People v. Antoine
Annotate this Case
NO. 4-96-0490
IN THE APPELLATE COURT
OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from
Plaintiff-Appellant, ) Circuit Court of
v. ) Champaign County
NATHAN J. ANTOINE, JR., ) No. 96CF262
Defendant-Appellee. )
) Honorable
) Harold L. Jensen,
) Judge Presiding.
_________________________________________________________________
PRESIDING JUSTICE STEIGMANN delivered the opinion of
the court:
In April 1996, the State filed a petition to have
defendant, Nathan J. Antoine, Jr., declared a sexually dangerous
person, pursuant to the Sexually Dangerous Persons Act (Act) (725
ILCS 205/0.01 et seq. (West 1994)). In May 1996, defendant filed
a motion for involuntary dismissal, alleging that the two psychi-
atrists appointed to examine him did not agree that he was a
sexually dangerous person. Following a hearing on the motion in
May 1996, the trial court granted defendant's motion for involun-
tary dismissal. The State appeals and we reverse and remand.
I. BACKGROUND
Section 1.01 of the Act defines a sexually dangerous
person as:
"[One] suffering from a mental disorder,
which mental disorder has existed for a peri-
od of not less than one year, immediately
prior to the filing of the petition hereinaf-
ter provided for, coupled with criminal pro-
pensities to the commission of sex offenses,
and who ha[s] demonstrated propensities to-
ward acts of sexual assault or acts of sexual
molestation of children ***." 725 ILCS
205/1.01 (West 1994).
Section 4 of the Act provides that the trial court
shall appoint two qualified psychiatrists to personally examine
the defendant, ascertain whether he is sexually dangerous, and
file with the court a written report of the examination result.
725 ILCS 205/4 (West 1994).
The trial court appointed psychiatrists Joseph Bohlen
and Lawrence Jeckel to examine defendant. In April 1996, Dr.
Bohlen submitted a report to the court concluding that defendant
suffered from a mental disorder, sexual paraphilia (violent type)
and, therefore, met the statutory criteria for a sexually danger-
ous person. In May 1996, Dr. Jeckel submitted a report to the
court concluding that defendant suffered from a character disor-
der, but that he did not have a mental disorder. Dr. Jeckel's
report stated, in relevant part, as follows:
"[Defendant] has the mentality of a rapist or
a killer. He does not have a mental illness
that would be classified on DSM-IV Axis I.
His behavior is part of a character disorder,
an enduring set of character traits charac-
terized by deceit, drug use, and violent
impulses toward women.
Therefore, although [defendant] has
demonstrated criminal propensities toward
acts of sexual assault in the past, he is not
suffering from a mental disorder that has
existed for one year."
Dr. Jeckel thus concluded that defendant did not meet the Act's
criteria for a sexually dangerous person.
In May 1996, defendant filed a motion for involuntary
dismissal because the two psychiatrists did not agree on whether
defendant was a sexually dangerous person pursuant to the Act.
Defendant contended that this court's decision in People v. Cole,
5 Ill. App. 3d 836, 284 N.E.2d 53 (1972), required dismissal
under these circumstances. At the hearing on defendant's motion,
the trial court questioned the reasoning in Cole, but dismissed
the petition because the court believed Cole required it to do
so.
II. ANALYSIS
The State appeals, arguing that the trial court erred
by dismissing the petition. The State contends that (1) the lan-
guage of the statute does not require that both psychiatrists
conclude that a defendant is sexually dangerous; and (2) to the
extent that Cole holds that a trial court must dismiss a petition
when the psychiatrists disagree, it is erroneous and should be
overturned. In response, defendant argues that (1) the statute
supports the trial court's dismissal; and (2) the doctrine of
stare decisis requires this court to affirm, based on Cole. We
agree with the State.
A. Statutory Language
The State first contends that the Act contains no
language that requires a trial court to dismiss a petition if
both court-appointed psychiatrists do not agree that the defen-
dant is a sexually dangerous person. Defendant responds that the
entire Act must be construed in light of and consistent with sec-
tion 3.01 of the Act, which places upon the State the burden of
proving beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant is a sexually
dangerous person (725 ILCS 205/3.01 (West 1994)). Thus, defen-
dant contends that if the court-appointed psychiatrists disagree,
the State can never establish a prima facie case, and the trial
court must dismiss the petition.
Section 4 of the Act reads as follows:
"After the filing of the petition, the
court shall appoint two qualified psychia-
trists to make a personal examination of such
alleged sexually dangerous person, to ascer-
tain whether such person is sexually danger-
ous, and the psychiatrists shall file with
the court a report in writing of the result
of their examination, a copy of which shall
be delivered to the respondent." 725 ILCS
205/4 (West 1994).
Nothing in this section indicates that the court-appointed
psychiatrists must agree in their court-ordered assessments that
defendant is a sexually dangerous person. Furthermore, no lan-
guage in any other section of the Act explicitly states or even
implies that a trial court must dismiss a petition if the psychi-
atrists do not so agree.
Defendant contends that the burden of proof requirement
establishes a "constitutional imperative" that ultimately re-
quires a trial court to dismiss if both psychiatrists do not
report that defendant is a sexually dangerous person. He relies
on cases which emphasize the need for criminal due process safe-
guards in proceedings under the Act. See People v. Pembrock, 62 Ill. 2d 317, 342 N.E.2d 28 (1976) (establishing the State's
burden of proving a defendant's status beyond a reasonable
doubt); People v. Shiro, 52 Ill. 2d 279, 287 N.E.2d 708 (1972)
(establishing a defendant's right to counsel in seeking release
under the Act); People v. Olmstead, 32 Ill. 2d 306, 205 N.E.2d 625 (1965) (establishing a defendant's rights to counsel and jury
trial in proceedings under the initial petition and a later
application for discharge). We are not persuaded by defendant's
logic.
We acknowledge the importance of scrupulously ensuring
the fairness of judicial proceedings that may result in indefi-
nite commitment of a person determined to be sexually dangerous.
See Pembrock, 62 Ill. 2d at 321, 342 N.E.2d at 29. However, we
do not agree with defendant that the Act's burden of proof and
the importance of due process safeguards mandate dismissal under
the circumstances of this case.
In construing legislation, a court's task is to give
effect to the legislature's intent in enacting the statute, which
is best indicated by the statute's plain language. Collins v.
Board of Trustees of the Firemen's Annuity & Benefit Fund, 155 Ill. 2d 103, 110, 610 N.E.2d 1250, 1253 (1993). The Act contains
no language that indicates the legislature intended a trial court
to dismiss a petition where the court-appointed psychiatrists do
not agree that the defendant is a sexually dangerous person, and
we decline to read such a requirement into the Act.
B. Stare Decisis
The State acknowledges that the Cole holding supports
the trial court's dismissal, but argues that we should overrule
Cole. Defendant responds that the doctrine of stare decisis
requires us to reaffirm Cole and affirm the dismissal in this
case.
In Cole, two court-appointed psychiatrists examined the
defendant and submitted reports which conflicted as to whether he
was sexually dangerous. Cole, 5 Ill. App. 3d at 837, 284 N.E.2d
at 53. One psychiatrist testified at a hearing that the defen-
dant was sexually dangerous; the other did not testify, but
submitted a report which concluded that the defendant was not a
sexually dangerous person. The trial court found that because
the testimony was uncontradicted, the State had established a
prima facie case that the defendant was a sexually dangerous
person. On appeal, this court held that "the clear implication
of this statute is that both psychiatrists in their preliminary
report[s] *** should find that [defendant] is a sexually danger-
ous person." Cole, 5 Ill. App. 3d at 837, 284 N.E.2d at 54.
Because the psychiatrists' reports conflicted on this point, the
State had not established a prima facie case, and this court re-
versed the trial court's finding that the defendant was a sexual-
ly dangerous person. Cole, 5 Ill. App. 3d at 838, 284 N.E.2d at
54.
Stare decisis is a policy of the courts to stand by
precedent and leave settled points of law undisturbed. Charles
v. Seigfried, 165 Ill. 2d 482, 492, 651 N.E.2d 154, 159 (1995).
The supreme court recently addressed this doctrine, and wrote the
following:
"The doctrine of stare decisis is the means
by which courts ensure that the law will not
merely change erratically, but will develop
in a principled and intelligible fashion.
Stare decisis permits society to presume that
fundamental principles are established in the
law rather than in the proclivities of indi-
viduals. The doctrine thereby contributes to
the integrity of our constitutional system of
government both in appearance and in fact.
Stare decisis is not an inexorable command.
However, a court will detour from the
straight path of stare decisis only for ar-
ticulable reasons, and only when the court
must bring its decisions into agreement with
experience and newly ascertained facts."
Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Illinois State Board of
Elections, 161 Ill. 2d 502, 510, 641 N.E.2d 525, 529 (1994).
Stare decisis considerations weigh heavily in the area
of statutory construction, in part because a departure from
precedent amounts to an amendment of the statute itself. Froud
v. Celotex Corp., 98 Ill. 2d 324, 336, 456 N.E.2d 131, 137
(1983). Indeed, such considerations are particularly strong
when, as here, the legislature has amended the Act in question
since the decision (that a party argues should be followed
because of stare decisis) was rendered. In particular, we note
that the legislature--on more than one occasion--has amended
section 3.01 of the Act, addressing the State's burden of proof.
See Pub. Act 79-1365, 19 eff. October 1, 1976 (1976 Ill. Laws
1034, 1060); Pub. Act 80-727, 1 eff. October 1, 1977 (1977 Ill.
Laws 2189); Pub. Act 81-661, 7 eff. September 16, 1979 (1979
Ill. Laws 2513, 2516); Pub. Act 82-783, art. XI, 80 eff. July
13, 1982 (1982 Ill. Laws 220, 933).
When the legislature amends a statute but leaves un-
changed provisions which have been judicially construed, the
unchanged provisions ordinarily retain the construction given
prior to the amendment. People v. Agnew, 105 Ill. 2d 275, 280,
473 N.E.2d 1319, 1322 (1985). The legislature is presumed to
know of judicial interpretation of statutes; thus, its inaction
suggests agreement with the judicial interpretation. In re May
1991 Will County Grand Jury, 152 Ill. 2d 381, 388, 604 N.E.2d 929, 933 (1992); Agnew, 105 Ill. 2d at 280, 473 N.E.2d at 1322.
We also acknowledge that stare decisis commands greater
respect when, as here, at issue is a judicial construction of a
statute, as opposed to a constitutional provision. This is so
because of the difficulty inherent in amending a constitution to
overcome a judicial misinterpretation. Thus, courts must be
willing to revisit decisions based upon constitutional interpre-
tations to determine if those decisions deserve further adher-
ence. See Chicago Bar Ass'n, 161 Ill. 2d at 510, 641 N.E.2d at
529; Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203, 212, 81 L. Ed. 2d 164, 172,
104 S. Ct. 2305, 2311 (1984) ("Although adherence to precedent is
not rigidly required in constitutional cases, any departure from
the doctrine of stare decisis demands special justification").
In contrast, because the legislature can easily amend statutes in
response to--and to correct--judicial misinterpretations, the
courts have much less need to take it upon themselves to second-
guess precedent interpreting a particular statute. The courts
can (and do) reasonably conclude that the legislature is likely
to correct judicial misinterpretations, and therefore the courts
need act only in the most extraordinary and compelling cases. In
our judgment, the case before us presents just such an extraordi-
nary and compelling circumstance, in part because this court's
decision in Cole was so erroneous.
We can find no justification for this court's holding
in Cole. As stated earlier, the statutory language does not sup-
port such a conclusion. Neither section 4 nor any other provi-
sion of the Act remotely addresses the procedural effect of con-
flicting psychiatric reports.
Moreover, it is unprecedented in Illinois law that a
conflict in a material factual issue would bar a trier of fact
from hearing evidence on the issue and resolving it on the
merits. Summary judgment proceedings exemplify this principle; a
trial court may grant summary judgment only when no dispute
exists as to material facts. 735 ILCS 5/2-1005(c) (West 1994).
Regarding defendant's argument about a "constitutional
imperative" because of the State's burden of proving beyond a
reasonable doubt that he is a sexually dangerous person, we note
that section 6-2 of the Criminal Code of 1961 formerly required
the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant
asserting the insanity defense was not insane. See Ill. Rev.
Stat. 1981, ch. 38, pars. 6-2, 6-4, 3-2. The legislature amended
that section effective January 1, 1994, in 1983 to (1) shift the
burden of proof to the defendant, and (2) change the burden of
proof to a preponderance of the evidence. See Ill. Rev. Stat.
1983, ch. 38, par. 6-2(e); Pub. Act 83-288, 1 eff. January 1,
1984 (1983 Ill. Laws 2035).
When the State still had the burden of proving a
defendant was not insane, it was not uncommon for psychiatrists
who had examined defendants to reach different conclusions. Yet,
these differences did not prevent the State from meeting its
heavy burden of proof. In People v. Eckhardt, 156 Ill. App. 3d
1077, 1090, 509 N.E.2d 1361, 1370-71 (1987), the second district
addressed a murder case under the old insanity statute and wrote
the following:
"In deciding whether the State has proved the
defendant sane beyond a reasonable doubt, the
trier of fact must consider the totality of
the evidence, weighing testimony and deter-
mining credibility of witnesses, both expert
and lay, without being required by law to
accept the opinions of psychiatrists regard-
ing sanity. [Citation.] The trial judge is
not obligated to accept the opinions of psy-
chiatrists proffered by the defendant, but is
entitled to consider contrary opinions of the
State's expert witness. [Citation.] The
resolution of contradictory testimony by
experts in the determination of whether the
defendant was legally sane at the time of
the crime and the determination of its weight
and credibility are for the trier of fact."
(Emphasis added.)
See also People v. Taylor, 110 Ill. App. 3d 112, 118, 441 N.E.2d 1231, 1235 (1982) ("In deciding the question of sanity, the trier
of fact may accept [one] expert's opinion over another").
The same analysis applies to psychiatrists who disagree
regarding whether a defendant is a sexually dangerous person.
Not only may the trial court choose to believe one psychiatrist
over another, but the court may do so and find in favor of the
State's petition even when, as here, the State's burden is proof
beyond a reasonable doubt. We add that the fact that the court
appoints the examining psychiatrists, under section 4 of the Act,
as opposed to having them selected by the State and defendant, is
irrelevant to the question of how the court--acting as trier of
fact--should evaluate the psychiatrists' testimony.
Finally, the State points out in its brief--and we
agree--that the Cole holding may lead to absurd results. The
practical effect of Cole is that the State is barred from chal-
lenging the facts or beliefs that form the basis for the expert's
opinion, and the trier of fact is precluded from hearing evidence
on the issue. Thus, the Cole court's interpretation of the Act
requires a trier of fact to delegate its decision-making authori-
ty to a third party. The legislature could not have intended
such an absurd result. In construing legislation, a court should
interpret it in a manner that is reasonable and will not produce
absurd or unjust results that the legislature could not have
intended. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Yapejian, 152 Ill. 2d 533, 541, 605 N.E.2d 539, 542 (1992).
We also note that Cole, which was rendered by this
court 24 years ago, has been cited only twice in that time. In
People v. Hodges, 36 Ill. App. 3d 422, 425, 343 N.E.2d 565, 568
(1976), the third district referred to it in passing when ad-
dressing a different issue. In People v. Becraft, 74 Ill. App.
3d 407, 410, 393 N.E.2d 110, 112 (1979), this court seemingly
backed away from its earlier decision in Cole, stating as fol-
lows: "[T]he Act does not state such a requirement [that both
psychiatric reports must agree that defendant is a sexually
dangerous person] ***." Thus, we need not be concerned that our
ruling will result in confusion among the appellate districts.
See Cravens v. Inman, 223 Ill. App. 3d 1059, 1075, 586 N.E.2d 367, 377 (1991).
In Alvis v. Ribar, 85 Ill. 2d 1, 24, 421 N.E.2d 886,
896 (1981), the supreme court addressed the doctrine of stare
decisis in the context of a common law doctrine as follows:
"The tenets of stare decisis cannot be
so rigid as to incapacitate a court in its
duty to develop the law. [Citation.] Clear-
ly, the need for stability in law must not be
allowed to obscure the changing needs of
society or to veil the injustice resulting
from a doctrine in need of reevaluation."
The decisions of this court ought to be soundly based; Illinois
jurisprudence demands no less. Cole was wrong, is not soundly
based, and we hereby overrule it.
Our decision here is not inconsistent with the supreme
court's decision in Olmstead on which the Cole court ostensibly
relied. In Olmstead, both court-appointed psychiatrists agreed
that the defendant was sexually dangerous, but only one testi-
fied. The circuit court granted the State's petition and the
supreme court affirmed, stating: "We find no requirement in the
[A]ct that both psychiatrists shall testify, and we feel that the
testimony of one may provide a prima facie case in the absence of
contradictory reports." Olmstead, 32 Ill. 2d at 312, 205 N.E.2d
at 629. The supreme court in Olmstead did not address the ques-
tion of how to proceed if the psychiatrists file contradictory
reports. Thus, the Cole court went far beyond Olmstead when it
dismissed the State's petition based on the conflicting reports.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, we reverse the trial court's
dismissal of the State's petition and remand for further proceed-
ings.
Reversed and remanded.
McCULLOUGH and KNECHT, JJ., concur.
IN THE APPELLATE COURT
OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from
Plaintiff-Appellant, ) Circuit Court of
v. ) Champaign County
NATHAN J. ANTOINE, JR., ) No. 96CF262
Defendant-Appellee. )
) Honorable
) Harold L. Jensen,
) Judge Presiding.
_________________________________________________________________
PRESIDING JUSTICE STEIGMANN delivered the opinion of
the court:
In April 1996, the State filed a petition to have
defendant, Nathan J. Antoine, Jr., declared a sexually dangerous
person, pursuant to the Sexually Dangerous Persons Act (Act) (725
ILCS 205/0.01 et seq. (West 1994)). In May 1996, defendant filed
a motion for involuntary dismissal, alleging that the two psychi-
atrists appointed to examine him did not agree that he was a
sexually dangerous person. Following a hearing on the motion in
May 1996, the trial court granted defendant's motion for involun-
tary dismissal. The State appeals and we reverse and remand.
I. BACKGROUND
Section 1.01 of the Act defines a sexually dangerous
person as:
"[One] suffering from a mental disorder,
which mental disorder has existed for a peri-
od of not less than one year, immediately
prior to the filing of the petition hereinaf-
ter provided for, coupled with criminal pro-
pensities to the commission of sex offenses,
and who ha[s] demonstrated propensities to-
ward acts of sexual assault or acts of sexual
molestation of children ***." 725 ILCS
205/1.01 (West 1994).
Section 4 of the Act provides that the trial court
shall appoint two qualified psychiatrists to personally examine
the defendant, ascertain whether he is sexually dangerous, and
file with the court a written report of the examination result.
725 ILCS 205/4 (West 1994).
The trial court appointed psychiatrists Joseph Bohlen
and Lawrence Jeckel to examine defendant. In April 1996, Dr.
Bohlen submitted a report to the court concluding that defendant
suffered from a mental disorder, sexual paraphilia (violent type)
and, therefore, met the statutory criteria for a sexually danger-
ous person. In May 1996, Dr. Jeckel submitted a report to the
court concluding that defendant suffered from a character disor-
der, but that he did not have a mental disorder. Dr. Jeckel's
report stated, in relevant part, as follows:
"[Defendant] has the mentality of a rapist or
a killer. He does not have a mental illness
that would be classified on DSM-IV Axis I.
His behavior is part of a character disorder,
an enduring set of character traits charac-
terized by deceit, drug use, and violent
impulses toward women.
Therefore, although [defendant] has
demonstrated criminal propensities toward
acts of sexual assault in the past, he is not
suffering from a mental disorder that has
existed for one year."
Dr. Jeckel thus concluded that defendant did not meet the Act's
criteria for a sexually dangerous person.
In May 1996, defendant filed a motion for involuntary
dismissal because the two psychiatrists did not agree on whether
defendant was a sexually dangerous person pursuant to the Act.
Defendant contended that this court's decision in People v. Cole,
5 Ill. App. 3d 836, 284 N.E.2d 53 (1972), required dismissal
under these circumstances. At the hearing on defendant's motion,
the trial court questioned the reasoning in Cole, but dismissed
the petition because the court believed Cole required it to do
so.
II. ANALYSIS
The State appeals, arguing that the trial court erred
by dismissing the petition. The State contends that (1) the lan-
guage of the statute does not require that both psychiatrists
conclude that a defendant is sexually dangerous; and (2) to the
extent that Cole holds that a trial court must dismiss a petition
when the psychiatrists disagree, it is erroneous and should be
overturned. In response, defendant argues that (1) the statute
supports the trial court's dismissal; and (2) the doctrine of
stare decisis requires this court to affirm, based on Cole. We
agree with the State.
A. Statutory Language
The State first contends that the Act contains no
language that requires a trial court to dismiss a petition if
both court-appointed psychiatrists do not agree that the defen-
dant is a sexually dangerous person. Defendant responds that the
entire Act must be construed in light of and consistent with sec-
tion 3.01 of the Act, which places upon the State the burden of
proving beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant is a sexually
dangerous person (725 ILCS 205/3.01 (West 1994)). Thus, defen-
dant contends that if the court-appointed psychiatrists disagree,
the State can never establish a prima facie case, and the trial
court must dismiss the petition.
Section 4 of the Act reads as follows:
"After the filing of the petition, the
court shall appoint two qualified psychia-
trists to make a personal examination of such
alleged sexually dangerous person, to ascer-
tain whether such person is sexually danger-
ous, and the psychiatrists shall file with
the court a report in writing of the result
of their examination, a copy of which shall
be delivered to the respondent." 725 ILCS
205/4 (West 1994).
Nothing in this section indicates that the court-appointed
psychiatrists must agree in their court-ordered assessments that
defendant is a sexually dangerous person. Furthermore, no lan-
guage in any other section of the Act explicitly states or even
implies that a trial court must dismiss a petition if the psychi-
atrists do not so agree.
Defendant contends that the burden of proof requirement
establishes a "constitutional imperative" that ultimately re-
quires a trial court to dismiss if both psychiatrists do not
report that defendant is a sexually dangerous person. He relies
on cases which emphasize the need for criminal due process safe-
guards in proceedings under the Act. See People v. Pembrock, 62 Ill. 2d 317, 342 N.E.2d 28 (1976) (establishing the State's
burden of proving a defendant's status beyond a reasonable
doubt); People v. Shiro, 52 Ill. 2d 279, 287 N.E.2d 708 (1972)
(establishing a defendant's right to counsel in seeking release
under the Act); People v. Olmstead, 32 Ill. 2d 306, 205 N.E.2d 625 (1965) (establishing a defendant's rights to counsel and jury
trial in proceedings under the initial petition and a later
application for discharge). We are not persuaded by defendant's
logic.
We acknowledge the importance of scrupulously ensuring
the fairness of judicial proceedings that may result in indefi-
nite commitment of a person determined to be sexually dangerous.
See Pembrock, 62 Ill. 2d at 321, 342 N.E.2d at 29. However, we
do not agree with defendant that the Act's burden of proof and
the importance of due process safeguards mandate dismissal under
the circumstances of this case.
In construing legislation, a court's task is to give
effect to the legislature's intent in enacting the statute, which
is best indicated by the statute's plain language. Collins v.
Board of Trustees of the Firemen's Annuity & Benefit Fund, 155 Ill. 2d 103, 110, 610 N.E.2d 1250, 1253 (1993). The Act contains
no language that indicates the legislature intended a trial court
to dismiss a petition where the court-appointed psychiatrists do
not agree that the defendant is a sexually dangerous person, and
we decline to read such a requirement into the Act.
B. Stare Decisis
The State acknowledges that the Cole holding supports
the trial court's dismissal, but argues that we should overrule
Cole. Defendant responds that the doctrine of stare decisis
requires us to reaffirm Cole and affirm the dismissal in this
case.
In Cole, two court-appointed psychiatrists examined the
defendant and submitted reports which conflicted as to whether he
was sexually dangerous. Cole, 5 Ill. App. 3d at 837, 284 N.E.2d
at 53. One psychiatrist testified at a hearing that the defen-
dant was sexually dangerous; the other did not testify, but
submitted a report which concluded that the defendant was not a
sexually dangerous person. The trial court found that because
the testimony was uncontradicted, the State had established a
prima facie case that the defendant was a sexually dangerous
person. On appeal, this court held that "the clear implication
of this statute is that both psychiatrists in their preliminary
report[s] *** should find that [defendant] is a sexually danger-
ous person." Cole, 5 Ill. App. 3d at 837, 284 N.E.2d at 54.
Because the psychiatrists' reports conflicted on this point, the
State had not established a prima facie case, and this court re-
versed the trial court's finding that the defendant was a sexual-
ly dangerous person. Cole, 5 Ill. App. 3d at 838, 284 N.E.2d at
54.
Stare decisis is a policy of the courts to stand by
precedent and leave settled points of law undisturbed. Charles
v. Seigfried, 165 Ill. 2d 482, 492, 651 N.E.2d 154, 159 (1995).
The supreme court recently addressed this doctrine, and wrote the
following:
"The doctrine of stare decisis is the means
by which courts ensure that the law will not
merely change erratically, but will develop
in a principled and intelligible fashion.
Stare decisis permits society to presume that
fundamental principles are established in the
law rather than in the proclivities of indi-
viduals. The doctrine thereby contributes to
the integrity of our constitutional system of
government both in appearance and in fact.
Stare decisis is not an inexorable command.
However, a court will detour from the
straight path of stare decisis only for ar-
ticulable reasons, and only when the court
must bring its decisions into agreement with
experience and newly ascertained facts."
Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Illinois State Board of
Elections, 161 Ill. 2d 502, 510, 641 N.E.2d 525, 529 (1994).
Stare decisis considerations weigh heavily in the area
of statutory construction, in part because a departure from
precedent amounts to an amendment of the statute itself. Froud
v. Celotex Corp., 98 Ill. 2d 324, 336, 456 N.E.2d 131, 137
(1983). Indeed, such considerations are particularly strong
when, as here, the legislature has amended the Act in question
since the decision (that a party argues should be followed
because of stare decisis) was rendered. In particular, we note
that the legislature--on more than one occasion--has amended
section 3.01 of the Act, addressing the State's burden of proof.
See Pub. Act 79-1365, 19 eff. October 1, 1976 (1976 Ill. Laws
1034, 1060); Pub. Act 80-727, 1 eff. October 1, 1977 (1977 Ill.
Laws 2189); Pub. Act 81-661, 7 eff. September 16, 1979 (1979
Ill. Laws 2513, 2516); Pub. Act 82-783, art. XI, 80 eff. July
13, 1982 (1982 Ill. Laws 220, 933).
When the legislature amends a statute but leaves un-
changed provisions which have been judicially construed, the
unchanged provisions ordinarily retain the construction given
prior to the amendment. People v. Agnew, 105 Ill. 2d 275, 280,
473 N.E.2d 1319, 1322 (1985). The legislature is presumed to
know of judicial interpretation of statutes; thus, its inaction
suggests agreement with the judicial interpretation. In re May
1991 Will County Grand Jury, 152 Ill. 2d 381, 388, 604 N.E.2d 929, 933 (1992); Agnew, 105 Ill. 2d at 280, 473 N.E.2d at 1322.
We also acknowledge that stare decisis commands greater
respect when, as here, at issue is a judicial construction of a
statute, as opposed to a constitutional provision. This is so
because of the difficulty inherent in amending a constitution to
overcome a judicial misinterpretation. Thus, courts must be
willing to revisit decisions based upon constitutional interpre-
tations to determine if those decisions deserve further adher-
ence. See Chicago Bar Ass'n, 161 Ill. 2d at 510, 641 N.E.2d at
529; Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203, 212, 81 L. Ed. 2d 164, 172,
104 S. Ct. 2305, 2311 (1984) ("Although adherence to precedent is
not rigidly required in constitutional cases, any departure from
the doctrine of stare decisis demands special justification").
In contrast, because the legislature can easily amend statutes in
response to--and to correct--judicial misinterpretations, the
courts have much less need to take it upon themselves to second-
guess precedent interpreting a particular statute. The courts
can (and do) reasonably conclude that the legislature is likely
to correct judicial misinterpretations, and therefore the courts
need act only in the most extraordinary and compelling cases. In
our judgment, the case before us presents just such an extraordi-
nary and compelling circumstance, in part because this court's
decision in Cole was so erroneous.
We can find no justification for this court's holding
in Cole. As stated earlier, the statutory language does not sup-
port such a conclusion. Neither section 4 nor any other provi-
sion of the Act remotely addresses the procedural effect of con-
flicting psychiatric reports.
Moreover, it is unprecedented in Illinois law that a
conflict in a material factual issue would bar a trier of fact
from hearing evidence on the issue and resolving it on the
merits. Summary judgment proceedings exemplify this principle; a
trial court may grant summary judgment only when no dispute
exists as to material facts. 735 ILCS 5/2-1005(c) (West 1994).
Regarding defendant's argument about a "constitutional
imperative" because of the State's burden of proving beyond a
reasonable doubt that he is a sexually dangerous person, we note
that section 6-2 of the Criminal Code of 1961 formerly required
the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant
asserting the insanity defense was not insane. See Ill. Rev.
Stat. 1981, ch. 38, pars. 6-2, 6-4, 3-2. The legislature amended
that section effective January 1, 1994, in 1983 to (1) shift the
burden of proof to the defendant, and (2) change the burden of
proof to a preponderance of the evidence. See Ill. Rev. Stat.
1983, ch. 38, par. 6-2(e); Pub. Act 83-288, 1 eff. January 1,
1984 (1983 Ill. Laws 2035).
When the State still had the burden of proving a
defendant was not insane, it was not uncommon for psychiatrists
who had examined defendants to reach different conclusions. Yet,
these differences did not prevent the State from meeting its
heavy burden of proof. In People v. Eckhardt, 156 Ill. App. 3d
1077, 1090, 509 N.E.2d 1361, 1370-71 (1987), the second district
addressed a murder case under the old insanity statute and wrote
the following:
"In deciding whether the State has proved the
defendant sane beyond a reasonable doubt, the
trier of fact must consider the totality of
the evidence, weighing testimony and deter-
mining credibility of witnesses, both expert
and lay, without being required by law to
accept the opinions of psychiatrists regard-
ing sanity. [Citation.] The trial judge is
not obligated to accept the opinions of psy-
chiatrists proffered by the defendant, but is
entitled to consider contrary opinions of the
State's expert witness. [Citation.] The
resolution of contradictory testimony by
experts in the determination of whether the
defendant was legally sane at the time of
the crime and the determination of its weight
and credibility are for the trier of fact."
(Emphasis added.)
See also People v. Taylor, 110 Ill. App. 3d 112, 118, 441 N.E.2d 1231, 1235 (1982) ("In deciding the question of sanity, the trier
of fact may accept [one] expert's opinion over another").
The same analysis applies to psychiatrists who disagree
regarding whether a defendant is a sexually dangerous person.
Not only may the trial court choose to believe one psychiatrist
over another, but the court may do so and find in favor of the
State's petition even when, as here, the State's burden is proof
beyond a reasonable doubt. We add that the fact that the court
appoints the examining psychiatrists, under section 4 of the Act,
as opposed to having them selected by the State and defendant, is
irrelevant to the question of how the court--acting as trier of
fact--should evaluate the psychiatrists' testimony.
Finally, the State points out in its brief--and we
agree--that the Cole holding may lead to absurd results. The
practical effect of Cole is that the State is barred from chal-
lenging the facts or beliefs that form the basis for the expert's
opinion, and the trier of fact is precluded from hearing evidence
on the issue. Thus, the Cole court's interpretation of the Act
requires a trier of fact to delegate its decision-making authori-
ty to a third party. The legislature could not have intended
such an absurd result. In construing legislation, a court should
interpret it in a manner that is reasonable and will not produce
absurd or unjust results that the legislature could not have
intended. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Yapejian, 152 Ill. 2d 533, 541, 605 N.E.2d 539, 542 (1992).
We also note that Cole, which was rendered by this
court 24 years ago, has been cited only twice in that time. In
People v. Hodges, 36 Ill. App. 3d 422, 425, 343 N.E.2d 565, 568
(1976), the third district referred to it in passing when ad-
dressing a different issue. In People v. Becraft, 74 Ill. App.
3d 407, 410, 393 N.E.2d 110, 112 (1979), this court seemingly
backed away from its earlier decision in Cole, stating as fol-
lows: "[T]he Act does not state such a requirement [that both
psychiatric reports must agree that defendant is a sexually
dangerous person] ***." Thus, we need not be concerned that our
ruling will result in confusion among the appellate districts.
See Cravens v. Inman, 223 Ill. App. 3d 1059, 1075, 586 N.E.2d 367, 377 (1991).
In Alvis v. Ribar, 85 Ill. 2d 1, 24, 421 N.E.2d 886,
896 (1981), the supreme court addressed the doctrine of stare
decisis in the context of a common law doctrine as follows:
"The tenets of stare decisis cannot be
so rigid as to incapacitate a court in its
duty to develop the law. [Citation.] Clear-
ly, the need for stability in law must not be
allowed to obscure the changing needs of
society or to veil the injustice resulting
from a doctrine in need of reevaluation."
The decisions of this court ought to be soundly based; Illinois
jurisprudence demands no less. Cole was wrong, is not soundly
based, and we hereby overrule it.
Our decision here is not inconsistent with the supreme
court's decision in Olmstead on which the Cole court ostensibly
relied. In Olmstead, both court-appointed psychiatrists agreed
that the defendant was sexually dangerous, but only one testi-
fied. The circuit court granted the State's petition and the
supreme court affirmed, stating: "We find no requirement in the
[A]ct that both psychiatrists shall testify, and we feel that the
testimony of one may provide a prima facie case in the absence of
contradictory reports." Olmstead, 32 Ill. 2d at 312, 205 N.E.2d
at 629. The supreme court in Olmstead did not address the ques-
tion of how to proceed if the psychiatrists file contradictory
reports. Thus, the Cole court went far beyond Olmstead when it
dismissed the State's petition based on the conflicting reports.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, we reverse the trial court's
dismissal of the State's petition and remand for further proceed-
ings.
Reversed and remanded.
McCULLOUGH and KNECHT, JJ., concur.
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
