People v. Jackson
Annotate this Case
SIXTH DIVISION
February 13, 1998
No. 1-97-0355
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the
) Circuit Court of
Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Cook County
)
v. )
)
LORENZO JACKSON, ) Honorable
) Daniel LoCallo,
Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE GREIMAN delivered the opinion of the court:
After his arrest in July 1995 and a bench trial in July
1996, defendant Lorenzo Jackson was found guilty of aggravated
vehicular hijacking and armed robbery. On appeal, defendant
asserts that his case should be remanded for a hearing pursuant
to People v. Kinkead, 168 Ill. 2d 394 (1995), to determine
whether he was being treated with psychotropic drugs during any
critical stage in the proceedings. We hold that no remand is
necessary because defendant definitively stated that he was not
taking medication at any time during or proximate to his trial.
On July 1, 1995, defendant was arrested for having taken a
car from its owner at gunpoint and robbing the owner's passenger
on June 28, 1995. On April 4 and 8, 1996, a hearing was held on
defendant's motion to suppress his statements and the motion was
denied. On July 10 and 11, 1996, a bench trial was held and the
witnesses included the two victims. On July 11, 1996, the trial
court convicted defendant of aggravated vehicular hijacking and
armed robbery. On August 13, 1996, defendant filed a motion for
a new trial.
On August 29, 1996, a hearing was held on defendant's post-
trial motion and for sentencing. When defense counsel presented
arguments for the purpose of sentencing, he informed the trial
court that defendant currently was being treated for depression.
The trial court asked when defendant started medication. Defense
counsel responded that defendant was getting treatment, in the
form of "siliquan [sic]," and that he did not know defendant was
taking medication until that day (August 29). The trial court
immediately ordered a behavioral clinic examination with respect
to the medication being taken by defendant and continued the
matter until September 23, 1996.
On September 23, 1996, the proceedings reconvened. The
trial court was informed that Forensic Clinical Services had
completed the psychological portion of the examination but still
had to do a psychiatric examination because defendant was
currently on medication. Accordingly, the matter was continued.
On October 17, 1996, the proceedings reconvened. A report
dated October 15, 1996, by Dr. Philip Pan, a staff psychiatrist
with Forensic Clinical Services, stated that defendant was fit to
stand trial or be sentenced and that he was not receiving
psychotropic medications "at this time." The trial court
conducted the following examination of defendant:
"THE COURT: On the last court date on September 23rd I
ordered a behavioral clinic examination because you
mentioned that you were taking some type of medication for
depression. Is this true?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
THE COURT: Now on October 11th [sic] Dr. Pan indicates
that you are not receiving any medications.
THE DEFENDANT: Now? No.
THE COURT: Are you still taking medication?
THE DEFENDANT: No.
THE COURT: Were you taking medications during the
trial?
THE DEFENDANT: I don't --
THE COURT: The trial. The first date of the trial was
July --
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: It was the 10th for us.
THE COURT: July 10th.
THE DEFENDANT: No.
THE COURT: When were you taking medication?
THE DEFENDANT: When I was initially brought into the
county system.
THE COURT: But at the time -- during the trial you
were not taking any medication?
THE DEFENDANT: No.
THE COURT: I am asking you, you were not taking any
medication?
THE DEFENDANT: No. No, sir.
THE COURT: Because initially you were in custody in
August of 1995. When did you stop taking the medication?
THE DEFENDANT: They had me off and on, off and on a
couple of times.
THE COURT: But I mean --
THE DEFENDANT: Maybe about January, something like
that.
THE COURT: Then after January of 1996 you were not
taking any medication?
THE DEFENDANT: No."
The court then stated they would definitely go forward on
November 4.
On November 4, 1996, the sentencing phase proceeded.
Defense counsel recounted the events leading up to the evaluation
of defendant and agreed with the trial court's statement that
defendant represented that he was not taking medication at the
time of trial. After defense counsel presented two witnesses in
mitigation, the trial court imposed an 11-year prison term.
On appeal, defendant asserts that his case should be
remanded for the limited purpose of a hearing based on the
Kinkead decision to determine whether he was receiving medication
during or proximate to any critical stage of his trial.
Defendant correctly observes that the record does not reveal the
specific dates when he was taking medication and argues that a
trial court should not be allowed to rely solely on information
provided by a defendant.
The State contends that a remand is not warranted because
defendant expressly stated that he was not taking medication
during or near trial. In the alternative, the State submits that
if this matter is remanded, the appropriate procedure would be to
conduct a retrospective fitness hearing, if possible, pursuant
to People v. Burgess, 176 Ill. 2d 289 (1997).
First, we address the statutory basis of defendant's claim,
i.e., section 104 21(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963
(725 ILCS 5/104 21(a) (West 1994)). Until December 1995, section
104 21(a) provided that "[a] defendant who is receiving
psychotropic drugs or other medications under medical direction
is entitled to a hearing on the issue of his fitness while under
medication." 725 ILCS 5/104 21(a) (West 1994). Subsequently,
the legislature twice amended section 104 21(a) and, therefore,
this section no longer exists in the same language.[fn1]
A split in authority developed regarding whether the
original version or the amended version of section 104 21(a)
should apply to cases on appeal. See, e.g., People v. Perry, 292
Ill. App. 3d 705 (1997) (amended version applied retroactively);
People v. McKay, 282 Ill. App. 3d 108 (1996) (amended version
could not apply retroactively). The Illinois Supreme Court
recently held that the preamended version of section 104 21(a)
must be applied on direct appeal. People v. Cortes, No. 80149,
slip op. at 15 (January 23, 1998).[fn2]
In the present case, defendant was arrested in 1995 and his
trial was held in July 1996. Defendant raises no issue or
argument regarding posttrial matters, including his sentencing
proceeding. Therefore, in light of the Cortes decision, we
consider this appeal under the original version of section
104 21(a) and direct attention to the time period of defendant's
trial in July 1996.
In Kinkead, the case on which defendant relies, the supreme
court held that "a limited remand for clarification of the
circumstances surrounding defendant's use of psychotropic
medications" was necessary based on the inadequate record.
Kinkead, 168 Ill. 2d at 415. The record was inadequate because
it failed to inform the court whether the administration of the
drug was proximate enough in time to critical stages of the
defendant's proceedings, when the defendant began to take the
drug, what amount had been prescribed, what the medical reasons
were for the medication, and in what manner the medication may
have influenced defendant. Kinkead, 168 Ill. 2d at 414-15.
In the present case, unlike Kinkead, defendant was not
taking any medication anytime near the time of trial. The record
reveals that on August 29, 1996, when a hearing was held on
defendant's motion for new trial and sentencing, defense counsel
alerted the trial court that defendant had been taking a
psychotropic drug (Sinequan) for depression. In addition, the
presentencing report specifically stated that defendant had been
treated for depression while previously incarcerated in 1994 and
currently was being treated for depression at Cermak Health
Services. Based on this information, the trial judge immediately
ordered a behavioral clinic examination for defendant and
continued the matter.
At the October 1996 proceedings, the report from a staff
psychiatrist informed the trial judge that defendant was fit to
be sentenced and was not receiving psychotropic medications at
the current time. The trial judge diligently questioned
defendant regarding his prior drug treatment. Defendant's
answers were unambiguous and clear that he had stopped taking
medication around January 1996, at least five months prior to
trial, and did not take any medication during his trial in July.
When defendant provided this information to the trial judge,
defendant was not taking medication and had been found fit by a
psychiatrist. Moreover, there is no suggestion that defendant
did not understand the questions posed by the trial judge.
Accordingly, there is no factual or legal basis to trigger
section 104 21(a) and its consequences.
Under the facts of this case, we find that the trial judge
amply satisfied his responsibilities. To require more than a
clear, direct statement that defendant was not even taking
medication at or near the time of trial would be exaltation of
form over substance.
Affirmed.
ZWICK and QUINN, JJ., concur.
[fn1]The first amendment, effective December 1995, was
declared unconstitutional in Johnson v. Edgar, 176 Ill. 2d 499
(1997). The second amended version became effective on December
31, 1996, and provides that "[a] defendant who is receiving
psychotropic drugs shall not be presumed to be unfit to stand
trial solely by virtue of the receipt of those drugs or
medications." 725 ILCS 5/104 21(a) (West 1996).
[fn2]The Illinois Supreme Court also has recently discussed
its eight prior cases that interpreted and applied section
104 21(a) in People v. Neal, No. 82556 (November 20, 1997).
February 13, 1998
No. 1-97-0355
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the
) Circuit Court of
Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Cook County
)
v. )
)
LORENZO JACKSON, ) Honorable
) Daniel LoCallo,
Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE GREIMAN delivered the opinion of the court:
After his arrest in July 1995 and a bench trial in July
1996, defendant Lorenzo Jackson was found guilty of aggravated
vehicular hijacking and armed robbery. On appeal, defendant
asserts that his case should be remanded for a hearing pursuant
to People v. Kinkead, 168 Ill. 2d 394 (1995), to determine
whether he was being treated with psychotropic drugs during any
critical stage in the proceedings. We hold that no remand is
necessary because defendant definitively stated that he was not
taking medication at any time during or proximate to his trial.
On July 1, 1995, defendant was arrested for having taken a
car from its owner at gunpoint and robbing the owner's passenger
on June 28, 1995. On April 4 and 8, 1996, a hearing was held on
defendant's motion to suppress his statements and the motion was
denied. On July 10 and 11, 1996, a bench trial was held and the
witnesses included the two victims. On July 11, 1996, the trial
court convicted defendant of aggravated vehicular hijacking and
armed robbery. On August 13, 1996, defendant filed a motion for
a new trial.
On August 29, 1996, a hearing was held on defendant's post-
trial motion and for sentencing. When defense counsel presented
arguments for the purpose of sentencing, he informed the trial
court that defendant currently was being treated for depression.
The trial court asked when defendant started medication. Defense
counsel responded that defendant was getting treatment, in the
form of "siliquan [sic]," and that he did not know defendant was
taking medication until that day (August 29). The trial court
immediately ordered a behavioral clinic examination with respect
to the medication being taken by defendant and continued the
matter until September 23, 1996.
On September 23, 1996, the proceedings reconvened. The
trial court was informed that Forensic Clinical Services had
completed the psychological portion of the examination but still
had to do a psychiatric examination because defendant was
currently on medication. Accordingly, the matter was continued.
On October 17, 1996, the proceedings reconvened. A report
dated October 15, 1996, by Dr. Philip Pan, a staff psychiatrist
with Forensic Clinical Services, stated that defendant was fit to
stand trial or be sentenced and that he was not receiving
psychotropic medications "at this time." The trial court
conducted the following examination of defendant:
"THE COURT: On the last court date on September 23rd I
ordered a behavioral clinic examination because you
mentioned that you were taking some type of medication for
depression. Is this true?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
THE COURT: Now on October 11th [sic] Dr. Pan indicates
that you are not receiving any medications.
THE DEFENDANT: Now? No.
THE COURT: Are you still taking medication?
THE DEFENDANT: No.
THE COURT: Were you taking medications during the
trial?
THE DEFENDANT: I don't --
THE COURT: The trial. The first date of the trial was
July --
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: It was the 10th for us.
THE COURT: July 10th.
THE DEFENDANT: No.
THE COURT: When were you taking medication?
THE DEFENDANT: When I was initially brought into the
county system.
THE COURT: But at the time -- during the trial you
were not taking any medication?
THE DEFENDANT: No.
THE COURT: I am asking you, you were not taking any
medication?
THE DEFENDANT: No. No, sir.
THE COURT: Because initially you were in custody in
August of 1995. When did you stop taking the medication?
THE DEFENDANT: They had me off and on, off and on a
couple of times.
THE COURT: But I mean --
THE DEFENDANT: Maybe about January, something like
that.
THE COURT: Then after January of 1996 you were not
taking any medication?
THE DEFENDANT: No."
The court then stated they would definitely go forward on
November 4.
On November 4, 1996, the sentencing phase proceeded.
Defense counsel recounted the events leading up to the evaluation
of defendant and agreed with the trial court's statement that
defendant represented that he was not taking medication at the
time of trial. After defense counsel presented two witnesses in
mitigation, the trial court imposed an 11-year prison term.
On appeal, defendant asserts that his case should be
remanded for the limited purpose of a hearing based on the
Kinkead decision to determine whether he was receiving medication
during or proximate to any critical stage of his trial.
Defendant correctly observes that the record does not reveal the
specific dates when he was taking medication and argues that a
trial court should not be allowed to rely solely on information
provided by a defendant.
The State contends that a remand is not warranted because
defendant expressly stated that he was not taking medication
during or near trial. In the alternative, the State submits that
if this matter is remanded, the appropriate procedure would be to
conduct a retrospective fitness hearing, if possible, pursuant
to People v. Burgess, 176 Ill. 2d 289 (1997).
First, we address the statutory basis of defendant's claim,
i.e., section 104 21(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963
(725 ILCS 5/104 21(a) (West 1994)). Until December 1995, section
104 21(a) provided that "[a] defendant who is receiving
psychotropic drugs or other medications under medical direction
is entitled to a hearing on the issue of his fitness while under
medication." 725 ILCS 5/104 21(a) (West 1994). Subsequently,
the legislature twice amended section 104 21(a) and, therefore,
this section no longer exists in the same language.[fn1]
A split in authority developed regarding whether the
original version or the amended version of section 104 21(a)
should apply to cases on appeal. See, e.g., People v. Perry, 292
Ill. App. 3d 705 (1997) (amended version applied retroactively);
People v. McKay, 282 Ill. App. 3d 108 (1996) (amended version
could not apply retroactively). The Illinois Supreme Court
recently held that the preamended version of section 104 21(a)
must be applied on direct appeal. People v. Cortes, No. 80149,
slip op. at 15 (January 23, 1998).[fn2]
In the present case, defendant was arrested in 1995 and his
trial was held in July 1996. Defendant raises no issue or
argument regarding posttrial matters, including his sentencing
proceeding. Therefore, in light of the Cortes decision, we
consider this appeal under the original version of section
104 21(a) and direct attention to the time period of defendant's
trial in July 1996.
In Kinkead, the case on which defendant relies, the supreme
court held that "a limited remand for clarification of the
circumstances surrounding defendant's use of psychotropic
medications" was necessary based on the inadequate record.
Kinkead, 168 Ill. 2d at 415. The record was inadequate because
it failed to inform the court whether the administration of the
drug was proximate enough in time to critical stages of the
defendant's proceedings, when the defendant began to take the
drug, what amount had been prescribed, what the medical reasons
were for the medication, and in what manner the medication may
have influenced defendant. Kinkead, 168 Ill. 2d at 414-15.
In the present case, unlike Kinkead, defendant was not
taking any medication anytime near the time of trial. The record
reveals that on August 29, 1996, when a hearing was held on
defendant's motion for new trial and sentencing, defense counsel
alerted the trial court that defendant had been taking a
psychotropic drug (Sinequan) for depression. In addition, the
presentencing report specifically stated that defendant had been
treated for depression while previously incarcerated in 1994 and
currently was being treated for depression at Cermak Health
Services. Based on this information, the trial judge immediately
ordered a behavioral clinic examination for defendant and
continued the matter.
At the October 1996 proceedings, the report from a staff
psychiatrist informed the trial judge that defendant was fit to
be sentenced and was not receiving psychotropic medications at
the current time. The trial judge diligently questioned
defendant regarding his prior drug treatment. Defendant's
answers were unambiguous and clear that he had stopped taking
medication around January 1996, at least five months prior to
trial, and did not take any medication during his trial in July.
When defendant provided this information to the trial judge,
defendant was not taking medication and had been found fit by a
psychiatrist. Moreover, there is no suggestion that defendant
did not understand the questions posed by the trial judge.
Accordingly, there is no factual or legal basis to trigger
section 104 21(a) and its consequences.
Under the facts of this case, we find that the trial judge
amply satisfied his responsibilities. To require more than a
clear, direct statement that defendant was not even taking
medication at or near the time of trial would be exaltation of
form over substance.
Affirmed.
ZWICK and QUINN, JJ., concur.
[fn1]The first amendment, effective December 1995, was
declared unconstitutional in Johnson v. Edgar, 176 Ill. 2d 499
(1997). The second amended version became effective on December
31, 1996, and provides that "[a] defendant who is receiving
psychotropic drugs shall not be presumed to be unfit to stand
trial solely by virtue of the receipt of those drugs or
medications." 725 ILCS 5/104 21(a) (West 1996).
[fn2]The Illinois Supreme Court also has recently discussed
its eight prior cases that interpreted and applied section
104 21(a) in People v. Neal, No. 82556 (November 20, 1997).
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