People v. Branch

No. 2--97--0433
________________________________________________________________

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

SECOND DISTRICT
________________________________________________________________

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
ILLINOIS, ) of Kane County.
)
Plaintiff-Appellant, ) No. 97--CF--52
)
v. )
)
VICTOR BRANCH, ) Honorable
) John L. Petersen,
Defendant-Appellee. ) Judge, Presiding.
________________________________________________________________

JUSTICE RATHJE delivered the opinion of the court:

Defendant, Victor Branch, was charged with the unlawful
possession of a weapon by a felon (720 ILCS 5/24--1.1(a) (West
1996)), possession of a firearm without a firearm owner s
identification card (430 ILCS 65/2(a)(1) (West 1996)), and the
unlawful use of weapons (720 ILCS 5/24--1(a)(4) (West 1996)). The
trial court granted his motion to suppress the evidence, and the
State appeals (see 145 Ill. 2d R. 604(a)), contending that the
search of the vehicle defendant was driving was proper.
The evidence presented at the hearing on the motion to
suppress established that defendant was driving a car owned by
Christy Boyton. The car had a license-applied-for sticker on the
rear window. The front seat passenger was Frank Rodriguez,
Boyton s boyfriend, and the backseat passenger was Carlos Acevedo.
Officer Michael Myhre of the Aurora police department stopped
the vehicle because he could not read the sticker. As he
approached the driver s window of the car, he was able to read the
vehicle identification number. Myhre requested defendant s
identification and the vehicle s registration. He also informed
defendant that he and the passenger needed to wear seat belts.
Defendant handed Myhre some ID, although it is not clear whether it
was a driver s license or a state ID card. Defendant told Myhre
that Rodriguez was the vehicle s owner, so Myhre requested
Rodriguez s ID and the vehicle s registration, which Rodriguez gave
him. Myhre also requested and received Acevedo s ID. Myhre
admitted that, when he asked for the ID, he did not suspect Acevedo
of any criminal activity. Myhre intended to give warnings for the
failure to wear seat belts and the improper display of the license
sticker. Myhre then went to his squad car and ran a computer
warrant check on the IDs. About three minutes expired between the
time the vehicle was stopped and when Myhre took the IDs to go run
the computer check.
Another officer arrived to assist as backup. Myhre learned
that Acevedo had an outstanding warrant, so Acevedo was arrested,
handcuffed, and placed in the squad car. The police informed
Rodriguez that, incident to that arrest, they were going to search
the backseat of the car for weapons. Rodriguez told the officers
they could search the entire car. The police smelled marijuana and
then found marijuana cigarettes in the ashtray, so they arrested
both defendant and Rodriguez. Defendant was then searched and
apparently a gun was found.
Relying on People v. Arteaga, 274 Ill. App. 3d 781 (1995), the
trial court found that, after the officer saw the valid
registration and defendant tendered a facially valid license, the
officer had no reason to detain defendant any longer.
Consequently, ordering defendant to wait while the officer ran the
computer check exceeded the justification of the stop and resulted
in an unlawful seizure. The court therefore granted defendant s
motion to suppress. The State contends that the officer s detention
and search of defendant were justified. Ordinarily, a trial
court s ruling on a motion to suppress evidence will not be
disturbed unless it is manifestly erroneous. People v. Krueger,
175 Ill. 2d 60, 64 (1996). However, when there is no question of
fact, we review de novo the trial court s determination of
reasonable suspicion to stop a vehicle and probable cause to
conduct a search. See People v. Shapiro, 177 Ill. 2d 519, 524
(1997); see also Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. ___, ___, 134 L. Ed. 2d 911, 920, 116 S. Ct. 1657, 1663 (1996). Although there
is some question whether defendant tendered a facially valid
license, because the outcome of our analysis would not change in
any event, we accept the trial court s finding that defendant did
give the officer a valid license.
The United States Constitution protects people against
unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const., amend. IV. The
Illinois Constitution of 1970 has a similar provision. See Ill.
Const. 1970, art. I, 6. Under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22,
20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 906-07, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1880 (1968), the fourth
amendment permits minimally intrusive investigatory stops of people
when there is a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. See
also 725 ILCS 5/107--14 (West 1996). The length and scope of the
detention must be strictly tied to and justified by the
circumstances which rendered its initiation permissible. Terry,
392 U.S. at 19, 20 L. Ed. 2d at 904, 88 S. Ct. at 1878. The
investigative detention must be temporary and last no longer than
is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop. People v.
Koutsakis, 272 Ill. App. 3d 159, 163 (1995), citing Florida v.
Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500, 75 L. Ed. 2d 229, 238, 103 S. Ct. 1319,
1325 (1983).
We note that the initial stop of the vehicle was valid, as the
absence of a license plate and the officer s inability to read the
sticker provide a valid basis for an investigatory stop. See
People v. Bradley, 292 Ill. App. 3d 208, 210 (1997). Moreover,
once the officer properly stopped the vehicle, he could approach
the driver to explain the purpose of the stop. See People v.
Adams, 225 Ill. App. 3d 815, 819 (1992). At that point, the
officer observed a violation of the traffic law, that defendant and
the front seat passenger were not wearing seat belts. See 625 ILCS
5/12--603.1(a) (West 1996) (the driver and front seat passenger
must wear seat belts).
The State argues that the trial court erred in relying on
Arteaga. In Arteaga, the Appellate Court, Third District, ruled
that a seizure occurs when, after being tendered a facially valid
driver s license, a police officer detains the defendant to run a
warrant check. Arteaga, 274 Ill. App. 3d at 783.
People v. McVey, 185 Ill. App. 3d 536 (1989), on which Arteaga
relied, does not support Arteaga s ruling. In McVey, the officer
approached a parked vehicle and ordered the occupant to return to
the car; the occupant was not already detained as part of a
legitimate traffic stop. McVey, 185 Ill. App. 3d at 537-38.
Therefore, when the officer ordered the defendant to return to the
car while the officer ran a check on the license, the defendant was
unlawfully seized. McVey, 185 Ill. App. 3d 539. The Appellate
Court, Third District, followed Arteaga in People v. Sinclair, 281
Ill. App. 3d 131, 135 (1996). However, Sinclair also based its
reasoning on State v. Robinette, 73 Ohio St. 3d 650 (1995), which
was reversed by the United States Supreme Court in Ohio v.
Robinette, 519 U.S. ___, 136 L. Ed. 2d 347, 117 S. Ct. 417 (1996).
The Supreme Court there noted that once a motor vehicle has been
lawfully detained for a traffic violation, the police officers may
order the driver to get out of the vehicle without violating the
Fourth Amendment s proscription of unreasonable searches and
seizures. Robinette, 519 U.S. at ___, 136 L. Ed. 2d at 354, 117 S. Ct. at 421, quoting Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 111
n.6, 54 L. Ed. 2d 331, 337 n.6, 98 S. Ct. 330, 333 n.6 (1977).
Robinette held that a police officer need not tell a driver that he
is free to leave before asking the driver s consent to search the
vehicle. Robinette, 519 U.S. at ___, 136 L. Ed. 2d at 355, 117 S. Ct. at 421.
By contrast, there is a long line of cases which ruled that,
under most circumstances, a police officer may run a quick warrant
check of a facially valid driver s license when the driver has been
stopped for a minor traffic violation. See People v. Perez, 288
Ill. App. 3d 1037, 1044 (1997); People v. Easley, 288 Ill. App. 3d
487, 491 (1997); Koutsakis, 272 Ill. App. 3d at 163; People v.
Clodfelder, 172 Ill. App. 3d 1030, 1035-36 (1988); People v.
Ellis, 113 Ill. App. 3d 314, 319-20 (1983). We believe that the
rationale of these cases is more sound, as reasonableness, the
touchstone of the fourth amendment, is measured in objective terms
by examining the totality of the circumstances. Robinette, 519
U.S. at ___, 136 L. Ed. 2d at 354, 117 S. Ct. at 421. The Supreme
Court has consistently eschewed bright-line rules (Robinette, 519
U.S. at ___, 136 L. Ed. 2d at 354, 117 S. Ct. at 421) in this
context, and we believe that it is unwise to adopt such a per se
rule as forbidding a police officer ever to run a warrant check
merely because the driver has produced a facially valid license.
We therefore decline to follow Arteaga, and we adhere to the rule
of the above-cited cases that permits an officer to run a warrant
check if, under the circumstances, to do so is reasonable.
Consequently, we disagree with the trial court that Officer
Myhre could not run a warrant check on defendant s license after
discovering that defendant violated the traffic laws by failing to
wear a seat belt. However, that does not end our inquiry. We must
next determine whether it was permissible for the officer to ask
for and run a warrant check on the ID of the backseat passenger.
The only authority the State cites for this assertion is Maryland
v. Wilson, 519 U.S. ___, 137 L. Ed. 2d 41, 117 S. Ct. 882 (1997).
However, Wilson merely held that, in the interest of the officer s
safety, an officer making a traffic stop may order passengers to
get out of the car during the stop. Wilson, 519 U.S. at ___, 137 L. Ed. 2d at 48, 117 S. Ct. at 886. This holding was based on the
balancing of the individual s right to be free from arbitrary
interference against the strong public interest in the officer s
safety. Wilson, 519 U.S. at ___, 137 L. Ed. 2d at 47, 117 S. Ct.
at 885. No similar competing interest is present here.
Although the State cites People v. Jennings, 185 Ill. App. 3d
164 (1989), in support of its argument concerning Arteaga, we are
troubled by its misreading of the case. The State s brief asserts
that the appellate court in Jennings h[e]ld[] that because the
police officer observed the defendant speeding, he [wa]s justified
in stopping the car[] and had the authority to briefly detain the
driver and request that he produce a valid driver s license.
However, in Jennings, the defendant was a passenger in his own
vehicle. The car was pulled over for speeding, and the officer
asked for both the driver s and defendant s licenses, and he ran a
warrant check on both.
The appellate court ruled that the stop and the check of the
driver s license were proper. However, it ruled that the request
for the defendant s license was improper. Jennings, 185 Ill. App.
3d at 169. The State in Jennings relied on Ellis, 113 Ill. App. 3d
at 314, and People v. Eyler, 132 Ill. App. 3d 792 (1985). The
court disagreed with the State, explaining that, in those cases,
the officer ran a warrant check on the detained person. In
Jennings, the officer had no reason to suspect [the] defendant of
criminal activity at the time of the initial stop. Jennings, 185
Ill. App. 3d at 169. The court concluded that the officer did not
have the authority to demand the production of the defendant s
driver s license when he was not the driver of the vehicle.
Jennings, 185 Ill. App. 3d at 169. This ruling is directly
contrary to the State s position that Officer Myhre could request
the backseat passenger s ID.
We find Jennings directly on point. Here, as in Jennings,
Officer Myhre had no reason to suspect the backseat passenger of
any criminal activity. In fact, Myhre testified that, when he
asked Acevedo for his ID, Myhre was [j]ust asking, and he did not
have any suspicion that a crime was being committed.
We therefore conclude that the officer did not have the
authority to request an ID from the backseat passenger. At that
point, the detention should have ceased (see United States v.
Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 881-82, 45 L. Ed. 2d 607, 617, 95 S. Ct. 2574, 2580 (1975) (the inquiry must be related to the reason
for the stop, and any further detention must be based on consent or
probable cause)), and the officer should have written the warning
ticket and allowed defendant to drive away. Consequently, we
affirm the trial court s order suppressing the evidence.
The order of the circuit court of Kane County is affirmed.
Affirmed.
GEIGER, P.J., and McLAREN, J., concur.