People v. Robles

No. 2--95--0527

_________________________________________________________________

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

SECOND DISTRICT
________________________________________________________________

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
ILLINOIS, ) of Du Page County.
)
Plaintiff-Appellee, )
)
v. ) No. 93--CF--0805
)
ERIC J. ROBLES, ) Honorable
) John J. Nelligan,
Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, Presiding.
_________________________________________________________________

JUSTICE RATHJE delivered the opinion of the court:

On April 30, 1993, defendant, Eric Robles, was indicted on 10
counts of first degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9--1(a)(1) (West 1992))
and 2 counts of solicitation of murder for hire (720 ILCS 5/8--1.2
(West 1992)) for the stabbing deaths of his parents, Peter and
Diana Robles. It was alleged that defendant had paid a high school
classmate, Sean Helgesen (Helgesen), to help him kill his parents.
Following a jury trial, defendant was found guilty but mentally ill
(GBMI) on all counts. The duplicative murder convictions were
vacated, and, on April 5, 1995, defendant was sentenced to a
mandatory term of natural life for the two counts of murder and to
concurrent sentences of 35 years' incarceration for the
solicitation of murder for hire convictions. The trial court
subsequently denied defendant's motion for a new trial, and this
timely appeal followed.
On appeal, defendant raises four issues, namely: (1) whether
the Illinois GBMI statute (725 ILCS 5/115--4(j) (West 1992))
violates state and federal guarantees of due process; (2) whether
the trial court's refusal to answer the jury's questions about the
definitions of mental illness violated defendant's due process
right to a fair trial; (3) whether the Illinois GBMI statute
violates state and federal guarantees of equal protection; and (4)
whether the trial court committed reversible error by allowing
certain expert testimony offered by the State, while denying
defendant the chance to put on evidence to rebut a report relied
upon by the State's experts. Because of our determination of the
first issue, we do not need to address defendant's final three
arguments.
Initially, we will address a motion filed by the State to
strike portions of the statement of facts found in defendant's
brief. Specifically, the State maintains that the opening and
closing sentences of the statement of facts are argumentative and
not based on the record, respectively. In response, defendant
essentially maintains that the disputed sentences contain no
improprieties. After reviewing the subject sentences, we find the
State has properly characterized them. Accordingly, both sentences
will be stricken from defendant's statement of facts.
Defendant made a pretrial motion to suppress his statements to
the police and an assistant State's Attorney. This motion was
denied on October 7, 1994. The jury trial began on December 5,
1994. In its opening statement, the defense introduced the
insanity defense.
State's Case
Elgin Detectives Daniel Rodmer and Michael Gough testified
that, after 11 p.m., on the evening of April 17, 1993, they came
upon defendant and Sean Helgesen near Elgin High School. The
detectives were investigating a parked car at Elgin High School and
noted that the license plate was covered by duct tape. Defendant
was naked from the waist down. Both defendant and Helgesen had
substantial amounts of blood on their persons, and defendant had an
injury to his right leg. The detectives retrieved a blood-covered
folding knife from defendant's person. En route to Sherman
Hospital, defendant was asked who should be notified of his injury.
Defendant replied, "I just killed my mom." Helgesen, who was not
injured, was transported to the Elgin police department.
Sergeant Robert Page of the Bartlett police department
testified that at 11:20 p.m. on April 17, 1993, he went to
defendant's home. Sergeant Page found a woman, later identified as
defendant's mother, Diana Robles, on the front room floor. He then
found the body of a man, later identified as defendant's father,
Peter Robles, in the downstairs bathroom. Both victims had been
cut and stabbed numerous times in their necks and chests. Sergeant
Page testified that Diana was still alive when he found her.
Evidence showed that she subsequently died in the hospital.
Paul Weiland testified that he was defendant's cousin.
According to Weiland, on April 14, 1993, defendant requested a gun
from him. Weiland took a .22-caliber handgun and three bullets
from a locked closet in his parents' bedroom and gave these to
defendant the following day. Weiland's father, Gary, subsequently
identified this handgun as a .22-caliber Derringer which he had
kept in a locked closet at his home.
Chris Washburn testified that he spoke several times with
defendant on April 15, 1993. Defendant demanded that Washburn get
$100 within four hours and threatened him with "trouble." Washburn
stated that he obtained the money from a friend and met defendant
later that day. During this meeting, which took place in
defendant's car, defendant held a gun to Washburn's head, took the
money, and told Washburn not to tell anyone.
Shane Jones testified that he saw Helgesen and defendant on
April 17 in Helgesen's home. They drove to another friend's house,
with defendant driving in a separate car. According to Jones, on
April 18, police officers and an assistant State's Attorney
searched his car and found two gloves, a black dress shirt, a pair
of black jeans, black socks and black shoes, none of which belonged
to Jones.
Helgesen's girlfriend, Melissa Mazur, testified that she went
out with him on April 16, the day before the murders. When
defendant was paying for some food, Mazur saw him pull out a "wad"
of $20 bills, which according to her, was unusual. Later that day,
she was in Helgesen's bedroom and saw a gun and a knife in the
dresser drawer.
Donald Cicikakus, the father of one of defendant's friends,
testified that he called defendant at approximately 10:30 p.m. on
the evening of the murders. Defendant told Cicikakus that his
parents were dead. Cicikakus asked him whether he had had a fight
with his father. Defendant answered that he had "it planned" and
that they used a knife, not a gun.
Joseph Birkett, then chief of the criminal division of the
Du Page County State's Attorney's office, testified that, on April
18, 1993, he went with the police to defendant's hospital
room. They introduced themselves and advised defendant of his
rights. Defendant signed a rights form and agreed to speak to
them. He could not recall how the stab wound to his leg occurred.
When asked about the murders, defendant said, "[A]ll I did was pay
[Helgesen] to do this." A tape-recorded statement made by
defendant during this interview was played for the jury.
Early in the morning of April 18, police returned to the
murder scene. They followed a trail of blood from the house to the
intersection of Heather and Morning Glory Lanes, a distance of
between an eighth of a mile and quarter of a mile in length.
Postmortem examinations of Peter and Diana Robles conducted by
Dr. Shaker Teas revealed the following. Diana had a large deep
slash wound to her neck, which severed the carotid artery. Another
slash wound went from her right ear to her mouth. She had
sustained 11 additional wounds to the head and face, some applied
with enough force to penetrate the skull. She had been stabbed in
her chest at least four times, with one wound going into her left
lung and heart. Diana's arms had a number of wounds, which were
consistent with attempts to defend herself. Dr. Teas opined that
these stab wounds and slashes could have been inflicted by the
knife that police took from defendant on the night of April 17.
Dr. Teas further testified that Peter had been slashed or
stabbed nine times in his head and neck. His carotid artery and
jugular vein had been "nicked" and several of the stab wounds went
through the scalp. He received two trunk wounds, both of which
entered a lung and one of which broke his clavicle. Peter's arms
and hands had sustained a number of wounds consistent with attempts
to protect himself. The knife wounds could have been caused by the
subject knife, according to Dr. Teas.
Several witnesses described incidents occurring in the months
prior to the subject murders in which defendant had lost his temper
with his mother, accusing her of favoring his brother, Jason.
There was also testimony regarding an occurrence in which defendant
had threatened a school official.
Defendant's Case
Lois Budzyn testified that she was a neighbor of defendant's
family for a number of years. She baby-sat for defendant and his
brother, Jason, on occasion. She recalled over 10 incidents in
which Peter Robles had come home and shouted at and hit his sons,
causing them to cry. She did not recall seeing any physical signs
of injuries to defendant and Jason.
Cheryl Watkins, a learning disabilities resource teacher,
stated that she had taught defendant from 1988 to 1990. According
to Watkins, defendant had a low to average intelligence quotient
and exhibited no emotional disturbances. Defendant showed deficits
in long- and short-term memory, in sequencing, and in visual motor
skills. Watkins, who also taught Jason, recalled that Peter was
helpful in educational matters related to Jason but was angry when
called about defendant. She did not see any signs of physical
abuse on either boy.
Brian Haske testified that he met defendant when both played
on the freshman football team at Elgin High School. Haske had been
in a car accident in which another friend of defendant's, Diane
Wagner, had been killed. After the accident, defendant assumed the
role of a "father figure" to Haske, until the latter felt a need
for more freedom. Haske stated that he had been to the Robles'
home many times and never saw the father being physically or
mentally abusive. He described the father as a man of differing
personalities, sometimes nice, and other times temperamental and
quick to anger. Haske stated that, in the week prior to the
murders, defendant seemed very quiet and did not associate with his
old friends. On April 17, while driving to a party, Haske saw
defendant in another car. Haske thought that defendant looked
confused but not intoxicated.
Janell St. Louis stated that she had known defendant since the
fourth grade. He was like a brother to her. According to St.
Louis, defendant loved his mother and was protective of her. Late
in 1992, defendant told her that his parents were going to get a
divorce and that he was tired of their arguing. Defendant did not
tell her that his father was abusive to family members.
Kristin, whose last name is not found in the record, testified
that she dated defendant intermittently from August 1991 to January
1993. During this time, Kristin became pregnant and underwent an
abortion, against defendant's wishes. Subsequently, their
relationship gradually deteriorated and Kristin sought to avoid all
contact with defendant. Kristin stated that she never saw
defendant's father abuse him. According to Kristin, defendant quit
the Elgin High School football team because he did not like it
anymore. Further, she said that defendant was not close to his
grandfather, who died in 1992. Late on April 16, 1993, defendant
called Kristin, asking repeatedly to see her. After she hung up,
defendant called again, seeking to meet her outside her home.
Another girlfriend of defendant's, Jennifer Engel, testified
that she began dating him in January 1993. Despite an incident in
February or March 1993, in which defendant had become intoxicated,
they continued seeing each other. Around Easter, they had arranged
to go to a movie. Defendant told Engel that his mother was crying
and that his father had gone off to a bar. Rather than go to the
movie, defendant wanted to look for his father. Defendant carried
a baseball bat in the car. They drove to one bar and then drove
back to defendant's home, where they saw that his father's car was
parked outside. Defendant went inside the house and then came out,
telling Engel that the date was cancelled.
Engel further testified that on April 16, 1993, she went with
defendant to watch a videotape at his home. When they entered the
house, defendant's father called him upstairs. Defendant appeared
startled. When defendant returned, he looked troubled; they
decided to go to Engel's home. On April 17, she saw defendant
during the day and talked to him on the telephone at about 10 p.m.
During this phone call, defendant said that he was with Helgesen,
and they were going over to Sean's house to shower and get some
clothes. In Engel's view, he sounded normal.
According to Engel, defendant's relationship with his mother
was "pretty good." She stated that defendant had told her that his
father was an alcoholic; that his father had beaten his mother; and
that he hated his father. Engel stated that she had never seen the
father abuse anyone.
Tim Riordan stated that he had been a friend of defendant's
since the third grade. Riordan played with defendant on the
football team, where defendant had assumed a leadership
role. Riordan stated that, on several occasions, he had seen
incidents in which defendant's father had yelled at him. Defendant
told Riordan that he hated his father's drinking and his parents'
fighting. Late in 1992, defendant asked Riordan if he could stay
at the latter's home to get away from the fighting. Riordan
testified that defendant drank throughout high school but cut back
while he was dating Kristin. Riordan quit the football team along
with defendant and Brian Haske after their sophomore year. Riordan
stated that defendant was bored with football and did not want to
play. In March and April 1993, Riordan noted that defendant kept
to himself and that his hair grew long and his style of dress
changed. Riordan conceded that he had once described defendant as
a "thick-headed stubborn individual" and had said that defendant
lied.
Ted Praznowski, who lived next door to the Robles for 16
years, stated that he was aware of Peter's drinking. When
defendant was about eight, Praznowski saw the father yell at
defendant and kick him "in the butt." He did not see other
instances of physical abuse but did hear yelling on several
occasions. Praznowski also stated that he heard the parents
arguing on many occasions.
Lorraine Chiodo, the mother of Diana Robles, stated that,
early in 1993, her daughter arrived at her house, looking upset,
and stayed there for three days. This had occurred several times
during the Robles' marriage. According to Chiodo, when Peter drank
alcohol, he became withdrawn. Chiodo stated that she had never
seen Peter abuse his wife or his children.
Defendant's brother, Jason, testified that his father drank 10
or more beers on a daily basis. His father's drinking caused many
arguments between his parents. On occasion, the parents would push
or hit each other. According to Jason, defendant, who was very
close to their mother, took his mother's side, at times getting
into a physical altercation with his father. Jason stated that,
when he and defendant were young, their father regularly spanked
them with a paddle. As they grew older, their father switched to
"mind games," i.e., playing up to one son and turning on the other.
During one four- to five-month stretch, their father discontinued
drinking, and the family fighting stopped.
Jason testified that in November 1992 he began working with
his father, whose drinking was again causing problems between the
parents. After the death of his grandfather in August 1992 and the
accident in which Diane Wagner was killed and Brian Haske injured,
defendant seemed to change. He began drinking more, and he became
sloppy in appearance. He quit the football team, and his
attendance at school slipped. According to Jason, defendant became
temperamental and quick to anger.
Jason stated that early in April his parents had a fight,
during which his mother took off her wedding rings, threw them at
her husband, and left the house. She stayed away for several days
and, upon returning, was cold and quiet toward her husband.
Defendant was upset by this situation and remained angry after his
mother's return.
Jason stated that his father had been upset by defendant's
police problems, appearance, and poor school attendance. Defendant
would talk back to his father, sometimes using foul language.
According to Jason, defendant did not use such language towards
their mother. He recalled an incident in February 1992 in which
defendant had to be "pulled off" their father, who did not hit back
at defendant.
Jason stated that he did not believe that defendant had killed
their parents. Further, he testified that defendant did not sound
like himself on the statement tape-recorded by the police.
Dr. Ruth Kuncel, a clinical psychologist, interviewed
defendant at the behest of his attorney. Dr. Kuncel met with
defendant on two occasions for a total of five hours. She also
interviewed Jason Robles and reviewed relevant documents, including
the reports of Drs. Daniel Hardy and Henry Lahmeyer, as well as the
report of psychological testing performed by Dr. Hartman.
Dr. Kuncel opined that defendant had a significant personality
disorder and substantial deficits in his cognitive functioning.
According to Dr. Kuncel, defendant's ability to think abstractly is
limited, and he has difficulty with judgment and cannot assess
alternatives or understand the consequences of actions. She viewed
the father's drinking as having a profound impact on defendant,
whose self-esteem and ability to develop relationships suffered.
As a result of his father's drinking behavior, defendant became
intensely close to his mother, whom he felt a responsibility to
protect.
In Dr. Kuncel's perspective, the 15 months prior to the
murders were very difficult for defendant. The father's drinking
began to cause more arguments between the parents. Moreover, his
grandfather died, and defendant quit the football team. Dr. Kuncel
described defendant's reaction to his girlfriend's abortion as one
in which, as a Catholic, he became "enormously upset." The
girlfriend's father, who had once had a good relationship with
defendant, threatened to have defendant killed. Dr. Kuncel opined
that this threat placed the concept of murder for hire into
defendant's thinking. Then, in November 1992, a serious automobile
accident killed one friend and seriously injured another.
According to Dr. Kuncel, defendant, who had been depressed for
years, became more seriously depressed at this time. His
attendance at school decreased, while his drinking increased.
Dr. Kuncel noted that two weeks before the murders defendant's
parents had a "really big fight," in which the mother threw her
wedding rings and went to her mother's house for several days. Dr.
Kuncel explained that defendant felt compelled to deal with this
problem but that his thinking had become delusional. In her
opinion, at this time, defendant was psychotic. She further opined
that defendant was legally insane at the time of the murders, as he
was not capable of conforming his conduct to the law's
requirements.
On cross-examination, Dr. Kuncel conceded that she had written
a report dated March 8, 1994, wherein she expressed a different
opinion from the one she had given during direct examination. She
explained that her opinion had changed due to additional
information she received. She further testified that she had
studied Dr. Hartman's report on his psychological testing of
defendant and that the results were similar to those of tests that
she had administered to defendant.
The State presented a number of witnesses in rebuttal.
Prominent among those were two psychiatrists, Drs. Henry Lahmeyer
and Daniel Hardy, who had been retained by the State to assess
defendant.
Dr. Lahmeyer testified that he reviewed the relevant documents
and interviewed defendant on July 14, 1994. Dr. Lahmeyer noted
that the juvenile and family counseling reports indicated no abuse
of the children, marital discord, or alcohol abuse. He also
reviewed the psychological testing performed by Dr. David Hartman,
a psychologist. Dr. Lahmeyer agreed with the results of the
testing, which indicated that defendant was suffering from "anti-
social traits and overt anti-social personality," while exhibiting
self-serving, self-centered, and paranoid traits.
Dr. Lahmeyer stated that, during his interview with defendant,
the latter appeared easy going and well groomed. Defendant told
him that he would not plead insanity because he "wasn't crazy at
the time." Further, defendant stated that he would plead not
guilty because he did not commit the crimes.
Dr. Lahmeyer stated that he agreed with most of Dr. Kuncel's
testimony but disagreed with her conclusion. In his opinion,
nothing in her report indicated that defendant was psychotic. He
noted that the results of her psychological testing were the same
as those reached in the psychological tests administered by Dr.
Hartman. Dr. Lahmeyer concluded that there was absolutely no
evidence of insanity in defendant.
Dr. Daniel Hardy testified that he had reviewed the various
records and reports that had a bearing on the case. He opined that
the hiring of another person to commit murder involves a
significant degree of planning and goal-directed behavior.
Defendant's attempts to conceal the crime, including the covering
of the license plate with duct tape and wearing gloves, also
demonstrated a recognition that the conduct was wrong. Dr. Hardy
did not find any evidence of a disordered thought process in
defendant's tape-recorded statement.
Dr. Hardy testified that he interviewed defendant on June 7,
1994. They discussed the facts of the case, as well as defendant's
upbringing. At one point in the interview, defendant stated, "I
never intended for my Mom. I always intended for my Dad." Dr.
Hardy concluded that there was no clinical or other evidence of
defendant having a psychosis.
At the close of the State's rebuttal, defendant attempted to
call Dr. Michael Rabin to testify to alleged defects in Dr.
Hartman's report, which, in Dr. Rabin's view, made it unreliable.
The State moved to bar Dr. Rabin's testimony. The trial court
granted the State's motion, finding that it was impermissible for
the defense to impeach Dr. Hartman, a nontestifying witness. After
an offer of proof, in which Dr. Rabin was examined intensively, the
trial court reconfirmed its granting of the State's motion to bar
the disputed testimony.
During the jury instruction conference, the State requested
that, in addition to the "guilty," "not guilty," and "not guilty by
reason of insanity" verdicts, the jury also be instructed on the
"guilty but mentally ill" verdict. The defense objected to any
jury instruction that made reference to the GBMI statutory
definitions or verdict. Despite agreeing that the GBMI statutory
scheme was "constitutionally bad," the trial court ruled that it
would instruct the jury regarding said GBMI statutory scheme.
As to each count, the jury was instructed:
"[A] special verdict of guilty but mentally ill may be
returned by you instead of a general verdict of guilty if you
find each of the following circumstances to be present in this
case:
First: That the State has proved [beyond] a
reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of [the
charge]; and
Second: That the defendant has not proved by a
preponderance of the evidence that he was insane at the
time he committed the offense of [the charge]; and
Third: That the defendant has proved by a
preponderance of the evidence that he was mentally ill at
the time he committed the offense of [the charge].
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence
that each one of these circumstances is present, you may
return the special verdict finding the defendant guilty but
mentally ill of [the charge].
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence
that the State has proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant is guilty of [the charge] and if you find that
either the second or third circumstance concerning the guilty
but mentally ill verdict is not present, you should return the
general verdict finding the defendant guilty of [the charge]."
After the jury began its deliberations, it sent out two notes
to the trial court. The first query read, "We are hung up on the
definition of mental illness, is there any other information we can
use?" The trial court indicated to the parties' attorneys that
"[t]he answer to [the] question is contained in the Court's
Instructions [sic]. There is no other information the Court can
supply." Over the defense's objection, the trial court directed
the jury to review the original instructions.
A number of hours later, the jury sent a second question to
the trial court, namely, "Your Honor--A juror needs to know if this
instruction on the definition of 'mental illness' [sic] was
mistyped. Thank you." To which the trial court replied, "The
instruction has been typed properly." Within a half hour, the jury
returned with verdicts of GBMI on all counts against defendant.
We first address the issue of whether the GBMI statute
violates the defendant's constitutionally guaranteed right of due
process. Before setting out the parties' arguments on this issue,
we will include the pertinent statutes and will provide a brief
background of the GBMI statute.
Relevant Statutes
Regarding the determination of this issue, the following
statutes are of primary importance. Section 6--2 of the Criminal
Code of 1961 reads in relevant part:
"(a) A person is not criminally responsible for conduct
if at the time of such conduct, as a result of mental disease
or mental defect, he lacks substantial capacity either to
appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his
conduct to the requirements of law.
(b) The terms 'mental disease or mental defect' do not
include an abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal or
otherwise antisocial conduct.
(c) A person who, at the time of the commission of a
criminal offense, was not insane but was suffering from a
mental illness, is not relieved of criminal responsibility for
his conduct and may be found guilty but mentally ill.
(d) For purposes of this Section, 'mental illness' or
'mentally ill' means a substantial disorder of thought, mood,
or behavior which afflicted a person at the time of the
commission of the offense and which impaired that person's
judgment, but not to the extent that he is unable to
appreciate the wrongfulness of his behavior or is unable to
conform his conduct to the requirements of law.
(e) When the defense of insanity has been presented
during the trial, the burden of proof is on the defendant to
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant is
not guilty by reason of insanity. However, the burden of
proof remains on the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
each of the elements of each of the offenses charged, and, in
a jury trial where the insanity defense has been presented,
the jury must be instructed that it may not consider whether
the defendant has met his burden of proving that he is not
guilty by reason of insanity until and unless it has first
determined that the State has proven the defendant guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt of the offense with which he is
charged." (Emphasis added.) 720 ILCS 5/6--2 (West 1992)
Section 115--4(j) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963
reads in relevant part:
"When the affirmative defense of insanity has been presented
during the trial, the court, where warranted by the evidence,
shall also provide the jury with a special verdict form of
guilty but mentally ill, as to each offense charged and shall
separately instruct the jury that a special verdict of guilty
but mentally ill may be returned instead of a general verdict,
but that such special verdict requires a unanimous finding by
the jury that: (1) the State has proven beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendant is guilty of the offense charged; and
(2) the defendant has failed to prove his insanity as required
in subsection (b) of Section 3--2 of the Criminal Code of
1961, as amended, and subsections (a), (b) and (e) of Section
6--2 of the Criminal Code of 1961, as amended; and (3) the
defendant has proven by a preponderance of the evidence that
he was mentally ill, as defined in subsections (c) and (d) of
Section 6--2 of the Criminal Code of 1961, as amended, at the
time of the offense." (Emphasis added.) 725 ILCS 5/115--4(j)
(West 1992).
Background of the GBMI Statute
At this point, it is useful to review the background of the
GBMI statute. Our principal source for this information is the
Report of the Governor's Commission to Revise the Mental Health
Code of Illinois. In the 1980s, then Governor Thompson created the
Governor's Commission to Revise the Mental Health Code of Illinois
(Commission). This Commission was comprised of many of the
State's leading authorities on psychiatric matters, including
forensic psychiatry. The Commission made numerous recommendations
to improve the care and treatment of Illinois' mentally ill
population.
In its report, the Commission described the origins of the
GBMI statute thusly:
"The Illinois GBMI provisions were patterned after a law
enacted in Michigan in 1975. The Michigan law was a response
to a decision of the Michigan Supreme Court requiring that
persons confined as insanity acquitees be treated just like
persons who were civilly committed. [Citation.] The Michigan
legislature feared that this decision would result in the
release of dangerous mentally ill criminals. [Citation.]
Even though insanity acquitees (commonly called NGRI's)
have never been treated like civil patients in Illinois,
similar concerns motivated the Illinois legislature when it
enacted our GBMI law in 1981. [Citation.] The intent of the
law was to reduce the number of NGRI's by giving the jury an
alternative to either finding the defendant guilty or not
guilty by reason of insanity. It was thought that the GBMI
finding would be less harsh than a guilty finding because the
defendant would receive treatment while in prison." Report of
the Governor's Commission to Revise the Mental Health Code of
Illinois, at 59-60 (1989) (hereinafter Report of the
Governor's Comm'n).
Moreover, the Commission concluded that the circumstances
which led Michigan's legislature to enact a GBMI statute were not
present in Illinois. The Commission explained the difference
thusly:
"[Unlike Michigan] Illinois has never treated NGRI's like
civil committees in terms of either the conditions of their
confinement or the procedures for release. NGRI's [in
Illinois] bear the burden of proving their entitlement to
release by clear and convincing evidence. Additionally, all
releases, even temporary or conditional ones, must be approved
by the judge who conducted the criminal trial. These
provisions have resulted in extremely low recidivism rates for
released insanity acquitees." Report of the Governor's
Comm'n, at 60-61.
In calling for the abolition of the GBMI verdict, the
Commission reasoned that it had failed to achieve its intended
goals and that it had caused a number of negative consequences.
The Commission initially determined that there was little evidence
that the enactment of the GBMI statute had reduced the number of
acquittals by reason of insanity. Report of the Governor's Comm'n,
at 60. As to the mental health treatment GBMIs receive in prison,
the Commission concluded: "[T]he actual treatment provided for
GBMI's is identical to other prisoners. No special units or
programs have been established for the small group; they are not
housed in any special facility; and no GBMI is currently confined
in a [Department of Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities]
facility." Report of the Governor's Comm'n, at 61.
The Commission also focused on two negative consequences of a
GBMI verdict. First, it found that GBMIs were stigmatized in the
general prison population and, as a result, maltreated. Second,
the Commission noted potential jury confusion caused by the verdict
and described anecdotal evidence of a jury's confusion when
deliberating a case involving GBMI instructions.
"Recently, in Cook County [a] mistrial was declared in a
murder trial because of a hung jury. The jury was split
between finding the defendant guilty and guilty but mentally
ill. Because the jury did not understand that there was no
difference between the guilty and guilty but mentally ill
disposition, the defendant must either be released or retried.
This is true though none of the jurors, at the time their
deliberations ended, favored an acquittal or an acquittal by
reason of insanity." Report of the Governor's Comm'n, at 61.
Further, since their enactment in a number of states, GBMI
statutes have been the source of considerable controversy. A
number of national associations, including the American Bar
Association (ABA) and the American Psychiatric Association, have
declared their opposition to such legislation. For example, the
ABA has described the GBMI verdict as:
"[N]ot a proper verdict at all. Rather it is a dispositional
mechanism transferred to the guilt determination phase of the
criminal process. The hybrid nature of the verdict is
demonstrated by the fact that a jury determination of mental
illness at the time of a charged offense is relevant not to
criminal responsibility or culpability but to whether the
accused persons might receive treatment after they have been
sentenced." ABA Criminal Justice Mental Health Standards,
Standard 7--6.10, Commentary, at 393-94 (1988).
In the supreme court case of People v. Fierer, 124 Ill. 2d 176, 184 (1988), the defendant argued, inter alia, "that the [GBMI]
verdict, on its face, is an unconstitutional denial of due process,
because it interjects irrelevant, misleading elements into the
determination of guilt or innocence." The Fierer court reversed
the case on other grounds, not reaching the issue of the GBMI
statute's constitutionality. Fierer, 124 Ill. 2d at 184.
Regarding this issue, defendant makes two arguments that the
GBMI statute violates defendant's due process. First, defendant
contends that the GBMI verdict misleads and confuses jurors into
believing they can assign a lower level of culpability, and a
correspondingly lower level of punishment, to a mentally ill
defendant. Defendant maintains that, in reality, a GBMI verdict,
based upon the subject statute, is no more than a guilty verdict
with the addition of a phrase, "but mentally ill," which is devoid
of meaning or consequences. Defendant maintains that, by
misleading jurors in this way, the GBMI statute encourages
compromise verdicts in violation of due process.
Second, defendant argues that the allocation of the burden of
proof under the current version of the GBMI statute results in the
defendant being required to prove something that is fundamentally
at odds with his defense of insanity. In defendant's view, under
the GBMI statute, whenever the defendant pleads insanity, the trial
court is allowed to instruct the jury that the defendant is
required to prove that he is not insane. Placing this burden on
the defendant simply introduces another level of confusion to the
deliberation process and furthers the jury's misperception that a
GBMI verdict is of some value to a defendant. Defendant contends
that, since no rational basis exists for assigning this burden to
the defense, the GBMI statute violates fundamental guarantees of
due process.
Initially, the State makes the following observations.
Generally, it maintains that the GBMI statute has had the following
salutary effects. Without the GBMI statute, in cases where the
jury did not return a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity,
prior law made no provision for a determination as to whether the
jury rejected the defense in its entirety or whether it accepted
the evidence of a mental dysfunction but nevertheless concluded
that defendant could conform his conduct to the law's requirements.
Thus, the State maintains that, in this type of situation, without
the GBMI statute, the trial court, in determining the defendant's
sentence, would be left to speculate whether the person acted under
the influence of "mental dysfunction." The State also maintains
that the GBMI statute can also be important from the standpoint of
the defendant's incarceration. While conceding that the statute
makes no requirement of any psychiatric prison treatments, the
State contends that the finding of "mental dysfunction" can be
useful in the Department of Corrections' evaluation of treatment
needs and determination of the place of confinement.
Regarding the arguments specifically raised by defendant, the
State makes the following responses. As to defendant's assertion
that the GBMI statute misleads and confuses jurors, the State
maintains that this argument ascribes to jurors a concern as to the
meaning and effect of their verdict, which runs contrary to their
functions of determining the credibility of witnesses and the
weight to be given their testimony, and of making inferences from
the evidence. The State further contends that this basic principle
of the jury's function also refutes defendant's complaints as to
the imposition of the burden of proof on him to prove a mental
disorder for purposes of the GBMI verdict. As to defendant's
burden of proof argument, the State maintains that defendant
ignores the fact that in asserting the insanity defense he had
already assumed the burden of proving mental disease or defect.
The State asserts that the GBMI verdict does not create a burden to
prove "noninsanity" but, instead, represents defendant's failure to
prove his entire insanity defense.
In his reply brief, defendant asserts that the State attempts
to rewrite the relevant statutory language to its own purpose.
Defendant contends that the State, in so doing, ignores the fact
that the definitions of the terms "mental illness" and "mentally
ill" found in the insanity statute are contrary to the statutory
definition of insanity. Defendant maintains that these terms are
defined as a condition whereby a defendant does not meet the
statutory definition of insanity. Defendant further disagrees with
the State's view that GBMI is merely an alternative verdict to not
guilty by reason of insanity (NGRI), containing no disparate
elements and requiring proof of some but not all elements of the
insanity defense. Defendant argues that the language of the GBMI
statute defines "mental illness" separately and disparately from
insanity and, further, that the GBMI statute definition of "mental
illness" has been interpreted by the supreme court as requiring
proof of "noninsanity." See People v. Fierer, 124 Ill. 2d 176, 191
(1988).
Moreover, defendant notes that the State does not dispute his
contention that jurors presented with a GBMI verdict will be misled
as to the meaning of the verdict and will determine the issue of
criminal responsibility on the basis of speculation or
impermissible compromise. Defendant also maintains that the
State's view of the inviolability of the jury's function ignores
those occasions in which the State encourages a jury to reach a
verdict based on speculation and misinformation.
Compromise Verdicts
We first address defendant's contention that the GBMI statute
encourages compromise verdicts in violation of due process.
Initially, we note that a statute that encourages compromise
verdicts based upon jurors' misperceptions and misunderstandings is
a violation of due process. Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 61 L. Ed. 2d 39, 99 S. Ct. 2450 (1979).
The wording of the GBMI statute would seem to indicate that
there is some sort of significance to the phrase "but mentally
ill." Certainly, the instant jury, which confusedly struggled with
the definition of mental illness that it had been given, wondering
if somehow the definition had a typographical error, placed great
emphasis upon the words it was given. In all probability, such a
jury would look at the subject phrase and infer that it carried
some significance.
Yet, as the supreme court has found, a GBMI verdict does not
reflect diminished culpability or criminal responsibility. People
v. Crews, 122 Ill. 2d 266, 278 (1988). Moreover, a GBMI verdict is
identical to a "guilty" verdict in terms of potential punishment
and/or psychiatric treatment. Crews, 122 Ill. 2d at 277. Further,
as of 1989, the psychiatric treatment afforded those found GBMI was
identical to that of other prisoners. There were no separate
facilities for them at any penal institutions, and none were
receiving treatment in a psychiatric facility. Report of the
Governor's Comm'n, at 62. We are aware of no evidence that any of
this has changed significantly in the intervening years. From
this, we conclude that the GBMI statute has no practical effect.
In reviewing the relevant decisions of other jurisdictions, we
find that two dissents most accurately describe the GBMI's
verdict's effect upon jurors.
In his dissent in Mitchell v. Commonwealth, 781 S.W.2d 510,
513 (Ky. 1989), Justice Leibson wrote:
"I have no doubt but that many jurors think that finding the
defendant Guilty But Mentally Ill means that the defendant
will be committed to a mental institution for treatment,
instead of prison ***. Few, if any, will realize that the
'but mentally ill' finding is, for all practical purposes,
empty of legal consequences ***." Mitchell, 781 S.W.2d at 513
(Leibson, J., dissenting).
Further, jurors' unawareness of this lack of legal consequences of
the GBMI verdict "induces compromise verdicts by seducing jurors
into settling on a middle ground between guilty and not guilty,
when in fact there is no middle ground." State v. Neely, 112 N.M.
702, ___, 819 P.2d 249, 261 (1991) (Montgomery, J., concurring in
part & dissenting in part).
We have little doubt that conscientious jurors who are
confronted with this continuum of verdicts assume that the GBMI
verdict represents a distinct and separate position on this
continuum. In all probability, they further assume that the GBMI
verdict indicates that some sort of ameliorative disposition will
be afforded the defendant. We find that these misconceptions and
misunderstandings encourage a compromise verdict of GBMI, which is
devoid of any substance.
The State erroneously insists that the jurors are only to
stick to their essential functions, namely, determining the
credibility of the witnesses, attaching weight to the testimony,
and drawing inferences from the evidence. In reality, juries can
be, and sometimes are, misled, with the result that convictions are
overturned and causes remanded. See, e.g., People v. Malkiewicz,
86 Ill. App. 3d 417 (1980). Moreover, the very title of the GBMI
statute encourages jurors to draw natural inferences from it.
We conclude that the GBMI statute encourages compromise
verdicts and that, as a result, the subject statutory scheme
deprives a defendant of due process.
Burden of Proof
Bearing in mind our determination of the compromise verdict
issue, we will also address defendant's argument that the
imposition of conflicting burdens of proof deprived him of due
process.
In People v. McCullum, 66 Ill. 2d 306 (1977), our supreme
court stated:
"Though the legislature has the authority to determine the
allocation of the burden of producing evidence and the burden
of persuasion, it may not allocate these burdens in a matter
that 'offends some principle of justice so rooted in the
traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as
fundamental.' " McCullum, 66 Ill. 2d at 314, quoting Speiser
v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 523, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1460, 1471, 78 S. Ct. 1332, 1341 (1958).
Under this statutory scheme, defendant has two conflicting
burdens. To achieve a NGRI verdict, defendant must prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that, at the time of the offense, "he
lack[ed] substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality
of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the
law." 720 ILCS 5/6--2(a) (West 1994). But when the State opts for
the GBMI instruction, defendant also has the burden of proving by
a preponderance of the evidence that, at the time of the commission
of the crime, he was "mentally ill," i.e., suffering from "a
substantial disorder of thought, mood, or behavior which afflicted
[him] at the time of the commission of the offense and which
impaired [his] judgment, but not to the extent that he is unable to
appreciate the wrongfulness of his behavior or is unable to conform
his conduct to the requirement of law." 720 ILCS 5/6--2(d) (West
1994). Essentially, in such a circumstance, a defendant has the
burden of proving that he did not know what he was doing at the
time of the offenses (NGRI), as well as the burden of proving that
he knew what he was doing at the pertinent time (GBMI).
This situation is somewhat analogous to one found in People v.
Reddick, 123 Ill. 2d 184 (1988), where voluntary manslaughter (now
second degree murder) and murder instructions were given to the
juries. The Reddick court determined that the voluntary
manslaughter instructions when given along with murder instructions
"indicate that to obtain a voluntary manslaughter conviction the
People must prove the existence of one of the alternative
mitigating mental conditions which the People contend did not
exist." Reddick, 123 Ill. 2d at 194. The supreme court explained
that, if a jury properly followed the instructions, a defendant
could not possibly be convicted of voluntary manslaughter due to
the fact that, if a mitigating mental state was proved, it would
have been done so by the defendant, not the State. Reddick, 123 Ill. 2d at 194-95. The Reddick court held it was error to place
the burden of proof on the State.
The State argues that Reddick has no bearing on this cause
because the alternative verdict of GBMI has no disparate elements
but, instead, requires proof of some, but not all, of the elements
of the insanity defense.
Contrary to the State's position, we find that Reddick lends
support to defendant's position. In order to obtain a GBMI
conviction, the defendant, akin to the State in Reddick, had to
prove the existence of a culpable state of mind which he had
maintained throughout the trial did not exist. Rather, it was the
State that offered extensive evidence and argument that defendant
was not legally insane at the time of the murders. Under these
circumstances, the jury could not possibly have returned a verdict
of GBMI because it would have been proved by the State, not
defendant. Reddick, 123 Ill. 2d at 194-95.
We find that this imposition of conflicting burdens upon
defendant was fundamentally unfair. It placed defendant in an
untenable position, depriving him of his due process rights.
Further, as we have already found, the GBMI statute encourages
compromise verdicts. The imposition of conflicting burdens on
defendant only adds more confusion in cases where the insanity
defense has been raised.
We take note of the dissent's contention that we are ignoring
precedent in reaching these determinations regarding the GBMI
statute. First, the cases cited by the dissent are not binding on
this court. Second, neither of the parties cited the cases pointed
to in the dissent. It is apparent that both the State and the
defendant sought to have this issue decided on the merits of their
arguments, not by this court's reliance on unbinding precedent.
Further, because of our determination of the
unconstitutionality of the GBMI statute, we must address the
question of whether the evidence presented at trial was sufficient
to prove that defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. See
e.g., People v. Taylor, 76 Ill. 2d 289 (1979). We find that there
was sufficient evidence presented at trial to prove defendant
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. In so determining, we make no
finding of defendant's innocence or guilt that would be binding in
a new trial. We merely are determining that defendant's
constitutional right against double jeopardy will not be abridged
by a new trial.
For the reasons stated above, we reverse the judgment of the
circuit court of Du Page County and remand this cause for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
McLAREN, J., concurs.
JUSTICE THOMAS, dissenting:
Illinois courts have repeatedly upheld the constitutionality
of the GBMI statute while rejecting the present defendant's same
arguments. People v. Seaman, 203 Ill. App. 3d 871, 884-88 (1990)
(rejected argument that statute was unconstitutional because it
leads to compromise verdicts and jury confusion); People v. Smith,
124 Ill. App. 3d 805, 807-12 (1984) (rejected arguments that danger
of compromise verdict and stigma associated with verdict of GBMI
rendered statute unconstitutional) ; People v. DeWit, 123 Ill. App.
3d 723, 735-36 (1984) (rejected argument that GBMI verdict promotes
jury confusion and leads to a compromise verdict); People v.
Fields, 170 Ill. App. 3d 1, 6-7 (1988) (declined to reexamine
decisions upholding the constitutionality of the GBMI statute); see
also People v. Martin, 166 Ill. App. 3d 428, 435 (1988); People v.
Boatright, 137 Ill. App. 3d 888, 890-91 (1985); People v. Carter,
135 Ill. App. 3d 403 (1985). Numerous states in addition to
Illinois have also enacted legislation providing for a verdict of
guilty but mentally ill. Annotation, "Guilty But Mentally Ill"
Statutes: Validity & Construction, 71 A.L.R.4th 702 (1989)
(hereinafter 71 A.L.R.4th 702). Despite being faced with basically
the same challenges raised by the defendant in the present case,
all of the various state statutes have been upheld. See State v.
Neely, 112 N.M. 702, 704, 819 P.2d 249, 251 (1991); 71 A.L.R.4th
702.
Since the majority intends to ignore well-established
precedent, I will reiterate some of the principles upon which the
above-cited decisions rest and which are by now axiomatic. A
statute carries a strong presumption of constitutionality, and the
burden of showing its invalidity is on the person challenging the
enactment. People v. Grano, 286 Ill. App. 3d 278, 295 (1996).
When determining whether a statute violates due process, the court
must determine whether the statute is designed to remedy the evils
the legislature has determined to be a threat to the public,
health, safety, and general welfare. Seaman, 203 Ill. App. 3d at
885. Due process requires only that the statute be reasonably
designed to accomplish its purposes, not that it be the best means
of accomplishing them. Seaman, 203 Ill. App. 3d at 885.
It has been repeatedly held that, because the GBMI statute is
clearly rationally designed to accomplish the legislative goal of
reducing the number of persons erroneously found not guilty by
reason of insanity and to identify such defendants as in need of
treatment, the statute does not violate due process. Seaman, 203
Ill. App. 3d at 885; Smith, 124 Ill. App. 3d at 811. The statute
is reasonably designed to accomplish a legitimate purpose of the
state. The verdict clarifies for the jury the distinction between
a person who is not guilty by reason of insanity and one who is
mentally ill yet not insane and, therefore, is criminally liable.
By focusing the jury's attention on the question of legal
culpability, the statute increases the likelihood that the jury
will return a verdict in accord with the appropriate legal
standard, and it is a legitimate state interest to have juries
returning verdicts that accord with the law. The legislature could
have believed that some defendants were being found not guilty by
reason of insanity even though they did not satisfy the legal
standard for the defense. That the majority cites a report
critical of the legislature's remedy is irrelevant since the remedy
need not be the best means to accomplish the statute's purpose but
only reasonably designed to accomplish its purpose to withstand
constitutional attack.
The majority erroneously concludes that the GBMI verdict is
without legal consequence. This court has recognized that, upon a
finding of guilty but mentally ill, the Department of Corrections
must " 'cause periodic inquiry and examination to be made
concerning the nature, extent, continuance, and treatment of the
defendant's mental illness' and to provide 'such psychiatric,
psychological, or other counseling and treatment for the defendant
as it determines necessary.' " People v. Morris, 237 Ill. App. 3d
140, 145 (1992), quoting Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 1005--
2--6(b). Moreover, this court in Morris recognized that a GBMI
verdict could work to the defendant's advantage in sentencing and
remanded the cause to make sure the trial judge considered the
defendant's mental illness in imposing sentence. Morris, 237 Ill.
App. 3d at 145. Given that the verdict serves to identify mentally
ill defendants in need of treatment and facilitates just the
sentencing of mentally ill defendants, it is not without legal
consequence as the majority argues.
The majority's discussion about the lack of treatment provided
by the Department of Corrections to mentally ill inmates is a red
herring. The Department of Corrections' noncompliance with the
statutory mandate for evaluation and treatment does not render an
otherwise constitutional statute unconstitutional. If the
defendant is in need of treatment but is not receiving it, then the
appropriate remedy is a suit to compel the State to provide
treatment. United States ex rel. Weismiller v. Lane, 815 F.2d 1106
(7th Cir. 1987). At any rate, this is not the appropriate forum to
determine whether the sentencing and treatment provisions of the
guilty but mentally ill statute are being complied with.
I also disagree with the majority's conclusion that the
statute places a conflicting burden of proof on the defendant. By
raising the insanity defense, the defendant has already assumed the
burden of proving that he is so mentally ill that he is legally
insane. I do not view the GBMI statute as requiring the defendant
to prove he is not insane. Rather, the current statute simply
recognizes that the defendant will be the party presenting evidence
of insanity, not the State, and that in the course of doing so the
defendant may have failed to prove legal insanity but may have
proved that he was mentally ill. In such a case, the defendant can
avail himself of the GBMI verdict. The majority's reliance on
Reddick is misplaced because in the present case defendant must
first be found guilty of the essential elements of the crime and
then found legally sane before the GBMI verdict may be properly
considered by the jury. See Seaman, 203 Ill. App. 3d at 886;
Smith, 124 Ill. App. 3d at 811. Since the defendant has already
been proved guilty with the requisite mental state before the jury
considers the GBMI verdict, Reddick has no application here.
Because I would follow the long line of cases upholding the
constitutionality of the GBMI statute, I respectfully dissent.