Sverid v. First National Bank
Annotate this Case
FIFTH DIVISION
March 31, 1998
No. 1-97-2615
MARY KAY COOPER SVERID, an Individual, )
) Appeal from
Plaintiff-Appellant, ) the Circuit Court
) of Cook County.
v. )
)
FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF EVERGREEN PARK, ) No. 96-P-6824
a National Banking Corporation, Not )
Individually, but Solely as Executor of the )
Estate of Marie Becker Moore, Deceased, and ) Honorable
PRINCIPIA CORPORATION, a Missouri Corporation,) Jeffrey A. Malak,
) Judge Presiding.
Defendants-Appellees. )
JUSTICE THEIS delivered the opinion of the court:
Appellant, Mary Kay Cooper Sverid, appeals from the circuit
court's interpretation of the last will and testament of the decedent,
Marie Becker Moore. Appellant sought a declaration from the circuit
court that decedent's bequest to her under the will of "the all of
[decedent's] personal effects, household goods, and all other goods
and chattels" should be interpreted to include the more than $1
million in stocks and bonds held by decedent at the time of her death.
The circuit court entered judgment in favor of the executor, First
National Bank of Evergreen Park, finding that the stocks and bonds
passed under the will's residuary clause to the Principia Corporation
(Principia), a Missouri educational institution. We affirm.
Decedent's will consists of three pages, and its only
beneficiaries are appellant and Principia. The relevant provisions of
the will are as follows:
"SECTION ONE
I give the all of my personal effects,
household goods, and all other goods and chattels
to my good friend, MARY KAY COOPER SVERID, in St.
Joseph, Michigan.
SECTION TWO
I give the residue of my estate to PRINCIPIA
CORPORATION at 13201 Clayton Road, St. Louis,
Missouri 63131."
At the time of her death, decedent owned her residence, its
contents and furnishings, and various certificates representing
ownership of certain common stocks and bonds. Upon her death, most of
decedent's stock and bond certificates were found in her safe-deposit
box; however, some were found in and among decedent's household and
personal possessions.
Decedent's will was admitted to probate on July 24, 1996, and
appellant sought a declaration that she, not Principia, was entitled
to decedent's stocks and bonds, which in total valued over $1 million.
Under section one of the will, all other tangible personal property of
decedent including decedent's automobile was distributed in kind to
appellant. The combined appraised value of these items was $9,075.
Upon consideration of the parties' filings and after hearing oral
argument, the court entered judgment in favor of the executor and
Principia, having determined that Principia should receive decedent's
stocks and bonds under the unambiguous terms of decedent's will. Ms.
Sverid appealed.
Appellant contends that the plain and obvious meaning of the
phrase "the all of my personal effects, household goods, and all other
goods and chattels to my good friend MARY KAY COOPER SVERID" is to
bequeath all of decedent's personal property to plaintiff, both
tangible and intangible. She maintains that, on its face, the bequest
contains no words of limitation as to tangible personal property, or
property at a particular location, and suggests that the will's
designation of appellant as decedent's "good friend" reinforces the
breadth of decedent's bequest to her. Appellant further suggests that
decedent's use of the words "the all" further denotes the inclusive
scope of her bequest of personal property to Sverid, and signals
decedent's intent to separate her property into the broad categories
of real and personal property, not tangible and intangible property.
At a minimum, appellant suggests that the phrase "personal
effects" is capable of two meanings: one inclusive of intangible
personal property, and one limited to tangible personal property.
As a result, appellant alternatively maintains that the will is
ambiguous and that extrinsic evidence of decedent's intent is vital to
its correct construction. To the contrary, the executor and Principia
contend that, under Illinois law, decedent's will unambiguously
conveyed only tangible personal property to appellant.
In Illinois, words used in a will are construed according to
their plain and ordinary meanings. Feder v. Luster, 54 Ill. 2d 6, 11,
294 N.E.2d 293, 295 (1973); Warren v. Albrecht, 213 Ill. App. 3d 55,
58, 571 N.E.2d 1179, 1180 (1991). Moreover, courts are charged with
ascertaining a testator's intent by, wherever possible, giving effect
to every "word, phrase and clause" in a will. Feder, 54 Ill. 2d at
11, 294 N.E.2d at 295. In addition, under the rule of ejusdem
generis, when general words are preceded by specific words, the
general words "`must be construed to include only things of the same
kind as those indicated by the particular and specific words.'"
Brink's, Inc. v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n, 108 Ill. App. 3d 186, 190,
439 N.E.2d 1, 3 (1982), quoting Bullman v. City of Chicago, 367 Ill. 217, 226, 10 N.E.2d 961, 965 (1937); In re Estate of Lindsey, 13 Ill.
App. 3d 717, 718, 300 N.E.2d 572, 573 (1973) (under ejusdem generis,
bequest of personal property "in or about" motel did not include money
in bank account).
Though various Illinois courts have interpreted the language used
in decedent's will, we are aware of no Illinois case construing the
precise phrase or resolving the particular issue that is the object of
this appeal. While the term "personal effects" usually means items
having an intimate relation to person, the term must be given meaning
in the context in which it occurs. Landstrom v. Krettler, 105 Ill.
App. 3d 863, 866, 435 N.E.2d 149, 151 (1982).
Appellant primarily relies upon Andrews v. Applegate, 223 Ill. 535, 537-38, 79 N.E. 176, 177 (1906). There, our supreme court
stated:
"The word `effects' in its primary and ordinary
meaning includes only personal estate, goods,
movables and chattel property. *** It denotes
property in a more extensive sense than goods, and
includes all kinds of personal property, such as
shares of capital stock. *** The word is
frequently found in wills, and, as a general thing,
means personal property."
We do not agree with appellant's broad reading of Andrews that
the phrase "personal effects" denotes both tangible and intangible
personal property, inclusive of stocks and bonds. The precise phrase
at issue in Andrews, "moneys and effects of every description not
hereafter otherwise disposed of" expressly contemplated intangible
personal property, specifically "moneys." Andrews, 223 Ill. at 536,
79 N.E. at 176. Additionally, the Andrews bequest of "effects of
every description not hereafter otherwise disposed of" expressly used
the word "effects" without qualification.
In this instance, decedent did not specifically include in the
bequest of "personal effects" intangible personal property, nor did
she expressly make the bequest unqualifiedly inclusive of "effects of
every description." To the contrary, decedent made a bequest of "the
all of [her] personal effects, household goods, and all other goods
and chattels." Decedent's bequest of "personal effects" was conjoined
with her bequest of other personalty already categorized as tangible
property by some Illinois courts. See In re Estate of Berman, 39 Ill.
App. 2d 175, 179, 187 N.E.2d 541, 544 (1963) (noting that the term
"goods and chattels" in the Probate Act denotes tangible personal
property, "as distinguished from such items as stocks, bonds,
mortgages, accounts receivable, notes and the like").
We find Watkins v. Nobiling, 22 Ill. 2d 290, 174 N.E.2d 858
(1961), more directly addresses the issues raised here. In Watkins,
our supreme court was asked to decide whether decedent's bequest of
"my joint belongings," when viewed in light of extrinsic
circumstances, manifested an intent to devise real estate. In that
context, the Watkins court made the following statement: "Similarly
the word `belongings' is ordinarily used to designate tangible
personal property such as household goods and personal effects."
Watkins, 22 Ill. 2d at 292, 174 N.E.2d at 859. This statement
suggests that our supreme court has determined that the phrase
"personal effects" denotes "tangible personal property."
Appellant questions the relevance of Watkins, suggesting that
Watkins did not pose, and that our supreme court did not address or
resolve, the precise question at issue here: whether the phrase
"personal effects" may include intangible property. We do not agree.
We do not find this contextual difference critical. Though the court
referenced the phrase "personal effects" in the context of deciding
whether the term "belongings" was inclusive of real property, it
nevertheless clearly identified "personal effects" as "tangible
personal property."
Moreover, the Watkins' designation of "personal effects" as
inclusive of only tangible personal property is consistent with the
words' plain and ordinary meaning. See Black's Law Dictionary, 1143
(6th ed. 1990) (the term "personal effects" is narrower than "effects"
and ordinarily includes only tangible property having an "intimate
relation to the person").
Therefore, we find the circuit court correctly determined that
under the unambiguous terms of the will, the stocks and bonds passed
to Principia under the residuary clause.
Affirmed.
HOFFMAN, P.J., and HARTMAN, J., concur.
March 31, 1998
No. 1-97-2615
MARY KAY COOPER SVERID, an Individual, )
) Appeal from
Plaintiff-Appellant, ) the Circuit Court
) of Cook County.
v. )
)
FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF EVERGREEN PARK, ) No. 96-P-6824
a National Banking Corporation, Not )
Individually, but Solely as Executor of the )
Estate of Marie Becker Moore, Deceased, and ) Honorable
PRINCIPIA CORPORATION, a Missouri Corporation,) Jeffrey A. Malak,
) Judge Presiding.
Defendants-Appellees. )
JUSTICE THEIS delivered the opinion of the court:
Appellant, Mary Kay Cooper Sverid, appeals from the circuit
court's interpretation of the last will and testament of the decedent,
Marie Becker Moore. Appellant sought a declaration from the circuit
court that decedent's bequest to her under the will of "the all of
[decedent's] personal effects, household goods, and all other goods
and chattels" should be interpreted to include the more than $1
million in stocks and bonds held by decedent at the time of her death.
The circuit court entered judgment in favor of the executor, First
National Bank of Evergreen Park, finding that the stocks and bonds
passed under the will's residuary clause to the Principia Corporation
(Principia), a Missouri educational institution. We affirm.
Decedent's will consists of three pages, and its only
beneficiaries are appellant and Principia. The relevant provisions of
the will are as follows:
"SECTION ONE
I give the all of my personal effects,
household goods, and all other goods and chattels
to my good friend, MARY KAY COOPER SVERID, in St.
Joseph, Michigan.
SECTION TWO
I give the residue of my estate to PRINCIPIA
CORPORATION at 13201 Clayton Road, St. Louis,
Missouri 63131."
At the time of her death, decedent owned her residence, its
contents and furnishings, and various certificates representing
ownership of certain common stocks and bonds. Upon her death, most of
decedent's stock and bond certificates were found in her safe-deposit
box; however, some were found in and among decedent's household and
personal possessions.
Decedent's will was admitted to probate on July 24, 1996, and
appellant sought a declaration that she, not Principia, was entitled
to decedent's stocks and bonds, which in total valued over $1 million.
Under section one of the will, all other tangible personal property of
decedent including decedent's automobile was distributed in kind to
appellant. The combined appraised value of these items was $9,075.
Upon consideration of the parties' filings and after hearing oral
argument, the court entered judgment in favor of the executor and
Principia, having determined that Principia should receive decedent's
stocks and bonds under the unambiguous terms of decedent's will. Ms.
Sverid appealed.
Appellant contends that the plain and obvious meaning of the
phrase "the all of my personal effects, household goods, and all other
goods and chattels to my good friend MARY KAY COOPER SVERID" is to
bequeath all of decedent's personal property to plaintiff, both
tangible and intangible. She maintains that, on its face, the bequest
contains no words of limitation as to tangible personal property, or
property at a particular location, and suggests that the will's
designation of appellant as decedent's "good friend" reinforces the
breadth of decedent's bequest to her. Appellant further suggests that
decedent's use of the words "the all" further denotes the inclusive
scope of her bequest of personal property to Sverid, and signals
decedent's intent to separate her property into the broad categories
of real and personal property, not tangible and intangible property.
At a minimum, appellant suggests that the phrase "personal
effects" is capable of two meanings: one inclusive of intangible
personal property, and one limited to tangible personal property.
As a result, appellant alternatively maintains that the will is
ambiguous and that extrinsic evidence of decedent's intent is vital to
its correct construction. To the contrary, the executor and Principia
contend that, under Illinois law, decedent's will unambiguously
conveyed only tangible personal property to appellant.
In Illinois, words used in a will are construed according to
their plain and ordinary meanings. Feder v. Luster, 54 Ill. 2d 6, 11,
294 N.E.2d 293, 295 (1973); Warren v. Albrecht, 213 Ill. App. 3d 55,
58, 571 N.E.2d 1179, 1180 (1991). Moreover, courts are charged with
ascertaining a testator's intent by, wherever possible, giving effect
to every "word, phrase and clause" in a will. Feder, 54 Ill. 2d at
11, 294 N.E.2d at 295. In addition, under the rule of ejusdem
generis, when general words are preceded by specific words, the
general words "`must be construed to include only things of the same
kind as those indicated by the particular and specific words.'"
Brink's, Inc. v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n, 108 Ill. App. 3d 186, 190,
439 N.E.2d 1, 3 (1982), quoting Bullman v. City of Chicago, 367 Ill. 217, 226, 10 N.E.2d 961, 965 (1937); In re Estate of Lindsey, 13 Ill.
App. 3d 717, 718, 300 N.E.2d 572, 573 (1973) (under ejusdem generis,
bequest of personal property "in or about" motel did not include money
in bank account).
Though various Illinois courts have interpreted the language used
in decedent's will, we are aware of no Illinois case construing the
precise phrase or resolving the particular issue that is the object of
this appeal. While the term "personal effects" usually means items
having an intimate relation to person, the term must be given meaning
in the context in which it occurs. Landstrom v. Krettler, 105 Ill.
App. 3d 863, 866, 435 N.E.2d 149, 151 (1982).
Appellant primarily relies upon Andrews v. Applegate, 223 Ill. 535, 537-38, 79 N.E. 176, 177 (1906). There, our supreme court
stated:
"The word `effects' in its primary and ordinary
meaning includes only personal estate, goods,
movables and chattel property. *** It denotes
property in a more extensive sense than goods, and
includes all kinds of personal property, such as
shares of capital stock. *** The word is
frequently found in wills, and, as a general thing,
means personal property."
We do not agree with appellant's broad reading of Andrews that
the phrase "personal effects" denotes both tangible and intangible
personal property, inclusive of stocks and bonds. The precise phrase
at issue in Andrews, "moneys and effects of every description not
hereafter otherwise disposed of" expressly contemplated intangible
personal property, specifically "moneys." Andrews, 223 Ill. at 536,
79 N.E. at 176. Additionally, the Andrews bequest of "effects of
every description not hereafter otherwise disposed of" expressly used
the word "effects" without qualification.
In this instance, decedent did not specifically include in the
bequest of "personal effects" intangible personal property, nor did
she expressly make the bequest unqualifiedly inclusive of "effects of
every description." To the contrary, decedent made a bequest of "the
all of [her] personal effects, household goods, and all other goods
and chattels." Decedent's bequest of "personal effects" was conjoined
with her bequest of other personalty already categorized as tangible
property by some Illinois courts. See In re Estate of Berman, 39 Ill.
App. 2d 175, 179, 187 N.E.2d 541, 544 (1963) (noting that the term
"goods and chattels" in the Probate Act denotes tangible personal
property, "as distinguished from such items as stocks, bonds,
mortgages, accounts receivable, notes and the like").
We find Watkins v. Nobiling, 22 Ill. 2d 290, 174 N.E.2d 858
(1961), more directly addresses the issues raised here. In Watkins,
our supreme court was asked to decide whether decedent's bequest of
"my joint belongings," when viewed in light of extrinsic
circumstances, manifested an intent to devise real estate. In that
context, the Watkins court made the following statement: "Similarly
the word `belongings' is ordinarily used to designate tangible
personal property such as household goods and personal effects."
Watkins, 22 Ill. 2d at 292, 174 N.E.2d at 859. This statement
suggests that our supreme court has determined that the phrase
"personal effects" denotes "tangible personal property."
Appellant questions the relevance of Watkins, suggesting that
Watkins did not pose, and that our supreme court did not address or
resolve, the precise question at issue here: whether the phrase
"personal effects" may include intangible property. We do not agree.
We do not find this contextual difference critical. Though the court
referenced the phrase "personal effects" in the context of deciding
whether the term "belongings" was inclusive of real property, it
nevertheless clearly identified "personal effects" as "tangible
personal property."
Moreover, the Watkins' designation of "personal effects" as
inclusive of only tangible personal property is consistent with the
words' plain and ordinary meaning. See Black's Law Dictionary, 1143
(6th ed. 1990) (the term "personal effects" is narrower than "effects"
and ordinarily includes only tangible property having an "intimate
relation to the person").
Therefore, we find the circuit court correctly determined that
under the unambiguous terms of the will, the stocks and bonds passed
to Principia under the residuary clause.
Affirmed.
HOFFMAN, P.J., and HARTMAN, J., concur.
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