People v. Meister

NOS. 4-96-0062, 4-96-0063 cons.
IN THE APPELLATE COURT
OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from
Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Circuit Court of
v. ) McLean County
JAMES LEE MEISTER, ) Nos. 95CM573
Defendant-Appellant. ) 95CM553
)
) Honorable
) Joseph H. Kelley,
) Judge Presiding.
_________________________________________________________________

JUSTICE KNECHT delivered the opinion of the court:
Following a jury trial in the circuit court of McLean
County, defendant James Lee Meister was convicted of obstructing
service of process (720 ILCS 5/31-3 (West 1994)) and criminal
trespass to residence (720 ILCS 5/19-4 (West 1994)). Defendant
challenges only his conviction for obstructing justice. Defen-
dant contends the evidence was insufficient to support his ob-
structing conviction because (1) he committed no physical act of
obstruction as purportedly required by the statute and (2) no
actual obstruction occurred. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
At trial, on October 11, 1995, Deputy Richard Scott of
the McLean County sheriff's department testified he received a
telephone call from defendant between 9:30 and 10:30 a.m. on
February 21, 1995. Defendant stated a neighbor informed him the
police had been going to his home at 1824 West Olive,
Bloomington, Illinois (Olive residence), and defendant wanted to
know the reason for the visits. Deputy Scott told defendant the
officers possessed a subpoena to be served upon defendant's wife,
Shannon Meister. Defendant then claimed Shannon no longer re-
sided at that residence and said he believed Shannon was residing
at an unknown address in Florida. Defendant stated he was being
harassed by the officers and threatened to contact his attorney.
Deputy Scott stated unless the department received solid informa-
tion to the contrary, the department would continue to look for
Shannon at the Olive residence.
Shortly after his conversation with defendant, Deputy
Scott telephoned the Olive residence. Shannon answered. Deputy
Scott told Shannon a subpoena had been issued for her to testify,
an officer was standing by to serve the subpoena, and she needed
to open the door. Deputy Scott then radioed Deputy John Foster.
Shortly after 10 a.m. on February 21, 1995, Deputy Fos-
ter received the call from Deputy Scott directing him to attempt
service upon Shannon. Shannon answered the door and he served
her with the subpoena. Deputy Foster made five prior attempts to
serve the subpoena at the Olive residence. On one occasion, he
observed a curtain move in a manner indicating someone was peek-
ing from behind the curtain.
Veronica Gray, Shannon's mother, testified she had no
knowledge her daughter ever lived in Florida. According to Gray,
Shannon resided in Bloomington during February 1995, but Gray was
unable to recall whether Shannon resided at the Salvation Army or
at the Olive residence on February 21, 1995.
Shannon testified she and defendant separated in either
the second or third week of February but she was unable to recall
the date. Defendant stayed at the Olive residence, to which
Shannon maintained a key. Shannon lied to defendant and told him
she was relocating to Florida. On February 21, 1995, Shannon,
who had not spoken with defendant since the separation, went to
the Olive residence to gather some belongings without defendant's
knowledge. After she received the subpoena, Shannon called her
husband at work. Shannon returned to live at the Olive residence
on either February 21 or 22, 1995.
Defendant testified when he and Shannon separated,
Shannon informed him she was going to Florida to visit her grand-
father and stepgrandmother, one of whom was ill. Shannon took
her child, defendant's stepson, with her. After defendant asked
a neighbor to watch his residence because he believed Shannon
might return, the neighbor telephoned defendant at work to inform
him the police had been to his residence. From his place of
employment, defendant contacted the police via telephone on two
occasions regarding the police visits. During the conversations,
when the police inquired how they could contact Shannon, defen-
dant stated they should ask her mother. The police informed
defendant they could go to his home at any time and, because of
an earlier discussion with Gray, they would continue to look for
Shannon there.
The jury found defendant guilty of obstructing service
of process. Defendant filed a motion for a new trial, contending
the trial court erred in denying his motion for a directed ver-
dict because defendant's actions did not constitute a physical
act as allegedly required by the statute. The trial court denied
defendant's motion and sentenced defendant to 24 months' condi-
tional discharge for both the criminal trespass and obstructing
offenses. Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal. The ap-
peals were consolidated for our review, but the defendant's brief
challenges only the conviction for obstruction of service of
process.
II. PHYSICAL ACT
Defendant argues the State failed to prove him guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt by failing to show defendant obstructed
service of process by a physical act. The State maintains a
physical act is not a prerequisite to prosecution under section
31-3 of the Criminal Code of 1961 (Code) (720 ILCS 5/31-3 (West
1994)) and, in the alternative, defendant's conduct sufficiently
constituted a physical act.
We will not overturn a criminal conviction unless the
evidence is so improbable or unsatisfactory it casts reasonable
doubt on defendant's guilt. People v. Collins, 106 Ill. 2d 237,
261, 478 N.E.2d 267, 276 (1985). When one challenges the suffi-
ciency of the evidence, we will sustain a conviction if "'after
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecu-
tion, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential
elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.'" (Emphasis in
original.) Collins, 106 Ill. 2d at 261, 478 N.E.2d at 277, quot-
ing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560,
573, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789 (1979).
Section 31-3 of the Code provides the following:
"Whoever knowingly resists or obstructs
the authorized service or execution of any
civil or criminal process or order of any
court commits a Class B misdemeanor." 720
ILCS 5/31-3 (West 1994).
The General Assembly separated the offense of obstruct-
ing service of process from the offense of obstructing a peace
officer. People v. Koester, 31 Ill. App. 3d 28, 31-32, 332 N.E.2d 755, 757-58 (1975), citing Ill. Ann. Stat., ch. 38, par.
31-3, Committee Comments, at 740 (Smith-Hurd 1970). Because sec-
tions 31-1 (720 ILCS 5/31-1 (West 1994)) and 31-3 of the Code
share the same origin, an examination of section 31-1 is benefi-
cial for our review. See Silverman v. Ballantine, 694 F.2d 1091
(7th Cir. 1982). Section 31-1(a) of the Code provides, in part:
"A person who knowingly resists or obstructs the performance by
one known to the person to be a peace officer *** commits a Class
A misdemeanor." 720 ILCS 5/31-1(a) (West 1994).
In People v. Raby, 40 Ill. 2d 392, 240 N.E.2d 595
(1968), the Supreme Court of Illinois adopted the language of an
earlier federal case that interpreted section 31-1 for the pur-
pose of determining whether the resisting-arrest provision was
vague or overly broad:
"'"Resisting" or "resistance" means "with-
standing the force or effect of" or the "ex-
ertion of oneself to counteract or defeat".
"Obstruct" means "to be or come in the way
of". These terms are alike in that they
imply some physical act or exertion. Given a
reasonable and natural construction, these
terms do not proscribe mere argument with a
policeman about the validity of an arrest or
other police action, but proscribe only some
physical act which imposes an obstacle which
may impede, hinder, interrupt, prevent or
delay the performance of the officer's du-
ties, such as going limp, forcefully resist-
ing arrest or physically aiding a third party
to avoid arrest.'" Raby, 40 Ill. 2d at 399,
240 N.E.2d at 599, quoting Landry v. Daley,
280 F. Supp. 938, 959 (N.D. Ill. 1968), rev'd
on other grounds sub nom. Boyle v. Landry,
401 U.S. 77, 27 L. Ed. 2d 696, 91 S. Ct. 758
(1971).
In the review of convictions of obstructing a peace
officer, appellate courts have worked within the "mere[ly] argu-
ment" and "physical act" dichotomy set forth in Raby and Landry.
See, e.g., People v. Hilgenberg, 223 Ill. App. 3d 286, 289, 585 N.E.2d 180, 183 (1991); People v. Ramirez, 151 Ill. App. 3d 731,
735, 502 N.E.2d 1237, 1239-40 (1986); People v. Weathington, 76
Ill. App. 3d 173, 176, 394 N.E.2d 1059, 1061-62 (1979); People v.
Conner, 42 Ill. App. 3d 234, 238-39, 355 N.E.2d 662, 665-66
(1976). Courts have encountered some difficulty in attempting to
place a defendant's conduct squarely within either "mere argu-
ment" or "some physical act." See, e.g., People v. Gibbs, 115
Ill. App. 2d 113, 253 N.E.2d 117 (1969); Conner, 42 Ill. App. 3d
234, 355 N.E.2d 662.
In Gibbs, while police were conducting a search of 10
to 12 teenage boys, the defendant exited the Woodlawn Organiza-
tion office (office) and declared the officers were violating the
boys' constitutional rights. Defendant informed the boys they
should enter the office where, he opined, the police would be
unable to conduct their search absent a valid warrant. When
defendant left the scene, seven or eight of the boys followed him
into the office. Police entered the office and learned the boys
had joined a group of approximately 35 to 40 others and they were
unable to finish the arrest. The defendant informed the officers
that, because he and the boys were on private property, they had
no right to be in the office absent a warrant. The defendant
failed to heed an additional warning he was interfering with
police business and was arrested. Gibbs, 115 Ill. App. 2d at
115-16, 119, 253 N.E.2d at 118-19, 120.
The Gibbs court determined the language in Landry and
Raby indicated the courts did not contemplate a situation where
the actions of a defendant fall between "mere argument" with an
officer and "some physical act." After concluding defendant's
conduct went beyond merely arguing with the police, the court
affirmed his obstructing-a-peace-officer conviction. Gibbs, 115
Ill. App. 2d at 117-19, 121, 253 N.E.2d at 119-20, 121.
In Conner, the evidence the jury believed showed the
defendant approached within 10 to 15 feet of police officers who
were arresting his brother, removed his jacket to reveal an empty
shoulder holster, and threatened to kill the police officers if
his brother was not released. After an unidentified man grabbed
the defendant from behind, the defendant struggled and continued
to threaten the officers. Conner, 42 Ill. App. 3d at 235-36, 355 N.E.2d at 663-64. Although defendant came into no physical con-
tact with the police officers, the court determined his actions
constituted more than mere words and thus amounted to obstruction
under section 31-1 and Landry and Raby. Conner, 42 Ill. App. 3d
at 238, 355 N.E.2d at 665.
Although apparently recognizing certain conduct may
fall between the two extremes, the Supreme Court of Illinois has
yet to determine such conduct is proscribed. See People v.
Weathington, 82 Ill. 2d 183, 187, 411 N.E.2d 862, 864 (1980).
Like Gibbs and Conner, this case involves a set of circumstances
where the defendant went beyond merely arguing with the police
but did not go as far as committing a physical act. Viewing the
evidence in the case before us in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, the facts show defendant intentionally initiated
contact with the police in order to furnish false information re-
garding his wife's whereabouts. This contact was designed to
mislead the officers and delay the performance of their duties.
We find such conduct is proscribed by section 31-3.
We note an examination of whether a defendant's conduct
as a whole amounts to obstructing service of process better re-
flects the purpose of section 31-3. We believe too much emphasis
is often placed upon the Raby and Landry language. The Raby
court interpreted section 31-1 and considered whether the section
was constitutional. Yet, here, we are considering whether con-
duct factually amounts to obstructing service of process. As the
first district noted, the two offenses consist of different ac-
tions: "[R]esisting arrest is a physical act that necessarily
involves a physical struggle. It does not potentially involve
the broad range of actions that obstructing a peace officer can
involve." People v. Lauer, 273 Ill. App. 3d 469, 474, 653 N.E.2d 30, 33 (1995) (distinguishing the two offenses for the purpose of
determining the sufficiency of a complaint).
Although the Landry and Raby language concludes "ob-
struct[ing]" implies a "physical act or exertion," Lauer demon-
strates obstructing does not necessarily involve a physical
struggle. The physical-implication conclusion drawn by the Lan-
dry and Raby courts is inconsistent with the Lauer decision but,
more importantly, is also inconsistent with the General Assemb-
ly's use of the phrase "obstructing justice" in section 31-4.
See 720 ILCS 5/31-4 (West 1994). In section 31-4(a), a nonphysi-
cal act, the provision of false information, is sufficient to
"obstruct" justice or, in other words, "to be or come in the way
of" justice.
Moreover, when considering obstructing service of pro-
cess, the intentional, self-initiated provision of false informa-
tion as to the identity or whereabouts of an individual could
actually be a greater obstruction than if one simply physically
stood between the server and the person to be served. We believe
the General Assembly sought to protect the judicial process from
such intrusion because the proper service of process depends upon
the identity and location of the individual.
III. ACTUAL DELAY
Defendant further argues the State failed to prove
defendant's conduct actually obstructed the service of process.
Defendant notes approximately 15 minutes following his telephone
conversation with Deputy Scott, Shannon was served with the sub-
poena. The State argues Silverman demonstrates there exists no
requirement for an actual delay. Even if an actual delay is
required, the State argues defendant's conduct did hinder or de-
lay the officers for at least a brief period.
Defendant failed to include this argument in his post-
trial motion and has waived this issue for review. People v.
Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d 176, 187, 522 N.E.2d 1124, 1130 (1988). His
argument also fails on the merits.
In People v. Dewlow, 54 Ill. App. 3d 5, 6-7, 369 N.E.2d 270, 271 (1977), the first district reversed a conviction for
obstructing a peace officer after it concluded defendant's behav-
ior resulted in no actual delay. According to Landry and Raby,
however, section 31-1 proscribes "'some physical act which impos-
es an obstacle which may impede, hinder, interrupt, prevent or
delay the performance of the officer's duties.'" (Emphasis add-
ed.) Raby, 40 Ill. 2d at 399, 240 N.E.2d at 599, quoting Landry,
280 F. Supp. at 959. This language was also found to apply to
the offense of obstructing service of process. Silverman, 694 F.2d at 1095.
Although we have determined a physical act is not a
requisite to prosecution under section 31-3, we respectfully
reject the Dewlow interpretation and adhere to the remainder of
the Raby and Landry definition. In determining whether there has
been an obstruction of service of process, the proper focus is
not upon whether actual delay occurred but, rather, on whether
defendant created an obstacle that may result in a delay. Defen-
dant created an obstacle for the judicial process when he delib-
erately contacted the authorities in order to mislead them.
Deputy Scott correctly chose to question defendant's assertions.
Police authorities successfully avoided the obstacle. This does
not render defendant's conviction invalid.
Affirmed.
STEIGMANN, P.J., and GARMAN, J., concur.