People v. Rice
Annotate this Case
Nos. 2--95--0307, 2--95--0308, 2--95--0309 cons.
_________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
SECOND DISTRICT
_________________________________________________________________
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
ILLINOIS, ) of Lake County.
)
Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Nos. 95--CF--2014,
) 95--CF--2017,
v. ) 95--CF--2020
)
LEROY RICE, ) Honorable
) Raymond J. McKoski,
Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, Presiding.
_________________________________________________________________
SUPPLEMENTAL OPINION ON REMAND
JUSTICE RATHJE delivered the supplemental opinion on remand:
On September 16, 1996, this court filed its opinion in the
above-entitled case. Defendant's petition for rehearing was denied
by this court on October 10, 1996. In said opinion, we initially
noted that defendant agreed to a plea negotiation and that, in
exchange for defendant's plea, the State agreed to a cap of six-
year terms on the burglary counts to which he pleaded guilty, with
the sentences to run concurrently. Defendant made three arguments
why this cause should be remanded for a new hearing on his motion
to reconsider his sentence. Defendant initially asserted that
defense counsel's failure to review the sentencing transcript prior
to the hearing on the motion to reconsider his sentence was a
ground for remand. We rejected defendant's argument, citing this
court's opinion in People v. Heinz, 259 Ill. App. 3d 709 (1994).
Defendant next argued that the trial court's failure to provide him
with a transcript of the sentencing hearing denied him the ability
to communicate effectively with counsel regarding the nature of his
claims and their factual bases. We disagreed with this argument,
finding that the pertinent supreme court rules did not provide that
a transcript of the sentencing hearing is required for a
defendant's use at a hearing on a motion to reconsider the
sentence.
Finally, defendant contended that, under Supreme Court Rule
604(d) (145 Ill. 2d R. 604(d)), defense counsel must certify that
he or she has made amendments to the postsentencing motion that are
necessary to present defendant's claims adequately. Defendant
argued that defense counsel's certificate omitted any reference to
the "necessary amendment" portion of the rule. We noted that the
evidence indicated that defense counsel thought it unnecessary to
make any amendments to the motion to reconsider his sentence. We
found that, in such a circumstance, defense counsel's failure to
make any amendments to the motion to reconsider the sentence was of
no consequence.
Accordingly, we affirmed the trial court's judgment.
Defendant petitioned our supreme court for leave to appeal.
The supreme court denied defendant leave to appeal. However, it
entered a supervisory order which stated:
"In the exercise of this Court's supervisory authority, this
cause is remanded to the Appellate Court, Second District, for
further consideration in light of People v. Evans (September
19, 1996), Nos. 80158 & 80159 cons."
In People v. Evans, 174 Ill. 2d 320 (1996), the supreme court
addressed the issue of how Supreme Court Rule 604(d) applies to
negotiated pleas. Both defendants in Evans asserted that the plain
language of Rule 604(d) authorized them to file a motion for
sentence reconsideration, despite their negotiated pleas. The
State argued that the motion to reconsider sentence provisions of
Rule 604(d) applied only to open guilty pleas, not to negotiated
guilty pleas.
The Evans court reviewed the decision in People v. Wilk, 124 Ill. 2d 93 (1988), which had broken with previous cases by allowing
a defendant to challenge only his sentence by filing a motion to
reconsider. The Evans court subsequently wrote:
"We agree with the State's position. Our review of Wilk
and [People v. Wallace, 143 Ill. 2d 59 (1991)] reveals that
the pleas involved in those cases were open guilty pleas. In
other words, the defendants pled guilty without receiving any
promises from the State in return. Following a defendant's
open guilty plea, the trial court exercises its discretion and
determines the sentence to be imposed. Both good public
policy and common sense dictate that defendants who enter open
guilty pleas be allowed to challenge only their sentences
without being required to withdraw their guilty pleas.
[Citations.] Wilk thus overruled Stacey [(People v. Stacey,
68 Ill. 2d 261 (1977))] where open guilty pleas are concerned.
The reasoning utilized by this court in Wilk, however,
does not apply to negotiated guilty plea agreements. We agree
with the State that, under these circumstances, the guilty
plea and the sentence 'go hand in hand' as material elements
of the plea bargain. To permit a defendant to challenge his
sentence without moving to withdraw the guilty plea in these
instances would vitiate the negotiated plea agreement he
entered into with the State. We therefore hold that,
following the entry of judgment on a negotiated guilty plea,
even if a defendant wants to challenge only his sentence, he
must move to withdraw the guilty plea and vacate the judgment
so that, in the event the motion is granted, the parties are
returned to the status quo. [Citations.] Consequently, the
motion-to-reconsider-sentence provisions of Rule 604(d) apply
only to open guilty pleas." (Emphasis added.) Evans, 174 Ill. 2d at 332.
Pursuant to the supreme court's supervisory order, we now
readdress the appeal at bar in light of Evans. Here, the parties
negotiated a guilty plea, and defendant failed to move to withdraw
his guilty plea and to vacate the judgment. However, the events of
the appeal at bar occurred long before the publication of Evans,
which clarified the law regarding procedural requirements related
to challenges to sentences imposed following negotiated pleas. In
fairness, defendant should be permitted to pursue the actions set
out in Evans.
Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's judgment and remand
this cause to the trial court to permit defendant, if he so
chooses, to move to withdraw his guilty plea and to vacate the
judgment.
Reversed and remanded.
GEIGER, P.J., concurs.
JUSTICE HUTCHINSON, dissenting:
I must respectfully dissent from the majority's resolution of
this case.
As previously noted in People v. Smith, 288 Ill. App. 3d 308
(1997), this court concluded that People v. Evans, 174 Ill. 2d 320
(1996), did not specifically address the type of negotiated plea
presented before the trial court. This court also analyzed the
types of negotiated pleas presented in People v. Johnson, 286 Ill.
App. 3d 597 (1997), and People v. Wilson, 286 Ill. App. 3d 169
(1997). We came to the same conclusion in each of those cases.
In the Evans case, the State and the defendant agreed which
charges would be dismissed, which charges defendant would plead to,
and a specific number of years to recommend as a sentence. On the
other hand, in Wilson and Smith, the State agreed to dismiss some
of the charges, and the defendants agreed to plead guilty to the
remaining charges. In Wilson and Smith, the State did not agree to
recommend a specific number of years as a sentence to the trial
court. Instead, the State agreed to recommend sentences not to
exceed a certain number of years. In Johnson, the State agreed to
dismiss charges, the defendant agreed to plead guilty to other
charges, and no sentencing recommendation was made by the State.
According to the facts in this case, the State agreed to
dismiss the charges, and the defendant agreed to plead guilty to
the remaining charges. Furthermore, the State did not recommend a
specific sentence to the trial court; the State agreed to recommend
no more than six years on those remaining burglary counts.
Therefore, I believe that this case should not be considered a
negotiated plea analogous to the plea bargained for in Evans.
Here, as in Wilson and Smith, the trial court had the obligation to
make findings concerning aggravation and mitigation and then
determine an appropriate sentence not to exceed six years. Of
course, the trial court also retained the option to reject the plea
in its entirety.
The Evans court identified open pleas and negotiated pleas as
the only two types of pleas presented to a trial court. The Smith
case, the Johnson case, the Wilson case, and this case clearly
identify other types of negotiated dispositions. In Smith, this
court observed that, "[i]n each of the cases permitting review of
a defendant's sentence following a negotiated plea agreement
without requiring a motion to withdraw the plea, the common
denominator of law seems to be that when a trial court exercises
any discretion in imposing a sentence, a defendant should be
allowed to challenge that sentence to determine whether the trial
court abused its discretion." Smith, 288 Ill. App. 3d at 315.
Based upon the foregoing, I believe that defendant here should
be allowed to pursue a properly presented motion to have his
sentence reconsidered.
_________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
SECOND DISTRICT
_________________________________________________________________
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
ILLINOIS, ) of Lake County.
)
Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Nos. 95--CF--2014,
) 95--CF--2017,
v. ) 95--CF--2020
)
LEROY RICE, ) Honorable
) Raymond J. McKoski,
Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, Presiding.
_________________________________________________________________
SUPPLEMENTAL OPINION ON REMAND
JUSTICE RATHJE delivered the supplemental opinion on remand:
On September 16, 1996, this court filed its opinion in the
above-entitled case. Defendant's petition for rehearing was denied
by this court on October 10, 1996. In said opinion, we initially
noted that defendant agreed to a plea negotiation and that, in
exchange for defendant's plea, the State agreed to a cap of six-
year terms on the burglary counts to which he pleaded guilty, with
the sentences to run concurrently. Defendant made three arguments
why this cause should be remanded for a new hearing on his motion
to reconsider his sentence. Defendant initially asserted that
defense counsel's failure to review the sentencing transcript prior
to the hearing on the motion to reconsider his sentence was a
ground for remand. We rejected defendant's argument, citing this
court's opinion in People v. Heinz, 259 Ill. App. 3d 709 (1994).
Defendant next argued that the trial court's failure to provide him
with a transcript of the sentencing hearing denied him the ability
to communicate effectively with counsel regarding the nature of his
claims and their factual bases. We disagreed with this argument,
finding that the pertinent supreme court rules did not provide that
a transcript of the sentencing hearing is required for a
defendant's use at a hearing on a motion to reconsider the
sentence.
Finally, defendant contended that, under Supreme Court Rule
604(d) (145 Ill. 2d R. 604(d)), defense counsel must certify that
he or she has made amendments to the postsentencing motion that are
necessary to present defendant's claims adequately. Defendant
argued that defense counsel's certificate omitted any reference to
the "necessary amendment" portion of the rule. We noted that the
evidence indicated that defense counsel thought it unnecessary to
make any amendments to the motion to reconsider his sentence. We
found that, in such a circumstance, defense counsel's failure to
make any amendments to the motion to reconsider the sentence was of
no consequence.
Accordingly, we affirmed the trial court's judgment.
Defendant petitioned our supreme court for leave to appeal.
The supreme court denied defendant leave to appeal. However, it
entered a supervisory order which stated:
"In the exercise of this Court's supervisory authority, this
cause is remanded to the Appellate Court, Second District, for
further consideration in light of People v. Evans (September
19, 1996), Nos. 80158 & 80159 cons."
In People v. Evans, 174 Ill. 2d 320 (1996), the supreme court
addressed the issue of how Supreme Court Rule 604(d) applies to
negotiated pleas. Both defendants in Evans asserted that the plain
language of Rule 604(d) authorized them to file a motion for
sentence reconsideration, despite their negotiated pleas. The
State argued that the motion to reconsider sentence provisions of
Rule 604(d) applied only to open guilty pleas, not to negotiated
guilty pleas.
The Evans court reviewed the decision in People v. Wilk, 124 Ill. 2d 93 (1988), which had broken with previous cases by allowing
a defendant to challenge only his sentence by filing a motion to
reconsider. The Evans court subsequently wrote:
"We agree with the State's position. Our review of Wilk
and [People v. Wallace, 143 Ill. 2d 59 (1991)] reveals that
the pleas involved in those cases were open guilty pleas. In
other words, the defendants pled guilty without receiving any
promises from the State in return. Following a defendant's
open guilty plea, the trial court exercises its discretion and
determines the sentence to be imposed. Both good public
policy and common sense dictate that defendants who enter open
guilty pleas be allowed to challenge only their sentences
without being required to withdraw their guilty pleas.
[Citations.] Wilk thus overruled Stacey [(People v. Stacey,
68 Ill. 2d 261 (1977))] where open guilty pleas are concerned.
The reasoning utilized by this court in Wilk, however,
does not apply to negotiated guilty plea agreements. We agree
with the State that, under these circumstances, the guilty
plea and the sentence 'go hand in hand' as material elements
of the plea bargain. To permit a defendant to challenge his
sentence without moving to withdraw the guilty plea in these
instances would vitiate the negotiated plea agreement he
entered into with the State. We therefore hold that,
following the entry of judgment on a negotiated guilty plea,
even if a defendant wants to challenge only his sentence, he
must move to withdraw the guilty plea and vacate the judgment
so that, in the event the motion is granted, the parties are
returned to the status quo. [Citations.] Consequently, the
motion-to-reconsider-sentence provisions of Rule 604(d) apply
only to open guilty pleas." (Emphasis added.) Evans, 174 Ill. 2d at 332.
Pursuant to the supreme court's supervisory order, we now
readdress the appeal at bar in light of Evans. Here, the parties
negotiated a guilty plea, and defendant failed to move to withdraw
his guilty plea and to vacate the judgment. However, the events of
the appeal at bar occurred long before the publication of Evans,
which clarified the law regarding procedural requirements related
to challenges to sentences imposed following negotiated pleas. In
fairness, defendant should be permitted to pursue the actions set
out in Evans.
Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's judgment and remand
this cause to the trial court to permit defendant, if he so
chooses, to move to withdraw his guilty plea and to vacate the
judgment.
Reversed and remanded.
GEIGER, P.J., concurs.
JUSTICE HUTCHINSON, dissenting:
I must respectfully dissent from the majority's resolution of
this case.
As previously noted in People v. Smith, 288 Ill. App. 3d 308
(1997), this court concluded that People v. Evans, 174 Ill. 2d 320
(1996), did not specifically address the type of negotiated plea
presented before the trial court. This court also analyzed the
types of negotiated pleas presented in People v. Johnson, 286 Ill.
App. 3d 597 (1997), and People v. Wilson, 286 Ill. App. 3d 169
(1997). We came to the same conclusion in each of those cases.
In the Evans case, the State and the defendant agreed which
charges would be dismissed, which charges defendant would plead to,
and a specific number of years to recommend as a sentence. On the
other hand, in Wilson and Smith, the State agreed to dismiss some
of the charges, and the defendants agreed to plead guilty to the
remaining charges. In Wilson and Smith, the State did not agree to
recommend a specific number of years as a sentence to the trial
court. Instead, the State agreed to recommend sentences not to
exceed a certain number of years. In Johnson, the State agreed to
dismiss charges, the defendant agreed to plead guilty to other
charges, and no sentencing recommendation was made by the State.
According to the facts in this case, the State agreed to
dismiss the charges, and the defendant agreed to plead guilty to
the remaining charges. Furthermore, the State did not recommend a
specific sentence to the trial court; the State agreed to recommend
no more than six years on those remaining burglary counts.
Therefore, I believe that this case should not be considered a
negotiated plea analogous to the plea bargained for in Evans.
Here, as in Wilson and Smith, the trial court had the obligation to
make findings concerning aggravation and mitigation and then
determine an appropriate sentence not to exceed six years. Of
course, the trial court also retained the option to reject the plea
in its entirety.
The Evans court identified open pleas and negotiated pleas as
the only two types of pleas presented to a trial court. The Smith
case, the Johnson case, the Wilson case, and this case clearly
identify other types of negotiated dispositions. In Smith, this
court observed that, "[i]n each of the cases permitting review of
a defendant's sentence following a negotiated plea agreement
without requiring a motion to withdraw the plea, the common
denominator of law seems to be that when a trial court exercises
any discretion in imposing a sentence, a defendant should be
allowed to challenge that sentence to determine whether the trial
court abused its discretion." Smith, 288 Ill. App. 3d at 315.
Based upon the foregoing, I believe that defendant here should
be allowed to pursue a properly presented motion to have his
sentence reconsidered.
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