Sassali v. Rockford Memorial Hospital

No. 2--97--0635
________________________________________________________________

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

SECOND DISTRICT
________________________________________________________________

WENDY SASSALI, ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
) of Winnebago County.
Plaintiff-Appellant, )
)
v. )
)
ROCKFORD MEMORIAL HOSPITAL and ) No. 96--L--17
THOMAS DeFAUW, )
)
Defendants-Appellees )
)
(Harry Darland, Michael Sassali ) Honorable
Jane Billeter, and Ashok Gupta, ) Gerald F. Grubb,
Defendants). ) Judge, Presiding.
________________________________________________________________

JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the opinion of the court:
Plaintiff, Wendy Sassali, appeals from the trial court s order
dismissing counts XI and XIII of her first amended complaint.
Defendants Rockford Memorial Hospital and Thomas DeFauw, CEO and
facility director of Rockford Memorial Hospital, (collectively
Rockford) assert that the trial court erred in concluding that the
Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Confidentiality Act
(Confidentiality Act) (740 ILCS 110/1 et seq. (West 1994))
authorized the release of her mental health records to a court
expert.
Counts XI and XIII allege that defendants Michael Sassali and
Harry Darland forcibly transported plaintiff to Rockford Memorial
Hospital and initiated emergency involuntary commitment
proceedings. As part of the involuntary commitment proceedings,
Dr. Warren Lewis was appointed to examine plaintiff. Thereafter,
Rockford released plaintiff s mental health records to Lewis.
Plaintiff alleges that this release violated the Confidentiality
Act and that she was damaged by Rockford s actions.
Pursuant to section 2--619(a)(9) of the Code of Civil
Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2--619(a)(9) (West 1996)), Rockford moved to
dismiss counts XI and XIII, arguing that the disclosure of the
records was permissible under sections 10(a)(1), 10(a)(8), and
11(vi) of the Confidentiality Act (740 ILCS 110/10(a)(1), 10(a)(8),
11(vi) (West 1994)). The trial court agreed that disclosure was
proper under section 11(vi) and dismissed those counts. The
dismissal order contained language stating that the judgment was
appealable pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 304(a) (155 Ill. 2d R.
304(a)). Plaintiff filed a timely notice of appeal.
For purposes of a section 2--619 motion to dismiss, a
defendant admits all well-pleaded facts. Barber-Colman Co. v. A&K
Midwest Insulation Co., 236 Ill. App. 3d 1065, 1073 (1992). We
review a dismissal pursuant to section 2--619 de novo. Kedzie &
103rd Currency Exchange, Inc. v. Hodge, 156 Ill. 2d 112, 116
(1993). In determining whether the sections Rockford relies upon
permit disclosure, we are guided by the general principle that the
legislative intent of a statute is best determined from the plain
and ordinary meaning of the statutory language. People v.
Wittenmyer, 151 Ill. 2d 175, 195 (1992). Where the language is
clear and unambiguous, we must apply it as written. Wittenmyer,
151 Ill. 2d at 195.
The Confidentiality Act provides that [a]ll records and
communications shall be confidential and shall not be disclosed
except as provided in this Act. 740 ILCS 110/3(a) (West 1994).
The exceptions to the Confidentiality Act are very narrow.
Pritchard v. Swedish American Hospital, 191 Ill. App. 3d 388, 402
(1989). Further, the legislature has provided a statutory cause of
action to remedy violations of the Confidentiality Act. 740 ILCS
110/15 (West 1994).
We first address Rockford s argument that section 10(a)(1)
authorizes the disclosure of the records to Lewis. Section
10(a)(1) provides that records may be disclosed in a civil,
criminal or administrative proceeding in which the recipient
introduces his mental condition *** as an element of his claim or
defense. 740 ILCS 110/10(a)(1) (West 1994). Section 10(a)(1)
further requires that, before the records may be disclosed, the
trial court must make several findings regarding the use of the
records, including that they are relevant, probative, not unduly
prejudicial or inflammatory, and otherwise clearly admissible.
740 ILCS 110/10(a)(1) (West 1994).
Rockford argues that plaintiff placed her mental condition at
issue during the involuntary commitment proceedings when she
sought to refute the allegations of the State as to her mental
instability. We disagree. A recipient waives the confidentiality
of her records only if she affirmatively places her own mental
condition at issue. Pritchard, 191 Ill. App. 3d at 403. Here
plaintiff did not place her mental condition at issue. Rather, by
filing the petition for involuntary admission, the State placed
plaintiff s mental condition at issue. Moreover, even if plaintiff
had introduced her mental condition as a claim or defense, Rockford
has presented no evidence to show that the trial court made the
numerous and explicit findings that section 10(a)(1) requires.
Consequently, we must conclude that the disclosure was not proper
under section 10(a)(1).
Rockford also argues that section 10(a)(8) permits disclosure.
Section 10(a)(8) allows the disclosure of mental health records
when they are relevant to a matter in issue in any action brought
under this Act. 740 ILCS 110/10(a)(8) (West 1994). Here the
involuntary commitment proceedings were brought pursuant to article
VI of the Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Code (405
ILCS 5/3--600 et seq. (West 1994)). Since the proceedings were not
pursuant to the Confidentiality Act, section 10(a)(8) cannot
authorize Rockford s disclosure.
We now turn our attention to section 11(vi), which provides
that records may be disclosed
in commitment proceedings under the Mental Health and
Developmental Disabilities Code and proceedings and
investigations preliminary thereto, to the State s Attorney
for the county or residence of a person for whom involuntary
or judicial admission is sought, or in which the person is
found, or in which the facility is located, and to the
attorney representing the recipient in the commitment
proceedings, provided that the information so disclosed shall
not be utilized for any other purpose nor be redisclosed
except in connection with the proceedings or investigations.
740 ILCS 110/11(vi) (West 1994).
The plain language of this section provides that Rockford was
permitted to release the records in connection with plaintiff s
commitment proceedings. With equal clarity, however, the section
authorizes disclosure to only two specific persons: the State s
Attorney and the recipient s attorney. Since Lewis was neither the
State s Attorney nor plaintiff s attorney, the plain language of
the section does not authorize the release of the records to him.
Rockford argues, however, that the legislature would not have
drawn the Confidentiality Act so narrowly that an expert appointed
to render an opinion on the recipient s mental condition would not
be permitted to review the documents. We agree. The last portion
of section 11(vi) provides that the information so disclosed shall
not be *** redisclosed except in connection with the proceedings or
investigations. 740 ILCS 110/11(vi) (West 1994). The clear
implication of this statement is that both the State s Attorney and
the recipient s attorney may disclose the information in the
records if the disclosure is in connection with the proceedings or
investigations. 740 ILCS 110/11(vi) (West 1994).
The Confidentiality Act is carefully drawn to maintain the
confidentiality of mental health records except in the specific
circumstances explicitly enumerated. Pritchard, 191 Ill. App. 3d
at 402. We believe that the plain language of section 11(vi)
demonstrates the legislature s conclusion that in commitment
proceedings the proper balance to be struck between confidentiality
and disclosure is best placed within the discretion of the State s
Attorney bringing the action and the recipient s attorney. Section
11(vi) clearly contemplates that these two officers of the court
will review the records and exercise their discretion so that
disclosure is made only to those people who need the information to
conduct properly the proceedings or investigation. Here Rockford
circumvented this entire process by delivering the records directly
to Lewis. While Rockford s actions may have placed the records
into the hands of the person who would have, in all likelihood,
eventually received them, that fact goes only to the question of
damages and not to the propriety of the disclosure itself.
After reviewing plaintiff s complaint, the Confidentiality
Act, and its narrowly drawn exceptions, we must conclude that none
of the exceptions permitted Rockford to release plaintiff s mental
health records to Lewis. Consequently, we agree with plaintiff
that the trial court erred in dismissing counts XI and XIII of
plaintiff s complaint.
The judgment of the circuit court of Winnebago County is
reversed, and this cause is remanded for further proceedings.
Reversed and remanded.
GEIGER, P.J., concurs.
JUSTICE McLAREN, specially concurring:
I concur. However, I desire to emphasize an aspect of this
case, which I believe judicial economy and a uniform body of law
require.
The complaint filed herein was not attacked for failing to
state a cause of action under section 2--615. Rather, the
defendants attacked the sufficiency of the complaint under section
2--619 claiming there was no recognizable breach of duty.
The majority correctly determined that a breach of duty was
sufficiently alleged. The majority then questioned whether any
damages may be proved but did not make further comment.
I submit that the parties and the trial court should review
Superdawg Drive-In, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 162 Ill. App. 3d 860
(1987). That case stands for the proposition that a plaintiff, in
order to prove the right to recover more than nominal damages, must
not only establish a due process violation but must also show that,
if due process had been given, the end result would have not been
the same, i.e., that the expert witness in this case would not have
inevitably received the confidential information but for the due
process violation.
Based upon the present record, it remains to be seen if the
plaintiff can recover more than nominal damages.