People v. Wallace

FIRST DIVISION
September 21, 1998

No. 1-96-2299

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

ANDRE WALLACE,

Defendant-Appellant.)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)Appeal from the
Circuit Court of
Cook County

Honorable
James Schreier,
Judge Presiding.


JUSTICE GALLAGHER delivered the opinion of the court:
Following a bench trial, defendant Andre Wallace was
convicted of first degree murder for the shooting death of Herb
Handy. The trial court sentenced defendant to serve a term of 26
years in the Illinois Department of Corrections on the first
degree murder conviction. Defendant next filed this appeal,
asserting: (1) the trial court erred in denying defendant's
motion to quash his arrest and suppress statements; (2) the
assistant State's Attorney who transcribed defendant's
inculpatory statement improperly advised him of his Miranda
rights; (3) the trial court erred in excluding defense evidence
regarding the victim's allegedly violent and aggressive
character; (4) the trial court erred in admitting prejudicial
hearsay offered into evidence by the State; and (5) defendant's
conviction for first degree murder should be reduced to second
degree murder because defendant was sufficiently provoked by the
victim.
The victim, Herb Handy, was shot and killed on January 17,
1994, at 825 North Lawndale Avenue in Chicago. Handy had been
hired by a real estate company to housesit the residence at that
address. The police recovered several 9 millimeter shell casings
from the murder scene, and another housesitter, Robert Banks,
claimed to have encountered the assailant face-to-face after the
shooting. On January 19, 1994, Chicago police officers took
defendant to the Area 4 police station for questioning regarding
Handy's death. On January 20, 1994, defendant was arrested for
the murder of Handy. At the time of the murder, defendant was 15
years old.
Conflicting testimony was offered at the hearing on
defendant's motion to quash his arrest and suppress statements.
Laron Jackson, testifying on behalf of defendant, stated that he
and defendant were walking along the 800 block of North Lawndale
Street in Chicago at approximately 8 p.m. on January 19, 1994.
At that time, several police officers arrived and stopped Jackson
and defendant. The police then searched the two young men,
handcuffed them, placed them in a police car and drove them to
the Area 4 police station at Harrison and Kedzie Streets.
Jackson testified that neither he nor defendant was asked to
accompany the police to the station. At the police station
Jackson and defendant were placed in separate rooms and
questioned. Ultimately, police placed both men in a lineup.
Coloia Wilkerson also testified for the defense. She stated
that she, too, was picked up, handcuffed, placed in a police car
and brought to the Area 4 station on January 19, 1994. She
stated that she saw defendant in a holding room while at Area 4.
Wilkerson further testified that, after being held for seven or
eight hours at Area 4, she was released between 3 and 4 a.m. on
January 20, 1994.
Defendant testified on his own behalf at the hearing. He
corroborated Jackson's version of how and when the police took
him to the Area 4 station on January 19. After waiting alone in
an interview room for approximately 45 minutes, an officer
entered the room and began questioning him about the shooting of
Handy on January 17, 1994. Roughly 90 minutes after this initial
questioning, Chicago police detective Kristen Kato entered the
room and began to question defendant. Defendant stated that he
asked Kato if he could go home, to which Kato responded that they
would have "to wait and see." Subsequently, Kato left defendant
alone--locked in the interview room. Kato later returned and
proceeded to question defendant "a lot." Defendant testified
that he was handcuffed throughout his stay at the police station
and that the police denied him the opportunity to make a phone
call. Defendant stated that Detective Kato informed him around
9:15 p.m. that defendant was being charged with Handy's murder.
On cross-examination, defendant testified that he informed
police he was a juvenile once he discovered he was being charged
with murder. He also testified that he was placed in a police
lineup some four or five hours after arriving at the police
station. On redirect, defendant stated that he was never advised
of his rights during the evening of January 19 and early morning
hours January 20. On recross, defendant acknowledged that he was
presented with a form advising him of his rights, but only after
he made his inculpatory statement the next day; moreover,
defendant claimed that he never read the form and that no one
ever read the form to him.
Chicago police detective Eugene Roy testified for the State.
Roy said that, around 8 p.m. on January 19, 1994, he and several
other police officers obtained the name of defendant and Jackson
from unknown individuals engaged in narcotics sales. These
unknown individuals indicated to the police that defendant was
"working security" for the narcotics operations near the murder
scene around the time of the victim's death. Shortly thereafter,
Detective Roy, Detective Kato and three other police officers
located defendant and Jackson and asked the two young men to
accompany them to the police station. Defendant and Jackson
agreed, and the two were searched, placed in separate cars and
driven to Area 4. Once they arrived at Area 4, defendant and
Jackson were placed in separate interview rooms. The room
defendant was placed in was locked. Defendant was never
handcuffed. When asked, defendant lied to the police regarding
his age and claimed to be 17. Although Roy did not consider
defendant under arrest, he and Detective Kato advised defendant
of his Miranda rights. This was done as a precaution, in the
event that defendant might make a statement inculpating himself
in Handy's homicide.
Roy further testified that defendant told the detectives
that, while "working security" on January 17, the night of the
murder, he overheard an argument between his cousin and the
victim. After his cousin disappeared down a gangway, defendant
heard the sound of three or four gunshots. Acting on this
information, the detectives left Area 4 around midnight in an
attempt to locate defendant's cousin and other individuals
mentioned by defendant in this initial statement. Coloia
Wilkerson was one individual mentioned by defendant. Roy and
Kato successfully located her and Cedric Smith and brought them
to Area 4. When questioned, Ms. Wilkerson gave an account of
January 17, 1994, that differed from that given by defendant.
The police then confronted Jackson with Wilkerson's statement.
Once confronted, Jackson informed police that defendant carried a
9 millimeter pistol while "working security" on the 17th, that
defendant got into an argument with Handy, and that defendant
disappeared into a gangway near the building where the shooting
transpired shortly before gunshots rang out. Defendant was
placed in a lineup at about 4 a.m., but the witness, Robert
Banks, could not identify anyone. Following the lineup, police
once again advised defendant of his Miranda rights and then
confronted him with the statements of Wilkerson and Jackson.
Defendant then made an inculpatory statement to Detectives Roy
and Kato. Up until he made this inculpatory statement, defendant
was free to go home--despite the fact that he was held in a
locked room. Defendant was never informed that he was free to
leave.
Several other police officers, including Detective Kristen
Kato, also testified for the State and essentially corroborated
Detective Roy's testimony. Kato expanded upon Roy's testimony,
stating that defendant was placed under arrest at roughly 4:30
a.m. After making his incriminating statement, defendant
informed the police that he was only 15 years old. A youth
officer, Officer Halko, was contacted and he attempted to
corroborate defendant's age. At approximately 6:45 a.m.,
Assistant State's Attorney Lu Ann Rodi arrived to take
defendant's statement. Defendant was yet again informed of his
Miranda rights, and Assistant State's Attorney Rodi transcribed
his statement, which defendant then signed in the presence of Ms.
Rodi, Officer Halko and Detective Halko. On cross-examination,
Kato testified that the door was not locked when he left
defendant alone in the interview room; however, Kato admitted
that defendant was not free to move about the Area 4 police
station.
After hearing this and other testimony, the trial court
denied defendant's motion to quash his arrest and suppress
statements. In denying the motion, the trial court specifically
found that the defendant voluntarily accompanied the police to
the station. This finding was based upon the fact that defendant
indicated as much in his written statement. Moreover, when it
denied defendant's motion to reconsider, the trial court noted
that the locked door on the interview room did not automatically
render defendant an arrestee.
The bench trial occurred on April 19, 1996. The State
recalled many of the witnesses it had called during the hearing
on defendant's motion to quash his arrest and suppress
statements. One of these was Assistant State's Attorney Lu Ann
Rodi. Ms. Rodi testified that she met with defendant alone and
told him that she would talk to him, that she would give him his
Miranda warnings when the officers returned, and that they "were
going to have a statement." She then transcribed the inculpatory
statement given by defendant on January 20, 1994. Through Ms.
Rodi's testimony, that statement was admitted into evidence. In
his written statement, transcribed by Ms. Rodi, defendant
acknowledged that he was apprised of and understood his Miranda
rights.
Defendant's statement related the following pertinent facts:
On the night of the murder defendant was "working security" near
825 North Lawndale while a friend, Shorty C, was selling drugs.
Defendant was armed with a fully loaded, black gun. At
approximately 8 p.m., the victim came toward the defendant's
position and told him to "get away from the house or I will kick
your ass." Defendant responded, "You can't tell me what to do,"
and a verbal confrontation ensued. This argument continued after
the victim entered the house on Lawndale, as the victim shouted
at defendant through an open, second-story window. The victim
challenged defendant to come inside the house. Defendant tried
to gain access to the house, but the door was locked. Defendant
ultimately climbed through a window toward the rear of the house.
After he entered through the window, defendant saw the victim
about 15 feet away with a baseball bat. Defendant shot the
victim about three times. As he tried to leave the house,
defendant saw another man, to whom defendant said, "Get back in
that room this is none of yours." When defendant discovered that
both doors were locked, he left the house using the window by
which he had entered. Upon leaving the house, defendant threw
the gun away in the middle of the gangway. He never went back to
look for it. Defendant also stated that, when police found him a
few days later, he agreed to accompany them to the police station
to tell them what he knew about the shooting.
Robert Banks also testified for the State. Banks lived at
825 North Lawndale as well, but on the first floor. Herb Handy,
the victim, lived on the second floor. On the night of the
murder, Banks heard the victim come home and go upstairs. He
could also hear someone yelling from outside up to the second-
floor window. Banks stated that he then heard Handy open a
window and yell, among other things, "Come on in, [expletive],"
down to the person on the street. The discussion continued for
four or five minutes, in Banks estimation. After the yelling
stopped, he saw Handy come downstairs and walk back into the
kitchen of the house. Banks then heard a thumping or banging
against the wall, followed by gunshots. The thumping sounded
like a bat or a stick hitting the wall. Banks jumped up when he
heard the gunshots and walked down the hall. He was then
confronted by another, unknown man. This other man carried a
gun, an automatic, and identified himself as the police; the
intruder then instructed Banks to return to his room and lie down
on the floor. Banks knew the man was not a police officer and
refused to comply. Banks ran upstairs and prepared to jump out
the window, but he called for help instead. Meanwhile, the
intruder left the way he came in because both doors were locked.
In a lineup conducted a few days later, Mr. Banks could not
identify anyone as the intruder he saw.
Detective Ralph Vucko testified next. He stated that he and
his partner responded to a call of a person shot at 825 North
Lawndale on January 17, 1994, at approximately 8:30 in the
evening. As he investigated the scene, he noted that the
recently fallen snow had been disturbed and that a trail had been
made in the snow in the gangway that abutted the south side of
the building. The trail led to a partially opened window near
the rear of the house, where the snow had been disturbed on the
ledge. Upon entering the house, Detective Vucko went into the
room with the partially opened window he had just seen from the
outside. In this room, he observed the victim--already dead but
warm to the touch--lying on the ground with gunshot wounds to his
chest and back and a bat in his hands. The victim was lying
about eight feet away from the window. Vucko also discovered
three 9 millimeter shell casings on the floor.
Detective Kato testified again at defendant's trial. Kato's
trial testimony was consistent with the testimony he gave at the
hearing on defendant's motion to quash his arrest and suppress
statements.
Both parties stipulated as to evidence regarding the
victim's autopsy. This stipulation stated, inter alia, that the
victim died of multiple gunshot wounds and that the victim tested
positive for cocaine.
At the close of the State's evidence, defendant moved for a
directed verdict. The trial court denied the motion. Defendant
also attempted to introduce evidence that would show the victim's
violent and aggressive character, pursuant to People v. Lynch,
104 Ill. 2d 194, 470 N.E.2d 1018 (1984). The trial court
disallowed such evidence. Defendant then rested his case. In
closing argument, defense counsel asserted that defendant acted
in self-defense when he shot Herb Handy because Handy was violent
and aggressive, on drugs and armed with a baseball bat.
Alternatively, the defense argued that Handy provoked defendant
into mutual combat; as a result, defendant was guilty only of
second degree murder. The trial court found defendant guilty of
first degree murder and sentenced him to 26 years in the Illinois
Department of Corrections.
Defendant's primary argument on appeal is that the trial
court erred in denying the motion to quash his arrest and
suppress statements. Defendant does not dispute the trial
court's finding that he voluntarily accompanied police to the
Area 4 police station. Instead, defendant asserts that at some
point after he arrived at the Area 4 police station he was
illegally detained without probable cause, and the trial court's
ruling to the contrary was against the manifest weight of the
evidence. We agree and reverse the trial court's order denying
defendant's motion to quash his arrest.
A motion to quash arrest and suppress statements presents a
trial court with a mixed question of law and fact. People v.
Kidd, 175 Ill. 2d 1, 25, 675 N.E.2d 910, 922 (1997). A reviewing
court will not disturb the trial court's ruling on a motion to
suppress unless it finds that ruling to be manifestly erroneous.
People v. Oaks, 169 Ill. 2d 409, 447, 662 N.E.2d 1328, 1345
(1996); People v. Melock, 149 Ill. 2d 423, 599 N.E.2d 941 (1992).
This is so because such determinations often require the trial
court to resolve conflicts in the facts and weigh the credibility
of witnesses. Oaks, 169 Ill. 2d at 447, 662 N.E.2d at 1345. We
acknowledge that the parties presented conflicting testimony at
the hearing on the motion to quash. However, this record
establishes several undisputed facts. When considering
undisputed facts in a motion to suppress, so that neither the
facts nor the credibility of witnesses is at issue, appellate
courts may conduct a de novo review. Oaks, 169 Ill. 2d at 447-
48, 662 N.E.2d at 1345; see also Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 134 L. Ed. 2d 911, 116 S. Ct. 1657 (1996) (while
findings as to relevant historical facts may be reviewed
deferentially, the ultimate determination of probable cause
should be reviewed de novo on appeal).
Both the United States and Illinois Constitutions protect an
individual from seizure or arrest without probable cause. U.S.
Const., amend. IV; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, 6; People v.
Williams, 164 Ill. 2d 1, 645 N.E.2d 844 (1994); Melock, 149 Ill. 2d at 436, 599 N.E.2d at 946. Illegal detentions for excessive
periods, absent probable cause, have also been deemed to violate
an individual's constitutional rights. People v. Walls, 220 Ill.
App. 3d 564, 578-79, 581 N.E.2d 264, 273-74 (1991); see also
People v. R.B., 232 Ill. App. 3d 583, 589, 597 N.E.2d 879, 883
(1992)("Custodial interrogation on less than probable cause
violates the fourth amendment whether or not the technical
trappings of a formal arrest existed"). The test for determining
whether a suspect has been arrested is whether, in light of the
surrounding circumstances, a reasonable, innocent person would
have considered himself free to leave. Williams, 164 Ill. 2d at
11, 645 N.E.2d at 848; Melock, 149 Ill. 2d at 437, 599 N.E.2d at
946. Additional considerations included in this analysis are the
intent of the police officer, the understanding of the suspect,
and whether the suspect was told that he was free to leave.
Melock, 149 Ill. 2d at 437, 599 N.E.2d at 946.
In their briefs, both the State and defendant offer the
seven-factor analysis that our supreme court has determined
should be reserved for fifth amendment compulsion issues.
Melock, 149 Ill. 2d at 432, 599 N.E.2d at 944; see also In re
J.W., 274 Ill. App. 3d 951, 957, 654 N.E.2d 517, 521-22
(1995)(following Melock). Because the case sub judice presents a
question of fourth amendment "arrest" rather than fifth amendment
"custodial interrogation," this court will follow the distinction
announced in Melock and focus on whether a reasonable person
would have considered himself free to leave J.W., 274 Ill. App.
3d at 957, 654 N.E.2d at 522.
An examination of the record reveals several undisputed
facts: (1) defendant, who was only 15 with no prior arrests, and
Jackson were originally stopped on the street by five police
officers; (2) defendant and Jackson rode to the Area 4 station in
separate cars and were placed in separate interview rooms upon
arriving at the police station; (3) defendant remained in the
same interview room--with the door closed--from his arrival at
the station (roughly 8:30 p.m.) until he made his incriminating
statement (at 4:30 a.m. the following morning); (4) police
officers apprised defendant of his Miranda rights several times;
(5) defendant was not free to move about the police station; and
(6) defendant was never informed that he was free to leave the
station. Moreover, both defendant and Detective Roy testified
that the door to defendant's interview room was locked.
After reviewing the aforementioned facts, we can only
conclude that a reasonable, innocent person placed in defendant's
position would not have felt himself free to leave. The State
does not contend that probable cause to arrest defendant existed
prior to his inculpatory statement. Even if we accept the trial
court's finding that defendant voluntarily accompanied the
police, we believe that defendant's presence at the Area 4
station escalated to an involuntary seizure prior to his formal
arrest. R.B., 232 Ill. App. 3d at 592, 597 N.E.2d at 885; Walls,
220 Ill. App. 3d at 579, 581 N.E.2d at 274 (finding it difficult
to believe "that citizens typically agree to spend extended
periods of time at police stations, kept in small windowless
rooms, waiting for the police to conduct their investigations and
obtain probable cause for their arrest"). Absent probable cause,
the involuntary seizure of defendant constituted a violation of
his fourth amendment rights. We therefore find that the ruling
of the trial court denying defendant's motion to quash was
manifestly erroneous.
In reaching our decision, special weight was given to
defendant's age and lack of criminal background at the time of
the occurrence. "[C]ourts must be especially cautious in cases
involving juveniles because the coerciveness of a situation is
thereby enhanced." People v. Cole, 168 Ill. App. 3d 172, 179,
522 N.E.2d 635, 639 (1988)(16-year-old defendant with no prior
experience with the criminal justice system was seized in
violation of his fourth amendment rights); see also R.B., 232
Ill. App. 3d at 592, 597 N.E.2d at 885 (illegal seizure of a 15-
year-old defendant); J.W., 274 Ill. App. 3d 951, 654 N.E.2d 517
(1995)(illegal seizure of a 14-year-old defendant). The State
fails to cite to any case in which a court determined that a
minor, detained in a fashion analogous to defendant's experience,
was legally seized. Although defendant failed to inform the
police of his true age until after his formal arrest, the fact
remains that defendant was a 15-year-old minor throughout his
questioning by police.
Of course, a finding that defendant was subject to an
illegal arrest does not resolve the question of whether
defendant's inculpatory statement was properly admissible at
trial. People v. Barlow, 273 Ill. App. 3d 943, 654 N.E.2d 223
(1995); Walls, 220 Ill. App. 3d at 579, 581 N.E.2d at 274. "A
confession obtained after an illegal arrest may be admissible
where it was obtained by means sufficiently distinguishable to be
purged of the taint of the illegal arrest." Barlow, 273 Ill.
App. 3d at 952, 654 N.E.2d at 231. The determination of whether
a confession was sufficiently attenuated from the illegal arrest
hinges upon the following considerations: (1) the temporal
proximity between the arrest and the confession; (2) the
existence of intervening circumstances; (3) the purpose and
flagrancy of the police misconduct; and (4) whether the defendant
received Miranda warnings. Barlow, 273 Ill. App. 3d at 952, 654 N.E.2d at 231; J.W., 274 Ill. App. 3d at 962-63, 654 N.E.2d at
525. In light of its ruling on defendant's motion to quash his
arrest, the trial court never considered the attenuation issue.
Remandment for an attenuation hearing is appropriate where the
record is not clear enough to allow a reviewing court to make an
independent ruling on the matter. Walls, 220 Ill. App. 3d at
579, 581 N.E.2d at 274 (confrontation of a defendant with
statements from other witnesses inculpating that defendant as the
shooter may have attenuated a confession from the illegal
arrest). Accordingly, we reverse defendant's conviction and
remand this cause for a hearing to determine whether defendant's
inculpatory statement was sufficiently attenuated from his
illegal arrest to warrant its admissibility. See Barlow, 273
Ill. App. 3d at 953, 654 N.E.2d at 231 (citing cases).
Defendant next argues that Assistant State's Attorney Rodi,
who transcribed defendant's inculpatory statement, improperly
advised him of his Miranda rights. In support of this
contention, defendant points to Ms. Rodi's trial testimony in
which she stated that she would give defendant his Miranda
warnings when the officers returned and that they "were going to
have a statement." Defendant argues that Ms. Rodi's statement
vitiated the effect of any proper Miranda warnings and hence
rendered the statement involuntary. The State points out (and
defendant concedes) that a trial court's ruling that a statement
is voluntary will not be disturbed unless that ruling is against
the manifest weight of the evidence. People v. Miller, 173 Ill. 2d 167, 181, 670 N.E.2d 721, 728 (1996). In the present case,
ample evidence supported the trial court's conclusion that
defendant was apprised of and understood his Miranda rights. We
reject defendant's second point of error.
Defendant also asserts that the trial court erred in
excluding defense evidence regarding the victim's allegedly
violent and aggressive character, where such evidence was
properly admissible under Lynch. "[W]hen the theory of self-
defense is raised, the victim's aggressive and violent character
is relevant to show who was the aggressor, and the defendant may
show it by appropriate evidence, regardless of when he learned of
it." People v. Lynch, 104 Ill. 2d 194, 200, 470 N.E.2d 1018,
1020 (1984). Nevertheless, a decision on the admission of
evidence is within the sound discretion of the trial court, and
such evidentiary rulings will be upheld absent a clear showing
that the court abused its discretion. People v. Booker, 274 Ill.
App. 3d 168, 653 N.E.2d 952 (1995). The evidence here
established that the victim was entitled to be inside 825 North
Lawndale when defendant climbed through an open window and shot
the victim several times, causing his death. In light of this
evidence, defendant's self-defense claim was spurious at best and
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the
proffered Lynch testimony. Defendant's third challenge on appeal
must fail.
Defendant further argues that the trial court erred when it
admitted Detective Kato's testimony regarding the steps of his
investigation, where that testimony contained prejudicial
hearsay. Defendant complains that Kato was permitted to testify
as to what Coloia Wilkerson told him and that the alleged hearsay
statement of Wilkerson damaged defendant's credibility. The
State counters that Wilkerson's out-of-court statement was not
offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted and therefore
did not constitute hearsay. "A police officer may testify about
statements made by others, such as victims or witnesses, when
such testimony is not offered to prove the truth of the matter
asserted, but is instead used to show the investigative steps
taken by the officer leading to the defendant's arrest." People
v. Pulliam, 176 Ill. 2d 261, 274, 680 N.E.2d 343, 350 (1997). We
agree with the State and find that Wilkerson's statement was not
offered for its truth; as such, the statement was not hearsay and
Kato's testimony was entirely proper.
As his final point of error, defendant argues that his
conviction for first degree murder should be reduced to second
degree murder because the evidence established that defendant had
an unreasonable belief that he needed to use deadly force in
self-defense and because the victim seriously provoked defendant.
When reviewing a challenge of this sort, the appellate court must
consider whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could
have found that the mitigating factors were not present. People
v. Blackwell, 171 Ill. 2d 338, 358, 665 N.E.2d 782, 790 (1996).
In this case, either the presence of a serious provocation
or an unreasonable belief in the need for deadly force would
constitute a mitigating factor. As support for his claim of
serious provocation, defendant points to the harsh and abusive
language of the victim. We reject this assertion. "Mere words
and gestures, however, are not enough to constitute serious
provocation." Blackwell, 171 Ill. 2d at 358, 665 N.E.2d at 791.
Alternatively, defendant argues that he had an unreasonable
belief that deadly force was necessary, in light of the fact that
the victim carried a baseball bat. The overwhelming evidence
presented to the trial court nullified this fact, namely,
defendant's trespass onto the crime scene (by climbing through a
window) while armed with a 9 millimeter semiautomatic handgun. A
rational trier of fact could have found that the suggested
mitigating factors were not present. As a result, defendant's
fifth and final point of error lacks merit.
In light of the foregoing analysis, we reverse defendant's
conviction and remand this case to the trial court for an
attenuation hearing regarding defendant's inculpatory statement.
Should the trial court find defendant's confession sufficiently
attenuated from his illegal arrest, we direct the court to
reinstate defendant's conviction. In the alternative, if the
trial court determines that no such attenuation exists to purge
the confession from the taint of defendant's illegal arrest, we
direct the trial court to suppress the confession and conduct
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Barlow, 273
Ill. App. 3d at 953, 654 N.E.2d at 231; J.W., 274 Ill. App. 3d at
963, 654 N.E.2d at 525.
Reversed and remanded.
O'BRIEN, P.J., and BUCKLEY, J., concur.
O'BRIEN, P.J., specially concurring. PRESIDING JUSTICE O'BRIEN specially concurring.
I concur with the result of the majority but disagree with
the majority's analysis that the defendant's presence "escalated"
to an involuntary seizure at some undefined time prior to his
formal arrest. In this case, once the door to the room
containing the defendant was locked, it was objectively true that
the defendant was not free to leave and was thus, in custody.
On all other issues, I concur.