In re W.L.

No. 2--97--0064
________________________________________________________________

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

SECOND DISTRICT
________________________________________________________________

In re W.L., a Minor ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
) of Lake County.
)
) No. 96--JD--554
)
(The People of the State of ) Honorable
Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, ) Margaret J. Mullen,
v. W.L., Respondent-Appellant). ) Judge, Presiding.)
________________________________________________________________

JUSTICE RATHJE delivered the opinion of the court:
Respondent, W.L., appeals the trial court's order releasing his
name and the offenses he committed to an agent of the Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF).
Respondent was originally charged with committing 14 counts of
criminal damage to property (720 ILCS 5/21--1(1)(a) (West 1996)) and
1 count of arson (720 ILCS 5/20--1(a) (West 1996)). Respondent
admitted committing two counts of criminal damage to property, was
adjudicated a delinquent minor, made a ward of the court, and placed
on two years' probation.
Thereafter, the State filed a petition seeking to release the
case number, respondent's name, and the final disposition of the
action to an ATF agent. The petition alleged that (1) the agent
wanted the information because the charges involved damage to church
property and the use of swastikas; (2) sections 1--7 and 1--8 of the
Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (Act) (705 ILCS 405/1--7, 1--8 (West
1996)) allow the release of the information if it is to be used for
an ongoing investigation; (3) the agent requested the information
for statistical purposes; and (4) the information would "be used for
investigation purposes, although not for any one specific
investigation."
Respondent objected to the release of the information and
argued that the Act did not authorize the release of the information
for the use cited by the State. Respondent further argued that, if
the agent wanted the information for statistical purposes, the court
should not release respondent's name but rather, only the nature of
the offenses and the final disposition.
After hearing argument, the trial court granted the State's
motion. The trial court denied respondent's motion to reconsider,
and respondent filed a timely notice of appeal.
We first address the State's argument that the party seeking
to restrict access to court records bears the burden of
demonstrating a compelling interest for restricting access. The
State further contends that any restriction should be narrowly
tailored.
After reviewing the Act, we conclude that the State's argument
is patently incorrect. Even a cursory reading of the Act reveals
that law enforcement and court records relating to juveniles are
presumed confidential and that those records will not be released
unless one of the exceptions noted in the Act is met. See 705 ILCS
405/1--7(A) (West 1996) ("Inspection and copying of law enforcement
records *** that relate to a minor *** shall be restricted to the
following"); 705 ILCS 405/1--7(C) (West 1996) ("The records of law
enforcement officers concerning all minors *** must be maintained
separate from the records of arrests and may not be open to public
inspection or their contents disclosed to the public"); 705 ILCS
405/1--7(E) (West 1996) ("Law enforcement officers may not disclose
the identity of any minor in releasing information to the general
public as to the arrest, investigation or disposition of any case
involving a minor"); 705 ILCS 405/1--8(A) (West 1996) ("Inspection
and copying of juvenile court records relating to a minor who is the
subject of a proceeding under this Act shall be restricted to the
following"); (705 ILCS 405/1--8(C) (West 1996) ("Except as otherwise
provided ***, juvenile court records shall not be made available to
the general public")). Consequently, we agree with respondent that
the trial court should not have ordered the release of the
information unless the State provided sufficient evidence to
demonstrate that the release falls within a statutory exception.
On appeal, the State identifies five subsections from two
different sections that allegedly justify the release of the
information to the ATF. First, the State argues that section 1--7
authorizes the release of respondent's law enforcement records.
This section provides, in pertinent part:
"(A) Inspection and copying of law enforcement records
*** that relate to a minor *** shall be restricted to the
following:
(1) Any local, State, or federal law enforcement
officers of any jurisdiction or agency when necessary for
the discharge of their official duties during the
investigation or prosecution of a crime ***.
* * *
(6) Persons engaged in bona fide research, with the
permission of the Presiding Judge of the Juvenile Court
and the chief executive of the respective law enforcement
agency ***." 705 ILCS 405/1--7(A)(1), (A)(6) (West
1996).
In order to determine if the State demonstrated that the
release of the information falls within one of these exceptions, we
must determine the intent and extent of the exceptions. In so
doing, we are guided by the general principle that the legislative
intent of a statute is best determined from the plain and ordinary
meaning of the statutory language. People v. Wittenmyer, 151 Ill. 2d 175, 195 (1992). Where the language is clear and unambiguous,
we must apply it as written. Wittenmyer, 151 Ill. 2d at 195.
After reviewing the exceptions relied upon by the State, we
have determined that they are clear and unambiguous and that the
State has failed to demonstrate that they permit the release of the
requested information.
Section 1--7(A)(1) permits the information to be released to
a law enforcement officer who is investigating or prosecuting "a
crime." The clear language of the statute indicates that it is not
sufficient for the officer to be investigating crime in general.
Instead, the officer must be investigating a particular crime.
Information should not be released under this provision unless the
State identifies the crime being investigated or prosecuted and
proves that the information is necessary to the investigation or
prosecution of that crime. Here, the State admitted in its petition
that the information would not be used "for any one specific
investigation." Since the State did not identify a crime and, in
fact, admitted that the information was not being used to
investigate a particular crime, this section cannot support the
trial court's decision.
The State next contends that the language of section 1--7(A)(6)
indicates a legislative intent to allow the release of the
information for bona fide research projects. The State further
explains that the ATF agent's project is just such a project.
Even if we were to conclude that the ATF agent is conducting
a bona fide research project, this fact is not dispositive.
Although the State curiously omits any reference to the additional
qualifiers contained within section 1--7(A)(6), this section
requires that, before the information can be released, the research
project must be approved by "the Presiding Judge of the Juvenile
Court and the chief executive of the respective law enforcement
agency." 705 ILCS 405/1--7(A)(6) (West 1996). Here not only did
the State ignore this provision on appeal, but it also provided no
evidence to the trial court to prove that the permission had been
given. Without evidence to demonstrate that the required permission
has been received, the release of the respondent's law enforcement
records cannot be permitted under this section.
We turn now to the State's argument that section 1--8 permits
the release of respondent's juvenile court records. This section
provides, in pertinent part:
"(A) Inspection and copying of juvenile court records
relating to a minor who is the subject of a proceeding under
this Act shall be restricted to the following:
***
(2) Law enforcement officers and law enforcement
agencies when such information is essential to executing
an arrest or search warrant or other compulsory process,
or to conducting an ongoing investigation ***.
* * *
(8) Persons engaged in bona fide research, with the
permission of the presiding judge of the juvenile court
and the chief executive of the agency that prepared the
particular records ***.
* * *
(C) Except as otherwise provided in this subsection (C),
juvenile court records shall not be made available to the
general public but may be inspected by representatives of
agencies, associations and news media or other properly
interested persons by general or special order of the court."
705 ILCS 405/1--8(A)(2), (A)(8), (C) (West 1996).
Even if we accept the State's contention that the ATF's
statistical use of respondent's information qualifies as "an ongoing
investigation," we still cannot conclude that the State met the
requirements of section 1--8(A)(2). The statute clearly requires
that the information should be released only "when such information
is essential *** to conducting an ongoing investigation." 705 ILCS
405/1--8(A)(2) (West 1996). The State focuses its argument on the
proper construction of the term "ongoing investigation" and, once
again, ignores other, relevant portions of the section. Section
1--8(A)(2) clearly requires the State both to identify an ongoing
investigation and prove that the information is essential to that
investigation. Here, the State described the alleged
"investigation" in only the vaguest terms and completely ignored the
"essential" requirement. Without evidence that the information is
essential to the ATF agent's alleged investigation, we are unable
to conclude that section 1--8(A)(2) provides a basis for the release
of respondent's juvenile court records.
As for section 1--8(A)(8), the State presents the same argument
that it did with respect to section 1--7(A)(6). Since we have found
this argument unavailing with respect to respondent's law
enforcement records, we similarly reject it with respect to
respondent's juvenile court records.
This leaves us with only section 1--8(C), which allows
"properly interested persons" to inspect juvenile court records upon
order of the court.
This argument fails because the State never presented it to the
trial court. Before the trial court, the State argued only that
the information was to be used for investigative and statistical
purposes. Moreover, when the trial court ruled, it stated, "With
regard to the motion, I think developing statistics to investigate
this kind of crime is an investigative purpose." Clearly the trial
court's ruling rested upon the investigation or, even arguably, the
research project subsections. Neither the trial court nor the State
ever mentioned the "interested person" subsection. Additionally,
since the court was never presented with this argument, it did not
make the necessary finding that the ATF agent was a properly
interested person. Absent a presentation of this argument to the
trial court and a corresponding finding that the ATF agent is a
properly interested person, this section can provide no basis for
the release of the information.
The Juvenile Court Act clearly provides that the law
enforcement and court records relating to a juvenile are
confidential and are not to be released unless the party seeking the
release demonstrates that the release falls within one of the
statutorily defined exceptions. Here, the State failed to produce
any evidence that the proposed release of information was permitted
by the Juvenile Court Act. Consequently, the trial court erred in
granting the State's motion.
We add that this decision is based on the particular facts
before this court and that it is not intended to preclude the State
from bringing other petitions pursuant to sections 1--7 and 1--8 of
the Act.
The judgment of the circuit court of Lake County is reversed.
Reversed.
GEIGER, P.J., and THOMAS, J., concur.