Board of Education v. Board of Education of High School District No. 214
Annotate this Case
No. 2--96--1112
__________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
SECOND DISTRICT
___________________________________________________________________
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
COMMUNITY UNIT SCHOOL DISTRICT ) of De Kalb County.
NO. 428, DE KALB COUNTY, )
STANLEY JOHNSON, and SUZANNE )
LAMBRECHT, )
)
Plaintiffs-Appellees, ) No. 95--MR--8
)
v. )
)
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF HIGH )
SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 214, )
COOK COUNTY, ) Honorable
) John W. Countryman,
Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, Presiding.
JUSTICE McLAREN delivered the opinion of the court:
Defendant, the Board of Education of High School District No.
214, Cook County (District 214), appeals a judgment ordering it to
reimburse plaintiff, the Board of Education of Community Unit
School District No. 428, De Kalb County (District 428), for
special education District 428 provided Student Doe, a child with
disabilities, from January 1, 1993, until his 18th birthday.
(Plaintiffs Stanley Johnson and Suzanne Lambrecht are residents of
District 428.) The court ruled that, under sections 14--1.11 and
14--1.11a of the Illinois School Code (Code) (105 ILCS 5/14--1.11,
14--1.11a (West 1994)), District 214 was Student Doe's district of
residence for this period and, therefore, under section 14--6.01 of
the Code (105 ILCS 5/14--6.01(West 1994)) District 214 must pay for
the public special education he received.
On appeal, District 214 argues that the court misconstrued
sections 14--11.1 and 14--11.1a and that District 428 is Student
Doe's district of residence because, while he attended school
there, he lived there with his foster parents, the Cresses, who
made all educational decisions on his behalf. District 428
counters that the plain import of sections 14--1.11 and 14--1.11a
is that District 214 is Student Doe's district of residence because
his parents and legal guardians, the Does, resided there while he
was attending school in District 428. We agree with District 428,
and we affirm.
The facts are not disputed. The Does have never surrendered
legal guardianship of their son. However, in 1987, through a
written power of attorney, they voluntarily transferred custody of
their son to the Cresses, licensed foster parents. The Cresses
have since been Student Doe's primary care givers, making decisions
about his education and everyday needs. In 1990, the Cresses
moved to De Kalb County and enrolled Student Doe in special
education classes in District 428.
Sections 14--1.11 and 14--1.11a of the Code became effective
January 1, 1993. See 105 ILCS 5/14--1.11, 14--1.11a (West 1994).
Late in 1994, District 428 learned that the Cresses were not
Student Doe's legal guardians and that his legal guardians, the
Does, resided in District 214. District 428's attempts to make
the Does enroll their son in District 214 were unavailing, as were
its demands that District 214 pay for Student Doe's education in
District 428. Therefore, District 428 (along with Johnson and
Lambrecht) brought this suit for declaratory judgment and mandamus.
On cross-motions for summary judgment (see 735 ILCS 5/2--
1005(c)(West 1994)), the court held that, during the period at
issue, District 214 was Student Doe's district of residence. The
court ordered District 214 to reimburse District 428 for the cost
of Student Doe's special public education.
We believe this judgment follows the plain meaning of sections
14--1.11 and 14--1.11a, which are part of the Code's comprehensive
regulatory and funding scheme for special education. See 105 ILCS
5/14--1.01 et seq. (West 1994). Section 14--1.11 defines the
"resident district" as the "school district in which the parent or
guardian, or both parent and guardian, of the student reside" when
"the parent has legal guardianship of the student and resides
within Illinois." (Emphasis added.) 105 ILCS 5/14--1.11 (West
1994). That is the situation here. The Does are the parents and
the legal guardians of Student Doe, and they reside in Illinois.
Section 14--1.11a provides that, under certain well-defined
circumstances (such as when the location of the parent or legal
guardian is unknown), the district of residence is that in which
the student resides. None of these exceptions applies here, as
District 214 concedes.
Where the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the
court's function is to enforce the law as enacted. Reed v. Kusper,
154 Ill. 2d 77, 84-85 (1992). The plain meaning of the statute's
words is the best guide to the legislature's intent People v.
Wittenmyer, 151 Ill. 2d 175, 195 (1992). To require District 428
to pay for Student Doe's special education would ignore the plain
legislative intent to make a special education student's district
of residence the one in which his parent or guardian is known to
reside, even if the student lives and attends school elsewhere.
Because District 214 is Student Doe's district of residence,
it must pay for his education in the period at issue. Section 14--
6.01 of the Code plainly imposes this responsibility on the
district of residence by stating that "high school districts are
financially responsible for the education of handicapped pupils
resident in their districts when such pupils have reached age 15."
105 ILCS 5/14--6.01 (West 1994).
To avoid the plain import of the statute, District 214 relies
on cases that apply equitable doctrines of "guardianship by
estoppel" and "putative parenthood" where someone other than the
natural parent or legal guardian is primarily responsible for the
care of the child. See Mid-American Lines, Inc. v. Industrial
Comm'n, 82 Ill. 2d 47, 50-55 (1980), and Faber v. Industrial
Comm'n, 352 Ill. 115, 119-23 (1933)(discussing when deceased
employee may have stood in loco parentis to child so as to entitled
child to workers' compensation death benefits); Alber v. Illinois
Department of Mental Health, 786 F. Supp. 1340, 1371-73 (N.D. Ill.
1992)(holding that care givers who are not legal guardians may
still have privacy rights based on their relationship to
dependents). District 214 did not raise this theory at the trial
level, where it conceded that the Cresses have never been Student
Doe's legal guardians. Issues not raised in the trial court may
not be raised for the first time on appeal. Eagan v. Chicago
Transit Authority, 158 Ill. 2d 527, 534 (1994). Therefore,
District 214 has waived this argument.
In any event, District 214's reliance on these cases is
misplaced. None of the cases apply to the allocation of burdens
among governmental units, such as is involved in financing special
education for disabled students in public schools. Also, as
District 428 observes, sections 14--1.11 and 14--1.11a speak
unambiguously in terms of the "parent" and the "legal guardian,"
leaving no room for the sort of construction District 214 urges.
As this rigid phrasing implies, the adoption of an equitable
balancing test to determine residence, parenthood, or guardianship
would frustrate the legislature's intent in enacting sections 14--
1.11 and 14--1.11a. Had the legislature desired a flexible
multifactor test for determining residence in special education
cases, it would not have passed these laws at all but simply
continued the existing system (which still governs outside the
special education context). See Israel S. v. Board of Education
of Oak Park & River Forest High School District 200, 235 Ill. App.
3d 652, 657 (1992); Kraut v. Rachford, 51 Ill. App. 3d 206, 212
(1977). Under this regime, a court could indeed consider "a
panoply of *** circumstances" (Kraut, 51 Ill. App. 3d at 212) that
might overcome the presumption that the district of residence is
that in which the parents reside. Using this multifactor balancing
test, the trial court correctly determined that, before the law was
changed, District 428 was Student Doe's district of residence.
However, as the trial court implicitly found, the adoption of the
bright-line tests of sections 14--1.11 and 14--1.11a shows the
legislature's intent to replace the Kraut test in the special
education setting and thereby eliminate the uncertainty that was
the product of the flexible standard.
The trial court correctly determined that District 214 must
reimburse District 428 for Student Doe's special education during
the time at issue. Therefore, the judgment of the circuit court of
De Kalb County is affirmed.
Affirmed.
GEIGER, P.J., and INGLIS, J., concur.
__________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
SECOND DISTRICT
___________________________________________________________________
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
COMMUNITY UNIT SCHOOL DISTRICT ) of De Kalb County.
NO. 428, DE KALB COUNTY, )
STANLEY JOHNSON, and SUZANNE )
LAMBRECHT, )
)
Plaintiffs-Appellees, ) No. 95--MR--8
)
v. )
)
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF HIGH )
SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 214, )
COOK COUNTY, ) Honorable
) John W. Countryman,
Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, Presiding.
JUSTICE McLAREN delivered the opinion of the court:
Defendant, the Board of Education of High School District No.
214, Cook County (District 214), appeals a judgment ordering it to
reimburse plaintiff, the Board of Education of Community Unit
School District No. 428, De Kalb County (District 428), for
special education District 428 provided Student Doe, a child with
disabilities, from January 1, 1993, until his 18th birthday.
(Plaintiffs Stanley Johnson and Suzanne Lambrecht are residents of
District 428.) The court ruled that, under sections 14--1.11 and
14--1.11a of the Illinois School Code (Code) (105 ILCS 5/14--1.11,
14--1.11a (West 1994)), District 214 was Student Doe's district of
residence for this period and, therefore, under section 14--6.01 of
the Code (105 ILCS 5/14--6.01(West 1994)) District 214 must pay for
the public special education he received.
On appeal, District 214 argues that the court misconstrued
sections 14--11.1 and 14--11.1a and that District 428 is Student
Doe's district of residence because, while he attended school
there, he lived there with his foster parents, the Cresses, who
made all educational decisions on his behalf. District 428
counters that the plain import of sections 14--1.11 and 14--1.11a
is that District 214 is Student Doe's district of residence because
his parents and legal guardians, the Does, resided there while he
was attending school in District 428. We agree with District 428,
and we affirm.
The facts are not disputed. The Does have never surrendered
legal guardianship of their son. However, in 1987, through a
written power of attorney, they voluntarily transferred custody of
their son to the Cresses, licensed foster parents. The Cresses
have since been Student Doe's primary care givers, making decisions
about his education and everyday needs. In 1990, the Cresses
moved to De Kalb County and enrolled Student Doe in special
education classes in District 428.
Sections 14--1.11 and 14--1.11a of the Code became effective
January 1, 1993. See 105 ILCS 5/14--1.11, 14--1.11a (West 1994).
Late in 1994, District 428 learned that the Cresses were not
Student Doe's legal guardians and that his legal guardians, the
Does, resided in District 214. District 428's attempts to make
the Does enroll their son in District 214 were unavailing, as were
its demands that District 214 pay for Student Doe's education in
District 428. Therefore, District 428 (along with Johnson and
Lambrecht) brought this suit for declaratory judgment and mandamus.
On cross-motions for summary judgment (see 735 ILCS 5/2--
1005(c)(West 1994)), the court held that, during the period at
issue, District 214 was Student Doe's district of residence. The
court ordered District 214 to reimburse District 428 for the cost
of Student Doe's special public education.
We believe this judgment follows the plain meaning of sections
14--1.11 and 14--1.11a, which are part of the Code's comprehensive
regulatory and funding scheme for special education. See 105 ILCS
5/14--1.01 et seq. (West 1994). Section 14--1.11 defines the
"resident district" as the "school district in which the parent or
guardian, or both parent and guardian, of the student reside" when
"the parent has legal guardianship of the student and resides
within Illinois." (Emphasis added.) 105 ILCS 5/14--1.11 (West
1994). That is the situation here. The Does are the parents and
the legal guardians of Student Doe, and they reside in Illinois.
Section 14--1.11a provides that, under certain well-defined
circumstances (such as when the location of the parent or legal
guardian is unknown), the district of residence is that in which
the student resides. None of these exceptions applies here, as
District 214 concedes.
Where the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the
court's function is to enforce the law as enacted. Reed v. Kusper,
154 Ill. 2d 77, 84-85 (1992). The plain meaning of the statute's
words is the best guide to the legislature's intent People v.
Wittenmyer, 151 Ill. 2d 175, 195 (1992). To require District 428
to pay for Student Doe's special education would ignore the plain
legislative intent to make a special education student's district
of residence the one in which his parent or guardian is known to
reside, even if the student lives and attends school elsewhere.
Because District 214 is Student Doe's district of residence,
it must pay for his education in the period at issue. Section 14--
6.01 of the Code plainly imposes this responsibility on the
district of residence by stating that "high school districts are
financially responsible for the education of handicapped pupils
resident in their districts when such pupils have reached age 15."
105 ILCS 5/14--6.01 (West 1994).
To avoid the plain import of the statute, District 214 relies
on cases that apply equitable doctrines of "guardianship by
estoppel" and "putative parenthood" where someone other than the
natural parent or legal guardian is primarily responsible for the
care of the child. See Mid-American Lines, Inc. v. Industrial
Comm'n, 82 Ill. 2d 47, 50-55 (1980), and Faber v. Industrial
Comm'n, 352 Ill. 115, 119-23 (1933)(discussing when deceased
employee may have stood in loco parentis to child so as to entitled
child to workers' compensation death benefits); Alber v. Illinois
Department of Mental Health, 786 F. Supp. 1340, 1371-73 (N.D. Ill.
1992)(holding that care givers who are not legal guardians may
still have privacy rights based on their relationship to
dependents). District 214 did not raise this theory at the trial
level, where it conceded that the Cresses have never been Student
Doe's legal guardians. Issues not raised in the trial court may
not be raised for the first time on appeal. Eagan v. Chicago
Transit Authority, 158 Ill. 2d 527, 534 (1994). Therefore,
District 214 has waived this argument.
In any event, District 214's reliance on these cases is
misplaced. None of the cases apply to the allocation of burdens
among governmental units, such as is involved in financing special
education for disabled students in public schools. Also, as
District 428 observes, sections 14--1.11 and 14--1.11a speak
unambiguously in terms of the "parent" and the "legal guardian,"
leaving no room for the sort of construction District 214 urges.
As this rigid phrasing implies, the adoption of an equitable
balancing test to determine residence, parenthood, or guardianship
would frustrate the legislature's intent in enacting sections 14--
1.11 and 14--1.11a. Had the legislature desired a flexible
multifactor test for determining residence in special education
cases, it would not have passed these laws at all but simply
continued the existing system (which still governs outside the
special education context). See Israel S. v. Board of Education
of Oak Park & River Forest High School District 200, 235 Ill. App.
3d 652, 657 (1992); Kraut v. Rachford, 51 Ill. App. 3d 206, 212
(1977). Under this regime, a court could indeed consider "a
panoply of *** circumstances" (Kraut, 51 Ill. App. 3d at 212) that
might overcome the presumption that the district of residence is
that in which the parents reside. Using this multifactor balancing
test, the trial court correctly determined that, before the law was
changed, District 428 was Student Doe's district of residence.
However, as the trial court implicitly found, the adoption of the
bright-line tests of sections 14--1.11 and 14--1.11a shows the
legislature's intent to replace the Kraut test in the special
education setting and thereby eliminate the uncertainty that was
the product of the flexible standard.
The trial court correctly determined that District 214 must
reimburse District 428 for Student Doe's special education during
the time at issue. Therefore, the judgment of the circuit court of
De Kalb County is affirmed.
Affirmed.
GEIGER, P.J., and INGLIS, J., concur.
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
