In re A.S.B.

No. 2--97--0305
_________________________________________________________________

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

SECOND DISTRICT
__________________________________________________________________

In re A.S.B., a Minor ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
) of Kane County.
(Yamal Aich-Sindino, )
Petitioner-Appellant, v. The ) Nos. 95--J--93
Department of Children and ) 96--AD--72
Family Services; John Doe )
and Jane Doe, Respondents- )
Appellees (The People of the ) Honorable
State of Illinois, Plaintiff, ) Thomas E. Mueller,
v. S.B., Defendant)). ) Judge, Presiding.
__________________________________________________________________

JUSTICE BOWMAN delivered the opinion of the court:
Petitioner, Yamal Aich-Sindino, appeals from the adoption
court's order granting the Department of Children and Family
Services' (DCFS) motion to strike his petition for leave to
intervene in the adoption proceeding of A.S.B. He is opposed by
both the State and the adoptive parents (collectively,
respondents). We affirm.
This case includes a somewhat detailed factual and procedural
history. On February 15, 1995, DCFS took A.S.B. into custody after
the child was abandoned by her natural mother, S.B. After the
juvenile court held an initial adjudicatory hearing on February 16,
1995, a process server attempted to serve S.B. at her last known
address. The summons was returned unserved because the address was
vacant. The process server then unsuccessfully attempted to locate
S.B. via telephone directory assistance. On February 24, 1995, the
process server filed an affidavit of due diligence and stated that
she was unable to locate S.B. S.B. was served with notice by
publication on March 23, 1995.
On April 18, 1995, a default judgment was entered against S.B.
At that time, the State indicated that A.S.B.'s father, Joseph
Youkhanna, was currently incarcerated; the record is unclear as to
how the State knew of Youkhanna. On April 19, 1995, DCFS filed an
affidavit of diligent search detailing its efforts in attempting to
locate S.B. For example, DCFS called S.B.'s maternal great
grandmother and her cousin, visited all prior addresses listed in
her DCFS file, and checked with the Department of Public Aid.
On June 5, 1995, S.B. and A.S.B. submitted to blood testing.
On June 22, 1995, Youkhanna agreed to submit to a paternity test.
On June 30, 1995, a blood test revealed that Youkhanna was not
A.S.B.'s father. On August 31, 1995, a DCFS official informed the
juvenile court that she knew "of no other father that mama has
named." As a result, the juvenile court again ordered DCFS to
attempt to locate S.B.
On October 12, 1995, DCFS filed another affidavit of diligent
search. In the affidavit, DCFS stated that it had no contact with
S.B. after the June 5 blood test. Moreover, DCFS had sent two
certified letters to S.B.'s last known address; DCFS did not
receive a response to either letter. The affidavit concluded that,
because S.B. could not be located, it would not be possible for
DCFS to inquire about the identity of A.S.B.'s natural father.
On November 2, 1995, notice by publication for an adjudicatory
hearing for unknown fathers of A.S.B. was effectuated in the Geneva
Republican newspaper. On November 14, 1995, the juvenile court
entered a default order against all unknown fathers regarding the
adjudication of their rights. On November 9, 16, and 23, notice by
publication for termination of parental rights of unknown fathers
of A.S.B. was effectuated in the Geneva Republican. On December
26, 1995, the juvenile court entered a default order against all
unknown fathers regarding the termination of their parental rights.
On January 25, February 1, and 8, 1996, S.B. was served with notice
by publication regarding the termination of her parental rights.
She appeared in court on March 1, 1996, and surrendered her
parental rights.
On April 11, 1996, the juvenile court held a hearing and
determined that it was in A.S.B.'s best interests to terminate the
parental rights of unknown fathers and to grant adoptive rights to
interested parties. On July 3, 1996, the adoptive parents filed
their petition for adoption. On August 29, 1996, petitioner's name
appeared, for the first time in the record, in a DCFS report. The
report indicates that S.B. stated petitioner was A.S.B.'s father.
The report also indicates that the Putative Father Registry was
checked. No one has registered as father of [A.S.B.]" DCFS
repeated this exact information in a status report dated September
30, 1996.
On December 2, 1996, petitioner appeared in the adoption court
and claimed to be the putative father. At that time, the adoption
court noted that (1) the State had initially proceeded with the
father as named by S.B. and that blood testing had excluded
Youkhanna as the father; (2) DCFS proceeded and published against
all unknown fathers because S.B. had not provided any other names;
and (3) DCFS had filed an affidavit of diligent search as early as
October 1995, wherein it stated that no additional information
could be obtained regarding a possible father because S.B. could
not be located. Petitioner informed the adoption court that, after
two of S.B.'s relatives had told him that Youkhanna was the father,
he "just left it alone." Then, late in November 1996, he
encountered another individual who told him that "everything was a
lie" and that there was a possibility that he was A.S.B.'s father.
On December 19, 1996, A.S.B.'s adoption was finalized without
notice to petitioner. DCFS informed the adoption court of this
finalization by letter dated December 23, 1996. The letter was
file-stamped December 30, 1996.
On December 30, 1996, petitioner filed a petition for leave to
intervene in the adoption proceedings. In it, he claimed that S.B.
had lied and misled him regarding paternity, so he had not taken
any action to preserve his rights prior to November 1996.
On February 14, 1997, the adoption court issued an order
granting DCFS' motion to strike the petition for leave to
intervene. The adoption court determined that petitioner had not
shown a sufficient interest in A.S.B. during the first 30 days
after her birth. Additionally, the adoption court found that
although petitioner was given notice in November 1995 of the case
involving A.S.B., when she was already 1« years old, he did not
pursue his paternity claim until more than one year later.
Accordingly, the adoption court granted DCFS' motion to strike his
petition for leave to intervene, discharged DCFS, and dismissed the
case.
Petitioner thereafter filed this appeal. On appeal,
petitioner has three principal contentions: (1) the juvenile court
violated his due process rights by terminating his parental rights
without notice; (2) the statutory scheme governing the termination
of his parental rights and the adoption of A.S.B. violated his
equal protection rights; and (3) the adoption court erred in
striking his petition for leave to intervene.
I
Petitioner's first contention on appeal is that the juvenile
court violated his due process rights when it terminated his
parental rights without notice. In support of this contention,
petitioner argues that (1) it was error for the juvenile court to
terminate his parental rights because DCFS did not exercise due
diligence during default proceedings against unknown fathers; and
(2) the adoption court improperly granted the judgment of adoption
after he first appeared in court. Respondents initially reply that
the record belies petitioner's argument that DCFS did not exercise
due diligence in attempting to determine the identity of A.S.B.'s
father and that any inquiry must be limited to an examination of
DCFS' actions before the entry of the default judgment as to
parental rights on December 26, 1995. Moreover, respondents argue
that petitioner had no right to notice of the adoption proceeding
and its finalization on December 19, 1996, because his parental
rights had already been terminated.
A
Petitioner's due diligence argument is governed by section 2--
16(2) of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (Act) (705 ILCS 405/2--
16(2) (West 1994)). This section states, in pertinent part, that
where a party's usual place of abode is unknown, "a diligent
inquiry shall be made to ascertain" his current and last known
address. 705 ILCS 405/2--16(2) (West 1994). If diligent inquiry
does not reveal the party's location, then opposing counsel is
required to file an affidavit stating as such and indicating what
efforts were made to effectuate service. 705 ILCS 405/2--16(2)
(West 1994). After receiving this affidavit, the clerk of the
court must then issue service by publication. 705 ILCS 405/2--
16(2) (West 1994).
The parties do not cite any authority, and our research has
not revealed any, which defines "due diligence" in the context of
section 2--16(2) of the Act (see 705 ILCS 405/2--16(2) (West
1994)). However, we believe that "due diligence" is a universal
concept and one which may reasonably include "that kind of search
or investigation which a diligent person, intent on ascertaining a
fact, would usually and ordinarily make." In re Application of the
County Collector for Judgment & Order of Sale Against the Lands &
Lots Returned Delinquent for Nonpayment of General Taxes for the
Year 1987 and Prior Years, 278 Ill. App. 3d 168, 172 (1996). When
examining the facts of this case in light of this common "due
diligence" standard, it is apparent that DCFS satisfied its
statutory burden.
In its initial effort to locate A.S.B.'s natural father, the
State first attempted to serve a summons upon the natural mother,
S.B. The summons was returned unserved. The process server also
unsuccessfully attempted to locate S.B. via telephone directory
assistance. The process server filed an affidavit of due diligence
describing her efforts. DCFS also filed several affidavits of due
diligence, wherein it described the efforts it made in attempting
to locate S.B. Such efforts included contacting S.B.'s relatives,
checking her records with the Department of Public Aid, and
visiting previously listed addresses. After the State became aware
of Youkhanna's identity, it obtained a writ for his presence in
court and his consent to paternity testing. A paternity test
revealed that he was not A.S.B.'s father. The State was unable to
contact S.B. after she appeared for blood testing. Thereafter,
notice by publication was made against all unknown fathers, both
for an adjudicatory hearing and then for the termination of
parental rights hearing. A default judgment was entered against
all unknown fathers on December 26, 1995, thereby terminating their
parental rights.
As the foregoing makes clear, the State and DCFS in particular
made several attempts to locate S.B. to determine the identity of
A.S.B.'s father. Youkhanna was the only person S.B. named as the
father before the termination of all unknown fathers' parental
rights. Prior to that termination, it is apparent that DCFS
conducted "that kind of search or investigation which a diligent
person, intent on ascertaining a fact, would usually and ordinarily
make." In re Application of the County Collector, 278 Ill. App. 3d
at 172. We therefore conclude that DCFS engaged in a diligent
inquiry for A.S.B's father prior to filing its affidavit and
requesting notice by publication. See 705 ILCS 405/2--16(2) (West
1994).
We note that petitioner also argues that the State did not
conduct a diligent inquiry because it subsequently learned of his
identity after the default judgment was entered. However,
petitioner cites no authority in support of this proposition. We
know of no precedent that would require the State to conduct a
second diligent inquiry after it had completed its initial diligent
inquiry pursuant to the Act. The Act makes no mention of such a
procedure. See 705 ILCS 405/2--16(2) (West 1994). Once the State
conducted a diligent inquiry in search of A.S.B's father,
memorialized that inquiry in an affidavit, requested notice by
publication, and proceeded while such notice was effectuated, the
State's responsibility under the Act was complete. See 705 ILCS
405/2--16(2) (West 1994). Under petitioner's argument, the
juvenile court would be forced to reopen the default judgment
against all unknown fathers almost a year after its entry because
S.B. chose to name a second possible father after December 26,
1995. Such a result would obviously eviscerate the purpose of
notice by publication and is without support in the Act.
B
We next address whether the juvenile court erred in
terminating the parental rights of all unknown fathers including
petitioner. Parental rights and responsibilities, despite their
societal and personal importance, may be terminated when a parent
is adjudicated unfit pursuant to statute. In re J.F., 248 Ill.
App. 3d 1, 5 (1992). However, because each case involving parental
unfitness is sui generis, courts generally do not make factual
comparisons to other cases. In re S.J., 233 Ill. App. 3d 88, 113
(1992). To effectuate the termination of parental rights, the
State need only prove one statutory factor of unfitness (In re
J.T.C., 273 Ill. App. 3d 193, 198 (1995)) by clear and convincing
evidence (In re V.O., 284 Ill. App. 3d 686, 690 (1996)). In other
words, a reviewing court need not consider other findings of
unfitness when there is sufficient evidence to satisfy any one
statutory ground. S.J., 233 Ill. App. 3d at 114-15. A finding of
parental fitness is accorded great deference on review (V.O., 284
Ill. App. 3d at 690) and will not be reversed unless it is against
the manifest weight of the evidence (In re B.R., 282 Ill. App. 3d
665, 670 (1996)).
Where the State alleges that a person is unfit because of a
failure to demonstrate a reasonable degree of interest, concern, or
responsibility to a newborn child (see 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(l) (West
1994)), fitness is determined by the efforts the person makes to
communicate with or show interest in the child. In re Adoption of
A.S.V., 268 Ill. App. 3d 549, 557 (1994). Even extreme
circumstances that impede the parent's ability to develop a
relationship with the child do not excuse a complete lack of
communication or interest in the child. A.S.V., 268 Ill. App. 3d
at 558.
In this case, at the termination hearing, the juvenile court
first considered whether the unknown fathers had maintained a
reasonable degree of interest, concern, or responsibility for
A.S.B. The trial court found "a total lack of any contact between
any fathers and the minor child, so certainly the State proved that
province [sic] by clear and convincing evidence." The juvenile
court also noted that, "it's very clear and cannot be disputed that
no fathers ever surfaced ***" within the first 30 days after
A.S.B.'s birth. Nothing in the record contradicts the juvenile
court's findings. The State proved, by clear and convincing
evidence, that petitioner and all unknown fathers failed to
demonstrate any interest, concern, or responsibility for A.S.B. not
only during the first 30 days of her life but also during the first
several years of her life. Accordingly, we find that the juvenile
court's decision to terminate the parental rights of all unknown
fathers, including petitioner, was not against the manifest weight
of the evidence. See B.R., 282 Ill. App. 3d at 670.
Petitioner argues that he was "thwarted" from demonstrating
interest, concern, or responsibility for A.S.B. by S.B.'s
representations to him. According to petitioner, S.B. and her
relatives told him that he was not A.S.B.'s father and that
Youkhanna was the child's father. After hearing this information,
petitioner "took no action to pursue the possibility of his own
paternity." He now asserts that "it was reasonable to rely on
[S.B.'s] representations." Therefore, his failure to timely assert
his rights should now be excused, even though the termination and
adoption proceedings are complete.
Petitioner's argument is untenable. As noted, we found no
error in the determination of unfitness pursuant to section 1(D)(l)
of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(l) (West 1994)). This
section imposes a substantial burden on natural parents to
demonstrate a reasonable degree of interest, concern, or
responsibility for a child during the first 30 days after its
birth. In re Adoption of J.R.G., 247 Ill. App. 3d 104, 110 (1993).
The burden is "unequivocal and requires that a parent affirmatively
show a commitment to his child within 30 days of birth ***."
J.R.G., 247 Ill. App. 3d at 110. Thus, what a putative father
believes in his own mind is relevant "only if he had made any
effort to show interest, concern, or responsibility" for a child.
A.S.V., 268 Ill. App. 3d at 558. In the absence of any effort on
petitioner's part, we cannot conclude that he has evinced a
reasonable degree of interest in A.S.B. See A.S.V., 268 Ill. App.
3d at 558. Therefore, the juvenile court did not err in
terminating the parental rights of all unknown fathers, including
petitioner.
C
Petitioner further argues that the adoption court erroneously
granted the judgment of adoption after it became aware of his
interest as a putative father. According to petitioner, after he
appeared in court on December 2, 1996, and was granted a
continuance until December 30, 1996, to hire an attorney, the
adoption court erred in granting the adoption decree on December
19, 1996, without notice to him. According to respondents,
petitioner had no right to notice of the adoption proceeding
because his rights had been previously terminated and he had not
shown any interest in A.S.B. since her birth.
Petitioner's contention is, of course, based on the premise
that he in fact had a due process right to notice of the adoption
hearing. He had no such right. In Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 77 L. Ed. 2d 614, 103 S. Ct. 2985 (1983), the Court reviewed
the constitutionality of New York's "Putative Father Registry"
statute, to which Illinois' statute is substantially similar.
Compare N.Y. Soc. Serv. Law 372-c (McKinney Supp. 1982-1983) with
750 ILCS 50/12.1 (West 1994). The putative father in Lehr
challenged the statute on due process and equal protection grounds
after he was not given advance notice of the adoption proceeding
involving his biological daughter. The putative father did not
have "any significant custodial, personal, or financial
relationship" with the child and "he did not seek to establish a
legal tie until after [the child] was two years old." Lehr, 463 U.S. at 262, 77 L. Ed. 2d at 627, 103 S. Ct. at 2994. The Court
held that New York's statutory scheme adequately protected the
putative father's interests. Notably, the Court stated that,
"[T]he right to receive notice was completely within [the putative
father's] control. By mailing a postcard to the putative father
registry, he could have guaranteed that he would receive notice of
any proceedings to adopt [his biological daughter]." Lehr, 463 U.S. at 264, 77 L. Ed. 2d at 628, 103 S. Ct. at 2995. Thus,
because the putative father in Lehr neither developed a
relationship with his biological daughter nor took any affirmative
action to protect his interest in establishing such a relationship,
the Constitution did not require "either a trial judge or a
litigant to give special notice to nonparties who are presumptively
capable of asserting and protecting their own rights." Lehr, 463 U.S. at 265, 77 L. Ed. 2d at 629, 103 S. Ct. at 2995.
Similarly in this case, petitioner did not establish any
relationship with A.S.B. during her life. More importantly, just
as the putative father in Lehr, petitioner did not avail himself of
the statutory scheme that was designed to protect his inchoate
interest in A.S.B.; petitioner concedes that he did not register
with the Putative Father Registry. As such, he is statutorily
barred from asserting that interest. See 750 ILCS 50/12.1(g) (West
1994). Consistent with the dictates of Lehr, petitioner was not
entitled to receive special notice of the adoption proceeding when
he was presumptively capable of protecting his interest in such
notice. Thus, his due process rights were not violated.
II
Petitioner next contends that his constitutional right to
equal protection was violated when his parental rights were
terminated. Although it is unclear from petitioner's brief, he is
seemingly challenging the constitutionality of section 1(D) of the
Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1(D) (West 1994)), which defines unfit
parents, and section 12.1 of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/12.1 et
seq. (West 1994)), which describes the Putative Father Registry.
In other words, petitioner contends that the statutory scheme that
governs the termination of his parental rights and the adoption of
A.S.B. is unconstitutional.
At the outset, we note that petitioner's brief is also devoid
of citation to any authority that governs our standard of review in
a statutory challenge of constitutional proportion. Fortunately,
this precedent is well settled. All legislative enactments are
presumed to be constitutional (Fink v. Ryan, 174 Ill. 2d 302, 308
(1996)), and any doubts are resolved in favor of their validity
(Jost v. Bailey, 286 Ill. App. 3d 872, 879 (1997)). Petitioner
has a heavy burden to rebut this presumption. See Jost, 286 Ill.
App. 3d at 879.
In reviewing an equal protection claim, we must first
determine whether the challenged statute impedes a fundamental
right or discriminates against a suspect class. In re C.T., 281
Ill. App. 3d 189, 195 (1996). If the statute suffers from either
infirmity, then we apply the strict scrutiny test and uphold the
statute's constitutionality only if it is narrowly tailored to
serve a compelling state interest. C.T., 281 Ill. App. 3d at 195.
However, where the challenged statute does not affect either a
fundamental right or a suspect class, we apply the rational basis
test. C.T., 281 Ill. App. 3d at 195. Under the rational basis
test, our review "is limited and generally deferential." Committee
for Education Rights v. Edgar, 174 Ill. 2d 1, 37 (1996). To
withstand rational basis review, a statute "need only be rationally
related to a legitimate state goal" and must be upheld if any set
of facts "can reasonably be conceived" to justify the legislative
classification. Edgar, 174 Ill. 2d at 37.
A
Petitioner's first equal protection challenge appears to be
directed at section 1 of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1 et seq.
(West 1994)), which provides for various definitions of "unfit
person." At the termination hearing, the trial court found that
the State had proved three separate bases for unfitness by clear
and convincing evidence. The juvenile court noted that it was
apparent that all unknown fathers had abandoned A.S.B. (see 750
ILCS 50/1(D)(a) (West 1994)), had failed to maintain a reasonable
degree of interest, concern, and responsibility for A.S.B.'s
welfare (see 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(b) (West 1994)), and had failed to
maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern, and
responsibility for A.S.B.'s welfare within the first 30 days after
her birth (see 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(l) (West 1994)). According to
petitioner, these sections discriminate against unwed fathers and
the termination of his parental rights pursuant to them violated
his right to equal protection.
Under the Adoption Act, "unfit person" is defined to be "any
person whom the court shall find to be unfit to have a child ***."
(Emphasis added.) 750 ILCS 50/1(D) (West 1994). The statute then
defines several grounds for unfitness, including abandonment (750
ILCS 50/1(D)(a) (West 1994)), failure to show reasonable interest,
concern, or responsibility (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(b) (West 1994)), and
failure to demonstrate the same during the first 30 days of the
child's life (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(l) (West 1994)).
As is obvious, the statute is written in gender-neutral
language. It does not create a sex-based classification because
"any person" may be judicially deemed to be unfit. See 750 ILCS
50/1(D) (West 1994). The Adoption Act therefore does not
discriminate against a suspect class. See Frontiero v. Richardson,
411 U.S. 677, 682, 36 L. Ed. 2d 583, 589, 93 S. Ct. 1764, 1768
(1973) (suspect classifications include only race, sex, alienage,
and national origin); People ex rel. Difanis v. Barr, 78 Ill. App.
3d 842, 848 (1979), aff'd, 83 Ill. 2d 191 (1980) (distinction not
based on gender subject only to rational basis review).
Moreover, the Adoption Act does not burden a fundamental
right. Of course, the interest of a parent in the care and custody
of his child is fundamental. C.T., 281 Ill. App. 3d at 195.
However, where a parent never establishes a "custodial, personal,
or financial relationship" with a child or merely abandons the
child, the Constitution does not grant him that fundamental right
of parenthood. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 267-68, 77 L. Ed. 2d at 630, 103 S. Ct. at 2996-97. As the facts of this case make clear,
petitioner did not establish a "custodial, personal, or financial
relationship" with A.S.B. at any time during her life. As such, he
cannot now claim to have a fundamental right. See Lehr, 463 U.S.
at 267-68, 77 L. Ed. 2d at 630, 103 S. Ct. at 2996-97. Absent a
burden on a fundamental right, or discrimination against a suspect
class, we review the challenged statutory provisions under the
rational basis test.
After reviewing the definition of "unfit person" under the
highly deferential rational basis test (see Edgar, 174 Ill. 2d at
37), we conclude that the statute is reasonably related to a
legitimate governmental interest. The overriding concern of the
Adoption Act is the best interests of the child at issue. In re
Marriage of T.H., 255 Ill. App. 3d 247, 253 (1993). While the
termination of parental rights should not be treated lightly (see
In re Dawn H., 281 Ill. App. 3d 746, 755 (1996)), terminating those
rights when a child's welfare is at issue constitutes a legitimate
state interest. The legislature has fashioned several definitions
of "unfit person" which, if proved by clear and convincing
evidence, allow for the termination of parental rights. See 750
ILCS 50/1(D) (West 1994). It is unassailable that each of the
challenged definitions of "unfit person" is reasonably related to
the State's interest in terminating parental rights in favor of the
best interests of a child. For example, it is axiomatic that a
parent who has abandoned a child, or has failed to demonstrate
concern, interest, or responsibility during the first 30 days of a
child's life reasonably qualifies as an "unfit person" for
parenthood purposes. Moreover, petitioner has set forth nothing to
satisfy his steep burden of proving the unconstitutionality of the
challenged provisions of the Adoption Act. See Bailey, 286 Ill.
App. 3d at 879. The provisions are rationally related to a
legitimate state goal. See Edgar, 174 Ill. 2d at 37. Accordingly,
we find no equal protection violation.
B
Petitioner's second equal protection challenge concerns the
Putative Father Registry, as contained in section 12.1 of the
Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/12.1 (West 1994). The Putative Father
Registry serves to aid in determining the identification and
location of putative fathers. 750 ILCS 50/12.1 (West 1994). Under
this section, any putative father of a minor child must register
with DCFS before the child's birth, but no later than 30 days after
the child's birth. 750 ILCS 50/12.1(b) (West 1994). A putative
father who fails to register within the time allotted "is barred
from thereafter bringing or maintaining any action to assert any
interest in the child ***." 750 ILCS 50/12.1(g) (West 1994).
However, if the putative father can prove by clear and convincing
evidence that it was not possible for him to register within the
allotted time (750 ILCS 50/12.1(g)(1) (West 1994)), that his
failure to register was not his fault (750 ILCS 50/12.1(g)(2) (West
1994)), and that he registered within 10 days after it became
possible for him to do so (750 ILCS 50/12.1(g)(3) (West 1994)),
then he is allowed to assert his interest in the child.
As is apparent, the Putative Father Registry is a gender-based
classification. Legislative classifications based on gender are
reviewed using the intermediate level of scrutiny. Edgar, 174 Ill. 2d at 33; Jacobson v. Department of Public Aid, 171 Ill. 2d 314,
322-23 (1996). The intermediate level of scrutiny "requires that
the statutory classification be substantially related to an
important governmental objective." In re Custody of D.A., 201 Ill.
App. 3d 810, 817 (1990).
As noted in the statute, the Putative Father Registry serves
to aid in identifying and locating putative fathers. By using the
Putative Father Registry, putative fathers can protect their
interests in their biological children. The Putative Father
Registry also serves to facilitate adoptions; where a search of the
Registry does not reveal a putative father, a presumption arises
that no putative father exists and the adoption can proceed. As
previously discussed, it is axiomatic that these concerns represent
important governmental interests. The registration provisions are
substantially related to these interests. Any man who has sexual
relations with a woman can register confidentially, at any time
before childbirth and up to 30 days thereafter, to protect his
rights. Moreover, if he can prove that his ability to register was
somehow impeded, then the statute provides him with even more time
to register. The Putative Father Registry is therefore
substantially related to important state interests. See D.A., 201
Ill. App. 3d at 817. Once again, petitioner has failed to satisfy
his burden of proving the unconstitutionally of the statute. See
Bailey, 286 Ill. App. 3d at 879. Thus, his equal protection rights
were not violated.
Finally, we note that our conclusion is again supported by the
Supreme Court's decision in Lehr. In Lehr, the Court distinguished
between two classes of unwed fathers. Those fathers who
demonstrate "a full commitment to the responsibilities of
parenthood" are afforded constitutional protection for their
interests in personal contact with their children. Lehr, 463 U.S.
at 261, 77 L. Ed. 2d at 626, 103 S. Ct. at 2993. On the other
hand, where a father does not accept "some measure of
responsibility for the child's future," the Constitution "will not
automatically compel a State to listen to his opinion of where the
child's best interests lie." Lehr, 463 U.S. at 262, 77 L. Ed. 2d
at 627, 103 S. Ct. at 2994-95. The Court held that, because the
putative father did not establish any "custodial, personal, or
financial relationship" with the child (Lehr, 463 U.S. at 267, 77 L. Ed. 2d at 630, 103 S. Ct. at 2996), his rights differed from
those of the mother and were not entitled to the same
constitutional protection (Lehr, 463 U.S. at 267-68, 77 L. Ed. 2d
at 630-31, 103 S. Ct. at 2996-97). As such, the putative father
registry and its application to the father were consistent with the
principles of equal protection.
Petitioner in the instant case acted similarly to the putative
father in Lehr. Petitioner did not establish a "custodial,
personal, or financial relationship" with A.S.B. at any time during
her life. Moreover, he did not seek to establish a legal tie to
A.S.B. As such, a possible biological connection to A.S.B. does
not trigger constitutional protection for any interest petitioner
may have asserted several years after A.S.B.'s birth and nearly one
year after her adoption was finalized. Neither the Putative Father
Registry nor its application to petitioner violate equal protection
principles.
III
Petitioner's final contention is that the adoption court erred
in striking his petition for leave to intervene. Specifically,
petitioner argues that he could not demonstrate a reasonable degree
of interest and concern in A.S.B. because he was "thwarted from
asserting" such interest and concern by S.B. According to
respondents, the adoption court correctly struck the petition for
leave to intervene and terminated petitioner's parental rights;
because petitioner's rights are independent of S.B.'s, his reliance
on her representations was misplaced.
Initially, we note that, as previously mentioned, petitioner
concedes that he did not register at any time with the Putative
Father Registry. He is therefore statutorily barred from bringing
any action to assert any interest in A.S.B. See 750 ILCS
50/12.1(g) (West 1994). On this ground alone, it was proper for
the adoption court to strike his petition for leave to intervene.
We further note that, because petitioner has no parental rights in
A.S.B., he has no standing to pursue any interests in an adoption
case. See 750 ILCS 50/5(B)(f)(1) (West 1994) (parents shall not be
made parties to an adoption proceeding if their rights have been
terminated). It was also proper for the trial court to deny
petitioner leave to intervene on this ground. We recognize that
the adoption court did not expressly employ either of these
rationales when it struck the petition for leave to intervene.
However, it is well established that we may affirm a trial court's
decision on any basis appearing in the record. Trustees of Wheaton
College v. Peters, 286 Ill. App. 3d 882, 887 (1997). Accordingly,
we determine that the adoption court's decision to strike the
petition for leave to intervene was not error.
Our decision is unchanged when we consider the rationale
expressed by the adoption court. In its February 14, 1997, order,
the trial court granted DCFS' motion to strike the petition for
leave to intervene because petitioner "failed to demonstrate a
reasonable degree of interest in this minor child" pursuant to
section 1(D)(1) of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(1) (West
1994)). We have already determined that this finding is not
against the manifest weight of the evidence. We have also
previously determined that petitioner's utter failure to
demonstrate any interest in A.S.B. cannot be excused by his belief
that S.B. "thwarted" his otherwise good intentions. Accordingly,
it was not error for the adoption court to deny petitioner leave to
intervene in the adoption proceeding.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court
of Kane County is affirmed.
Affirmed.
DOYLE and COLWELL, JJ., concur.