In re V.O.

No. 3--96--0117

_________________________________________________________________

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

THIRD DISTRICT

A.D., 1996

IN RE V.O., D.P., J.P., T.P., ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
J.P., P.P., J.P., J.P., & M.P., ) of the 10th Judicial Circuit,
Minors ) Peoria County, Illinois
)
(THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE )
OF ILLINOIS, )
)
Petitioner-Appellee, ) No. 92--J--519
)
v. )
)
JONATHAN P., ) Honorable
) Stuart P. Borden
Respondent-Appellant). ) Judge, Presiding
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JUSTICE LYTTON delivered the opinion of the court:
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The respondent, Jonathan P., appeals from the judgment of the
circuit court which found him to be an unfit parent and terminated
his parental rights. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
On February 25, 1993, seven of the respondent's nine children
were adjudicated neglected. The counts of neglect were based upon
their mother's drug addiction and the injurious nature of their
environment stemming from that addiction. 705 ILCS 405/2--3(b)
(West 1992). The remaining two children were subsequently adjudi-
cated neglected after they were born with cocaine in their systems.
705 ILCS 405/2--3(c) (West 1992). The children ranged in age from
12 years to 6 months.
The unfitness hearing was held on November 8, 1995. Elizabeth
Clayton, a Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) case-
worker, testified that she had been involved in this case since
March 1, 1993. At that time, the respondent's service plan
objectives were to obtain employment, attend parenting classes, and
receive drug, alcohol and psychological evaluations. When that
service plan was later evaluated, the only goal the respondent had
completed was the psychological evaluation. In November 1993, the
respondent began unsupervised visits with his children. However,
in April 1994, those visits were terminated because he repeatedly
allowed the children to see their mother in violation of a court
order.
His next service plan, devised in April 1994, required him to
participate in a 12-step program to learn about substance abuse and
the effects of such abuse on his family. However, he had not
attended the program at the time of his next evaluation. Clayton
further testified that the respondent made poor progress with the
November 1994 service plan. He eventually went to a drug and
alcohol evaluation in January 1995. The evaluators told him that
they thought he had an alcohol problem and that he should partici-
pate in a weekly class. He refused to participate, however, because
he did not believe that he had a problem.
According to Clayton, during the time she was the respondent's
caseworker, he failed to attend 25% of the scheduled visits. She
also said that from about October 1993 to January 1995, the
respondent had the same address as the children's mother, Bunny P.
The court had prohibited Bunny from seeing the children due to her
drug addiction. To the best of Clayton's knowledge, the respondent
and Bunny lived together during the time they shared an address.
At other times, Clayton did not have an address for the respondent.
Kelly Anderson, a caseworker for Counseling and Family
Services, testified that she evaluated the respondent's compliance
with the May 1995 service plan. At that time, he still had not
completed a 12-step program which DCFS had requested in 1994.
Anderson also observed the respondent's visits with the children
beginning in June 1995. The respondent would sit in a chair and
occasionally ask one of the children to sit in his lap. He would
direct the children from the chair to stop fighting and hitting
each other. At one point, however, the respondent said, "go ahead
and tear up the room, because we have to be in such a small place
anyway."
The State then called the respondent as an adverse witness.
He testified that he lived alone at the Shamrock Hotel and had
lived there for about three months. However, he admitted that his
wife had spent the night with him there about a month before. He
said that he and his wife last lived together on a full-time basis
in September 1994, when he was found in contempt for allowing her
to have contact with the children. He said that they have
continued to see each other and she sometimes spent the night with
him. Finally, the respondent denied allowing any contact between
the children and their mother other than yelling out the window,
which he did not consider "contact" with the children. He denied
having previously told the court at a review hearing that he had
allowed contact between the children and his wife.
Clayton was recalled as a rebuttal witness. She testified
that in a court review on January 28, 1994, the trial judge asked
the respondent if he was allowing contact between his wife and the
children. The respondent said that he was allowing her to see them
and that she was their mother and would not harm them.
The respondent then testified on his own behalf. He admitted
that he did not complete the 12-step program. He said he did not
do so because its purpose was to understand the effects of drug
abuse on the family and, since he no longer lived with his wife, he
did not need to attend the sessions. He said he had not lived with
his wife for 1« to 2 years and did not intend to live with her
again. He said he understood that her parental rights have been
terminated and that she is allowed no contact with the children.
At the conclusion of the evidence, the trial court found the
respondent unfit because he (1) failed to make reasonable efforts
to correct the conditions which were the basis for the removal, and
(2) failed to make reasonable progress toward the return of the
children within 12 months of adjudication. 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m)
(West 1992).
At the best interests hearing, Anderson and Clayton submitted
reports about the children to the court. Emily McGhee of Counsel-
ing and Family Services and Pat Alexander of DCFS also submitted
reports. In general, their reports concluded that the respondent
had failed to take any responsibility for his children being in
foster care. He continued to believe that he and his wife were
good parents who had done nothing wrong, and he continued to
support his wife rather than work toward the return of the
children. According to the reports, the respondent told the
children during visits that the only reason they were not at home
was because he needed to find a large enough place for them all to
live. This explanation left the older children hopeful, confused,
and frustrated. The reports also stated that the respondent's
sporadic attendance at visits belied his claims of interest. On
October 6, 1993, the caseworkers began requiring him to call the
day before a visit to confirm that he would attend because he had
missed five visits in a six-month period without explanation.
Since March 1994, the respondent did not attend 14 of the 35
scheduled visits. Finally, the authors concluded that it would be
in the best interests of the children to terminate the respondent's
parental rights.
The respondent testified that he had moved from the Shamrock
Hotel to his sister's house and was saving money to obtain living
arrangements suitable for himself and the children. He said that
although he would like all of the children returned to him, he
would particularly like a chance with the three oldest ones. He
testified that it was not his fault that his children were taken
away. He also noted that he had completed a 12-step Al-Anon
program and had begun working at the Peoria Civic Center.
Thelma Munoz, the respondent's mother and the foster mother of
two of the children, testified that the girls always talked about
their father and hoped that some day he would come home. She said
that prior to the children going into foster care, the respondent
took care of them more than his wife did.
Tina Hopson, the respondent's sister, testified that when she
was younger and "running the streets" her brother lived with her
and took care of her child. She said that when her brother has his
children he takes good care of them and neighbors call him Mr. Mom.
After hearing all the evidence, the court terminated the
respondent's parental rights.
DISCUSSION
On appeal, the respondent first argues that the trial court's
finding that he was unfit was against the manifest weight of the
evidence.
In this case, the State alleged that the respondent failed to
make reasonable efforts to correct the conditions that were the
basis for removal of the children and failed to make reasonable
progress toward the return of the children. 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m)
(West 1992). Whether a parent's efforts to correct conditions are
reasonable involves a subjective judgment of a particular parent's
efforts; however, the reasonableness of a parent's progress toward
the child's return is measured objectively by the amount of
movement toward the goal of reunification. In re L.L.S., 218 Ill.
App. 3d 444, 577 N.E.2d 1375 (1991). A finding of unfitness must
be based on evidence that is clear and convincing. In re Adoption
of Syck, 138 Ill. 2d 255, 562 N.E.2d 174 (1990). Once such a
finding has been made, however, it will be given great deference
and will not be disturbed on appeal unless it is contrary to the
manifest weight of the evidence. In re J.B., 198 Ill. App. 3d 495,
555 N.E.2d 1198 (1990).
Here, we find that there was ample evidence of unfitness. The
respondent's children were removed from his home due to his wife's
drug abuse problem. However, he allowed the children to see their
mother even after being ordered by the trial court not to do so.
He repeatedly failed to complete a 12-step program to understand
how drug abuse affected his family until after the unfitness
hearing. He lived with his wife for much of the time that he was
supposed to be working toward the return of his children. He
failed to attend many of the visits that DCFS arranged for him to
see his children. In sum, we find that the respondent consistently
demonstrated both a lack of reasonable effort and reasonable
progress. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court's decision
finding him unfit is not against the manifest weight of the
evidence.
Next, the respondent argues that the State did not prove by
clear and convincing evidence that it was in the children's best
interests to terminate his parental rights.
In response, the State argues that the proper burden of proof
of the children's best interest lies within the sound discretion of
the trial court, and its decision will not be reversed absent an
abuse of that discretion. See In re Jason U., 214 Ill. App. 3d
545, 574 N.E.2d 90 (1991). Within this argument, the State submits
that our decision in In re B.C., 247 Ill. App. 3d 803, 617 N.E.2d 1207 (1993), is incorrect. In B.C., we indicated that clear and
convincing evidence was necessary to terminate parental rights.
B.C., 247 Ill. App. 3d at 806, 617 N.E.2d at 1210. We have re-
examined this issue, however, and agree with the State that once a
parent has been found unfit by clear and convincing evidence, the
decision to terminate an individual's parental rights rests within
the sound discretion of the trial judge.
The remaining question is whether the trial court abused its
discretion in terminating the respondent's parental rights. In
this case, the respondent failed to take responsibility for his
children being in foster care. As late as the best interest
hearing, he did not believe that it was his fault that his children
were taken from him. He misled the children about an eventual
homecoming, which only confused and frustrated them. He could not
even manage to show enough interest or concern to attend the
planned visits with the children, missing almost half of the visits
from March 1994 to the time of the hearings. The trial court did
not abuse its discretion in terminating the respondent's parental
rights.
The judgment of the circuit court of Peoria County is
affirmed.
Affirmed.
MICHELA and SLATER, JJ., concur