People v. Oakley

October 20, 1998

No. 2--97--0437
________________________________________________________________

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

SECOND DISTRICT
________________________________________________________________

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
OF ILLINOIS, ) of Winnebago County.
)
Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Nos. 96--CF--2514,
) 96--CF--2515
)
v. )
)
LENNETT OAKLEY, ) Honorable
) Frederick J. Kapala,
Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, Presiding.
________________________________________________________________

JUSTICE BOWMAN delivered the opinion of the court:
Following a trial in the circuit court of Winnebago County,
a jury found defendant, Lennett Oakley, guilty of home invasion
(720 ILCS 5/12--11(a)(1) (West 1996)) and aggravated battery (720
ILCS 5/ 12--4(b)(1) (West 1996)). The trial court sentenced
defendant to terms of imprisonment of six years for home invasion
and two years for aggravated battery.
Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal. On appeal, the
only issue that defendant raises is whether his conviction of
home invasion was improper and must be reversed. Defendant
asserts that his conviction of home invasion was improper and
should be reversed because the State failed to establish one of
the elements of the offense. Defendant claims the State failed
to establish that he entered "the dwelling place of another,"
when he engaged in the purportedly criminal conduct. 720 ILCS
5/12--11(a) (West 1996).
The events that gave rise to the charges against defendant
may be briefly summarized. Around 4 a.m. on September 20, 1996,
without authority, defendant knowingly entered a house in
Rockford, Illinois, that was the dwelling place of his former
spouse, Beverly Johnson. Defendant had reason to know that one
or more persons were present in the house because shortly before
he entered the house, defendant had telephoned and spoken to
Johnson, who was in the house at the time.
Defendant entered the house by breaking a basement window
with a sledgehammer and then crawling into the basement through
the broken window. Defendant brought the sledgehammer with him
into the house. There, defendant encountered Johnson's
boyfriend, Kenneth Reaves, and struck Reaves with the
sledgehammer. A struggle between defendant and Reaves ensued.
Johnson called the police, who quickly responded and arrested
defendant. Evidence was presented at trial suggesting that
defendant also had a knife with him when he entered the house.
At trial, Johnson's testimony included the following. The
house that defendant entered was the former marital residence of
Johnson and defendant. When defendant called Johnson at the
house on the morning of September 20, 1996, he told her, "You
need to get your company out of my house. I'll give you 5 to 10
minutes, or I will call the police." Johnson was stunned by the
call from defendant because she and defendant had not lived
together in the house since December 1992. Johnson testified
that her divorce from defendant had been finalized and that the
divorce decree gave her possession of the house. Johnson
acknowledged that defendant's name was still on the title to the
house and on the mortgage papers for the house. Johnson
testified that she was in the process of having defendant's name
removed from the title to the house.
Defendant's testimony included the following. Although the
divorce decree gave Johnson possession of the house, defendant
went to the house nearly every day since he had stopped living in
the house with Johnson. He went to the house to visit his
daughters, ages 12 and 16 at the time, who lived in the house
with Johnson. On the days when he went to the house, defendant
arrived around 7 a.m. after Johnson left for work. After
visiting his daughters, defendant slept in the house until it was
time for him to go to work. Defendant usually started work about
2:30 p.m. According to defendant, he entered the house through a
back door that was always unlocked.
Defendant acknowledged that he did not have Johnson's
permission to be in the house during the day. However, defendant
felt that he did not need Johnson's permission to be in the house
when she was not there. Defendant also acknowledged that on at
least one occasion Johnson discovered him in the house and told
him to "get out of my house." On that occasion, defendant left
because he did not want to cause trouble. However, defendant
felt he had the right to be in the house.
Defendant further testified that his purpose in going to the
house at 4 a.m. on the morning of September 20, 1996, was to get
information about one of his daughters. He claimed that he had
recently learned that the daughter had been raped, but that
Johnson had not told him anything about it. Johnson testified
that the incident involving the daughter had occurred about a
year earlier. Defendant testified that he did not go to the
house with the intention of hurting anyone.
On cross-examination, defendant acknowledged that the order
finalizing his divorce from Johnson had been entered about six
months prior to September 20, 1996. Defendant also acknowledged
that the divorce decree gave Johnson exclusive possession of the
house, all the equity in the house, and responsibility for all
the debts related to the house. Nonetheless, defendant
maintained that the house was his dwelling place "during the day"
when Johnson was not there and when he was there to visit his
daughters and to sleep.
On appeal, defendant contests only his conviction of home
invasion. Defendant does not contest his conviction of
aggravated battery. Defendant asserts that the home invasion
conviction was improper because when he entered the house on
September 20, 1996, he did not enter "the dwelling place of
another," an element of the crime of home invasion. 720 ILCS
5/12--11(a) (West 1996).
Section 12--11 of the Criminal Code of 1961 (720 ILCS 5/12--
11 (West 1996)) sets out the elements of the crime of home
invasion. Section 12--11 provides, in relevant part, as follows:
"(a) A person who is not a peace officer acting in the
line of duty commits home invasion when without authority he
or she knowingly enters the dwelling place of another when
he or she knows or has reason to know that one or more
persons is present or he or she knowingly enters the
dwelling place of another and remains in such dwelling place
until he or she knows or has reason to know that one or more
persons is present and
(1) While armed with a dangerous weapon uses force or
threatens the imminent use of force upon any person or
persons within such dwelling place whether or not injury
occurs, or
(2) Intentionally causes any injury to any person or
persons within such dwelling place." 720 ILCS 5/12--
11(a)(1), (2) (West 1996).
Entry into "the dwelling place of another" is plainly an
element of the crime of home invasion. In this case, defendant
argues that his entry into his former marital residence was not
an entry into "the dwelling place of another" because his name
was on the title to the house and on the mortgage for the house.
In support of his position, defendant cites People v. Reid,
179 Ill. 2d 297 (1997), and People v. Moulton, 282 Ill. App. 3d
102 (1996). In Moulton, a recently divorced woman had exclusive
possession of and was living in her former marital residence.
The woman's ex-spouse, who retained joint title to the property,
violated a plenary order of protection and invaded the former
marital residence. The ex-spouse was charged with aggravated
battery, criminal sexual assault, and home invasion. The trial
court dismissed the home invasion charge on the ground that a
joint owner of a dwelling place could not be charged with home
invasion. Moulton, 282 Ill. App. 3d at 103-04.
On appeal, the Appellate Court, Third District, reviewed the
legislative history of the home invasion statute and concluded
that it showed that the legislature intended that the home
invasion statute should not apply to cases of domestic violence
involving married couples. Moulton, 282 Ill. App. 3d at 105-07.
However, the court stated that it was unclear whether the home
invasion statute was intended to apply in cases where the parties
were recently divorced and the defendant retained an ownership,
but not a possessory, interest in the marital residence.
Reasoning that criminal and penal statutes must be strictly
construed and may not be extended in their application to cases
that do not, by the strictest construction, come under their
provisions, the court ruled that a joint tenant of property does
not fall within the scope of the home invasion statute and
affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the home invasion charge.
Moulton, 282 Ill. App. 3d at 107.
In Reid the defendant was sentenced to death on the basis of
his commission of a murder in the course of the felony of home
invasion. The defendant had rented an apartment with the murder
victim. The victim later obtained an order of protection that
prohibited the defendant from entering the apartment unless the
police were present. The defendant violated the protection order
and entered the apartment, in which the victim continued to live,
without the police being present. During an ensuing fight
between the victim and the defendant in the apartment, the
defendant murdered the victim.
Relying on Moulton, the defendant in Reid argued that his
conduct did not fall within the scope of the home invasion
statute. The State responded by arguing that the protection
order, which granted the victim exclusive possession of the
apartment, rendered the apartment the dwelling place of another
for purposes of the home invasion statute. Reid, 179 Ill. 2d at
316. Our supreme court discussed Moulton and noted the
legislative history of the home invasion statute. The court
stated that the legislative history clearly showed that, in
drafting the home invasion statute, the legislature "specifically
sought to exclude domestic disputes from the reach of the
statute." Reid, 179 Ill. 2d at 316. The court concluded that
the defendant, as a joint renter of the apartment, did not enter
the dwelling place of another when he entered the apartment, even
if he violated a protection order in doing so. The court
therefore held that the "defendant did not commit the offense of
home invasion when he entered his own apartment." Reid, 179 Ill. 2d at 317.
In this case, like the defendants in Reid and Moulton,
defendant contends that he did not enter the dwelling place of
another and therefore did not commit home invasion when he
entered his former marital residence on September 20, 1996.
Defendant argues that because he was a joint tenant of the former
marital residence and because his name appeared on the mortgage
documents for the former marital residence, he did not enter the
dwelling place of another.
Defendant's reliance on Moulton and Reid is unpersuasive.
There are significant distinctions between this case and Moulton
and Reid. In both Moulton and Reid, the defendant's ownership or
lawful tenancy in the property had not been extinguished at the
time each entered the property in question. In Moulton, the
divorce decree granted the wife exclusive possession of the
marital residence only for a period of about two years, after
which the marital residence was to be sold and the proceeds
divided equally between the parties. Moulton, 282 Ill. App. 3d
at 103. In Reid, the defendant, as a joint renter, retained a
tenancy interest in the apartment. Although we note that in both
Moulton and Reid, an existing order of protection barred the
entry of the defendants, we believe that this order did not
necessarily destroy each defendant's ownership or tenancy
interest in the property.
Unlike Moulton and Reid, in this case, when defendant
entered his former marital residence on September 20, 1996, he no
longer possessed an ownership interest in the marital residence.
Any ownership interest defendant possessed prior to the parties'
divorce was extinguished at the time of the entry of the
dissolution judgment. The dissolution judgment granted Johnson
permanent exclusive possession of and all the equity in the
marital residence and gave Johnson responsibility for the debts
related to the marital residence. Although defendant's name had
not yet been removed from the title and mortgage of the marital
residence on the date in question, Johnson testified that she was
in the process of doing so. By its very nature, the dissolution
judgment established the parties' intent to sever their joint
tenancy in the marital residence. See Estate of Dompke v.
Dompke, 186 Ill. App. 3d 930 (1989) (actual transfer of interest
is not required to sever joint tenancy where dissolution decree
clearly established intent to sever). Thus, absent an ownership
interest, defendant did enter the dwelling place "of another"
when he entered Johnson's home on September 20, 1996.
Accordingly, the judgment of the circuit court of Winnebago
County is affirmed.
Affirmed.
INGLIS, J., concurs.
JUSTICE RATHJE, dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. Contrary to the majority's view,
People v. Reid, 179 Ill. 2d 297 (1997) and People v. Moulton, 282
Ill. App. 3d 102 (1996) support defendant's contention that his
conviction on home invasion should be reversed for failure to
establish one of the offense's elements.
Before this court, the State posits that Reid and Moulton
are different from this case because in those cases the marriages
were not dissolved while in this case the marriage had been
dissolved. However, Moulton stated that "[t]he marriage between
the defendant and the victim *** had been dissolved on March 7,
1995," about four months prior to the purported home invasion in
that case. Moulton, 282 Ill. App. 3d at 103. Moreover, there is
nothing in Reid that shows that the defendant and the victim in
that case had ever been married.
Admittedly, there is a factual distinction between this case
and Moulton that is worth noting. In Moulton, the divorce decree
granted the wife exclusive possession of the marital residence
only for a period of about two years, after which the marital
residence was to be sold and the proceeds divided evenly between
the parties. Moulton, 282 Ill. App. 3d at 103. In this case,
the divorce decree granted Johnson permanent exclusive possession
of and all the equity in the marital residence and gave Johnson
responsibility for the debts related to the marital residence.
Despite this distinction, I believe that this court should
follow Reid and Moulton. I am convinced that the courts in Reid
and Moulton correctly determined that the legislature did not
intend the home invasion statute to apply to domestic disputes.
Even if the parties are divorced and one of the parties has the
right to exclusive possession of the property in question, the
home invasion statute would not apply as long as there is an
indication of joint ownership of the property, such as the name
of both parties on the title to the property.
Defendant's claim to ownership of the former marital
residence in this case may be seen as diminished in view of the
terms of the divorce decree. Nonetheless, it is undisputed that
defendant was listed as a joint tenant of the property and his
name was still on the mortgage for the property on September 20,
1996.
This court should hold that defendant's conviction of home
invasion was improper because, as in Reid and Moulton, defendant
did not enter the dwelling place of another when he entered his
former marital residence on September 20, 1996. Defendant's
entry into the dwelling place was therefore outside the scope of
the home invasion statute.