People v. Garbo
Annotate this Case
NO. 4-96-0511
IN THE APPELLATE COURT
OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from
Plaintiff-Appellant, ) Circuit Court of
v. ) Coles County
TAMARA L. GARBO, ) No. 96TR2257
Defendant-Appellee. )
) Honorable
) Dale A. Cini,
) Judge Presiding.
_________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE McCULLOUGH delivered the opinion of the court:
The State appeals pursuant to Supreme Court Rule
604(a)(1) (145 Ill. 2d R. 604(a)(1)) from the order of the circuit
court of Coles County dismissing its information charging defendant
Tamara L. Garbo with the offense of driving while her license was
suspended in violation of section 6-303(a) of the Illinois Vehicle
Code (Vehicle Code) (625 ILCS 5/6-303(a) (West 1994)). The
information was dismissed for failure to state an offense. 725
ILCS 5/114-1(a)(8) (West 1994). We affirm.
The information alleged that, in driving or being in
actual physical control of a motor vehicle on February 22, 1996,
defendant was driving while license suspended because her driver's
license had been suspended for a statutory summary suspension
violation of section 11-501.1 of the Vehicle Code (Ill. Rev. Stat.
1989, ch. 95«, par. 11-501.1) and the suspension was to be in
effect until March 11, 1991, but because defendant had failed to
pay the reinstatement fees, the suspension remained in effect on
February 22, 1996. In People v. Johnson, 115 Ill. App. 3d 987,
989, 451 N.E.2d 28, 30 (1983), the court stated that a suspension
is a temporary sanction for a specified period and failure to pay
the reinstatement fees did not extend the period of suspension.
See 625 ILCS 5/1-204 (West 1994). The State argues that the
legislature's enactment of section 6-208.1 of the Vehicle Code (625
ILCS 5/6-208.1 (West 1994)) after the decision in Johnson indicated
a legislative intent to extend the statutory summary suspension
unless the reinstatement fees had been paid. We disagree.
The portion of section 6-208.1 upon which the State
relies is subsection (c), which states:
"(c) Full driving privileges may not be
restored until all applicable reinstatement
fees, as provided by this Code, have been paid
to the Secretary of State and the appropriate
entry made to the driver's record." 625 ILCS
5/6-208.1(c) (West 1994).
The reinstatement fee for summary suspension under
section 11-501.1 of the Vehicle Code is $60. 625 ILCS 5/6-118(b)
(West 1994). Upon payment of the reinstatement fee at the end of
any period of suspension, the licensee is entitled to reinstatement
of driving privileges and return of her license if (1) the license
has not expired, in which case the licensee may apply for a new
license or (2) the licensee is not ineligible for some other
reason. 625 ILCS 5/6-209 (West 1994). Section 6-209 of the
Vehicle Code has remained unchanged since Johnson. Section 6-
303(b) of the Vehicle Code allows the Secretary of State (Secre-
tary) to extend the period of suspension upon receiving a report of
conviction of any violation for operating a motor vehicle during
the time the driver's license is suspended. 625 ILCS 5/6-303(b)
(West 1994). Therefore, if the legislature intended that the
failure to pay reinstatement fees should effectively extend the
period of suspension, the legislature could have so stated.
"The cardinal rule of statutory construc-
tion is to ascertain and give effect to the
true intent and meaning of the legislature.
State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Yapejian,
152 Ill. 2d 533, 540-41, 605 N.E.2d 539, 542
(1992). The language of the statute is the
best indicator of that intent, and aids for
construing a statute will only be resorted to
if the language of the statute is not clear.
Solich v. George & Anna Portes Cancer Preven-
tion Center of Chicago, Inc., 158 Ill. 2d 76,
81, 630 N.E.2d 820, 822 (1994)." Randall v.
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 284 Ill. App. 3d 970,
972, 673 N.E.2d 452, 454-55 (1996).
The State argues that the fact section 6-208.1 of the
Vehicle Code was enacted after the decision in Johnson indicates a
legislative intent to change the law. The legislature is presumed
to know the construction courts have placed on a statute (see Hupp
v. Gray, 73 Ill. 2d 78, 86, 382 N.E.2d 1211, 1215 (1978)), and had
the legislature intended to change the law it is likely that
section 6-209 would have been amended to reflect that intention and
that the new section 6-208.1(c) would not have used language
similar to then-existing section 6-209.
The State also argues that Johnson does not state the law
here because it is based on the definition of suspension contained
in section 1-204 of the Vehicle Code, and section 6-208.1 relates
to "statutory summary suspension." However, a statutory summary
suspension is merely a type of suspension, and the fact it fits the
definition of suspension in section 1-204 is obvious from the
specifically designated periods of temporary withdrawal by formal
action of the Secretary of a person's license or privilege to
operate a motor vehicle on public highways set forth in sections 6-
208.1(a)(1) through (a)(4) of the Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/6-
208.1(a)(1) through (a)(4) (West 1994)).
The State's final argument is that this court should give
deference to the Secretary's interpretation of the statute. At the
hearing on the motion to dismiss, the State introduced a driving
abstract from the Secretary certifying (1) the defendant's driver's
license was suspended for three months on December 18, 1990,
pursuant to section 11-501.1 of the Vehicle Code and (2) her
license remained suspended on February 22, 1996.
Some deference is afforded an agency's interpretation of
a statute the agency is charged with administering and enforcing.
Stroh Oil Co. v. Office of the State Fire Marshal, 281 Ill. App. 3d
121, 124, 665 N.E.2d 540, 544 (1996), citing City of Burbank v.
Illinois State Labor Relations Board, 128 Ill. 2d 335, 345, 538 N.E.2d 1146, 1149 (1989). However, the construction of a statute
is a question of law considered de novo by a court of review.
Boaden v. Department of Law Enforcement, 171 Ill. 2d 230, 237, 664 N.E.2d 61, 65 (1996). While a court may give some deference to the
agency's construction of an ambiguous statute, the courts are not
bound by an erroneous construction. Boaden, 171 Ill. 2d at 239,
664 N.E.2d at 65. Moreover, section 6-208.1(c) of the Vehicle Code
is not an ambiguous statute. It simply does not say what the State
wants it to say.
We further note that section 6-115 of the Vehicle Code
(625 ILCS 5/6-115 (West 1994)) states, in substance, every driver's
license issued shall expire four years from the date of its
issuance and, with certain exceptions, five years from the date of
issuance. Expiration dates for persons over 81 years of age are
also shortened. Section 6-115(e) provides that the Secretary may
decline to process a renewal of any person "who has not paid any
fee or tax due under this Code." 625 ILCS 5/6-115(e) (West 1994).
In this case, under any scenario, the defendant, on the
date of her arrest, February 22, 1996, did not have a valid
driver's license. The license, which had been suspended to March
11, 1991, had long expired.
The present provisions of section 6-208.1(c) of the
Vehicle Code are consistent with Johnson because they speak of not
"restoring full driving privileges" until a reinstatement fee is
paid. 625 ILCS 5/6-208.1(c) (West 1994). The reference to "full
driving privileges" implies the existence of driving privileges
that are less than full. That is the status of the driving
privileges of defendant here, as was the case in Johnson. As the
suspension period had terminated here, as in Johnson, the defendant
could drive a motor vehicle without being guilty of driving under
suspension but may have violated some other provision of the
Vehicle Code (see 625 ILCS 5/6-601(c)(2), 6-112 (West 1994)).
The defendant may have been driving without a valid
driver's license (625 ILCS 5/6-101(a) (West 1994)), but defendant
was not driving while her license was suspended since the period of
suspension had terminated on March 18, 1991. The judgment of the
circuit court of Coles County is affirmed.
Affirmed.
GARMAN and GREEN, JJ., concur.
IN THE APPELLATE COURT
OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from
Plaintiff-Appellant, ) Circuit Court of
v. ) Coles County
TAMARA L. GARBO, ) No. 96TR2257
Defendant-Appellee. )
) Honorable
) Dale A. Cini,
) Judge Presiding.
_________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE McCULLOUGH delivered the opinion of the court:
The State appeals pursuant to Supreme Court Rule
604(a)(1) (145 Ill. 2d R. 604(a)(1)) from the order of the circuit
court of Coles County dismissing its information charging defendant
Tamara L. Garbo with the offense of driving while her license was
suspended in violation of section 6-303(a) of the Illinois Vehicle
Code (Vehicle Code) (625 ILCS 5/6-303(a) (West 1994)). The
information was dismissed for failure to state an offense. 725
ILCS 5/114-1(a)(8) (West 1994). We affirm.
The information alleged that, in driving or being in
actual physical control of a motor vehicle on February 22, 1996,
defendant was driving while license suspended because her driver's
license had been suspended for a statutory summary suspension
violation of section 11-501.1 of the Vehicle Code (Ill. Rev. Stat.
1989, ch. 95«, par. 11-501.1) and the suspension was to be in
effect until March 11, 1991, but because defendant had failed to
pay the reinstatement fees, the suspension remained in effect on
February 22, 1996. In People v. Johnson, 115 Ill. App. 3d 987,
989, 451 N.E.2d 28, 30 (1983), the court stated that a suspension
is a temporary sanction for a specified period and failure to pay
the reinstatement fees did not extend the period of suspension.
See 625 ILCS 5/1-204 (West 1994). The State argues that the
legislature's enactment of section 6-208.1 of the Vehicle Code (625
ILCS 5/6-208.1 (West 1994)) after the decision in Johnson indicated
a legislative intent to extend the statutory summary suspension
unless the reinstatement fees had been paid. We disagree.
The portion of section 6-208.1 upon which the State
relies is subsection (c), which states:
"(c) Full driving privileges may not be
restored until all applicable reinstatement
fees, as provided by this Code, have been paid
to the Secretary of State and the appropriate
entry made to the driver's record." 625 ILCS
5/6-208.1(c) (West 1994).
The reinstatement fee for summary suspension under
section 11-501.1 of the Vehicle Code is $60. 625 ILCS 5/6-118(b)
(West 1994). Upon payment of the reinstatement fee at the end of
any period of suspension, the licensee is entitled to reinstatement
of driving privileges and return of her license if (1) the license
has not expired, in which case the licensee may apply for a new
license or (2) the licensee is not ineligible for some other
reason. 625 ILCS 5/6-209 (West 1994). Section 6-209 of the
Vehicle Code has remained unchanged since Johnson. Section 6-
303(b) of the Vehicle Code allows the Secretary of State (Secre-
tary) to extend the period of suspension upon receiving a report of
conviction of any violation for operating a motor vehicle during
the time the driver's license is suspended. 625 ILCS 5/6-303(b)
(West 1994). Therefore, if the legislature intended that the
failure to pay reinstatement fees should effectively extend the
period of suspension, the legislature could have so stated.
"The cardinal rule of statutory construc-
tion is to ascertain and give effect to the
true intent and meaning of the legislature.
State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Yapejian,
152 Ill. 2d 533, 540-41, 605 N.E.2d 539, 542
(1992). The language of the statute is the
best indicator of that intent, and aids for
construing a statute will only be resorted to
if the language of the statute is not clear.
Solich v. George & Anna Portes Cancer Preven-
tion Center of Chicago, Inc., 158 Ill. 2d 76,
81, 630 N.E.2d 820, 822 (1994)." Randall v.
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 284 Ill. App. 3d 970,
972, 673 N.E.2d 452, 454-55 (1996).
The State argues that the fact section 6-208.1 of the
Vehicle Code was enacted after the decision in Johnson indicates a
legislative intent to change the law. The legislature is presumed
to know the construction courts have placed on a statute (see Hupp
v. Gray, 73 Ill. 2d 78, 86, 382 N.E.2d 1211, 1215 (1978)), and had
the legislature intended to change the law it is likely that
section 6-209 would have been amended to reflect that intention and
that the new section 6-208.1(c) would not have used language
similar to then-existing section 6-209.
The State also argues that Johnson does not state the law
here because it is based on the definition of suspension contained
in section 1-204 of the Vehicle Code, and section 6-208.1 relates
to "statutory summary suspension." However, a statutory summary
suspension is merely a type of suspension, and the fact it fits the
definition of suspension in section 1-204 is obvious from the
specifically designated periods of temporary withdrawal by formal
action of the Secretary of a person's license or privilege to
operate a motor vehicle on public highways set forth in sections 6-
208.1(a)(1) through (a)(4) of the Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/6-
208.1(a)(1) through (a)(4) (West 1994)).
The State's final argument is that this court should give
deference to the Secretary's interpretation of the statute. At the
hearing on the motion to dismiss, the State introduced a driving
abstract from the Secretary certifying (1) the defendant's driver's
license was suspended for three months on December 18, 1990,
pursuant to section 11-501.1 of the Vehicle Code and (2) her
license remained suspended on February 22, 1996.
Some deference is afforded an agency's interpretation of
a statute the agency is charged with administering and enforcing.
Stroh Oil Co. v. Office of the State Fire Marshal, 281 Ill. App. 3d
121, 124, 665 N.E.2d 540, 544 (1996), citing City of Burbank v.
Illinois State Labor Relations Board, 128 Ill. 2d 335, 345, 538 N.E.2d 1146, 1149 (1989). However, the construction of a statute
is a question of law considered de novo by a court of review.
Boaden v. Department of Law Enforcement, 171 Ill. 2d 230, 237, 664 N.E.2d 61, 65 (1996). While a court may give some deference to the
agency's construction of an ambiguous statute, the courts are not
bound by an erroneous construction. Boaden, 171 Ill. 2d at 239,
664 N.E.2d at 65. Moreover, section 6-208.1(c) of the Vehicle Code
is not an ambiguous statute. It simply does not say what the State
wants it to say.
We further note that section 6-115 of the Vehicle Code
(625 ILCS 5/6-115 (West 1994)) states, in substance, every driver's
license issued shall expire four years from the date of its
issuance and, with certain exceptions, five years from the date of
issuance. Expiration dates for persons over 81 years of age are
also shortened. Section 6-115(e) provides that the Secretary may
decline to process a renewal of any person "who has not paid any
fee or tax due under this Code." 625 ILCS 5/6-115(e) (West 1994).
In this case, under any scenario, the defendant, on the
date of her arrest, February 22, 1996, did not have a valid
driver's license. The license, which had been suspended to March
11, 1991, had long expired.
The present provisions of section 6-208.1(c) of the
Vehicle Code are consistent with Johnson because they speak of not
"restoring full driving privileges" until a reinstatement fee is
paid. 625 ILCS 5/6-208.1(c) (West 1994). The reference to "full
driving privileges" implies the existence of driving privileges
that are less than full. That is the status of the driving
privileges of defendant here, as was the case in Johnson. As the
suspension period had terminated here, as in Johnson, the defendant
could drive a motor vehicle without being guilty of driving under
suspension but may have violated some other provision of the
Vehicle Code (see 625 ILCS 5/6-601(c)(2), 6-112 (West 1994)).
The defendant may have been driving without a valid
driver's license (625 ILCS 5/6-101(a) (West 1994)), but defendant
was not driving while her license was suspended since the period of
suspension had terminated on March 18, 1991. The judgment of the
circuit court of Coles County is affirmed.
Affirmed.
GARMAN and GREEN, JJ., concur.
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