In re J.E.M.Y.

NO. 4-96-0301

IN THE APPELLATE COURT

OF ILLINOIS

FOURTH DISTRICT

In the Interest of J.E.M.Y., Alleged ) Appeal from
to be a Delinquent Minor, ) Circuit Court of
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) McLean County
Petitioner-Appellee, ) No. 94J100
v. )
J.E.M.Y., ) Honorable
Respondent-Appellant. ) Luther H. Dearborn,
) Judge Presiding.
_________________________________________________________________

JUSTICE COOK delivered the opinion of the court:

The trial court revoked the delinquent minor's proba-
tion and committed the minor to the Illinois Department of
Corrections. The trial court subsequently denied the minor's
motion to reconsider the disposition. Upon appeal, the minor
argues this court must remand the cause due to trial counsel's
failure to strictly comply with Supreme Court Rule 604(d). 145
Ill. 2d R. 604(d). We affirm.
In April 1994, a petition for adjudication of wardship
was filed, alleging the J.E.M.Y. (born July 21, 1978) was a
delinquent minor in that he had committed the offense of theft.
In May 1994, J.E.M.Y. admitted the allegations and was subse-
quently committed to the Department of Corrections (DOC). In
August 1994, the trial court vacated J.E.M.Y.'s commitment and
placed him on probation for 18 months.
In December 1995, the State filed a petition seeking to
revoke J.E.M.Y.'s probation, alleging that J.E.M.Y. had violated
the terms of probation (1) by leaving his court-ordered placement
at his grandparents' house; and (2) by failing to meet with his
probation officer on three occasions. In January 1996, J.E.M.Y.
admitted the first allegation and, following a dispositional
hearing, was again committed to DOC.
J.E.M.Y. filed a motion asking the court to reconsider
the disposition. The motion was accompanied by a certificate
from J.E.M.Y.'s attorney stating the he had met with J.E.M.Y.,
examined the court file, and reviewed the transcript of the
"sentencing hearing" before drafting the motion. The certificate
did not state that counsel had reviewed the transcript of the
revocation hearing. J.E.M.Y.'s motion was subsequently denied.
Upon appeal, J.E.M.Y. argues that this court must
remand the cause due to trial counsel's failure to strictly
comply with Supreme Court Rule 604(d). 145 Ill. 2d R. 604(d).
Rule 604(d) establishes written motion and certification require-
ments as a prerequisite to an appeal from a judgment entered on a
guilty plea and is applicable to delinquency proceedings. In re
R.C.K., 285 Ill. App. 3d 310, 312, 674 N.E.2d 494, 495 (1996).
Indeed, Rule 660(a) provides that "[a]ppeals from final judgments
in delinquent minor proceedings, except as otherwise specifically
provided, shall be governed by the rules applicable to criminal
cases." 134 Ill. 2d R. 660(a).
In People v. Tufte, 165 Ill. 2d 66, 649 N.E.2d 374
(1995), the supreme court held that a defendant's admission to a
violation of his conditional discharge was not the same as a
guilty plea, and thus did not require the trial court to admonish
defendant, pursuant to Rule 605(b) (145 Ill. 2d R. 605(b)), of
the necessity of filing either a motion to vacate guilty plea, or
a motion to reconsider sentence, before appealing the trial
court's judgment. The court explained that the filing of a
motion to reconsider sentence following the revocation of the
defendant's conditional discharge is merely permissible and is
not a prerequisite to an appeal. Tufte, 165 Ill. 2d at 78, 649 N.E.2d at 380. "If the defendant does not file a motion to
vacate or reconsider, but rather seeks an immediate appeal, the
reviewing court may consider the defendant's argument on its
merits." Tufte, 165 Ill. 2d at 78, 649 N.E.2d at 380. The
revocation of a defendant's conditional discharge is substantial-
ly similar to the revocation of a defendant's probation. Tufte,
165 Ill. 2d at 75, 649 N.E.2d at 378. Indeed, they are governed
by the same statutory requirements. Tufte, 165 Ill. 2d at 74,
649 N.E.2d at 378. We find the logic and analysis in Tufte to be
equally applicable to probation revocation hearings.
Since the filing of a motion to reconsider sentence or
disposition following a probation revocation hearing is unneces-
sary before taking an appeal, complying with the requirements of
Rule 604(d) is likewise unnecessary. J.E.M.Y. has not argued
that Tufte is inapplicable in juvenile proceedings, and there is
no reason to find it inapplicable.
We note that J.E.M.Y. has not presented this court with
an argument that the trial court erred or abused its discretion
in fashioning his disposition. J.E.M.Y.'s failure to present
such an argument constitutes a procedural waiver of any such
claim. Tufte, 165 Ill. 2d at 79, 649 N.E.2d at 380. Since
J.E.M.Y. also does not suggest any benefit would be result from a
remand, we find no basis for either reversal or remandment.
For the forgoing reasons, the judgment of the trial
court is affirmed.
Affirmed.
McCULLOUGH and GREEN, JJ., concur.