People v. Ornelas

SIXTH DIVISION
APRIL 17, 1998

No. 1-96-4232

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) APPEAL FROM THE
) CIRCUIT COURT
Plaintiff-Appellee, ) OF COOK COUNTY.
)
v. )
)
ROBERT ORNELAS, ) HONORABLE
) RALPH REYNA,
Defendant-Appellant. ) JUDGE PRESIDING.

PRESIDING JUSTICE CAMPBELL delivered the opinion of the court:
Following a bench trial in the circuit court of Cook County,
defendant Robert Ornelas was found guilty of first degree murder
and sentenced to natural life imprisonment in the Illinois De-
partment of Corrections. Defendant appeals his conviction.
The record on appeal indicates that prior to trial, defendant
filed a motion to quash his arrest. During a hearing on the
matter, Frankfort Police Officer Robert Piscia testified that on
November 15, 1990, at approximately 7:30 a.m., he spoke to four men
standing around the parking lot of the White Hen at LaGrange Road
and Route 30. Illinois State Trooper Kim Hoffman-Davis testified
that at approximately 8:20 a.m., she was at a gas station near
Routes 30 and 45 in Tinley Park, Illinois, when a citizen informed
her that a fight was in progress at the White Hen.
Trooper Hoffman-Davis went to the White Hen, where she saw
four men standing in the parking lot. Trooper Hoffman-Davis made a
radio call regarding the reported fight. Trooper Hoffman-Davis
testified that she believed that she noted that she did not see an
ongoing fight. Trooper Hoffman-Davis asked the men for identifica-
tion; three of the men had identification, but defendant did not.
Trooper Hoffman-Davis asked defendant his name; defendant first
said his name was Ornelas, then said he was named Rudy Ramos.
Approximately two or three minutes later, Illinois State
Trooper Charles Arceneux arrived on the scene. Trooper Arceneux
testified that the four men would just stare and appeared inco-
herent when posed with a question. The men did not appear normal;
based on his experience, Trooper Arceneux assumed some drug other
than alcohol was at work, because there was no alcohol smell.
Trooper Hoffman-Davis asked the men to empty their pockets.
The men produced a pair of brass knuckles, 21 hits of LSD and a
vial of PCP. However, none of these items were produced by defen-
dant.
At this point, according to Trooper Hoffman-Davis, the Frank-
fort Police arrived on the scene. Officer Piscia testified that he
had returned to the scene in response to a radio call. Officer
Piscia stated that another Frankfort Police car appeared on the
scene to transport the men to the police station, because the
Frankfort cars -- unlike the State Police cars -- had safety cages.
Officer Piscia stated that the emotions of the four men would vary
from excited to lethargic.
Officer Piscia transported two of the men to the police
station in his car. One of the men claimed to be a devil, then
claimed to be Jesus Christ and forgave Officer Piscia for his sins.
Officer Piscia did not recall which of the men made these claims.
Trooper Hoffman-Davis testified that after arriving at the police
station, defendant was screaming in his cell, where he had fash-
ioned a cross on the door. According to Trooper Hoffman-Davis,
defendant claimed he was Jesus Christ, but also identified himself
as Joe Montana. Trooper Hoffman-Davis testified that the Frankfort
Police summoned paramedics to the police station because the men
apparently ingested drugs; although the police believed one of the
drugs was LSD, they did not know what the vial of liquid contained
at that time.
Peter Hwang testified that he was a Special Agent for the
Illinois State Police, Division of Criminal Investigations. On
November 15, 1990, Special Agent Hwang went to the Frankfort Police
station regarding a narcotics investigation. After speaking with
Trooper Hoffman-Davis, Special Agent Hwang spoke to the individuals
at the police station. Special Agent Hwang spoke to William
Luedtke, after obtaining a written waiver of Miranda rights.
According to Special Agent Hwang, Luedtke appeared to be under the
influence of "something," but also understood everything Special
Agent Hwang said. Luedtke told Special Agent Hwang that defen-
dant's name was Bobby Ornelas, not "Rudy Ramos."
Luedtke also told Special Agent Hwang that defendant had been
involved in a double homicide on the south side of Chicago two
nights earlier. Luedtke stated that defendant had spoken of
killing two people with a shotgun near a party to which defendant
had been denied admittance.
Special Agent Hwang telephoned the Chicago Police Department,
Area 2 Violent Crimes. Special Agent Hwang was informed that the
Chicago Police were looking for Robert Ornelas in connection with
the investigation of a double homicide. Special Agent Hwang was
also informed that Area 2 detectives would be sent.
At approximately 11 to 11:30 a.m., Special Agent Hwang spoke
to defendant, who was handcuffed to the wall of an interview room.
Defendant confirmed that he was also named Ornelas. In Special
Agent Hwang's opinion, defendant appeared "a little confused" and
under the influence of narcotics at the time. Special Agent Hwang
told defendant that he would take defendant to the Illinois State
Police station in Joliet and that the Chicago Police Department was
coming to talk to him.
Special Agent Hwang then transported defendant to the Illinois
State Police District 5 headquarters in Romeoville. After a
conversation with defendant, Special Agent Hwang went to lunch.
Defendant was handcuffed to a chair in an interview room.
Two Chicago Police Detectives arrived at approximately 3 p.m.
After the detectives spoke with defendant, they accompanied Special
Agent Hwang to the Will County Jail, where the police obtained a
written waiver of Miranda rights and a written statement from
Luedtke. Special Agent Hwang stated that Luedtke was not under
medical care at the time and appeared to be fine.
The police later returned to District 5 headquarters; at
trial, the time was established as approximately 5 p.m. Chicago
Police Detective Steven Brownfield, who was involved in the
investigation of the double homicide and the questioning of defen-
dant, testified that defendant was orally notified of his Miranda
rights. Detective Brownfield testified that defendant admitted to
the double murder, at which time he was arrested and charged with
the offense.
The trial court denied the motion to quash arrest. Although
the trial court did not rule on the legality of defendant's initial
arrest, the court held that the arrest for murder was not an
extension of the initial arrest. The trial court also held that
there had been probable cause to arrest defendant for murder.
Defendant also filed a motion to suppress his statement to the
police. The trial court denied this motion, ruling that defendant
was coherent at the time he made the statement, which the court
held to be voluntary.
At trial, Scott Byron testified that on November 11, 1990, he
attended a party near 104th and Calhoun. Between 11 and 11:30
p.m., Byron heard what sounded like a gunshot or a gun backfiring.
Byron admitted that in 1991, he had been convicted of burglary to
an automobile and sentenced to probation.
Chicago Police Officer John Boitch testified that at approx-
imately midnight on the night in question, he received a call
reporting a vehicle theft. While responding to this call, he
received another call reporting persons possibly shot in a car,
approximately one and one-half blocks from the first location.
Upon arriving at the scene approximately two minutes later, Officer
Boitch observed an automobile with a shattered window leaning
against a fence. The steering column was peeled; there were no
keys in the car.
Officer Boitch observed two bodies in the car, later identi-
fied as Joy Mosqueda and Robert Cheeks; one had been shot in the
face, the other in the neck. The car's transmission appeared to be
set to drive. Officer Boitch also saw two spent shotgun shells on
the ground. Dr. Mitra Kalelkar, a forensic pathologist who had
been employed by the Cook County Medical Examiner's Office, testi-
fied her post-mortem examination of the bodies showed that Mosqueda
died from a shotgun wound to the face and Cheeks died of multiple
shotgun wounds.
Chicago Police Detective James Boylan testified that he was
assigned to investigate the double homicide. Detective Boylan
testified that he spoke with Dion Castillo, who attended the
aforementioned party near 104th and Calhoun. According to Detec-
tive Boylan, Castillo stated that defendant came to the door of the
party, but was not admitted. Detective Boylan testified that
Castillo had told him that defendant had a gun that he fired before
he left, at approximately 11:45 p.m. Castillo testified that she
had not seen defendant on the day at issue. Castillo thought she
had told Detective Boylan that she had not been at the party at the
time these events supposedly occurred and that she was relaying
hearsay to the detective.
William Luedtke testified that defendant came to his house at
approximately 11:30 p.m. on November 11, 1990. Luedtke stated that
defendant seemed nervous and edgy. The next day, defendant told
Luedtke that he was wanted for a double homicide he committed in
Chicago. According to Luedtke, defendant said that he was under
the influence of LSD the previous night and "blew off a round" in
the backyard after he was denied admittance to the party. Luedtke
testified that defendant had said that while he was walking home,
"there were two guys in a car, and they were looking for trouble,
and he proceeded to shoot them both" with a sawed-off shotgun.
According to Luedtke, defendant stated that there was a look of
fear on the victims' faces before he shot them.
Special Agent Hwang gave testimony that was substantively
similar to his testimony at the hearing on the motion to quash
arrest. Special Agent Hwang added that when the detectives spoke
with defendant at approximately 3 p.m., defendant claimed he had
been with a woman named Dawn in Chicago Heights on the night in
question, but could not remember the exact address. When the
police again questioned defendant after speaking with Luedtke,
defendant gave a statement admitting the offense, explaining that
he was a member of the Vice Lords and that the victims were members
of the King Cobras. Defendant claimed he shot at the automobile
twice with a shotgun in self-defense.
Detective Mike Gerhardstein testified that in November 1990,
he was on a leave of absence and was serving as an Assistant
State's Attorney. Detective Gerhardstein took a lengthier written
statement from defendant on November 15, 1990. Detective Gerhard-
stein read the statement into the record.
In the statement, defendant admitted firing his 12-gauge
shotgun in a backyard after being denied entrance to the party near
104th and Calhoun. Later, as defendant walked down an alley
between Bensley and Calhoun, defendant saw Jay Mosqueda and "a
black guy" in an automobile. Defendant stated that Mosqueda used
to beat defendant when they were both young. Defendant knew that
Mosqueda was a member of the King Cobras, whereas he was a Vice
Lord. Defendant thought that Mosqueda and Cheeks were going to run
over defendant in their automobile. Defendant and Mosqueda yelled
at each other, though defendant could not remember what was said.
Defendant fired his shotgun through the passenger side window,
hitting Mosqueda in the face. Cheeks said something; defendant
fired at him also. Defendant then ran, destroyed the shotgun and
walked to Whiting, Indiana to hide with friends.
Assistant Public Defender Crystal Marchigiani testified that
she interviewed Luedtke in April 1994. According to Assistant
Public Defender Marchigiani, Luedtke stated that in November 1990,
the police told him they could not help him with the narcotics
charge and that he would be charged as an accessory after the fact
to the double homicide if he did not talk. Defendant maintains
that Luedtke and the two others who were in the White Hen parking
lot with him were charged with possession of contraband in Will
County, but that their motions to quash arrest and suppress evi-
dence were granted, though the citation in defendant's brief does
not directly support this contention.
It was stipulated that at approximately 12:05 a.m. on Novem-
ber 11, 1990, Roy Medrano called 911 to report that his car was
stolen by two offenders that Medrano thought to be armed. It was
stipulated that police evidence technicians found no guns or knives
in the automobile or on the victims. The parties also stipulated
to the prior criminal records of Mosqueda and Cheeks.
The trial judge found defendant guilty of the first degree
murder of Mosqueda and Cheeks. The trial court denied defendant's
post-trial motions and sentenced defendant to natural life impris-
onment. Defendant now appeals.
I
Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying the
motion to quash his arrest, arguing that the police initially
lacked probable cause to detain him and the State failed to show
that his statements to the police were sufficiently attenuated from
the illegal arrest. The State, like the trial court, does not
address the legality of defendant's initial arrest. Rather, the
State argues that there was probable cause to arrest defendant for
the double murder and that such arrest is attenuated from the
initial arrest. Thus, we address the issue of attenuation.
This court will not disturb a trial court's decision on a
motion to quash and suppress unless that decision is determined to
be clearly erroneous. People v. Foskey, 136 Ill. 2d 66, 76, 554 N.E.2d 192, 197 (1990). However, when neither the facts nor the
credibility of witnesses is questioned, and the issue is a question
of law, this court reviews de novo. See Foskey, 136 Ill. 2d at 76,
554 N.E.2d at 197.
The law rejects a simple "but for" test under which any
statement by a defendant following an unlawful arrest must be
suppressed on the ground that the statement would not have been
made had he not been taken into custody. See People v. Gabbard, 78 Ill. 2d 88, 95, 398 N.E.2d 574, 577 (1979)(and cases cited there-
in). A motion to quash and suppress will be granted where the
evidence shows a causal connection between the illegal arrest and
the statement such that the statement could be said to have been
obtained by exploitation of the illegality. See Gabbard, 78 Ill. 2d at 95, 398 N.E.2d at 577. The question of whether defendant's
statement was obtained by means sufficient to cleanse the taint of
the illegal arrest depends on the facts of each case. Brown v.
Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603-04, 95 S. Ct. 2254, 2261, 45 L. Ed. 2d 416, 427 (1975). The factors to be considered in deciding this
question are: (1) the presence or absence of Miranda warnings; (2)
the "temporal proximity" of the arrest and the confession; (3) the
presence or absence of intervening circumstances; and (4) the
purpose of the official misconduct. Brown, 422 U.S. at 603-04, 95 S. Ct. at 2261-62, 45 L. Ed. 2d at 427 (1975). The State bears the
burden of demonstrating attenuation. Foskey, 136 Ill. 2d at 86,
554 N.E.2d at 202.
In this case, defendant makes no claim that he was not proper-
ly given Miranda warnings when questioned by the police. Defendant
first identified himself as Ornelas prior to the initial arrest.
The record shows that defendant was at the Frankfort police station
by 9 or 9:15 a.m., which suggests that he was arrested between 8:30
a.m. and 9 a.m. Defendant attempted to give an alibi to police who
questioned him in the afternoon, but confessed to the double murder
at approximately 5 p.m., eight hours after his arrest. This lapse
of time alone would not dissipate the illegality of an arrest, but
is to be considered. See, e.g., People v. Dale, 189 Ill. App. 3d
704, 722-23, 545 N.E.2d 521, 533 (1989).
The third factor -- the presence or absence of intervening
circumstances -- requires more analysis than the first two factors
in this case. The State argues that confronting defendant with
Luedtke's statement after it was partially corroborated by the
Chicago Police Department is an intervening event which creates
attenuation from the original arrest. Although intervening prob-
able cause does not assure in every case that an illegal arrest has
not been unduly exploited, it is an important factor in the analy-
sis of attenuation. People v. Pierson, 166 Ill. App. 3d 558, 519 N.E.2d 1185 (1988).
In this case, we note that Luedtke was in custody and did not
implicate himself in the double murder. These factors could cast
suspicion on the reliability of Luedtke's statement. However, the
record here shows that Special Agent Hwang confirmed with the
Chicago Police Department that defendant was wanted for questioning
regarding the double murder. A partially corroborated statement of
someone who would not be presumed credible (e.g., an accomplice or
paid informant) can establish probable cause for arrest. See,
e.g., People v. James, 118 Ill. 2d 214, 222-24, 514 N.E.2d 998,
1002 (1987).
Inexplicably, defendant's initial brief did not expressly
address the impact of Luedtke's statement on the issues of probable
cause and attenuation. However, defendant has sought leave to rely
on two recent decisions of this court that have reversed the denial
of motions to quash and suppress where the intervening event is the
confrontation of the defendant with the statement of an illegally
arrested co-offender. E.g., People v. Austin, No. 1-96-2864 (1st
Dist. 6th Div., Nov. 26, 1997); People v. Beamon, 255 Ill. App. 3d
63, 627 N.E.2d 316 (1993)(State's use of evidence obtained as a
result of the illegal arrest of a codefendant may not serve to
attenuate the taint of defendant's illegal arrest).[fn1] Austin
is of particular interest because it involved confronting the
defendant with statements from two co-offenders, Gamble Dorrough
and Bobby Walley, and a statement from a man named Kevin Taylor,
who implicated Dorrough, Walley and defendant in a homicide. The
trial court held that defendant, Dorrough and Walley were illegally
arrested, but that their statements were attenuated because Taylor
was not illegally arrested and it was his statement that caused
Dorrough to make a statement; the two statements caused Walley to
make a statement; the three statements caused defendant to make a
statement.
This court reversed and remanded, holding that defendant's
statement was not attenuated from his unlawful arrest. This court
noted that "[d]espite the fact that the record suggested that
Taylor was taken to the police station in the same manner as the
other men, the trial court refused to find that Taylor had been
illegally arrested." Austin, slip op. at 8. However, Austin does
not state that the trial court's ruling on this point was erron-
eous. In a concurring opinion, Justice Quinn, noting a factual
similarity to Pierson, wrote that had defendant been confronted
solely by Taylor's statement (which implicated defendant but not
Taylor), the arrest would have been attenuated. Austin, slip op.
at 16-17 (Quinn, J., specially concurring).
In reviewing the Pierson and Austin opinions, as well as the
cases upon which those opinions rely, it is clear that intervening
probable cause will not attenuate an illegal arrest in every case.
However, the Austin line of cases do not hold that intervening
probable cause will never attenuate an illegal arrest. Rather,
cases such as Pierson and Austin may reach different results
because they are merely specific examples of the case-by-case
analysis this court is required to undertake pursuant to Supreme
Court opinions such as Brown.
In our view, the difference in outcome shown in cases such as
Pierson and Austin are due to the fourth factor of the Brown
analysis, i.e. -- the purpose and flagrancy of the official miscon-
duct. Our supreme court has yet to rule in a case with facts
similar to this one. Nevertheless, a review of the supreme court's
opinion in Gabbard reveals similarities to this case.
In Gabbard, the defendant was unlawfully arrested while
walking along the shoulder of a road and later gave an inculpatory
statement regarding a robbery. The Gabbard court nevertheless
stated as follows:
"The unlawful arrest of the defendant was
*** not made in the course of an investigation
into the robbery or for the purpose of interro-
gating the defendant on that subject. Neither
the arresting officer nor the governmental
entity by which he was employed was investigat-
ing that crime or was responsible for doing so,
and the arresting officer was not even aware
that it had occurred. The interrogating offi-
cer, on the other hand, knew that the defendant
was in custody as the result of having escaped
from an institution, and while also aware that
the defendant had been found in possession of
articles stolen in the robbery, he did not know
the circumstances leading to the defendant's
arrest. We are not presented here with an
attempt by police to avoid responsibility by
dividing it among different individuals. ***
In the present case the purpose of the exclus-
ionary rule, i.e., to deter improper police
conduct ***, would be served minimally, if at
all, by exclusion of the defendant's state-
ments." Gabbard, 78 Ill. 2d at 98-99, 398 N.E.2d at 578-79.
The Gabbard court then noted that the evidence showed that the
defendant's statements were prompted by intervening events, such as
being shown a sketch that defendant acknowledged resembled him and
that was prepared prior to his arrest. Gabbard, 78 Ill. 2d at 99,
398 N.E.2d at 579. Accordingly, the supreme court affirmed the
appellate court's decision that defendant's statements were admis-
sible. See also People v. Malloy, 104 Ill. App. 3d 605, 607-08,
432 N.E.2d 1291, 1293 (1982).
In this case, the record shows that the arresting officers had
no knowledge of the double murder investigation in Chicago. Nor
did Special Agent Hwang, who questioned Luedtke, have any such
information prior to Luedtke volunteering it.
In contrast, the record shows that when Chicago Police Detec-
tive Steven Brownfield became involved in the investigation of the
double homicide, he learned that defendant was wanted for question-
ing based on evidence that defendant had been armed with a shotgun
and had fired that shotgun near the location of the double murder
within minutes of that shooting. Detective Brownfield also testi-
fied that prior to November 15, 1990, the police had searched
defendant's home, where several shotguns and barrels were
discovered. Thus, the Chicago Police Department had already
gathered significant evidence incriminating the defendant prior to
and independent of his arrest in the White Hen parking lot.
Moreover, there is no evidence that the Chicago Police Department
was aware of the circumstances of defendant's arrest. These
aspects of the case are similar to those in Gabbard.
However, the fact that the statement implicating defendant was
not made by defendant, which was not present in Gabbard, raises
additional concerns, such as whether Luedtke's statement should be
considered tainted by an illegal arrest and, if so, whether an
illegal arrest defeats a finding of intervening probable cause.
Although defendant does not expressly claim that Luedtke was
illegally arrested, he does claim that the circuit court of Will
County granted motions to quash and suppress filed by the three
other men. The citation to a transcript of proceedings supplied by
defendant shows that the trial court here admitted orders of the
circuit court of Will County as evidence, but does not expressly
state the contents of the orders. The transcript also contains
closing argument in which defense counsel states that the State's
Attorney moved for nolle prosequi as to Luedtke on the ground of
collateral estoppel after a motion to quash and suppress was
granted as to one of the other men. Yet defendant fails to identi-
fy where the underlying orders and motions appear in this record.
This court hesitates to conclude that Luedtke's arrest was illegal,
particularly given the fact that Luedtke testified for the State in
this case, which suggests another reason why charges against him
may have been dropped.
Fortunately, in this case, we need not reach a conclusion
regarding the legality of Luedtke's arrest. Assuming arguendo that
Luedtke was illegally arrested, this case remains distinguishable
from cases such as Beamon and Austin. In those cases, an illegally
arrested informant or informants implicated the defendant in the
offense for which both were arrested. In this case, Luedtke was
not arrested in connection with the double murder. Thus, Luedtke's
statement is similar to the information provided in Pierson.
Defendant correctly notes that Luedtke might not have made the
statement had he not been in police custody. However, such an
argument cannot rest on a "but for" analysis that has been held
improper. The possibility that Luedtke might have volunteered the
statement to obtain favorable treatment is relevant, but not
determinative.
We hasten to add that the fact that Luedtke and defendant were
not arrested for the double murder is similarly not determinative.
It is possible to imagine a hypothetical case where the flagrancy
and improper purpose of the police is such that an arrest initially
based on a seemingly unrelated illegal arrest must be quashed. In
this case, however, the arresting officers could not have exploited
the arrests to obtain Luedtke's statement relating to a crime of
which the arresting officers were unaware. Moreover, the record
supports the conclusion that the police did not arrest the four men
for the purpose of gaining evidence of unrelated offenses.
In sum, defendant was given Miranda warnings, but did not
confess for eight hours -- after he was confronted with Luedtke's
statement. Given this record, the police do not appear to have
engaged in flagrant misconduct. The benefit to be derived from
enforcing the exclusionary rule in this case seems minimal. Thus,
the trial court's determination that defendant's arrest for murder
was attenuated from the initial arrest is not manifestly erroneous.
II
Defendant also contends that he was not proved guilty beyond
a reasonable doubt because he acted in self-defense. The standard
for reviewing a conviction that is challenged on the sufficiency of
the evidence is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light
most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could
have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable
doubt. People v. Dent, 230 Ill. App. 3d 238, 242, 595 N.E.2d 18,
21 (1992). Once a defendant has been found guilty of a crime, the
fact finder's role as weigher of the evidence is preserved through
a legal conclusion. Dent, 230 Ill. App. 3d at 242, 595 N.E.2d at
21. On review, this court will not reverse a criminal conviction
unless the evidence is so improbable or unsatisfactory that a
reasonable doubt of defendant's guilt is justified. People v.
Moore, 171 Ill. 2d 74, 94, 662 N.E.2d 1215, 1224 (1996).
Self-defense is an affirmative defense to the charge of
murder. When raised by defendant with some evidence, the State has
the burden of proving that defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt. People v. Rogers, 263 Ill. App. 3d 120, 126, 635 N.E.2d 889, 894 (1994). Whether a killing is justified under the law of
self-defense is a question of fact to be decided by the trier of
fact. People v. Turcios, 228 Ill. App. 3d 583, 594, 593 N.E.2d 907, 915 (1992). Unless the record raises serious questions
regarding the trier of fact's finding on self-defense, it should
not be disturbed by a reviewing court. Turcios, 228 Ill. App. 3d
at 594-95, 593 N.E.2d at 915.
In this case, the record does not raise serious questions
regarding the trial court's rejection of the claim of self-defense.
Luedtke's testimony regarding defendant's statement to him does not
mention any threat of bodily harm to defendant by the victims.
Moreover, in his statement to the police, defendant first claimed
that he thought the victims were going to run him over in their
car, but then stated that he first had an argument with one of the
victims before firing his gun. The record indicates that the
victims were shot at close range from the side of the car. Viewing
the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a
rational trier of fact could have concluded that defendant did not
act in self-defense.
For all of the aforementioned reasons, the judgment of the
circuit court of Cook County is affirmed.
Affirmed.
ZWICK, J., and QUINN, J., concur.
[fn1] Austin and Beamon also hold that a defendant can
contest the legality of an accomplice's arrest, which is a question
of some controversy. See Austin, 1-96-2864 (Quinn, J., specially
concurring). Justice Quinn noted that our supreme court has held
that probable cause to arrest may be based on the statement of an
illegally arrested codefendant (see People v. James, 118 Ill. 2d 214, 222-24, 514 N.E.2d 998, 1002 (1987)), but Beamon held without
citation that a different rule applies to attenuation. However,
this controversy need not be revisited in this case, based on the
record on appeal.