Mann v. Mann

No. 3--96--0108
_________________________________________________________________

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

THIRD DISTRICT

A.D., 1996

STEPHEN B. MANN and STANLEY ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
MANN, ) of the 13th Judicial Circuit,
) Grundy County, Illinois
Plaintiffs-Appellees, )
)
v. )
)
JOHN BERRY MANN and MARY L. )
MANN, )
)
Defendants-Appellants. )
)
______________________________) No. 95--LM--35
) 95--LM--36
JOHN BERRY MANN and MARY L. )
MANN, )
)
Plaintiffs-Appellants, )
)
v. )
)
STEPHEN B. MANN and STANLEY )
MANN, ) Honorable
) Robert H. Adcock,
Defendants-Appellees. ) Judge Presiding.

_________________________________________________________________

JUSTICE MICHELA delivered the opinion of the court:
_________________________________________________________________

Stephen B. Mann and his son Stanley Mann (plaintiffs) filed a
complaint in forcible entry and detainer (735 ILCS 5/9--101 et seq.
(West 1994)) against their brother and uncle, John Berry Mann and
his wife Mary L. Mann (defendants). Defendants also filed a
complaint in forcible entry and detainer against the plaintiffs
(735 ILCS 5/9--101 et seq. (West 1994)). Upon the agreement of the
parties the cases were consolidated for a bench trial. Plaintiffs,
as lessees sought to enforce the terms of a written "Crop Share
Farm Lease" (lease) executed with John Mann, the father of
plaintiff Stephen and defendant John Berry, which allowed them to
farm land known as "parcel number five" (the realty) for a term of
15 years. Defendants succeeded to the title of the realty upon the
death of John Mann and sought to terminate the lease upon the
ground that the leasehold was a tenancy at will; alternatively,
defendants contended the lease was terminable because the
plaintiffs were in breach of the terms of the lease. The trial
court ruled the lease was a tenancy for years and enforceable
against both plaintiffs and defendants for the duration of the
leasehold. The trial court further found plaintiffs were not in
breach of the lease; and, alternatively ruled that if a breach did
occur, it was immaterial and entered judgment in favor of
plaintiffs. Defendants appeal the judgment and certain evidentiary
rulings rendered by the trial court. We affirm.
The lease was properly executed between John Mann and
plaintiffs on June 10, 1993, and properly recorded on June 11,
1993, at 2:56 p.m. A term in the lease provided that the lessees
were to submit annual reports to the lessor on forms provided by
the lessor. During a second transaction on or about June 10, 1993,
John Mann executed a quitclaim deed (deed two) conveying the realty
to the defendants, reserving a life estate in himself and expressly
providing that "[t]his conveyance is made subject to the terms of
the [lease]." Deed two was also properly recorded on June 11,
1993, at 3:03 p.m. John Mann died on November 15, 1993. On
September 22, 1994, defendants notified plaintiffs of their intent
to terminate the lease and provided further notice of the
termination by letter on March 24, 1995, claiming plaintiffs were
in breach of the lease for their failure to provide the lessor with
an annual report concerning finances and recordkeeping.
At trial, plaintiff Stephen testified he had farmed the realty
under an oral lease agreement with John Mann since 1980. During
cross-examination, Stephen was asked why he and his father decided
to execute a written lease after farming the realty under an oral
lease for 13 years. Plaintiffs' counsel objected on the basis of
relevancy and defendants argued the answer was relevant to
construing John Mann's intent in executing the lease and deed two.
The trial court sustained the objection.
During defendants' case-in-chief they unsuccessfully sought
admission of two legal documents, John Mann's will and a third
quitclaim deed (deed three) which was also executed by John Mann on
or about June 10, 1993, and recorded after 3:03 p.m. on June 11,
1993. Defendants argued deed three was contemporaneous with both
the lease and deed two. Defendants reasoned deed three would be
helpful in resolving any ambiguity caused by the lease and its
impact upon their possessory interest in the realty. The trial
court ruled that this extrinsic evidence was inadmissible because
the lease and deed two were not ambiguous and John Mann's intent as
both grantor and lessor must be construed from the words of the
documents themselves.
We first address defendants' argument that the trial court
committed reversible error in refusing to admit John Mann's will
and deed three into evidence. We do not dispute defendants'
reliance on the long-standing principle that "deeds and contracts
executed contemporaneously, must be construed together."
Clodfelter v. Van Fossan, 394 Ill. 29, 67 N.E.2d 182, 184 (1946).
However, it is an equally long-standing principle that "the nature
and extent of the estate granted shall be determined, as a matter
of law, from the deed itself." Rockford Trust Co. v. Moon, 370 Ill. 250, 18 N.E.2d 447, 448-49 (1938). Further, the grantor's
intent is to be construed from the four corners of the deed. See
generally Rockford Trust Co., 370 Ill. 250, 18 N.E.2d at 449. If,
however, a deed is ambiguous, extrinsic or parol evidence may be
used. Foster v. Foster, 273 Ill. App. 3d 106, 112, 652 N.E.2d 350,
354 (1995).
Similarly, the intentions of the parties to a contract, such
as a lease, are to be determined from the document itself. Mayol
v. Weiner Cos., Ltd. 98 Ill. App. 3d 985, 986-87, 425 N.E.2d 45, 47
(1981). In the event of an ambiguity within the lease, extrinsic
evidence may be used. Mayol, 98 Ill. App. 3d at 987, 425 N.E.2d at
47. Evidentiary rulings are within the discretion of the trial
court and, absent an abuse of discretion resulting in prejudice to
the objecting party, the rulings will not be disturbed on appeal.
Smith v. Black & Decker, Inc., 272 Ill. App. 3d 451, 650 N.E.2d 1108 (1995).
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to
admit copies of John Mann's will and deed three. The lease speaks
for itself. There is no ambiguity in its terms that plaintiffs
Stephen and Stanley shall farm the realty for 15 years. Likewise,
deed two is unambiguous. Deed two conveys the realty to defendants
John Berry and Mary, reserving a life estate in the grantor, John
Mann. This deed also makes the conveyance of the realty subject to
the terms of the lease. These documents, when construed together
as contemporaneous written instruments, indicate John Mann wished
one son to farm the realty for 15 years while he wished for another
son to own the realty in fee. These documents further indicate
that John Mann foresaw the contingency of his death during the
leasehold's term. Thus, the provisions of deed two indicate John
Mann's intent upon the event of his death.
Deed two unambiguously demonstrates that if John Mann died
during the life of the leasehold, he intended the remaindermen to
honor the terms of the leasehold agreement. On their face, these
documents present no ambiguity. Thus, the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in refusing to admit John Mann's will and deed
three. Nor do we agree the trial court abused its discretion in
sustaining plaintiffs' objection to defendants' query to Stephen on
cross-examination as to why John Mann wanted to execute a written
lease. This question's only purpose was to delve into the
grantor's intent which the trial court, in its sound discretion,
deemed irrelevant in the absence of any ambiguity within the lease
and deed two. Smith, 272 Ill. App. 3d at 458, 650 N.E.2d at 1114-
15.
Defendants next contend the trial court erred when it found
the realty remained subject to the leasehold agreement.
Specifically, defendants argue that "a life tenant cannot make a
lease for a longer period than his own term unless joined by the
remainder-man, and his lessee, upon the death of the life tenant,
becomes a tenant by sufferance or at will." Craig v. Launer, 346
Ill. App. 234, 104 N.E.2d 830, 832 (1952). Defendants maintain
that as remaindermen they are bound to a non-freehold estate which
will last for a term longer than John Mann's life. Defendants
further contend that since they were not a party to the lease at
its execution and because they have succeeded to title in the
realty, the leasehold has been transformed into a tenancy at will.
Defendants therefore conclude the lease is terminable upon their
election. Upon a close analysis of the documents, the times they
were recorded and the resulting legal positions of the parties, we
disagree.
Before the lease was executed and recorded, John Mann owned
the realty in fee. John Mann then executed a lease with plaintiffs
permitting them to farm the realty from March 1, 1994, to February
28, 2009. The lease was a term for years, which has as its
distinctive feature, "the right of the tenant to exclusive
possession of a defined physical area for the duration of the
specified term." C. Moynihan, Introduction to the Law of Real
Property, 63 (1988); People v. May, 46 Ill. 2d 120, 124, 262 N.E.2d 908, 910 (1970). Thus, the effect of the lease was to carve out a
term for years leaving John Mann, as lessor, with a reversion in
fee simple.
Seven minutes later, John Mann transferred his reversion in
fee simple to the defendants, reserving a life estate in himself.
Thus, John Mann kept a life estate in his reversionary interest in
fee simple to the realty, subject to the leasehold's term for 15
years. Therefore, the defendants, as grantees, took a vested
remainder interest in fee simple subject to postponed enjoyment.
"A remainder is vested if there is a person in being ascertained
and ready to take who has a present right of future enjoyment, one
which is not dependent upon any uncertain event or contingency."
Dauer v. Butera, 267 Ill. App. 3d 539, 543, 642 N.E.2d 848, 850
(1994). However, the defendants' remainder interest in possession,
although vested, does not mean they were seized, i.e., immediately
entitled to possession of the realty upon John Mann's death.
Dalton v. Eash, 411 Ill. 296, 103 N.E.2d 483 (1952). John Mann
used words of limitation when he executed deed two which expressly
provided that the conveyance of the realty was subject to the
duration of the leasehold.
We conclude that although the defendants had a vested interest
in possession to the realty or, put another way, a present fixed
right of future enjoyment, (Northern Trust Co. v. Biddle, 65 Ill.
App. 2d 253, 212 N.E.2d 694 (1965)), their right to enjoy the
possession of the realty is postponed. See generally 28 Am. Jur.
2d Estates  256 (1966). Accordingly, the result in the case at
bar is that upon John Mann's death, defendants, being vested, took
title in fee simple to the realty but their right to enjoy
possession of the realty is postponed for the duration of the
leasehold's term for 15 years. Defendants cannot hasten their
enjoyment of their possessory interest to the realty by relying
upon the rule of law announced in Craig v. Launer.
Craig v. Launer is factually distinguishable from the case at
bar. There, the defendant tenant, Launer, farmed land pursuant to
an oral periodic tenancy lease agreement with the lessor. Upon the
lessor's death, the land was devised to his wife for her life. The
wife continued to accept rents from the tenant under the pre-
existing oral lease. The wife died and the land was devised to the
plaintiff Craig for her life. However, the defendant tenant,
Launer, continued farming the land after the wife's death pursuant
to the oral lease agreement. The defendant tenant, Launer, refused
to surrender possession of the land and the plaintiff lessor,
Craig, brought an action in forcible entry and detainer. The court
ruled in the plaintiff's favor.
The court found that the lessor's wife, as a life tenant, had
continued the oral periodic tenancy agreement through her consent
to the tenant's use of the land and acceptance of rents. The
wife's possessory interest in the land only existed for the
duration of her life. Thus, the court ruled that when the wife
permitted the oral periodic tenancy, an estate of indefinite
duration to continue, she had improperly bound the remainderman to
the leasehold because it lasted for a term greater than her
possessory interest in the land. The court then concluded that the
leasehold was terminable as a tenancy at will or a tenancy by
sufferance when it invoked the general rule that while a life
estate retains the quality of alienability enabling the life tenant
to convey his estate to a third person, the life tenant cannot
convey a greater estate than his own. Launer, 346 Ill. App. 234,
104 N.E.2d at 832; see C. Moynihan, Introduction to the Law of Real
Property, 53 (1988).
Conversely, in the case at bar, John Mann executed a written
lease for a term for years which was recorded before deed two,
establishing that, unlike Craig v. Launer, John Mann was not a life
tenant when he executed deed two and conveyed his reversionary
interest in fee simple to the realty. Moreover, the plaintiffs,
unlike the lessees in Craig v. Launer, had an estate in land of
finite duration conferring them with the exclusive right of the use
and possession of the realty for 15 years. 8930 South Harlem Ltd.
v. Moore, 77 Ill. 2d 212, 220, 396 N.E.2d 1, 5 (1979).
Accordingly, John Mann conveyed his reversionary interest in fee
simple with words of limitation, postponing defendants right to
enjoy possession of the realty for the duration of the leasehold.
Because these differences are significant, we decline to apply the
rule announced in Craig v. Launer.
Finally, neither party has directed our attention to any
precedent, nor could we locate any such precedent, standing for the
proposition that a grantor cannot convey his reversionary interest
in fee simple subject to postponed enjoyment for the duration of a
pre-existing leasehold's term for years. Therefore, we hold the
trial court did not err in finding that the tenancy for years did
not terminate upon the death of the lessor. We also hold the trial
court correctly ruled that defendants' possessory interest in the
realty was postponed for the duration of the pre-existing leasehold
agreement for a term of 15 years. See Restatement (Second) of
Property, Landlord & Tenant  15.1, illustration 12, at 90 (1977).
Next, we address defendants' argument that the trial court
erred in holding that the lease agreement was not breached or,
alternatively, was not materially breached by the plaintiffs'
failure to tender an annual financial report to the lessor as
required by the terms of the lease. Plaintiff Stephen testified at
trial that he understood that the lease required him to provide an
annual report to the lessor by December 31, for each year
comprising the 15 year term of the leasehold. Stephen testified he
provided his father John Mann, as lessor, with such a final
accounting in 1993. Stephen further testified that he kept records
and receipts of crop production for 1995. However, defendants
never requested plaintiffs to submit an annual report, nor did
defendants provide annual report forms to plaintiffs.
We agree with the trial court that the lease was not
materially breached. The record irrefutably demonstrates that
plaintiff Stephen kept records and receipts of crop production for
the 1995 year. Additionally, Stephen apportioned the lessor's
share of the crops to defendant John Berry. John Berry received
this payment and the remainder of his share was placed in storage.
In effect, Stephen performed his contractual obligation by
maintaining financial records and farming the realty so that the
payment terms of the lease were honored. Therefore, we cannot say
that the trial court erred when it found that if a breach occurred
when Stephen did not tender an annual report, it was immaterial.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court
of Grundy County is affirmed.
Affirmed.
MC CUSKEY, J. and LYTTON, J., concur.