People v. Bubolz

No. 2--96--0485

________________________________________________________________

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

SECOND DISTRICT
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THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
ILLINOIS, ) of Du Page County.
)
Plaintiff-Appellee, ) No. 96--TR--25520
)
v. )
)
ALFRED BUBOLZ, ) Honorable
) C. Andrew Hayton,
Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, Presiding.
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JUSTICE DOYLE delivered the opinion of the court:

Defendant, Alfred Bubolz, was convicted of operating a tow
truck without a valid safety sticker (625 ILCS 5/13--111 (West
1994)). Defendant stipulated to the facts and was found guilty of
the offense and fined $75. The issue for review is whether the
trial court erred in denying his motion for a directed finding by
ruling that tow trucks are not exempt from the provisions of
section 13--101 of the Illinois Vehicle Code (Code) (625 ILCS 5/13-
-101 (West 1994)). We affirm.
Defendant contends that under section 13--101 of the Code tow
trucks are exempt from the testing and certificate requirements.
As our resolution of this issue depends on the interpretation of a
statute, we turn to the rules of statutory interpretation. The
primary rule, to which all others are subordinate, is that the
court should ascertain and give effect to the legislative intent.
People v. Britz, 174 Ill. 2d 163, 196 (1996). To determine that
intent, the court looks first to the language of the statute, which
is given its plain and ordinary meaning. People v. Haynes, 174 Ill. 2d 204, 222 (1996). The court must also consider every part
of the statute together (People v. Warren, 173 Ill. 2d 348, 357
(1996)) and give every word or phrase some reasonable meaning
(Opyt's Amoco, Inc. v. Village of South Holland, 149 Ill. 2d 265,
277 (1992)). Moreover, we must assume that the legislature did not
intend an absurd result. People v. Coleman, 166 Ill. 2d 247, 253
(1995).
The statute provides in relevant part:
"To promote the safety of the general public, every owner
of a second division vehicle, medical transport vehicle, or
tow truck shall, before operating it upon the highways of
Illinois, submit it to a 'safety test' and secure a
certificate of safety furnished by the Department as set forth
in Section 13--109. ***
However, none of the provisions of Chapter 13 requiring
safety tests or a certificate of safety shall apply to:
* * *
(n) Second division vehicles registered for a gross
weight of 8,000 pounds or less, except when such second
division motor vehicles pull or draw a trailer, semi-trailer
or pole trailer having a gross weight of or registered for a
gross weight of more than 8,000 pounds; motor buses; religious
organization buses; school buses; senior citizen
transportation vehicles; medical transport vehicles and tow
trucks." (Emphasis added.) 625 ILCS 5/13--101 (West 1994).
Defendant asserts that because each of the items in subsection (n)
is separated by a semicolon which follows a colon, each item
relates back to the original colon. Defendant therefore reasons
that none of the provisions of chapter 13 apply to tow trucks.
The State responds that this reading of the statute is
incorrect because it yields an absurd result. As the State points
out, a recent amendment to the statute provides:
"For tow trucks, the safety test and inspection shall
also include the inspection of winch mountings, body panels,
body mounts, wheel lift swivel points, and sling straps, and
other tests and inspections the Department by rule requires
for tow trucks." 625 ILCS Ann. 5/13--101 (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1996).
Clearly, this paragraph makes no sense if tow trucks are exempt
from safety inspections. Similarly, the language of the first
paragraph of this section, "[t]o promote the safety of the general
public, every owner of a *** tow truck shall *** submit it to a
'safety test' " (625 ILCS 5/13--101 (West 1994)), would become a
nullity if we adopted defendant's interpretation.
Instead, we believe that the legislature's obvious intent, as
expressed in subsection (n) was to exempt second division vehicles
registered for a gross weight of 8,000 pounds or less except tow
trucks and the other second division vehicles specifically listed
in subsection (n) as exceptions to that exemption.
This interpretation comports with the purpose of the act and
is in harmony with other provisions, such as section 13--101.1 of
the Code, which pertains to senior citizen transportation vehicles.
See 625 ILCS 5/13--101.1 (West 1994). Although subsection (n) is
poorly worded, it is not ambiguous. Defendant's interpretation of
the statute would yield an absurd result. See People v. Ross, 168 Ill. 2d 347, 352 (1995). Accordingly, we conclude that all tow
trucks, regardless of gross weight, are subject to the provisions
of chapter 13 requiring safety tests and certificates of safety.
Thus, the trial court did not err in denying defendant's motion for
a directed finding.
The judgment of the circuit court of Du Page County is
affirmed.
Affirmed.
COLWELL and THOMAS, JJ., concur.