In re Dorothy W.

No. 2--97--0349
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IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

SECOND DISTRICT
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In re DOROTHY W., Alleged to ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
be a Person in Need of ) of Kane County.
Involuntary Psychotropic )
Medication ) No. 97--MH--56
)
(The People of the State of )
Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, ) Honorable
v. Dorothy W., Respondent- ) Robert L. Janes,
Appellant). ) Judge, Presiding.
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PRESIDING JUSTICE GEIGER delivered the opinion of the court:
The respondent, Dorothy W., timely appeals from the circuit
court s order of February 21, 1997, authorizing the involuntary
administration of psychotropic medication to the respondent for up
to 90 days pursuant to section 2--107.1 of the Mental Health and
Developmental Disabilities Code (Code) (405 ILCS 5/2--107.1 (West
1996)). Following an evidentiary hearing on the petition to
administer medication involuntarily, the court concluded that the
State met its burden of showing, with clear and convincing
evidence, that respondent did not have the capacity to make a
reasoned decision whether the benefits of the medication outweighed
its harm. The court stated its findings based on its consideration
of the appropriate factors enumerated in section 2--107.1(a)(4) of
the Code. 405 ILCS 5/2--107.1(a)(4) (West 1996). We affirm.
On appeal, the respondent argues that this court should adopt
a de novo standard of review rather than the manifestly erroneous
standard in reviewing this case and that the decision below merely
involves a question of law. We disagree. This case involves the
application of the appropriate legal standards to the disputed
facts regarding the respondent s need for medication and her
capacity to make a reasoned decision with respect to the advantages
and disadvantages of taking the medication. The State must
demonstrate, by means of clear and convincing evidence, the
statutory bases for medicating the respondent involuntarily. In re
Israel, 278 Ill. App. 3d 24, 35 (1996) (applying manifestly
erroneous standard). The testimony was conflicting, and the
court s decision is based on its findings of fact. The trial court
chose to believe the testimony of the treating physician and
enumerated its factual findings and its legal conclusions.
The manifestly erroneous standard is well established in
Illinois, and we see no compelling reason to alter it. In this
type of case, a reviewing court will give great deference to the
trial court s factual findings because the trial court stands in
the best position to weigh the credibility of the witnesses. A
reviewing court will not reverse a trial court s decision merely
because it might have come to a different conclusion; instead, the
reviewing court will reverse the decision of the trial court only
if it is manifestly erroneous. Israel, 278 Ill. App. 3d at 35; In
re Kness, 277 Ill. App. 3d 711, 718 (1996); In re Schaap, 274 Ill.
App. 3d 497, 502 (1995); In re Jeffers, 239 Ill. App. 3d 29, 35
(1992). This is the standard we apply.
The respondent next argues that the State failed to meet its
burden of proof in showing the need for involuntary medication and
the State failed to overcome the presumption that the respondent
was competent to make medical decisions for herself. Again, we
disagree.
The trial court found that the respondent refused to receive
the medication but could not articulate a reasoned decision for the
refusal; she did not understand the risk/benefit analysis. She had
never before complained of side effects and had merely refused
because she was not arrested on a mental case. The record
discloses that her testimony was sometimes rambling or unresponsive
to some of the questions posed and conflicted with that of the
treating physician.
The treating physician testified that the respondent was
diagnosed as a paranoid schizophrenic. She refused even to listen
to his attempts to have her consider the benefits of the
medication. She was charged with aggravated battery and attempted
murder and had been found unfit to stand trial. She deteriorated
after her previous medications were discontinued because of a legal
time limitation. She became isolative and verbally aggressive
with staff and peers and suffered wide mood swings. The physician
and nurses regularly monitored her for side effects and had not
observed any, nor had she complained of any.
The court found that the respondent had deteriorated in her
ability to function; this deterioration was marked by her
disruptive and aggressive behavior and her becoming isolative.
The less restrictive alternatives of individual and group therapy
had been attempted but had not changed her condition. The court
determined that the benefits of medication outweighed the harm
despite the respondent s belated claim that the medication made her
groggy or zombie-like.
Based on our careful review of the record, we cannot say that
the trial court s decision to authorize the administration of the
medication was manifestly erroneous or that there was any error
committed that was clearly evident, plain, and undisputable.
Kness, 277 Ill. App. 3d at 718.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court
of Kane County is affirmed.
Affirmed.
BOWMAN and THOMAS, JJ., concur.