People v. Sargeant
Annotate this Case
FOURTH DIVISION
SEPTEMBER 11, 1997
No. 1--96--4082
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
SUSAN C. SARGEANT,
Defendant-Appellant. )
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
) Appeal from the
Circuit Court of
Cook County
No. 94--CR--19252
Honorable
Thomas R. Sumner,
Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE CERDA delivered the opinion of the court:
Defendant, Susan Sargeant, was charged with theft by
unauthorized control and theft by deception of property in excess
of $100,000 from her former employer, Graphic Approach, Inc.
(Graphic). 720 ILCS 5/3-8 (West 1994). Defendant filed a motion
in limine to bar the State's handwriting expert. After the trial
court granted the motion, the State appealed pursuant to Supreme
Court Rule 604(a)(1). 134 Ill. 2d R. 604(a)(1).
Rule 604(a)(1) allows the State to appeal a pretrial
suppression order if the substantive effect of the trial court's
order granting the defendant's motion in limine was to suppress
evidence and the suppression substantially impairs the State's
ability to prosecute the case. People v. Truitt, 175 Ill. 2d 148, 676 N.E.2d 665 (1997); People v. Keith, 148 Ill. 2d 32, 38,
591 N.E.2d 449 (1992); People v. Young, 82 Ill. 2d 234, 247, 412 N.E.2d 501, 507 (1980); 145 Ill.2d R. 604(a)(1). Although in
limine motions usually involve evidentiary matters, the
substantive effect of the court's order, not the label of the
motion, controls appealability under Rule 604(a)(1). Keith, 148 Ill. 2d at 38; People v. Phipps, 83 Ill. 2d 87, 90-91, 413 N.E.2d 1277 (1980).
To exercise its right of appeal, the State need only file a
notice of appeal together with a certificate of impairment.
Young, 82 Ill. 2d at 247; 145 Ill. 2d R. 604(a)(1). This court
may rely on the good faith evaluation of the prosecutor and need
not second-guess the impact of the suppression order to determine
appellate jurisdiction. Keith, 148 Ill. 2d at 39-40; Young, 82 Ill. 2d at 247; People v. Krause, 273 Ill. App. 3d 59, 61, 651 N.E.2d 744 (1995). Since the State filed the requisite
certificate of impairment in this case, we have jurisdiction.
Defendant is a former employee of Graphic, which alleged
that she wrote over 100 unauthorized checks on the company's
corporate account, payable to herself, her husband, and her two
children. According to defendant, she left Graphic because she
became aware of unethical and fraudulent business practices being
conducted by Graphic's president, Mike Neenan, who is the
complaining witness in this case. After defendant left Graphic,
she began operating Orion Offset, Inc., which competes with
Graphic.
Shortly after Orion began operations, Neenan filed a
criminal complaint alleging that defendant wrongfully
appropriated money belonging to Graphics. According to the
State, an accountant hired after defendant left Graphic
discovered the alleged theft while conducting an audit of
Graphic's books.
Neenan also filed a civil complaint against Orion and
defendant, alleging that defendant wrongfully appropriated money
belonging to Graphic, and defendant and Orion tortiously
interfered with contractual relations between Graphic and its
customers. In response, Orion filed a counterclaim alleging
tortious interference with Orion's prospective business
expectancies and violation of the Illinois Consumer Fraud and
Deceptive Business Practices Act. 815 ILCS 505/2 (West 1994).
Defendant filed a counterclaim alleging intentional infliction of
emotional distress arising from Neenan's sexual harassment of
her. Subsequently, all parties to the civil lawsuit settled the
civil matter and dismissed their claims against each other.
In the criminal case, defendant's theory of defense is in
part that Neenan's baseless accusations are in retaliation for
defendant challenging Neenan's fraudulent conduct and organizing
a competing company. Defendant maintains that Neenan authorized
her to use the money he now alleges she misappropriated.
During discovery in the civil case, defendant tendered a
photocopy of a memo allegedly signed by Neenan confirming that
authorization. In the criminal case, the State tendered an
October 26, 1993, letter from James L. Hayes, a handwriting
expert, to Gregory Adamski, one of the attorneys who represented
Graphic and Neenan in the civil lawsuit. In his letter, Hayes
stated:
"Based upon the examinations and comparisons conducted,
I am of the opinion that the questioned signature
cannot be identified as having been made by [Neenan].
Characteristics within the questioned signature, such
as tremorous line quality and movement variations,
indicate the signature may be an attempt at simulation.
Should the original questioned exhibit become
available, I will need to conduct a further analysis."
Expert testimony that is probative and relevant should be
allowed and evidence is relevant where the fact or circumstances
offered tend to prove or disprove a disputed fact or to render
the matter in issue more or less probable. People v. Brown, 232
Ill. App. 3d 885, 898, 598 N.E.2d 948 (1992). An expert whose
qualifications and experience give him or her knowledge that is
beyond the knowledge of the average fact finder and whose
testimony will aid, and not invade, the province of the fact
finder in reaching its decision, should be allowed to testify.
People v. Masor, 218 Ill. App. 3d 884, 887, 578 N.E.2d 1176
(1991). While an expert witness may testify in terms of "could
have" or "might have" (Cook County v. Industrial Commission, 69 Ill. 2d 10, 18, 370 N.E.2d 520 (1977)), his opinion should not be
admitted if it is inconclusive or speculative (Wakeford v.
Rodehouse Restaurants, 223 Ill. App. 3d 31, 49, 584 N.E.2d
(1991)). In this case the handwriting expert's opinion was based
on a photocopy of a writing sample and was inconclusive,
tentative, and speculative. We do not know what his opinion
would be if the original writing were to be examined.
As a result, in this case, Hayes's testimony was
inadmissible. Because the trial court did not abuse its
discretion, we are affirming its suppression order. People v.
Hayes, 139 Ill. 2d 89, 130, 564 N.E.2d 803 (1990); Masor, 218
Ill. App. 3d at 887-88.
Based on the foregoing, the circuit court order is affirmed.
Affirmed.
WOLFSON, P.J., and BURKE, J., concur.
SEPTEMBER 11, 1997
No. 1--96--4082
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
SUSAN C. SARGEANT,
Defendant-Appellant. )
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
) Appeal from the
Circuit Court of
Cook County
No. 94--CR--19252
Honorable
Thomas R. Sumner,
Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE CERDA delivered the opinion of the court:
Defendant, Susan Sargeant, was charged with theft by
unauthorized control and theft by deception of property in excess
of $100,000 from her former employer, Graphic Approach, Inc.
(Graphic). 720 ILCS 5/3-8 (West 1994). Defendant filed a motion
in limine to bar the State's handwriting expert. After the trial
court granted the motion, the State appealed pursuant to Supreme
Court Rule 604(a)(1). 134 Ill. 2d R. 604(a)(1).
Rule 604(a)(1) allows the State to appeal a pretrial
suppression order if the substantive effect of the trial court's
order granting the defendant's motion in limine was to suppress
evidence and the suppression substantially impairs the State's
ability to prosecute the case. People v. Truitt, 175 Ill. 2d 148, 676 N.E.2d 665 (1997); People v. Keith, 148 Ill. 2d 32, 38,
591 N.E.2d 449 (1992); People v. Young, 82 Ill. 2d 234, 247, 412 N.E.2d 501, 507 (1980); 145 Ill.2d R. 604(a)(1). Although in
limine motions usually involve evidentiary matters, the
substantive effect of the court's order, not the label of the
motion, controls appealability under Rule 604(a)(1). Keith, 148 Ill. 2d at 38; People v. Phipps, 83 Ill. 2d 87, 90-91, 413 N.E.2d 1277 (1980).
To exercise its right of appeal, the State need only file a
notice of appeal together with a certificate of impairment.
Young, 82 Ill. 2d at 247; 145 Ill. 2d R. 604(a)(1). This court
may rely on the good faith evaluation of the prosecutor and need
not second-guess the impact of the suppression order to determine
appellate jurisdiction. Keith, 148 Ill. 2d at 39-40; Young, 82 Ill. 2d at 247; People v. Krause, 273 Ill. App. 3d 59, 61, 651 N.E.2d 744 (1995). Since the State filed the requisite
certificate of impairment in this case, we have jurisdiction.
Defendant is a former employee of Graphic, which alleged
that she wrote over 100 unauthorized checks on the company's
corporate account, payable to herself, her husband, and her two
children. According to defendant, she left Graphic because she
became aware of unethical and fraudulent business practices being
conducted by Graphic's president, Mike Neenan, who is the
complaining witness in this case. After defendant left Graphic,
she began operating Orion Offset, Inc., which competes with
Graphic.
Shortly after Orion began operations, Neenan filed a
criminal complaint alleging that defendant wrongfully
appropriated money belonging to Graphics. According to the
State, an accountant hired after defendant left Graphic
discovered the alleged theft while conducting an audit of
Graphic's books.
Neenan also filed a civil complaint against Orion and
defendant, alleging that defendant wrongfully appropriated money
belonging to Graphic, and defendant and Orion tortiously
interfered with contractual relations between Graphic and its
customers. In response, Orion filed a counterclaim alleging
tortious interference with Orion's prospective business
expectancies and violation of the Illinois Consumer Fraud and
Deceptive Business Practices Act. 815 ILCS 505/2 (West 1994).
Defendant filed a counterclaim alleging intentional infliction of
emotional distress arising from Neenan's sexual harassment of
her. Subsequently, all parties to the civil lawsuit settled the
civil matter and dismissed their claims against each other.
In the criminal case, defendant's theory of defense is in
part that Neenan's baseless accusations are in retaliation for
defendant challenging Neenan's fraudulent conduct and organizing
a competing company. Defendant maintains that Neenan authorized
her to use the money he now alleges she misappropriated.
During discovery in the civil case, defendant tendered a
photocopy of a memo allegedly signed by Neenan confirming that
authorization. In the criminal case, the State tendered an
October 26, 1993, letter from James L. Hayes, a handwriting
expert, to Gregory Adamski, one of the attorneys who represented
Graphic and Neenan in the civil lawsuit. In his letter, Hayes
stated:
"Based upon the examinations and comparisons conducted,
I am of the opinion that the questioned signature
cannot be identified as having been made by [Neenan].
Characteristics within the questioned signature, such
as tremorous line quality and movement variations,
indicate the signature may be an attempt at simulation.
Should the original questioned exhibit become
available, I will need to conduct a further analysis."
Expert testimony that is probative and relevant should be
allowed and evidence is relevant where the fact or circumstances
offered tend to prove or disprove a disputed fact or to render
the matter in issue more or less probable. People v. Brown, 232
Ill. App. 3d 885, 898, 598 N.E.2d 948 (1992). An expert whose
qualifications and experience give him or her knowledge that is
beyond the knowledge of the average fact finder and whose
testimony will aid, and not invade, the province of the fact
finder in reaching its decision, should be allowed to testify.
People v. Masor, 218 Ill. App. 3d 884, 887, 578 N.E.2d 1176
(1991). While an expert witness may testify in terms of "could
have" or "might have" (Cook County v. Industrial Commission, 69 Ill. 2d 10, 18, 370 N.E.2d 520 (1977)), his opinion should not be
admitted if it is inconclusive or speculative (Wakeford v.
Rodehouse Restaurants, 223 Ill. App. 3d 31, 49, 584 N.E.2d
(1991)). In this case the handwriting expert's opinion was based
on a photocopy of a writing sample and was inconclusive,
tentative, and speculative. We do not know what his opinion
would be if the original writing were to be examined.
As a result, in this case, Hayes's testimony was
inadmissible. Because the trial court did not abuse its
discretion, we are affirming its suppression order. People v.
Hayes, 139 Ill. 2d 89, 130, 564 N.E.2d 803 (1990); Masor, 218
Ill. App. 3d at 887-88.
Based on the foregoing, the circuit court order is affirmed.
Affirmed.
WOLFSON, P.J., and BURKE, J., concur.
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