In re S.J.

NO. 4-96-0939

IN THE APPELLATE COURT

OF ILLINOIS

FOURTH DISTRICT

In the Interest of S.J., J.J., and K.J., ) Appeal from
Alleged to be Neglected Minors, ) Circuit Court of
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) McLean County
Petitioner-Appellee, ) No. 92J226
v. )
CHARLES J. JENKINS, ) Honorable
Respondent-Appellant. ) Elizabeth A. Robb,
) Judge Presiding.
_________________________________________________________________

PRESIDING JUSTICE STEIGMANN delivered the opinion of
the court:
In March 1993, the trial court adjudicated each of the
respondent minors in this case, S.J. (born September 1982), J.J.
(born June 1984), and K.J. (born July 1985), neglected minors,
made them wards of the court, and placed them under the guardian-
ship of the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services
(DCFS). In November 1995, the State filed a petition to termi-
nate the parental rights of respondent father, Charles J.
Jenkins, and the court conducted a hearing on that petition in
June 1996. After hearing the evidence, including testimony that
Jenkins had not had any contact with his three children in over
one year, the court found Jenkins to be unfit and terminated his
parental rights by written order entered June 27, 1996. See 750
ILCS 50/1(D)(b), (D)(m), (D)(n) (West 1994).
Jenkins appeals, arguing that the trial court (1)
failed to obtain proper service on Jenkins and the eldest child,
S.J.; and (2) erred in terminating the appointment of Jenkins'
court-appointed attorney in January 1996 due to Jenkins' failure
to have any contact with his attorney.
We dismiss this appeal.
Even though the trial court entered its written order
terminating Jenkins' parental rights on June 27, 1996, he did not
file a notice of appeal until December 2, 1996. The State asks
this court to dismiss Jenkins' appeal for lack of appellate
jurisdiction, pointing out that his delay in filing a notice of
appeal goes far beyond the 30-day limit set by Supreme Court
Rules 303 and 660(b) (155 Ill. 2d R. 303; 134 Ill 2d R. 660(b)),
as well as beyond the period set for filing a late notice of
appeal under Supreme Court Rule 303(d) (155 Ill. 2d R. 303(d).
In support of the State's claim that this court lacks jurisdic-
tion and must dismiss Jenkins' appeal, the State cites Martin v.
Cajda, 238 Ill. App. 3d 721, 728, 606 N.E.2d 566, 571 (1992),
which held as follows:
"[Completely dispositive of the issue
before this court is the requirement that]
'[t]o vest the appellate court with jurisdic-
tion[,] a party must file a notice of appeal
within 30 days after entry of [the] judgment
appealed from.' [Citation.] Compliance with
the deadlines for appeals in Supreme Court
Rule 303 is mandatory and jurisdictional
[citations], and appellate jurisdiction may
not be conferred by laches, consent, waiv-
er[,] or estoppel."
See also In re Kerwood, 44 Ill. App. 3d 1040, 1043, 359 N.E.2d 183, 185 (1976); In re Charles S., 83 Ill. App. 3d 515, 516-17,
404 N.E.2d 435, 436 (1980) (appellant's failure to appeal within
30 days of adjudication of wardship coupled with a dispositional
order deprived appellate court of jurisdiction to hear that
appeal).
In response, Jenkins cites In re Rauch, 45 Ill. App. 3d
784, 359 N.E.2d 894 (1977), where the Third District Appellate
Court rejected the State's argument that the court had no juris-
diction to consider an appeal by a parent whose parental rights
had been terminated when notice of appeal was filed more than 30
days after the judgment appealed from. In Rauch, the trial court
told the respondent parents that they had 50 days in which to
file a notice of appeal, and the State's Attorney apparently
agreed with that representation. The appellate court cited the
"broad concept that a party whose own conduct contributes or
causes another to commit an irregularity in judicial procedure[]
cannot later twist that irregularity to his own advantage."
Rauch, 45 Ill. App. 3d at 787, 359 N.E.2d at 896. Noting that
the time difference involved did not engender any prejudice to
the State, the third district concluded that "[t]he ends of
justice will be better served by permitting the appeal to pro-
ceed." Rauch, 45 Ill. App. 3d at 787, 359 N.E.2d at 896. Based
upon Rauch, Jenkins claims that this court has discretion to hear
his appeal, especially where, as here, the "ends of justice"
would be better served by permitting the appeal to proceed. We
disagree.
Although 20 years have passed since Rauch was decided,
no case in this State has followed its holding that circumstances
can exist in which the appellate court can accept an appeal not
filed in accordance with Supreme Court Rule 303. We disagree
with Rauch on the merits and view Martin as a more correct and
current statement of Illinois law on this point.
Accordingly, for the reasons stated, we dismiss
Jenkins' appeal.
Appeal dismissed.
McCULLOUGH and GARMAN, JJ., concur.