People v. Frias

FIRST DIVISION

February 17, 1998

No. 1-96-0045

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the
) Circuit Court of
Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Cook County.
)
v. )
)
ADOLFO MUNOZ FRIAS, ) Honorable
) Dennis J. Porter,
Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge Presiding.

PRESIDING JUSTICE BUCKLEY delivered the opinion of the
court:
Following a jury trial, defendant Adolfo Munoz Frias was
convicted of first-degree murder and home invasion and sentenced
to consecutive sentences of 85 years and 10 years, respectively.
Defendant does not contest the sufficiency of the evidence of his
guilt. He does not allege that any error occurred at trial, nor
does he contend that his sentences were excessive. Rather,
defendant contends on appeal only that he is entitled to 846
days' credit on each of his sentences. Accordingly, we will
discuss only that limited issue.
Pursuant to section 5-8-4(e)(4) of the Unified Code of
Corrections (Code), a defendant's consecutive sentences are
treated as a single term, and he is entitled to credit against
the aggregate term of imprisonment for time he was in custody.
730 ILCS 5/5-8-4(e)(4) (West 1996). Section 5-8-7(b) of the Code
states that a defendant shall be given credit for time spent in
custody as a result of the offense for which the sentence was
imposed. 730 ILCS 5/5-8-7(b) (West 1996). The supreme court has
held that the language of section 5-8-7(b) entitles a defendant
who, while out on bond awaiting trial on one charge, commits
another offense and serves a sentence for it, to receive credit
for time served in prison for the sentences he received on both
charges. People v. Robinson, 172 Ill. 2d 452, 463 (1996). The
Robinson court did not, however, address section 5-8-4(e) of the
Code.
Our appellate court has split over the application of the
Robinson holding to consecutive sentences. The fourth and fifth
districts have concluded that because Robinson did not address
the issue of consecutive sentences, it is inapplicable to the
determination of credit for time served against the aggregate
"single term" definition of consecutive sentences under the plain
language of section 5-8-4(e) of the Code. See People v. Plair,
292 Ill. App. 3d 396, 400-01 (1997), appeal pending, No. 84387;
Feazell v. Washington, 291 Ill. App. 3d 766, 768 (1997), appeal
pending, No. 84076. The second district, however, applied
Robinson to such a situation and awarded the defendant credit for
time served against each of four consecutive sentences. People
v. Johnson, 286 Ill. App. 3d 597, 601 (1997), appeal denied, 173 Ill. 2d 536 (1997).
We find the Plair and Feazell decisions better reasoned and
agree that a defendant is entitled to time served only on the
aggregate term of his consecutive sentences. Thus, the trial
court correctly determined that defendant was not entitled to
double credit in this case. Accord People v. Walker, 278 Ill.
App. 3d 916, 922 (1995); People v. Mata, 243 Ill. App. 3d 365,
377 (1993); People v. McLemore, 203 Ill. App. 3d 1052, 1058
(1990); People v. Pluskis, 162 Ill. App. 3d 449, 454-55 (1987).
Accordingly, the judgment of the circuit court of Cook
County is affirmed.
Affirmed.
CAMPBELL, P.J. and GALLAGHER, J., concur.