People v. Bradley

NO. 4-96-0835

IN THE APPELLATE COURT

OF ILLINOIS

FOURTH DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from
Plaintiff-Appellant, ) Circuit Court of
v. ) Champaign County
CHRISTOPHER S. BRADLEY, ) No. 96CF529
Defendant-Appellee. )
) Honorable
) Donald R. Parkinson,
) Judge Presiding.
_________________________________________________________________


PRESIDING JUSTICE STEIGMANN delivered the opinion of
the court:
In May 1996, the State charged defendant, Christopher
S. Bradley, with obstructing justice by providing false in-
formation to a police officer (720 ILCS 5/31-4 (West 1994)). In
August 1996, defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence
that was the basis for the charge against him. In September
1996, the trial court conducted a hearing on that motion and
granted it. The State appeals, and we reverse and remand with
directions.
I. BACKGROUND
At the September 1996 hearing on defendant's motion to
suppress, the only witness to testify was Urbana police officer
Liam Dempsey. He testified about events of March 23, 1996, and
April 7, 1996, which led to defendant's arrest. On March 23,
1996, at about 12:40 a.m., Dempsey and Urbana police sergeant Pat
Connolly were on routine patrol when Dempsey saw a station wagon
with no license plates and a license-applied-for (LAF) sticker
with an unreadable expiration date. Dempsey stated that the type
of LAF sticker located on the station wagon contains small
lettering which "sometimes cannot be read until a person gets
right up to it."
Dempsey stopped the vehicle, approached the car from
the rear, and determined that the LAF sticker located on the rear
windshield was valid. Dempsey then approached defendant, who re-
mained seated in the car, and asked for his driver's license.
Defendant said he had a valid driver's license but did not have
it with him. At that point, Dempsey asked defendant for his name
so that Dempsey could run a computer check to determine if
defendant had a valid driver's license. Defendant told Dempsey
that his name was Brian Cutter. The computer check indicated
that there was "no record on file" for Brian Cutter, which means
that a person by that name has never had a driver's license in
Illinois. Dempsey confronted defendant with this information,
and defendant then stated that he did not have a valid driver's
license. Defendant also stated that he was driving only because
his passenger was intoxicated and could not drive safely. At
that point, Dempsey issued defendant a citation for driving
without a valid driver's license.
Dempsey also testified that he asked defendant for his
driver's license after confirming that the LAF sticker was valid
because (1) departmental policy required him to do so; and (2) he
wanted to make sure that defendant had a legal right to drive a
vehicle.
On April 7, 1996, while Dempsey was stopped at an
intersection, he saw defendant driving the same car he had been
driving on March 23, 1996. Dempsey mentioned to other police
officers present that a person without a valid driver's license
had just driven past them. At that point, defendant pulled over
and walked over to Dempsey. Another officer then arrested
defendant for driving without a valid driver's license. After
officers took defendant into custody, he told Dempsey that his
real name was Christopher Bradley.
After hearing counsels' arguments and considering the
evidence, the trial court granted defendant's motion. The court
found that once Dempsey determined that the LAF sticker was
valid, the "purpose for the stop of the vehicle ha[d] been taken
care of," and Dempsey could do nothing more than explain to
defendant the reason he had been stopped.
II. ANALYSIS
The State argues on appeal that the trial court erred
by granting defendant's motion to suppress on the ground that the
police officer unjustifiably seized defendant when he asked for
his driver's license. We note that the court's ruling is gener-
ally entitled to great deference, and this court will not disturb
it on review unless we conclude it is against the manifest weight
of the evidence. People v. Garriott, 253 Ill. App. 3d 1048,
1050, 625 N.E.2d 780, 782 (1993). However, where the facts are
uncontroverted, as here--and we add that we accept the trial
court's factual findings--we may review the trial court's deter-
mination de novo as to what conclusions of law apply to the facts
as found. In re D.G., 144 Ill. 2d 404, 408-09, 581 N.E.2d 648,
649 (1991).
Initially, we note that defendant concedes that
Dempsey's initial stop on March 23, 1996, was valid. See People
v. Adams, 225 Ill. App. 3d 815, 818, 587 N.E.2d 592, 595 (1992)
("The absence of a license plate provides the basis for the
[investigatory] stop"); People v. Tylkowski, 171 Ill. App. 3d 93,
99, 524 N.E.2d 1112, 1116 (1988) (where the court held that the
only way police officers could determine whether the defendant
had a valid LAF sticker was to stop him and check).
The State contends that after Dempsey had properly
stopped defendant to check the validity of the car's LAF sticker,
he could then approach defendant to request defendant's driver's
license. We agree.
In People v. McVey, 185 Ill. App. 3d 536, 539, 541 N.E.2d 835, 837 (1989), a police officer pulled up behind a
parked car. The officer asked for the defendant's driver's
license, and the defendant handed him a facially valid California
driver's license. The officer then ordered the defendant to
remain in his car while the officer ran a computer check on the
defendant's license. The McVey court held that no seizure
occurred when the officer asked to see the defendant's driver's
license. McVey, 185 Ill. App. 3d at 539, 541 N.E.2d at 837. The
court also held that an unjustifiable seizure occurred only when
the officer continued his investigation even though the defendant
had produced a facially valid driver's license. McVey, 185 Ill.
App. 3d at 539, 541 N.E.2d at 837. The court reasoned that "[a]t
that point, the officer's questions had been answered." McVey,
185 Ill. App. 3d at 540, 541 N.E.2d at 837.
In People v. Arteaga, 274 Ill. App. 3d 781, 782, 655 N.E.2d 290, 290 (1995), a police officer stopped a vehicle with
no visible registration. The officer approached the vehicle and
observed a valid registration sticker on the car's rear window.
The officer asked for the defendant's driver's license, and the
defendant produced a facially valid Illinois driver's license.
The officer then ran a computer check and discovered that the
defendant's license had been revoked. The Arteaga court, relying
in part on McVey, concluded that when the officer ran a computer
check on the defendant's license, he exceeded the underlying
justification for the initial stop. Arteaga, 274 Ill. App. 3d at
783, 655 N.E.2d at 291-92. In so concluding, the court wrote
that once the officer "saw the valid registration in the rear
window and the defendant tendered a facially valid driver's li-
cense, [the officer] had no reason to detain the defendant any
longer." Arteaga, 274 Ill. App. 3d at 783, 655 N.E.2d at 291.
In People v. McKnight, 198 Ill. App. 3d 530, 531-32,
555 N.E.2d 1196, 1197 (1990), a police officer pulled up behind a
parked truck because it looked suspicious and she wanted to
determine whether the driver was injured. Upon approaching the
truck, the officer asked the defendant if he had a driver's
license, and he responded that he did not have one. The officer
then ran a computer check, determined that the defendant's
driver's license was revoked, and arrested defendant after he
admitted he had been driving the truck. The McKnight court
concluded that the police officer in that case did not need
probable cause to request the defendant's driver's license and
her request did not constitute an illegal seizure. McKnight, 198
Ill. App. 3d at 533, 555 N.E.2d at 1198.
Consistent with McVey, Arteaga, and McKnight, we
conclude that once Dempsey properly stopped the car defendant was
driving to determine whether the LAF sticker was valid and found
that the sticker was valid, he could then approach defendant,
explain to him why he had been stopped, and ask defendant to
produce his driver's license. Under these circumstances, no
seizure occurred when Dempsey did so. Accordingly, we hold that
the trial court erred by granting defendant's motion to suppress.
We further hold that when, as here, a police officer
has lawfully stopped a motorist, the officer may ask to see the
motorist's driver's license, proof of insurance, and vehicle
registration, and the officer's doing so does not raise any
constitutional issues. We note that our decision is consistent
with this court's holding in Adams, where a police officer ap-
proached the defendant's car after having stopped it to check its
LAF sticker. Upon approaching the defendant, the officer noticed
an alcohol odor on defendant's breath and slurred speech, and
subsequently ticketed him for driving while under the influence
of alcohol. Adams, 225 Ill. App. 3d at 816-17, 587 N.E.2d at
594. This court addressed the defendant's argument that once the
officer properly stopped him, it was improper for the officer to
further "detain" him to explain the reason for the stop, and we
wrote the following:
"[O]nce it was determined that defendant had
a valid [LAF] form displayed, [it just natu-
rally followed that] the officer would ap-
proach the defendant, explain the reason for
the stop, apologize, and advise defendant he
was free to leave. In doing so, any observa-
tions the officer made may form the basis of
probable cause to arrest the defendant ***."
Adams, 225 Ill. App. 3d at 819, 587 N.E.2d at
595.
We also note that because the issue is not before us
under the circumstances of this case, we do not express any
opinion about the conclusions in McVey and Arteaga that running a
computer check on a facially valid driver's license constitutes
an unjustifiable seizure.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, we reverse the trial court's
judgment granting defendant's motion to suppress, and we remand
for further proceedings consistent with the views expressed
herein.
Reversed and remanded with directions.
McCULLOUGH and COOK, JJ., concur.