People v. Hawkins

FOURTH DIVISION
MAY 14, 1998

No. 1--96--4058

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

RONALD HAWKINS,

Defendant-Appellant.)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)Appeal from the
Circuit Court of
Cook County

No. 95--CR--25316

Honorable
John D. Brady,
Judge Presiding.


PRESIDING JUSTICE CERDA delivered the opinion of the court:
Following a bench trial, defendant, Ronald Hawkins, was
convicted of the first-degree murder (720 ILCS 9--1(a)(1)(West
1994)) of Ernest Green and sentenced to 20 years' imprisonment.
On appeal, defendant asserts that (1) he was denied the right to
present a defense; and (2) he was not proven guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt. For the following reasons, we reduce the
conviction to second-degree murder and remand for resentencing.
On August 15, 1995, defendant stabbed and killed the victim,
Ernest Green. Defendant does not deny killing Green, but
contends that he did so in self-defense.
At trial, Sheila Davis testified that she lived on the
second floor of 5449 South Morgan Street in Chicago. Lornett Bea
lived on the first floor on the 5449 side of the building and
defendant lived on the 5447 side. At 1:30 p.m. on August 15,
1995, Davis was returning home when she went up the back stairs
of her building. Defendant, Green, and Bea were sitting on Bea's
back porch. A half-hour later, Davis went onto her back porch.
Shortly after sitting down, she heard two bams coming from Bea's
porch. When she yelled, "[W]hat's going on down there," no one
responded.
After the second bam, Davis heard a woman screaming from a
nearby porch. Davis ran downstairs, looked over the railing, and
saw Green running down the back stairs toward the alley. There
was blood on Green's neck. When Davis asked defendant, who was
standing at the bottom of the first floor stairs, what had
happened, he did not respond. Davis called Green's mother, then
went through the alley to Green's house. Davis saw Green,
covered with blood, lying on the ground in his backyard. After
the police arrived, Davis heard defendant tell the police, "I did
it." She did not see defendant bleeding, but she did see blood
on his hands and shirt.
Davis further testified that she saw defendant and Green
together four times during that summer, including a week before
the stabbing. Once, Davis saw Green fighting with defendant, but
she did not hear Green make any threats against defendant.
Lornett Bea, who was a friend of both defendant and Green,
testified that he never saw defendant and Green fighting although
they teased and argued with each other. On the afternoon of
August 15, 1995, Bea, defendant, and Green were sitting on Bea's
back porch. They were drinking and smoking marijuana laced with
cocaine. At 2 p.m., Bea went inside his apartment to use the
bathroom and to get something to eat. While he was in his
kitchen, he heard the glass in his back door breaking. When he
went out to the porch, he saw a brick on the porch near the
glass. He also saw Green running towards his home and defendant
on the 5447 side of the building.
The parties stipulated that Dr. Larry Simms, Cook County
Deputy Medical Examiner, would testify that he performed the
autopsy on Green, who died of multiple stab and incised wounds.
The toxicology report indicated that there was .35 ml. of
benzoyledgonine, .51 ml. of ethanol, and .16 ml. of cocaine in
Green's body at the time of his death.
Chicago police officer Michael Kolasa investigated the
stabbing. While he was on Bea's back porch, defendant came onto
a nearby porch and yelled, "I did it. I cut him. I stabbed
him." Defendant was handcuffed, advised of his Miranda rights,
and transported to the police station by Chicago police officer
William Svillar. At the time, defendant's clothes were covered
with blood. Later, when Officer Kolasa saw defendant at the
police station after other officers had taken defendant's
clothes, he did not notice any injuries on defendant.
Officer Svillar testified that defendant initiated a
conversation with him on the way to the police station by asking
if Green was dead. When Officer Svillar told him that Green had
died, defendant responded, "I meant that to happen" and "I love
that." Defendant further stated that he had had some problems
with Green in the past and that he was no mass murderer, but he
"just had to take care of business."
Defendant testified that he had known Green for one and one-
half years before the stabbing and had been in his company 20
times. At 1:15 p.m. on August 15, 1995, defendant and Bea were
sitting on Bea's back porch when Green arrived. The three men
drank and talked until Bea went into his apartment. A couple of
seconds later, Green asked defendant for $2. Defendant responded
by telling Green that he had a lot of nerve asking for money
after Green had earlier pulled a knife on him. Defendant
explained that Green had approached him three days earlier when
defendant was sitting on his own back porch. After Green pulled
the knife on him, defendant went into his house and locked the
door.
On the day of the stabbing, defendant told Green that he
would not give him the $2, so Green reached into defendant's
pockets, then punched defendant on the left side of his head,
causing defendant to fall to the floor. After defendant fell,
Green threw a brick at defendant just missing defendant's head
and hitting the glass in Bea's back door. Green then came up the
stairs toward defendant and said, "I'm goin' kill you, nigger."
At that point, defendant pulled out his knife, but Green
kept coming toward defendant, who tried to run down the stairs.
Green blocked his way, grabbed him and swung at him with a closed
fist. Defendant testified that he did not know if Green had
anything in his hand, but defendant was terrified and scared. As
a result, he defended himself by swinging the knife at Green.
Defendant remembered stabbing Green only once.
After the stabbing, defendant was in shock, but he went home
and washed the blood off before waiting for the police on his
back porch. After he was arrested, defendant told the paramedics
that he felt fine. A picture of defendant taken shortly after
the stabbing showed no injuries on defendant's body.
According to defendant, he told the police that he had had
an altercation with Green, who threatened to kill him and that he
was defending himself. Defendant further stated that he never
intended to kill Green.
Defendant testified about his past problems with Green. Not
only had defendant and Green had an argument a week before the
stabbing, but Green had pulled a knife on defendant on several
previous occasions. The victim had also hit defendant with a
brick on a previous occasion.
In the State's rebuttal, by way of stipulation, Chicago
police detective Edward Winstead testified that he spoke with
defendant the day he was arrested. After being advised of his
Miranda rights, defendant told Detective Winstead that he was so
upset by what happened that he picked up a brick and broke Bea's
window.
Defendant asserts on appeal that he was denied the right to
present a defense because the trial court excluded his state-of-
mind evidence as well as evidence of the victim's prior violent
and bad acts.
When the theory of self-defense is raised, evidence of the
victim's aggressive and violent character is relevant (1) to show
that a defendant's knowledge of the victim's behavior and
tendencies affected his perceptions of and reactions to the
victim's actions, and (2) to support the defendant's version of
the facts where there are conflicting accounts of what happened,
regardless of when the defendant learned of the victim's violent
tendencies. People v. Lynch, 104 Ill. 2d 194, 199-201, 470 N.E.2d 1018 (1984); People v. Booker 274 Ill. App. 3d 168, 171,
653 N.E.2d 952 (1995). However, it is within the trial court's
discretion to determine whether evidence is relevant and
admissible and its decision will not be overturned absent a clear
abuse of discretion resulting in manifest prejudice to defendant.
People v. Hayes, 139 Ill. 2d 89, 130, 564 N.E.2d 803 (1990);
People v. Ward, 101 Ill. 2d 443, 455-56, 463 N.E.2d 696 (1984).
Whether the victim was a violent person was an important and
relevant part of the defense, which was that defendant acted
reasonably in defending himself against the victim. Booker 274
Ill. App. 3d at 172. Also important in self-defense is the
defendant's state of mind. Where the intention, motive or belief
of the accused is material to the issue, he is allowed to testify
directly to that fact, and to have the circumstances surrounding
the act considered in connection with his testimony. People v.
Quick, 236 Ill. App. 3d 446, 453, 603 N.E.2d 53 (1992); People v.
Perez, 209 Ill. App. 3d 457, 466, 568 N.E.2d 250 (1991). What
defendant was told and how that affected his state of mind are
relevant issues. Booker 274 Ill. App. 3d at 172. Moreover,
defendant's knowledge of the victim's propensity for violence is
probative of the question of whether defendant reasonably
believed that he was at imminent risk of danger at the time of
the stabbing.
We find that the trial court made several errors when it did
not allow more complete evidence of Green's past violent acts
against defendant and defendant's state of mind at the time of
the stabbing, but the exclusion of evidence was not prejudicial
because defendant was able to present the same or substantially
the same evidence during the trial to try to show that the victim
was more likely the aggressor and that defendant was scared of
him. Therefore, the errors were harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt.
The trier of fact in this case heard evidence that Green had
pulled a knife on defendant three days before the stabbing, that
Green had fought with defendant earlier that summer, that Green
had previously struck him with a brick, that Green threw a brick
at defendant's head, that Green and defendant were smoking
marijuana laced with cocaine just prior to the stabbing, that
alcohol and cocaine were found in Green's blood, that Green told
defendant, "I'm goin' kill you, nigger," and that defendant was
scared and terrified of Green at the time of the stabbing.
Therefore, defendant was not prejudiced by the trial court's
errors in not allowing more complete testimony about Green's
propensity toward violence and defendant's state of mind at the
time of the stabbing.
Finally, defendant argues that there was insufficient
evidence to prove that he did not have a reasonable belief that
he needed to act in self-defense, or in the alternative, that his
conviction should be reduced to second-degree murder.
For a second-degree murder conviction, the State must prove
beyond a reasonable doubt all the elements of first degree
murder; that is, that the defendant intended the killing by
proving either that he intended to kill or do great bodily harm
to the person killed or another person, or that he knew that his
acts would cause death to the person killed, or that he knew that
his acts created a strong probability of death or great bodily
harm to the person killed or to another person. 720 ILCS 5/9-
1(a)(1), 9-1(a)(2))(West 1994). Once the State has proven first
degree murder beyond a reasonable doubt, the defendant must prove
by a preponderance of the evidence either that he was acting
under a sudden and intense passion resulting from serious
provocation by the victim or that he believed that the
circumstances justified using self-defense, but that his belief
was unreasonable. People v. Shumpert, 126 Ill. 2d 344, 352, 533 N.E.2d 1106 (1989); People v. Brown, 218 Ill. App. 3d 890, 895,
578 N.E.2d 1168 (1991); 720 ILCS 5/9-2(c)(West 1994). The
mitigating factors present in the second degree murder statute
are not elements of the offense. Instead, they lessen the culpa-
bility and severity of the punishment for murder. Brown, 218
Ill. App. 3d at 897.
If evidence of self-defense is raised, the State has the
burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
did not have a reasonable belief in the necessity of using deadly
force. 720 ILCS 5/7-1 (West 1992); Brown, 218 Ill. App. 3d at
897. The reasonableness of an individual's belief that the use
of deadly force was necessary depends on the surrounding facts
and circumstances and is a question of fact. People v. Felella,
131 Ill. 2d 525, 534, 546 N.E.2d 492 (1989); Booker 274 Ill. App.
3d at 171. The use of deadly force in self-defense is justified
when the defendant is not the aggressor and the defendant
reasonably believes that he is threatened with force that will
cause death or great bodily harm and the danger of harm is
imminent. Booker 274 Ill. App. 3d at 171. The use and amount of
force exercised must be necessary to avert the danger. Booker
274 Ill. App. 3d at 171.
To establish self-defense, the defendant must show some
evidence that unlawful force was threatened against him; the
danger of harm was imminent; he was not the aggressor; that he
actually believed that a danger existed, force was necessary to
avert the danger, and the type and amount of force was necessary;
and that his beliefs were reasonable. Brown, 218 Ill. App. 3d at
898; People v. Alcazar, 173 Ill. App. 3d 344, 349, 527 N.E.2d 325
(1988). While the law does not require the aggressor to be armed
for self-defense to be justified, it must appear that the
aggressor is capable of inflicting serious bodily harm without
the use of a deadly weapon, and is intending to do so. Brown,
218 Ill. App. 3d at 898; People v. Estes, 127 Ill. App. 3d 642,
469 N.E.2d 275 (1984).
Once the defendant has met his burden, the burden of proof
shifts to the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant did not act in self-defense. Brown, 218 Ill. App. 3d
at 898; People v. White, 90 Ill. App. 3d 1067, 1070, 414 N.E.2d 196 (1980); 720 ILCS 5/7-1 (West 1992). The State carries its
burden if it negates any one of the elements beyond a reasonable
doubt. Brown, 218 Ill. App. 3d at 898.
When the sufficiency of the evidence is challenged, a
criminal conviction will not be set aside unless the evidence is
so improbable or unsatisfactory that it creates a reasonable
doubt of the defendant's guilt. People v. Gilliam, 172 Ill. 2d 484, 515, 670 N.E.2d 606 (1996); People v. McDonald, 168 Ill. 2d 420, 443, 660 N.E.2d 832 (1995). The reviewing court may not
retry the defendant. People v. Rivera, 166 Ill. 2d 279, 287, 652 N.E.2d 307 (1995). Instead, the trier of fact has the
responsibility to determine the credibility of the witnesses, the
weight given their testimony, and the reasonable inferences to be
drawn from the evidence. People v. Enis, 163 Ill. 2d 367, 393,
645 N.E.2d 856 (1994); People v. Mullen, 141 Ill. 2d 394, 403,
566 N.E.2d 222 (1990). The relevant inquiry is whether, after
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, a rational trier of fact could have found the
essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560, 573, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789 (1979); Gilliam, 172 Ill. 2d at 515.
After carefully considering all the evidence in the light
most favorable to the prosecution, we find that defendant had an
actual, but unreasonable belief that he had the right to use
self-defense against Green. There was evidence that Green had
pulled a knife on defendant three days before the stabbing, that
Green had fought with defendant earlier that summer, that Green
had previously struck him with a brick, that Green and defendant
were smoking marijuana laced with cocaine just prior to the
stabbing, and that alcohol and cocaine were found in Green's
blood. Defendant presented the only testimony about the events
on the porch just prior to the stabbing. After defendant refused
to lend Green $2, Green reached into defendant's pockets, then
punched defendant on the left side of his head, causing defendant
to fall to the floor. After defendant fell, Green threw a brick
at defendant just missing defendant's head and hitting the glass
in Bea's back door. Green then came up the stairs toward
defendant and said, "I'm goin' kill you, nigger." At that point,
defendant pulled out his knife, but Green kept coming toward
defendant, who tried to run down the stairs. Green blocked his
way, grabbed him, and swung at him with a closed fist. Defendant
testified that he did not know if Green had anything in his hand,
but defendant was terrified and scared.
Considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, we find that the State proved defendant guilty of
first-degree murder beyond a reasonable doubt. When the victim
grabbed the defendant and swung at him with a closed fist, there
was no visible evidence of a weapon. Thus, deadly force was not
threatened at that time. Also the victim and defendant had
fought before and there was no evidence defendant had ever
suffered any bodily harm. Therefore, defendant's belief of the
need to use a deadly weapon in his defense was unreasonable.
However, we find that defendant proved by a preponderance of
the evidence that he believed that the circumstances justified
using self-defense, but that his belief was unreasonable.
Therefore, the evidence supports a conviction for second-degree
murder, not first-degree murder. People v. Collins, 213 Ill.
App. 3d 818, 572 N.E.2d 1005 (1991).

Based on the foregoing, we affirm defendant's murder
conviction as reduced to second-degree murder and remand for
resentencing.
Affirmed as modified and remanded.
Wolfson, J., and South, J., concur.