hearing would be admitted and considered as evidence on
the motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence. In addition,
the State introduced Illinois Department of Public Health
regulations which listed the type of instrument used by officer
Hochbaum as an approved PBT device. Officer Hochbaum testified
that he requested a breath sample from the defendant prior to
arrest to help him determine whether or not the defendant was
under the influence of alcohol.
The trial court found that, although the State had
established a sufficient foundation, the results of the PBT were
nevertheless inadmissible. The court ruled that the language of
section 11-501.5 did not authorize use of the results of a PBT to
determine whether probable cause existed. The court also noted
that while section 11-501.5 expressly allows a defendant to use
the results of a PBT in any administrative or court proceeding,
no similar authorization is given to the State. Because this
additional evidence was ruled inadmissible, the court found that
officer Hochbaum did not have probable cause to arrest the
defendant and the defendant's motion was granted. On appeal, the
sole issue raised by the State is whether the trial court erred
in ruling that the results of the PBT were inadmissible.
Analysis
The primary rule of statutory construction, to which all
other rules are subordinate, is to ascertain and give effect to
the intent of the legislature. People ex rel. Baker v. Cowlin,
154 Ill. 2d 193, 607 N.E.2d 1251 (1992). The most reliable
indicator of legislative intent is the language of the statute
(People v. Tucker, 167 Ill. 2d 431, 657 N.E.2d 1009 (1995)), and
any inquiry should begin with that language (People v. Zaremba,
158 Ill. 2d 36, 630 N.E.2d 797 (1994); Baker, 154 Ill. 2d 193,
607 N.E.2d 1251). Where the statutory language is clear, it will
be given effect without relying on other aids for construction.
Where the language is ambiguous, however, it is appropriate to
consider the legislative history. Zaremba, 158 Ill. 2d 36, 630 N.E.2d 797; Baker, 154 Ill. 2d 193, 607 N.E.2d 1251. In
addition, a court should consider the reason and necessity for
the law, the evils it was intended to remedy and the objects and
purposes to be obtained. Tucker 167 Ill. 2d 431, 657 N.E.2d 1009; People v. Garrett, 136 Ill. 2d 318, 555 N.E.2d 353 (1990).
Statutory construction is a question of law to be decided by the
reviewing court independent of, and without deference to, the
judgment of the trial court. Advincula v. United Blood Services,
176 Ill. 2d 1, 678 N.E.2d 1009 (1996).
Section 11-501.5 of the Code states:
"Preliminary Breath Screening Test. If
a law enforcement officer has reasonable
suspicion to believe that a person is
violating or has violated Section 11-501 or a
similar provision of a local ordinance, the
officer, prior to an arrest, may request the
person to provide a sample of his or her
breath for a preliminary breath screening
test using a portable device approved by the
Department of Public Health. The results of
this preliminary breath screening test may be
used by the law enforcement officer for the
purpose of assisting with the determination
of whether to require a chemical test as
authorized under Sections 11-501.1 and 11-
501.2, and the appropriate type of test to
request. Any chemical test authorized under
Section 11-501.1 and 11-501.2 may be
requested by the officer regardless of the
result of the preliminary breath screening
test, if probable cause for an arrest exists.
The result of a preliminary breath screening
test may be used by the defendant as evidence
in any administrative or court proceeding
involving a violation of Section 11-501 or
11-501.1." 625 ILCS 5/11-501.5 (West 1996).
We first consider whether the language of the statute is
reasonably clear or whether some ambiguity exists. Section 11-
501.5 provides that a police officer who reasonably suspects that
a person is DUI may request that person to submit to a PBT. The
results of the PBT may be used by the officer to assist in
determining "whether to require a chemical test as authorized
under Sections 11-501.1 [statutory summary suspension; implied
consent] and 11-501.2 [concerning admissibility of chemical test
results in DUI prosecutions], and the appropriate type of test to
request." 625 ILCS 5/11-501.5 (West 1996). The defendant
maintains that this language limits use of PBT results to the
purposes expressed in the statute and does not permit their use
for any other purpose. The State contends, however, that since
the chemical tests authorized under sections 11-501.1 and 11-
501.2 require a determination by the officer of probable cause to
arrest for DUI, the purpose of section 11-501.5 is to assist the
officer in making the probable cause determination. In that
case, the State argues, the PBT results are necessarily
admissible in a proceeding challenging the existence of probable
cause.
"A statute is ambiguous when it is capable of being
understood by reasonably well-informed persons in two or more
different senses, thus warranting the consideration of other
sources to ascertain the legislative intent." Advincula, 176 Ill. 2d at 18, 678 N.E.2d at 1018. We find that section 11-501.5
is ambiguous concerning the purpose of a PBT and whether the
results of a PBT may be used by the State to establish probable
cause. Faced with this ambiguity, we consider the legislative
history of the statute.
Representative Matijevich, the House sponsor of Senate Bill
1283, which became section 11-501.5, stated on the floor of the
House that PBTs would be particularly helpful in rural areas
where police officers might have to transport a DUI suspect long
distances to an evidentiary test site. When asked whether the
test results were admissible in court, Matijevich responded that
a defendant could use the results in court or at an
administrative hearing. He was then asked, "Can the prosecution
use them in court?" and he answered, "Yes." (85th Ill. Gen.
Assem., House Proceedings, June 26, 1987, at 397 (statements of
Representative Matijevich and Young).
Section 11-501.5, as it was originally enacted, required a
police officer to have probable cause to believe that a person
was DUI before administering a PBT. This was changed to the
current requirement of reasonable suspicion by House Bill 2294,
which according to Representative Parke's statement on the House
floor, placed the PBT "in its intended place in the DUI arrest
process. These tests are used to develop probable cause for the
arrest ***." (Emphasis added.) 88th Ill. Gen. Assem., House
Proceedings, April 20, 1993, at 22 (statement of Representative
Parke).
While the comments by Representatives Matijevich and Parke
do not provide a definitive explanation of the "reason and
necessity for the law, the evils to be remedied, and the objects
and purposes to be obtained" (Garrett, 136 Ill. 2d at 329, 555
N.E.2d at 358), they are sufficiently indicative of legislative
intent to resolve the issue presented here. We believe that the
primary purpose of section 11-501.5 is, as the State suggests, to
aid police officers in determining the existence of probable
cause to arrest. This is evident from Representative Parke's
statement concerning the amendment to section 11-501.5. That
amendment lowered the threshold requirement for a PBT from
probable cause to reasonable suspicion, thereby allowing it to be
used as an investigative tool, similar to field sobriety tests.
Our conclusion in this regard is consistent with that of the
court in People v. Rose, 268 Ill. App. 3d 174, 180, 643 N.E.2d 865, 869-70 (1994):
"Based on legislative remarks concerning
section 11-501.5, it seems its primary
purpose is to aid police officers in
assessing probable cause to arrest. ***
Section 11-501.5 allows a police officer to
make an initial determination regarding the
blood-alcohol content of a person so the
officer will know whether to arrest a person,
whether to take the time necessary to drive
the person to the evidential test site, and
whether to administer a test for alcohol or
some other drug. It appears, then, that the
results of a PBT would be admissible to show
probable cause existed at the time of arrest.
This interpretation is consistent with the
understanding of the legislators that the
results would be admissible by the
prosecution." (Emphasis in original.)
We also agree with the Rose court that the results of a PBT
are admissible on the issue of probable cause. Since the purpose
of a PBT is to aid a police officer in determining the existence
of probable cause, the results of the PBT must be admissible in a
proceeding where that determination is challenged. Probable
cause exists where the facts and circumstances known to the
arresting officer are sufficient to warrant a man of reasonable
caution to believe an offense was committed. People v. Bulman,
212 Ill. App. 3d 795, 571 N.E.2d 850 (1991). Section 11-501.5
allows an officer to consider PBT results as one of those "facts
and circumstances." Therefore, when the issue is the correctness
of the officer's probable cause determination, he must be allowed
to demonstrate the bases for his belief, including PBT results.
To hold otherwise renders the statute ineffectual. When the
language of a statute permits two constructions, one of which
would make an enactment absurd and illogical, while the other
renders it reasonable and sensible, the construction which leads
to an absurd result must be avoided. People v. Stanciel, 153 Ill. 2d 218, 606 N.E.2d 1201 (1992).
Defendant argues that the statutory language allowing a
defendant to use PBT results in any administrative or court
proceeding indicates that similar use by the State is prohibited.
However, the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, which
means that the expression of one thing implies the exclusion of
another (Black's Law Dictionary 581 (6th ed. 1990)), is a rule of
construction, not a rule of law (Baker v. Miller, 159 Ill. 2d 249, 636 N.E.2d 551 (1994)). It should never be applied to
defeat the purpose of a statute. Paxson v. Board of Education of
School District No. 87, 276 Ill. App. 3d 912, 658 N.E.2d 1309
(1995).
We find that the trial court erred in ruling that the PBT
results were inadmissible at the hearing on defendant's motion to
quash his arrest and suppress evidence. We reverse the judgment
granting defendant's motion and remand for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
JUSTICE HOLDRIDGE, dissenting:
I repectfully dissent. Unlike the majority, I see no
ambiguity in Section 11-501.5 of the Code. The statute clearly
states that the sole purpose for which law enforcement may employ
preliminary breath screening tests is "the purpose of assisting
[the officer] with the determination of whether to require a
chemical test as authorized under Sections 11-501.1 and 11-501.2,
and the approprate type of test to request." (Emphasis added.) 625
ILCS 5/11-501.5 (Michie 1996). The statute is equally clear in
authorizing only the defendant, not the People, to use the results
of the preliminary breath screening test in a court proceeding
involving a charge of driving under the influence of alcohol in
violation of section 11-501 of the Code. 625 ILCS 5/11-501.5
(Michie 1996).
As the majority noted, the most reliable indicator of
legislative intent is the language of the statute, (People v.
Tucker, 167 Ill. 2d 431 (1995), and where the language of the
statute is clear, it will be given effect without relying upon
other aids for construction. People v. Zaremba, 158 Ill. 2d 36
(1994). In construing the words of the statute, we must give them
their plain and ordinary meaning. Hernon v. E.W. Corrigan
Construction Co., 149 Ill. 2d 190, 194-95 (1992).
Unlike the majority, I see no need to resort to the abyss of
legislative history. The plain and ordinary meaning of the words
in the PBT statute are clear. The test may be used in only two
situations: (1) by a law enforcement officer to assist him or her
in determining whether to require certain chemical tests authorized
by statute, and (2) by a defendant as evidence in any
administrative or court proceeding involving a charge of driving
under the influence of alcohol or drugs, or in an implied consent
hearing under section 11-501.1 of the Code.
If, as the majority suggests, the legislative intent of the
PBT statute was actually contrary to the clear and unambiguous
language enacted into law, and the legislature actually intended
other unstated purposes and uses for the test, it should have taken
care to accurately express its intent.
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