Wozniak v. Conry

NO. 4-96-0631

IN THE APPELLATE COURT

OF ILLINOIS

FOURTH DISTRICT

LOUIS WOZNIAK, ) Appeal from
Plaintiff-Appellant, ) Circuit Court of
v. ) Champaign County
THOMAS F. CONRY, ) No. 96L60
Defendant-Appellee, )
and )
MICHAEL H. PLECK, LARRY R. FAULKNER, )
C.K. GUNSALUS, WAYNE J. DAVIS, EDWARD N.)
KUZNETSOV, L. DANIEL METZ, DAVID E. )
GOLDBERG, JURAJ V. MEDANIC, MARK W. )
SPONG, WILLIAM R. SCHOWALTER, KEN )
MURPHY, MICHAEL AIKEN, ROSCOE PERSHING, )
CAROLYN REED, and THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES ) Honorable
OF THE UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS, ) John G. Townsend,
Respondents in Discovery. ) Judge Presiding.
_________________________________________________________________

PRESIDING JUSTICE STEIGMANN delivered the opinion of

the court:

In February 1996, plaintiff, Louis Wozniak, sued
defendant, Thomas F. Conry, for tortious interference with an
employment contract. In July 1996, the circuit court dismissed
the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. The court ruled that
because Conry's conduct arose solely out of conduct related to
duties imposed on him by virtue of his job at the University of
Illinois (University), a state institution, Wozniak's suit could
only be brought in the Court of Claims. 705 ILCS 505/8 (West
Supp. 1995). Wozniak appeals, and we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
Prior to July 1995, Wozniak was an associate professor
in the Department of General Engineering (Department) at theUniversity. In August 1995, Wozniak was reassigned from a
teaching position to a position maintaining a website on the
World Wide Web for the College of Engineering (College). In
February 1996, Wozniak filed a one-count complaint against Conry,
the acting Department head, alleging that Conry had tortiously
interfered with his employment contract with the University's
Board of Trustees (Board).
In his complaint, Wozniak alleged Conry made false
accusations about him, knowing they were untrue or acting with
reckless disregard for their truth. These accusations included
statements that Wozniak had (1) sexually harassed a female
employee; (2) deliberately failed to comply with course standards
and departmental policy regarding assignments, practice exams,
and grade books; and (3) graded capriciously and in violation of
University policies and procedures. Wozniak also alleged that
Conry falsely told others in the Department that Wozniak was
unable to carry out his teaching duties in compliance with
professional and ethical standards. Further, Wozniak alleged
that Conry told the Department's executive committee members that
the Dean of the College had requested the committee's support in
removing Wozniak from his assigned responsibilities, knowing this
statement to be untrue or acting with reckless disregard for its
truth.
Wozniak also alleged that Conry knew of Wozniak's con-
tractual relationship with the Board and had acted with the
intent to interfere with this relationship. Wozniak did not
allege that a specific provision of his contract had been
breached, but alleged that Conry intentionally interfered with
his employment relationship, directly and proximately causing him
to be removed from his position as associate professor. Wozniak
alleged that this removal caused him to suffer emotional dis-
tress, humiliation, embarrassment, a loss of sleep and appetite,
and a loss of reputation.
In March 1996, Conry filed a motion to dismiss the
complaint, contending that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction
over Wozniak's claim. Conry argued that Wozniak's claim was, in
effect, a claim against the state, which could only be brought in
the Court of Claims under section 8 of the Court of Claims Act
(Act) (705 ILCS 505/8 (West Supp. 1995)). In the alternative,
Conry contended that the court should dismiss the complaint
because it failed to state a cause of action for tortious inter-
ference with a contractual relationship. Specifically, Conry
asserted that Wozniak failed to allege his contract with the
Board had been breached by his reassignment.
In May 1996, the circuit court dismissed Wozniak's
complaint for lack of jurisdiction without addressing the suffi-
ciency of the pleadings. In its opinion letter, the court based
its decision on the fact that Wozniak's charges of negligence
arose solely out of duties imposed on Conry by virtue of his job
at the University.
In June 1996, Wozniak filed a motion to reconsider. He
argued that (1) the only duty Conry breached was the duty imposed
on all people, regardless of employment, not to interfere with
others' contractual relations; and (2) his claim was based on
Conry's intentional conduct, not negligence. In July 1996, the
circuit court sent a second opinion letter to counsel, reaf-
firming its conclusion that it lacked jurisdiction because
Conry's conduct was related to his job duties at the University.
In both opinion letters, the court relied on the holdings in
Currie v. Lao, 148 Ill. 2d 151, 592 N.E.2d 977 (1992), and
Nikelly v. Stubing, 204 Ill. App. 3d 870, 562 N.E.2d 360 (1990).
II. ANALYSIS
The issue before us is whether Wozniak's suit against
Conry, a supervisor for a state entity, is in reality a suit
against the state such that the Court of Claims has exclusive
jurisdiction over the action.
The parties disagree on the relevant standard for
determining if a suit against a supervisor for a state entity for
allegedly tortious statements about an employee's work is effec-
tively a suit against the state. Wozniak contends that his suit
is not effectively against the state because Conry's statements
regarding him did not arise out of a duty imposed solely by
virtue of Conry's employment; instead, those statements arose out
of a duty imposed on the general public not to interfere with
others' contractual relationships. Conry contends that a suit
against a state employee constitutes a suit against the state as
long as the employee acted within the scope of his governmental
authority when engaging in the conduct giving rise to the suit.
See Robb v. Sutton, 147 Ill. App. 3d 710, 716, 498 N.E.2d 267,
272 (1986). Accordingly, Conry contends that the circuit court
has no jurisdiction in this case because his statements regarding
Wozniak were made within the scope of his employment at the
University.
Section 8 of the Act provides, in pertinent part, as
follows:
"The [Court of Claims] shall have exclu-
sive jurisdiction to hear and determine the
following matters:
(a) All claims against the [S]tate
founded upon any law of the State of Illi-
nois, or upon any regulation thereunder by an
executive or administrative officer or agency
*** or claims for expenses in civil litiga-
tion.
* * *
(d) All claims against the State for
damages in cases sounding in tort, if a like
cause of action would lie against a private
person or corporation in a civil suit, and
all like claims sounding in tort against ***
the [Board] ***." 705 ILCS 505/8(a),(d)
(West Supp. 1995).
Determining whether an action constitutes a suit
against the state turns upon an analysis of the issues involved
and the relief sought, rather than the formal designation of the
parties. Healy v. Vaupel, 133 Ill. 2d 295, 308, 549 N.E.2d 1240,
1247 (1990). In Currie, the supreme court specifically held that
a state employee is not immunized by sovereign immunity for his
own acts of negligence merely because he was acting within the
scope of his employment. Currie, 148 Ill. 2d at 158, 592 N.E.2d
at 980; see also Healy, 133 Ill. 2d at 312-13, 549 N.E.2d at 1249
(finding that a suit was effectively against the state, not an
individual coach at a state university, for violation of a duty
identical to duties imposed on coaches at private universities),
cited with approval in Currie, 148 Ill. 2d at 165-66, 592 N.E.2d
at 983. Instead, the supreme court concluded that where a state
employee, although acting within the scope of his employment, is
charged with breaching a duty that arose independently of his
state employment, a suit against him will not be shielded by
sovereign immunity. Currie, 148 Ill. 2d at 159-60, 592 N.E.2d at
980.
Although Conry's statements regarding Wozniak may have
been made within the scope of his employment at the University,
Wozniak argues nonetheless that they violated a duty imposed on
the general public not to interfere with others' contractual
relationships. Wozniak asserts that because this duty is not
imposed solely because of Conry's employment, the suit was not
effectively against the state.
In Currie, the supreme court also recognized that a
suit against a state employee in his individual capacity consti-
tutes a claim against the state when a judgment for the plaintiff
could control the state's actions or subject it to liability.
Currie, 148 Ill. 2d at 158, 592 N.E.2d at 980. This rule "pro-
tects the State from interference in its performance of the
functions of government and preserves its control over State
coffers." S.J. Groves & Sons Co. v. State of Illinois, 93 Ill. 2d 397, 401, 444 N.E.2d 131, 133 (1982), overruled on other
grounds, Rossetti Contracting Co. v. Court of Claims, 109 Ill. 2d 72, 485 N.E.2d 332 (1985).
A suit against a state employee controls the state's
actions when the relief sought would limit the ability of the
employee to engage in lawful activity on behalf of the state.
See Management Ass'n of Illinois, Inc. v. Board of Regents of
Northern Illinois University, 248 Ill. App. 3d 599, 609, 618 N.E.2d 694, 701 (1993). The threat of private suits against
supervisors for work-related statements about those under their
authority clearly would affect the way supervisors communicate,
allocate tasks, and make employment decisions. Accordingly, when
a supervisor for a state department or entity is sued by an
employee for statements regarding the employee's work-related
conduct and pending personnel decisions, the suit necessarily
threatens to control the actions of the state. It does not
matter if, as here, the plaintiff alleges the statements were
knowingly false. See Rembis v. Board of Trustees of the Univer-
sity of Illinois, 249 Ill. App. 3d 1, 4, 618 N.E.2d 797, 799
(1993) (notwithstanding dicta in Robb (147 Ill. App. 3d at 714,
498 N.E.2d at 271)). Instead, the relevant inquiry is whether
the supervisor would be acting within the scope of his duties by
making truthful statements of the general type alleged. Cf.
President Lincoln Hotel Venture v. Bank One, Springfield, 271
Ill. App. 3d 1048, 1057, 649 N.E.2d 432, 438-39 (1994) (focusing
on whether individual defendant had authority to take general
type of action giving rise to contract claim, not whether action
violated contract).
However, this rule--that a suit against a state employ-
ee constitutes a suit against the state when a judgment for a
plaintiff could control the state's actions--is not without
limits. Whenever a state employee performs illegally, unconsti-
tutionally, or without authority, a suit may still be maintained
against the employee in his individual capacity and does not
constitute an action against the State of Illinois. Sass v.
Kramer, 72 Ill. 2d 485, 492, 381 N.E.2d 975, 977 (1978); Village
of Riverwoods v. BG Ltd Partnership., 276 Ill. App. 3d 720, 725,
658 N.E.2d 1261, 1265-66 (1995).
Here, Conry's conduct goes to the core of the state's
ability to control its own affairs. A state is a purely legal
entity that can act only through its agents. See Local 3236 v.
Illinois State Board of Education, 121 Ill. App. 3d 160, 164-65,
459 N.E.2d 300, 303 (1984). Almost every aspect of every employ-
ment relationship with the state manifests itself through the
immediate working relationships between co-workers, supervisors,
and fellow state agents. Therefore, limiting the actions of
state employees acts to control the actions of the state.
Currie, 148 Ill. 2d at 159-60, 592 N.E.2d at 980.
To allow Wozniak's suit against Conry in his individual
capacity clearly would limit Conry's ability to engage in lawful
activity on behalf of the University--namely, to communicate,
allocate tasks, and make personnel and other employment deci-
sions. Conry's comments, which were within the scope of his
employment, related to the employment relationship between
Wozniak and the University. One comment concerned the Dean's
response to Wozniak's alleged misconduct. The rest of Conry's
comments involved Wozniak's performance as a teacher and supervi-
sor. A judgment for Wozniak would directly influence Conry's
ability as a state employee to handle departmental personnel
issues. Accordingly, this suit threatens to control the actions
of the state.
Suits against supervisors of state departments or state
agencies for statements they would not be authorized by their
position to make--even if the statements were true--are only
indirectly related to the employment relationship and are unlike-
ly to control the actions of the state. See Robb, 147 Ill. App.
3d at 715, 498 N.E.2d at 272. This factor distinguishes Ritchey
v. Maksin, 49 Ill. App. 3d 974, 365 N.E.2d 127 (1977), rev'd on
other grounds, 71 Ill. 2d 470, 376 N.E.2d 991 (1978), relied on
by Wozniak. In that case, the fifth district held that a meat
inspector can be sued individually for tortiously initiating
false criminal charges and making false public accusations
because initiating criminal charges and making public statements
were not part of his normal duties. Ritchey, 49 Ill. App. 3d at
975, 365 N.E.2d at 128. This factor also distinguishes Hoffman
v. Yack, 57 Ill. App. 3d 744, 746, 373 N.E.2d 486, 488 (1978), in
which the fifth district also held that a suit was not against
the state when the defendant supervisor made personal accusations
that did not relate solely to the employee's job, and the super-
visor also intercepted the employee's mail.
Wozniak urges this court to adopt an alternative rule
that would attribute a supervisor's conduct (in making work-
related statements) to the State only if the circuit court makes
some preliminary evidentiary finding regarding their truthful-
ness. Because Conry obviously would possess the authority to
make the statements giving rise to the suit if they were true,
the truthfulness of the statements would then become dispositive
of the circuit court's jurisdiction. However, jurisdiction
generally does not turn on the merits of the underlying claim.
See People of the State of California v. Western Tire Auto
Stores, Inc., 32 Ill. 2d 527, 531, 207 N.E.2d 474, 476-77 (1965);
3 R. Michael, Illinois Practice 6.2, 6.5, at 60, 68 (1989).
Because courts look only to the complaint to determine if sover-
eign immunity attaches, we decline to adopt the rule Wozniak
urges. Cf. Christiansen v. Masse, 279 Ill. App. 3d 162, 169, 664 N.E.2d 314, 319 (1996); President Lincoln Hotel, 271 Ill. App. 3d
at 1056, 649 N.E.2d at 438.
To summarize our holding, the Court of Claims provides
the only forum for a suit against a supervisor of a state depart-
ment or agency for making statements regarding pending personnel
decisions and work-related conduct about an employee under his or
her supervision. Such statements are within the scope of the
supervisor's duties as a state employee. While acting within the
scope of one's employment is not usually enough to satisfy the
analysis set forth by the supreme court in Currie, it is suffi-
cient in this context, because any limit on such a supervisor's
ability to make such statements would necessarily control the
actions of the state.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, we affirm the circuit court's
dismissal for lack of jurisdiction.
Affirmed.
GARMAN and COOK, JJ., concur.