Village of Tinley Park v. Ray

Sixth Division
FILED: 09/04/98

No. 1-97-2436

THE VILLAGE OF TINLEY PARK, ) Appeal from the Circuit
a municipal corporation, ) Court of Cook County
)
Plaintiff-Appellant, )
)
v. )
) No. 97 CH 2199
NIRMALA M. RAY, as trustee )
u/t/a dated 4/8/91 a/k/a the )
Nirmala M. Ray Trust, UNIVERSAL )
OUTDOOR, INC., and UNKNOWN )
OWNERS, NON-RELATED CLAIMANTS, ) Honorable
) Ellis E. Reid,
Defendants-Appellees. ) Judge Presiding.

JUSTICE ZWICK delivered the opinion of the court:
Plaintiff, the Village of Tinley Park (the Village), instituted this action for
injunctive and other relief, seeking enforcement of a zoning ordinance which prohibits
the construction of billboards within the Village's boundaries. The trial court
determined that the Village lacked standing to bring the action and dismissed the
complaint with prejudice. The Village has appealed the dismissal order.
The undisputed facts establish that in July 1996, defendant Universal Outdoor,
Inc., (Universal) applied for a permit to erect a billboard on a parcel of property at
7951 West 159th Street, which was then located within unincorporated Cook County.
The requested permit was issued by Cook County on August 21, 1996, and the subject
billboard was thereafter constructed on the property.
On November 19, 1996, subsequent to the construction of the billboard, the
Village annexed the parcel of property on which the billboard had been erected.
Thereafter, the Village sought removal of the billboard based upon the violation of its
pre-existing zoning ordinance which prohibits billboards within the Village.
Defendants refused to remove the billboard, and the Village filed suit, pursuant
to section 11-13-15 of the Illinois Municipal Code (65 ILCS 5/11-13-15 (West 1996)),
seeking an injunction and the imposition of fines for violation of the subject zoning
ordinance. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, asserting that the
Village did not have standing to challenge the permit issued by Cook County. The
trial court agreed and granted defendants' motion to dismiss with prejudice.
The only issue raised in this appeal is whether the trial court erred in dismissing
the complaint based upon its determination that the Village lacked standing to bring
the action.
Article VII, 6(a) of the Illinois Constitution of 1970 provides, in pertinent part,
as follows:
"Except as limited by this Section, a home rule unit may exercise
any power and perform any function pertaining to its government and
affairs including, but not limited to, the power to regulate for the
protection of the public health, safety, morals and welfare. Ill. Const.
1970, art. VII, 6(a).
Thus, the Illinois Constitution authorizes home rule units of government to adopt and
enforce zoning ordinances. Thompson v. Cook County Zoning Board of Appeals, 96
Ill. App. 3d 561, 569, 421 N.E.2d 285 (1981); Metropolitan Sanitary District of Greater
Chicago v. On-Cor Frozen Foods, Inc., 36 Ill. App. 3d 239, 242-43, 343 N.E.2d 577
(1976). In addition, section 11-13-15 of the Illinois Municipal Code specifically permits
municipalities to enforce zoning and building ordinances in order to promote public
health, welfare and safety. See 65 ILCS 5/11-13-15 (West 1996). Notwithstanding the
above constitutional and statutory provisions, the trial court determined that the
Village lacked standing to sue for enforcement of its zoning ordinance. For the
following reasons, we reverse.
The doctrine of standing seeks to ensure that courts are deciding actual, specific
controversies, and not abstract questions or moot issues. In re Marriage of Rodriguez,
131 Ill. 2d 273, 279-80, 545 N.E.2d 731 (1989). The primary focus of standing is that a
party have a real interest in the action brought and in its outcome. Rodriguez, 131 Ill. 2d at 280. The doctrine is designed to preclude persons having no interest in a
controversy from bringing suit; it does not preclude a valid suit from being litigated.
Rodriguez, 131 Ill. 2d at 280.
A finding of standing must be predicated upon some injury in fact to a legally
recognized interest. In re Estate of Burgeson, 125 Ill. 2d 477, 486, 532 N.E.2d 825
(1988); Glazewski v. Coronet Insurance Co., 108 Ill. 2d 243, 254, 483 N.E.2d 1263
(1985). The claimed injury must be distinct and palpable, fairly traceable to the
defendant's actions, and substantially likely to be prevented or redressed by the grant
of the requested relief. Greer v. Illinois Housing Development Authority, 122 Ill. 2d 462, 492-93, 524 N.E.2d 561 (1988).
When a municipality annexes property into its corporate boundaries, the
annexed property immediately becomes subject to the zoning jurisdiction of the
annexing municipality. Citizens Bank and Trust Co. v. City of Park Ridge, 5 Ill. App.
3d 77, 80, 282 N.E.2d 751 (1972). The automatic zoning of annexed property has been
codified by section 7-1-47 of the Illinois Municipal Code (65 ILCS 5/7-1-47 (West
1996)) and by Tinley Park Zoning Ordinance IV(B)(4). Thus, upon its annexation on
November 19, 1996, the property immediately became subject to the relevant zoning
ordinances of Tinley Park. Accordingly, the Village had the right, authority, and
obligation to enforce those zoning ordinances against all owners and occupiers of the
recently annexed property. See generally Village of Burr Ridge v. Elia, 65 Ill. App. 3d
827, 382 N.E.2d 876 (1978); City of Rockford v. Sallee, 129 Ill. App. 2d 75, 262 N.E.2d 485 (1970).
It is beyond dispute that the Village has the power to enforce its zoning
ordinances on property located within its boundaries. Moreover, we hold that this
power is in no way diminished or curtailed merely because the property came to be
located within the village boundaries through annexation. Based upon the record
before us, we find the Village has a real interest in the enforcement of its zoning
ordinances. In addition, a violation of those ordinances by an offending billboard
results in injury which is distinct, palpable, traceable to the defendant's actions, and
may be redressed by the grant of the requested relief. We hold, therefore, that the trial
court erred in dismissing the Village's complaint for lack of standing.
We observe that the record contains some discussion by the trial judge and
counsel for both parties as to the applicability of Tinley Park Zoning Ordinance
IX(E) (the "grandfather clause"), which permits continuation of a legal non-
conforming use for a maximum of five years from the effective date of the relevant
zoning ordinance. However, this issue goes to the merits of whether the Village is
entitled to immediate removal of the subject billboard. As such, it is wholly unrelated
to the narrow question of whether the Village has standing to pursue the instant
action, and the trial court never rendered a decision on the applicability of IX(E).
In light of our holding that the Village has standing to pursue its claim, we
reverse the trial court's judgment dismissing the complaint and remand the cause for a
ruling on the applicability of IX(E).
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and the
cause is remanded for further proceedings.
Reversed and remanded.
ZWICK, J., with CAMPBELL, P.J., and QUINN, J., concurring.