Henricksen v. Illinois Racing Board
Annotate this Case
December 2, 1997
2nd Division
No. 1-96-3925
PER HENRIKSEN, ) Appeal from the
) Circuit Court of
Plaintiff-Appellant, ) Cook County
)
v. )
)
ILLINOIS RACING BOARD, an agency of )
the State of Illinois; GARY STARKMAN, )
RICHARD H. BALOG, RALPH M. GONZALEZ, )
WILLIAM E. JACKSON, GENE LAMB, LORNA E. )
PROPES, and JOHN B. SIMON, members of )
the Board; and RICHARD GARRETT, BRAD )
DYE and JOHN EDDY, stewards, ) Honorable
) John K. Madden,
Defendants-Appellees. ) Judge Presiding
Justice McNulty delivered the opinion of the court:
In this case we must decide the territorial extent of the
Illinois Racing Board's jurisdiction. We find its power limited
to racetracks in the State of Illinois.
Per Henriksen trains and drives horses. On September 2,
1995, one of the horses he trained raced in Illinois. A
laboratory discovered a foreign substance, phenytoin, in the
horse's urine after the race. Because the finding proved a
violation of State rules, the Board suspended Henriksen for 15
days, from September 26 through October 10, 1995, denying him
"the privileges and use of the course and grounds of all
racetracks and wagering locations under the jurisdiction of the
Illinois Racing Board."
On October 7, 1995, Henriksen drove a horse in a qualifying
race in New Jersey. On October 9, 1995, Henriksen drove horses
in two races in New York, and a third horse in a race in New
Jersey. Also, on October 2, 1995, Henriksen went to a Kentucky
racetrack during a sale and entered an area not open to the
public. Under the New Jersey Administrative Code, "Full force
and effect shall be given to the denial, revocation or suspension
of any license by any other racing commission or turf governing
body." N.J.A.C. 13:71-1.10. The New York State Racing and
Wagering Board abides by the bylaws of the Association of Racing
Commissioners International (ARCI), which provide:
"Every Board, Commission and Regulatory Agency
identified with or belonging to the corporation shall
uphold the ruling of every other Board, Commission and
Regulatory Agency likewise identified with or belonging
to the corporation. The denial of a license or a
suspension or a revocation of a license by any member
Board, Commission or Regulatory Agency shall be deemed
to be such a ruling."
When the Illinois Board's stewards learned of Henriksen's
conduct in New Jersey, New York and Kentucky, they issued a
ruling, dated October 21, 1995, suspending him for six months and
fining him $1,000 for violating the prior suspension. Henriksen
requested a hearing before the Board. At the hearing Henriksen
admitted that he violated the suspension but he explained the
reasons for his error. He stressed that he had no intention of
violating the order. He did not contest the Board's
jurisdiction.
The Board, by a vote of five to two, upheld the six month
suspension and the fine. The two dissenting board members
believed the Board lacked jurisdiction because the acts occurred
on racetracks in other states. On November 14, 1995, the day the
Board rendered its decision, Henriksen filed a complaint for
administrative review. Henriksen contested the Board's
jurisdiction as well as the evaluation of the evidence and the
severity of the punishment. The court affirmed the Board's
order.
On appeal, Henriksen again challenges the Board's
jurisdiction. The Board argues that Henriksen waived the issue
by failing to raise it in proceedings before the Board. "Waiver
does not apply, however, when the argument challenges the
authority of the administrative forum to adjudicate causes."
Board of Education of Community High School District No. 94 v.
Regional Board of School Trustees, 242 Ill. App. 3d 229, 234, 613 N.E.2d 754 (1993). Therefore, parties may object to jurisdiction
at any time. Tower Hill School District No. 10 v. Regional Board
of School Trustees, 267 Ill. App. 3d 180, 183, 640 N.E.2d 1386
(1994).
The United States Supreme Court stated the basic principles
of territorial jurisdiction in Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714,
720-22, 24 L. Ed. 565, 568 (1878):
"The authority of every tribunal is necessarily
restricted by the territorial limits of the State in
which it is established. Any attempt to exercise
authority beyond those limits would be deemed in every
other forum, as has been said by this court, an
illegitimate assumption of power, and be resisted as
mere abuse.
***
*** The several States of the Union are not, it is
true, in every respect independent, many of the right
and powers which originally belonged to them being now
vested in the government created by the Constitution.
But, except as restrained and limited by that
instrument, they possess and exercise the authority of
independent States, and the principles of public law to
which we have referred are applicable to them. One of
these principles is, that every State possesses
exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty over persons and
property within its territory. *** [T]he laws of one
State have no operation outside of its territory,
except so far as is allowed by comity."
Similarly, our supreme court has held that "one State's law has
no force beyond that State's boundaries unless another State
chooses to recognize it." Rollins v. Ellwood, 141 Ill. 2d 244,
256, 565 N.E.2d 1302 (1990).
The Supreme Court of New Jersey applied Neff in Pennsylvania
R.R. Co. v. Board of Public Utility Commissioners, 11 N.J. 43, 93 A.2d 339 (1952). The New Jersey administrative agency made
findings and rulings pertaining to train operation in New Jersey
and Pennsylvania. Although the court affirmed the findings and
rulings insofar as they pertained solely to New Jersey, it
vacated the findings and rulings that directly applied to
transportation in Pennsylvania. The court explained:
"It is fundamental that the authority of every tribunal
is necessarily restricted by the territorial limits of
the state in which it is established." Pennsylvania
R.R., 93 A.2d at 342.
Here the Board ordered Henriksen not to use the course or
grounds of any racetrack "under the jurisdiction of the Illinois
Racing Board." The statute which created the Board vests the
Board with jurisdiction "over all race meetings in this State"
(230 ILCS 5/9(a) (West 1994)), giving the Board power to
prescribe "reasonable rules, regulations and conditions under
which all horse race meetings in the State shall be held and
conducted" (230 ILCS 5/9(b) (West 1994)). Thus, even if the
legislature had the power to extend the Board's jurisdiction to
racetracks in other states, it expressly limited the jurisdiction
of the Board to racetracks in Illinois. See Business &
Professional People for the Public Interest v. Illinois Commerce
Comm'n, 136 Ill. 2d 192, 243, 555 N.E.2d 693 (1990).
The Board claims that Henriksen violated its ruling because
the ARCI bylaws and the New Jersey statute require administrative
agencies in other states to uphold, or give full force and
effect, to the Board's ruling. The New Jersey statute and the
ARCI rule effectively demand full faith and credit for rulings by
any state's racing board. See Marina Associates v. Barton, 206
Ill. App. 3d 122, 125, 563 N.E.2d 1110 (1990). The United States
Supreme Court explained full faith and credit in Thomas v.
Washington Gas Light Co., 448 U.S. 261, 270-72, 65 L. Ed. 2d 757, 766-67, 100 S. Ct. 2647, 2655-56 (1980):
"[B]y virtue of the full faith and credit obligations
of the several States, a State is permitted to
determine the extraterritorial effect of its judgments;
but it may only do so indirectly, by prescribing the
effect of its judgments within the State.
*** To vest the power of determining the
extraterritorial effect of a State's own laws and
judgments in the State itself risks the very kind of
parochial entrenchment on the interests of other States
that it was the purpose of the Full Faith and Credit
Clause *** to prevent."
The New Jersey Administrative Code and the ARCI bylaws do
not expand the territorial jurisdiction of the Board. Plaintiff
did not violate the ruling because he did not set foot on an
Illinois racetrack during his suspension. The Board presented
evidence that the New Jersey Racing Commission interprets its
code to require it to suspend from racing in New Jersey any
driver suspended by the Illinois Board for the duration of the
Illinois suspension. Therefore the Board in effect interpreted
the New Jersey code and found that Henriksen's conduct at a New
Jersey racetrack contravened the ruling in the manner in which
the New Jersey Racing Commission should give that ruling full
force and effect. This is precisely the kind of determination of
extraterritorial effect of a ruling which the ARCI bylaws are
designed to prevent. Only the New Jersey Commission has the
power to determine whether acts on New Jersey racetracks violate
racing board rulings, regardless of which jurisdiction issued the
ruling allegedly violated. The hearing here on the charges
against Henriksen exceeded the Board's jurisdiction.
As in all cases involving extraterritorial enforcement of a
state's orders, the Board's lack of jurisdiction does not
immunize the alleged misconduct: the New Jersey Racing
Commission has the power to determine whether Henriksen's conduct
in New Jersey violated its code requiring the Commission to give
the Illinois Board's ruling full force and effect in New Jersey.
Similarly the New York Racing and Wagering Board, and an
administrative agency in Kentucky, have jurisdiction to determine
whether Henriksen violated their rules under the ARCI bylaws.
Those bylaws require the Illinois Board to give the rulings and
sanctions imposed by New Jersey and New York effect in Illinois.
Because the Board lacked jurisdiction over the charges, the
steward's ruling, and the decisions of the Board and the trial
court affirming that ruling, are vacated.
VACATED.
2nd Division
No. 1-96-3925
PER HENRIKSEN, ) Appeal from the
) Circuit Court of
Plaintiff-Appellant, ) Cook County
)
v. )
)
ILLINOIS RACING BOARD, an agency of )
the State of Illinois; GARY STARKMAN, )
RICHARD H. BALOG, RALPH M. GONZALEZ, )
WILLIAM E. JACKSON, GENE LAMB, LORNA E. )
PROPES, and JOHN B. SIMON, members of )
the Board; and RICHARD GARRETT, BRAD )
DYE and JOHN EDDY, stewards, ) Honorable
) John K. Madden,
Defendants-Appellees. ) Judge Presiding
Justice McNulty delivered the opinion of the court:
In this case we must decide the territorial extent of the
Illinois Racing Board's jurisdiction. We find its power limited
to racetracks in the State of Illinois.
Per Henriksen trains and drives horses. On September 2,
1995, one of the horses he trained raced in Illinois. A
laboratory discovered a foreign substance, phenytoin, in the
horse's urine after the race. Because the finding proved a
violation of State rules, the Board suspended Henriksen for 15
days, from September 26 through October 10, 1995, denying him
"the privileges and use of the course and grounds of all
racetracks and wagering locations under the jurisdiction of the
Illinois Racing Board."
On October 7, 1995, Henriksen drove a horse in a qualifying
race in New Jersey. On October 9, 1995, Henriksen drove horses
in two races in New York, and a third horse in a race in New
Jersey. Also, on October 2, 1995, Henriksen went to a Kentucky
racetrack during a sale and entered an area not open to the
public. Under the New Jersey Administrative Code, "Full force
and effect shall be given to the denial, revocation or suspension
of any license by any other racing commission or turf governing
body." N.J.A.C. 13:71-1.10. The New York State Racing and
Wagering Board abides by the bylaws of the Association of Racing
Commissioners International (ARCI), which provide:
"Every Board, Commission and Regulatory Agency
identified with or belonging to the corporation shall
uphold the ruling of every other Board, Commission and
Regulatory Agency likewise identified with or belonging
to the corporation. The denial of a license or a
suspension or a revocation of a license by any member
Board, Commission or Regulatory Agency shall be deemed
to be such a ruling."
When the Illinois Board's stewards learned of Henriksen's
conduct in New Jersey, New York and Kentucky, they issued a
ruling, dated October 21, 1995, suspending him for six months and
fining him $1,000 for violating the prior suspension. Henriksen
requested a hearing before the Board. At the hearing Henriksen
admitted that he violated the suspension but he explained the
reasons for his error. He stressed that he had no intention of
violating the order. He did not contest the Board's
jurisdiction.
The Board, by a vote of five to two, upheld the six month
suspension and the fine. The two dissenting board members
believed the Board lacked jurisdiction because the acts occurred
on racetracks in other states. On November 14, 1995, the day the
Board rendered its decision, Henriksen filed a complaint for
administrative review. Henriksen contested the Board's
jurisdiction as well as the evaluation of the evidence and the
severity of the punishment. The court affirmed the Board's
order.
On appeal, Henriksen again challenges the Board's
jurisdiction. The Board argues that Henriksen waived the issue
by failing to raise it in proceedings before the Board. "Waiver
does not apply, however, when the argument challenges the
authority of the administrative forum to adjudicate causes."
Board of Education of Community High School District No. 94 v.
Regional Board of School Trustees, 242 Ill. App. 3d 229, 234, 613 N.E.2d 754 (1993). Therefore, parties may object to jurisdiction
at any time. Tower Hill School District No. 10 v. Regional Board
of School Trustees, 267 Ill. App. 3d 180, 183, 640 N.E.2d 1386
(1994).
The United States Supreme Court stated the basic principles
of territorial jurisdiction in Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714,
720-22, 24 L. Ed. 565, 568 (1878):
"The authority of every tribunal is necessarily
restricted by the territorial limits of the State in
which it is established. Any attempt to exercise
authority beyond those limits would be deemed in every
other forum, as has been said by this court, an
illegitimate assumption of power, and be resisted as
mere abuse.
***
*** The several States of the Union are not, it is
true, in every respect independent, many of the right
and powers which originally belonged to them being now
vested in the government created by the Constitution.
But, except as restrained and limited by that
instrument, they possess and exercise the authority of
independent States, and the principles of public law to
which we have referred are applicable to them. One of
these principles is, that every State possesses
exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty over persons and
property within its territory. *** [T]he laws of one
State have no operation outside of its territory,
except so far as is allowed by comity."
Similarly, our supreme court has held that "one State's law has
no force beyond that State's boundaries unless another State
chooses to recognize it." Rollins v. Ellwood, 141 Ill. 2d 244,
256, 565 N.E.2d 1302 (1990).
The Supreme Court of New Jersey applied Neff in Pennsylvania
R.R. Co. v. Board of Public Utility Commissioners, 11 N.J. 43, 93 A.2d 339 (1952). The New Jersey administrative agency made
findings and rulings pertaining to train operation in New Jersey
and Pennsylvania. Although the court affirmed the findings and
rulings insofar as they pertained solely to New Jersey, it
vacated the findings and rulings that directly applied to
transportation in Pennsylvania. The court explained:
"It is fundamental that the authority of every tribunal
is necessarily restricted by the territorial limits of
the state in which it is established." Pennsylvania
R.R., 93 A.2d at 342.
Here the Board ordered Henriksen not to use the course or
grounds of any racetrack "under the jurisdiction of the Illinois
Racing Board." The statute which created the Board vests the
Board with jurisdiction "over all race meetings in this State"
(230 ILCS 5/9(a) (West 1994)), giving the Board power to
prescribe "reasonable rules, regulations and conditions under
which all horse race meetings in the State shall be held and
conducted" (230 ILCS 5/9(b) (West 1994)). Thus, even if the
legislature had the power to extend the Board's jurisdiction to
racetracks in other states, it expressly limited the jurisdiction
of the Board to racetracks in Illinois. See Business &
Professional People for the Public Interest v. Illinois Commerce
Comm'n, 136 Ill. 2d 192, 243, 555 N.E.2d 693 (1990).
The Board claims that Henriksen violated its ruling because
the ARCI bylaws and the New Jersey statute require administrative
agencies in other states to uphold, or give full force and
effect, to the Board's ruling. The New Jersey statute and the
ARCI rule effectively demand full faith and credit for rulings by
any state's racing board. See Marina Associates v. Barton, 206
Ill. App. 3d 122, 125, 563 N.E.2d 1110 (1990). The United States
Supreme Court explained full faith and credit in Thomas v.
Washington Gas Light Co., 448 U.S. 261, 270-72, 65 L. Ed. 2d 757, 766-67, 100 S. Ct. 2647, 2655-56 (1980):
"[B]y virtue of the full faith and credit obligations
of the several States, a State is permitted to
determine the extraterritorial effect of its judgments;
but it may only do so indirectly, by prescribing the
effect of its judgments within the State.
*** To vest the power of determining the
extraterritorial effect of a State's own laws and
judgments in the State itself risks the very kind of
parochial entrenchment on the interests of other States
that it was the purpose of the Full Faith and Credit
Clause *** to prevent."
The New Jersey Administrative Code and the ARCI bylaws do
not expand the territorial jurisdiction of the Board. Plaintiff
did not violate the ruling because he did not set foot on an
Illinois racetrack during his suspension. The Board presented
evidence that the New Jersey Racing Commission interprets its
code to require it to suspend from racing in New Jersey any
driver suspended by the Illinois Board for the duration of the
Illinois suspension. Therefore the Board in effect interpreted
the New Jersey code and found that Henriksen's conduct at a New
Jersey racetrack contravened the ruling in the manner in which
the New Jersey Racing Commission should give that ruling full
force and effect. This is precisely the kind of determination of
extraterritorial effect of a ruling which the ARCI bylaws are
designed to prevent. Only the New Jersey Commission has the
power to determine whether acts on New Jersey racetracks violate
racing board rulings, regardless of which jurisdiction issued the
ruling allegedly violated. The hearing here on the charges
against Henriksen exceeded the Board's jurisdiction.
As in all cases involving extraterritorial enforcement of a
state's orders, the Board's lack of jurisdiction does not
immunize the alleged misconduct: the New Jersey Racing
Commission has the power to determine whether Henriksen's conduct
in New Jersey violated its code requiring the Commission to give
the Illinois Board's ruling full force and effect in New Jersey.
Similarly the New York Racing and Wagering Board, and an
administrative agency in Kentucky, have jurisdiction to determine
whether Henriksen violated their rules under the ARCI bylaws.
Those bylaws require the Illinois Board to give the rulings and
sanctions imposed by New Jersey and New York effect in Illinois.
Because the Board lacked jurisdiction over the charges, the
steward's ruling, and the decisions of the Board and the trial
court affirming that ruling, are vacated.
VACATED.
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