Norton v. City of Chicago
Annotate this Case
THIRD DIVISION
December 10, 1997
No. 1-96-2684
DON NORTON, GERALD MARLATT, WILLIAM
KNACK, RUTH KNACK, JANE REAMES and ALL
OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
THE CITY OF CHICAGO, DATACOM SYSTEM
CORPORATION and COOK COUNTY,
Defendants-Appellees. )
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
) Appeal from the
Circuit Court of
Cook County
No. 88 CH 9011
Honorable
John K. Madden,
Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE CAHILL delivered the opinion of the court:
We review once again a long running dispute between plaintiffs
and the lone remaining defendant, Cook County, about the legality
of a $3 charge added to delinquent parking tickets in the City of
Chicago between 1985 and 1986.
In an earlier appeal, we reviewed the trial court's grant of
defendant's motion to dismiss against all defendants: the city, the
county, and Datacom System Corporation. See Norton v. City of
Chicago, 267 Ill. App. 3d 507, 642 N.E.2d 839 (1994) (Norton I).
We first upheld the dismissal of the city and Datacom. We then
reversed the trial court's ruling that plaintiffs' suit was an
impermissible collateral attack, finding that the record was
"unclear whether final judgments were ever entered by the traffic
court." Norton, 267 Ill. App. 3d at 510. We held that the
county's motion to dismiss under section 2-615 (735 ILCS 5/2-615
(West 1996)) of the Code of Civil Procedure rather than section 2-
619 (735 ILCS 5/2-619 (West 1996)) should not have been granted.
The trial court could not conclude, based on pleadings alone, that
final judgments had been entered in traffic court. We held that
the trial court erred in finding that the traffic court entered
final judgments where the allegations of the county's motion to
dismiss failed to establish final judgments. Norton, 267 Ill. App.
3d at 511.
On remand, the parties filed cross-motions for summary
judgment. The trial court granted summary judgment for the county.
The parties raise the following issues on appeal: (1) whether
the suit is barred by the collateral attack doctrine; (2) whether
the suit is barred by the voluntary payment doctrine; (3) whether
the county retained money wrongfully obtained from plaintiffs; and
(4) whether plaintiffs are entitled to prejudgment interest. We
reverse and remand.
The affidavits and depositions attached to the motions for
summary judgment show that, through 1986, if a city parking ticket
defendant did not pay the fine or appear in court after two
notices, the ticket was listed by the clerk of the court as
delinquent, but no default judgment was entered. If the ticket was
later paid, the county received $3 of the money collected from each
delinquent ticket. Before May, 1985, the $3 was taken from each
fine paid to the city. In 1985, the city hired Datacom System
Corporation to send demand notices and collect delinquent fines.
A $3 surcharge was added to the total fine due. The surcharge was
described on the notice as "court costs." The clerk of the circuit
court passed on the money collected from this surcharge to the
county.
The notices sent by Datacom read:
"You can obtain additional information about this
notice ONLY by writing to the address listed above or by
calling (312) 580-3400.
Our records indicate that the parking tickets listed
below have not been paid. IF YOU DO NOT PAY THE TOTAL
AMOUNT SHOWN BELOW IMMEDIATELY, THE CITY OF CHICAGO WILL
TAKE FURTHER LEGAL ACTION AGAINST YOU. This may include
preparing a verified petition in the Circuit Court of
Cook County requesting that a DEFAULT JUDGMENT in the
amount of $35 plus court costs be entered against you for
each unpaid ticket.
You can avoid this action by mailing a check or
money order in the total amount shown below. *** No
information will be given or payment accepted at Traffic
Court." (Emphasis added.)
The demand notices were revised during a law suit (Horn v.
City of Chicago, 85 C 6838 (N.D. Ill. 1988)) in which the
plaintiffs alleged that the demand notices violated their right to
due process by failing to give sufficient notice that a hearing was
available to contest their liability. See Horn v. City of Chicago,
860 F.2d 700 (7th Cir. 1988). The $3 surcharge was relabeled a
"statutory mailing fee." The revised demand notices read:
"You can obtain additional information about this
notice ONLY by writing to the address listed, by calling
(312) 580-3400, or by visiting the parking ticket
information windows in City Hall ***.
***
IF YOU DO NOT PAY THE TOTAL AMOUNT DUE WITHIN 15
DAYS, THE CITY WILL TAKE ACTION TO RECOVER PAYMENT IN A
LARGER AMOUNT, AND MAY DEMAND THE MAXIMUM FINE ALLOWED
BY LAW."
Plaintiffs here are among those who paid the surcharge in
response to the notices. Plaintiffs allege that Cook County was
unjustly enriched by collecting the surcharge.
We review a trial court's grant of summary judgment de novo.
Outboard Marine Corp. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 154 Ill. 2d 90, 102, 607 N.E.2d 1204 (1992). Summary judgment is
appropriate when there are no genuine issues of material fact and
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Purtill v. Hess, 111 Ill. 2d 229, 240, 489 N.E.2d 867 (1986).
Plaintiffs first argue that the trial court's ruling that
their suit is an impermissible collateral attack on a preexisting
judgment is barred by the law of the case. Plaintiffs argue that
in Norton I, we decided, as a matter of law, that judgments were
not entered in traffic court. We disagree.
The rule of the law of the case provides that where an issue
has been litigated and decided, a court's unreversed decision on
a question of law or fact settles that question for all
subsequent stages of the suit. McDonald's Corp. v. Vittorio
Ricci Chicago, Inc., 125 Ill. App. 3d 1083, 1086-87, 466 N.E.2d 1116 (1984). A question of law decided on appeal is binding on
the trial court on remand, and the appellate court if the case is
appealed again. Martin v. Federal Life Insurance Co., 268 Ill.
App. 3d 698, 701, 644 N.E.2d 42 (1994).
In Norton I, we held that the trial court could not conclude
from the pleadings on the section 2-615 motion to dismiss that
final judgments had been entered in traffic court. The ruling
did not resolve the issue or preclude the trial court from
reconsidering the question if the county presented evidence of
final judgments on a motion for summary judgment. On remand, the
county offered evidence not presented in Norton I. The county
offered deposition testimony explaining how the cases against
plaintiffs were disposed of by the clerk of the court. The
county's offer of evidence to show that the traffic court's
method of disposing of these cases was "tantamount" to final
judgment complied with the directions of this court on remand.
We next address the trial court's finding that final
judgments were entered in the underlying cases, precluding
collateral attack in this case.
A final judgment can only be attacked by direct appeal or in
traditional collateral proceedings defined by statute. Malone v.
Cosentino, 99 Ill. 2d 29, 32-33, 457 N.E.2d 395 (1983). Once a
judgment is final, issues that could have been raised are barred
in subsequent proceedings. Malone, 99 Ill. 2d at 33.
The county offered proof that after plaintiffs paid fines,
their cases were no longer active before the traffic court.
Although no judicial action was taken, the clerk recorded the
dispositions of paid tickets in the same way he recorded those
disposed of judicially--by removing them from the clerk's
"violator file." The county claims that the clerk's removal of
cases from the violator file amounts to a "final judgment for
purposes of closing the case." In support, the county argues
that section 27-387(b) of the Municipal Code of Chicago (Code)
authorized the clerk to "enter final dispositions on cases where
payments were mailed to the [c]lerk." Section 27-387(b) (1984)
provides:
"Upon the filing of such traffic violation
complaint in the Municipal Court of Chicago as
aforesaid, said complaint may be disposed of only by
trial in said court or other official action by a judge
of said court, including forfeiture of bail or by
payment of a fine to the traffic violations bureau of
said court." Chicago Municipal Code 27-387(b)
(repealed July 12, 1990).
We first note that the language of section 27-387(b) does not
support the county's reading. The Code does not authorize the
clerk to enter "final dispositions," but says that complaints for
traffic violations may only be disposed of by trial or "other
official action by a judge." Second, even if the clerk's
administrative action was authorized, the question of whether
that action amounts to a final judgment remains unanswered. The
county cites no case, except Stelzik v. City of Chicago, 85-CH-
7631 (Cir. Ct. Cook Co. January 21, 1986), to support the view
that disposing of a case without judicial action amounts to a
final judgment. An unpublished order of a trial court is without
precedential value. Harvard State Bank v. County of McHenry, 251
Ill. App. 3d 84, 92, 620 N.E.2d 1360 (1993).
Plaintiffs do not contest the conclusion that payment of the
tickets and the surcharge disposed of the cases before the
traffic court. But plaintiffs argue that only a judge can enter
a final judgment. See Towns v. Yellow Cab Co., 73 Ill. 2d 113,
119, 382 N.E.2d 1217 (1978)(defining "judgment" as "a
determination by the court on the issues presented by the
pleadings which ascertains and fixes absolutely and finally the
rights of the parties in the lawsuit") (emphasis added).
The only judicial action suggested by the county is an
"approval" of the clerk's system by the then chief judge of the
circuit court. The county contends that "the [r]ecord ***
establishes that [the chief judge] was aware that the clerk
entered final dispositions in parking ticket cases where fines
were mailed to the clerk and that the [c]hief [j]udge agreed to
this arrangement." The county's apparent argument is that the
court delegated the function of entering final judgments in
traffic court to the clerk. The county contends that the
Illinois Constitution, supreme court rules, and the rules of the
circuit court of Cook County empower the chief judge to do this.
Article VI, section 7(c), of the Illinois Constitution
grants the chief judge general administrative authority over his
court. Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, 7(c). Supreme Court Rule 272
provides that "[i]f no *** written judgment is to be filed, the
judge or clerk shall forthwith make a notation of judgment and
enter the judgment of record promptly." 137 Ill. 2d R. 272.
Rule 0.3 of the rules of the circuit court of Cook County
provides:
"(a) Forms of entries. The Chief Judge shall
superintend the keeping of the records of the Circuit
Court of Cook County and prescribe abbreviated forms of
entries therein of the proceedings, orders and
judgments of said court, which abbreviated forms so
prescribed shall have the same force and effect as if
said proceedings, orders and judgments were entered in
full on the records of said court in the forms
heretofore customary in courts of record of this
state." Cook Co. Cir. Ct. R. 0.3(a) (eff. October 2,
1995).
As plaintiffs note, section 7(c) of the constitution and
Rule 0.3 do not address whether the chief judge may empower the
clerk of the court to enter judgments without participation of a
judge.
A system that disposes of parking violations by an
administrator may be proper if delegated by an appropriate
statute or ordinance. See Gardner v. City of Columbus, 841 F.2d 1272 (6th Cir. 1988)(upholding an administrative procedure
established pursuant to a statute to dispose of parking
violations). But the part of the record the county relies on to
support that such a delegation took place here shows that a
deputy clerk of the Municipal Court of Chicago believed that the
clerk of the circuit court, the chief judge of the court, and the
mayor of the City of Chicago entered into an oral agreement in
1964 to add a $3 charge to delinquent parking tickets to cover
costs incurred by the clerk for collection of payments. Even if
we consider this hearsay statement, it fails to support the
county's assertion that final judgments were somehow created by
the "agreement" or that the clerk's administrative disposal of
plaintiffs' cases was "tantamount" to final judgments for
purposes of the collateral attack doctrine.
Even if we entertain a broad reading of section 27-387(b) of
the Municipal Code--that "payment of a fine to the traffic
violations bureau of said court" complies with Supreme Court Rule
272 and circuit court Rule 0.3(a), to create a judgment--that is
not what happened here. No payments were made to the "traffic
violations bureau" of the court and no authority existed to
deviate from the procedures set out in section 27-387(b).
The county next argues that the trial court's judgment may
be affirmed on several other grounds. We may affirm a trial
court's ruling on any grounds supported by the record. Gonzalez
v. Kennedy Mobil Service, Inc., 274 Ill. App. 3d 1077, 1083, 654 N.E.2d 624 (1995).
The county argues that summary judgment should be affirmed
because the plaintiffs voluntarily paid the $3 charge. The
voluntary payment doctrine provides that a payor may not recover
fees voluntarily paid, without protest, even if the fees were
illegal. Getto v. City of Chicago, 86 Ill. 2d 39, 48-49, 426 N.E.2d 844 (1981); Terra-Nova Investments v. Rosewell, 235 Ill.
App. 3d 330, 337, 601 N.E.2d 1109 (1992). But a payment is not
voluntary if (1) the payor lacked knowledge of facts upon which
to protest payment, or (2) the payment was made under duress.
Terra-Nova, 235 Ill. App. 3d at 337.
The voluntary payment doctrine does not apply when payment
is "made under duress or compulsion." See Getto, 86 Ill. 2d at
51; Geary v. Dominick's Finer Foods, Inc., 129 Ill. 2d 389, 395,
544 N.E.2d 344 (1989). Under the doctrine, a payment is made
"under duress" when the payee "exert[s] some actual or threatened
power over the payor from which the payor has no immediate relief
except by paying." Terra-Nova Investments, 235 Ill. App. 3d at
337.
The demand notices sent to plaintiffs here threatened
"further legal action," a "default judgment in the amount of $35
plus court costs," to "take action to recover payment in a larger
amount," or to "demand the maximum fine allowed by law." The
Datacom mailing directed the delinquent not to contact the
traffic court, where the delinquent parking tickets remained
pending. While threatening to obtain a default judgment, the
authors of the original demand notice state flatly, "No
information will be given or payment accepted at Traffic Court."
The county offers no legal foundation or statutory authority for
this unique restriction on a defendant in a pending case. The
county does not suggest what authority existed to allow the
authors of the demand notice to imply that the traffic court shut
itself off from communication with a traffic court defendant,
refuse to accept payments, or refuse to allow a defendant or his
attorney to file an appearance in a pending case. The demand
notice, in effect, suggests that the defendant's access to the
court system has been blocked by an intervening administrative
procedure established after suit was filed. We have found
nothing in Illinois law that would allow a government to issue
such notice and deny a defendant access to the courts.
The wording of these demand notices urged recipients to pay
the fines in lieu of steeper penalties or court action. But the
wording misrepresented the rights then available to delinquents
in their pending cases. No authority existed to announce that
"no information will be given or accepted at Traffic Court."
We are aware that in Horn v. City of Chicago, 860 F.2d 700
(7th Cir. 1988), the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals ruled on
the constitutionality of the revised notices in the context of a
Section 1983 (42 U.S.C. 1983 (1988)) action in which the
plaintiffs claimed that the wording of the unrevised notice
deprived them of due process without adequate notice of a
hearing. The plaintiffs argued that the demand notices
misleadingly implied that judgments had already been entered
against them in traffic court. Horn, 860 F.2d at 702. Reversing
the trial court, the seventh circuit found that the notices did
not "[imply] that judgment had already been entered against
plaintiffs" and were "reasonably certain to inform those
affected" that they could contest the amounts demanded. Horn,
860 F.2d at 705.
We agree with the seventh circuit that the notices did not
imply that judgments had been entered. But the seventh circuit's
analysis is not applicable here. The issue before the seventh
circuit did not require the court to address whether the notices
discouraged use of the judicial process or coerced payment. We
analyze the demand notices to decide a different issue: whether
the notices were coercive enough to render plaintiffs' payment
involuntary. We believe they were.
The county next argues that it is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law because plaintiffs, in their unjust enrichment
claim, presented no evidence that the county engaged in wrongful
conduct.
The county notes that unjust enrichment is "a condition that
may be brought about by unlawful or improper conduct *** and may
be redressed by a cause of action based upon that improper
conduct." McKay v. Kusper, 252 Ill. App. 3d 450, 463, 624 N.E.2d 1140 (1993). The county argues that they did not collect the $3
charge and cannot be vicariously liable for the alleged wrongful
conduct of the clerk of the circuit court.
The wrongful conduct rule is not absolute. Plaintiffs do
not argue that the county is vicariously liable for the clerk's
actions, but rely on a "constructive trust" theory. Whether the
clerk of the circuit court is the county's agent is not relevant.
Nor is wrongful conduct on the part of the county necessary to
impose a constructive trust. See Frederickson v. Blumenthal, 271
Ill. App. 3d 738, 740, 648 N.E.2d 1060 (1995) (recognizing that
courts have broadened application of constructive trusts beyond
those where defendant's conduct was wrongful).
Where a defendant has obtained money to which he is not
entitled, under such circumstances that "in equity and good
conscience he ought not retain it," the rightful owners of the
money can claim it through a constructive trust to avoid unjust
enrichment. Selmaville County Consolidated School District No.
10 v. Salem Elementary School District No. 111, 96 Ill. App. 3d
1062, 1066, 421 N.E.2d 1087 (1981). That the person receiving
the money acted in good faith does not prevent recovery of the
sum paid. Selmaville, 96 Ill. App. 3d at 1066; Board of
Education v. Holt, 41 Ill. App. 3d 625, 626, 354 N.E.2d 534
(1976).
The county next argues that it did not retain the $3 charge.
Although the county concedes that the money was deposited with
the county treasurer, the county maintains that the money was
held in trust for the purpose of the operation, maintenance and
benefit of the circuit court.
Where money is placed in the hands of a person to be
delivered to another, a resulting trust arises in favor of the
latter. In re Estate of Habel, 88 Ill. App. 2d 194, 202, 231 N.E.2d 616 (1967). The county argues that such a resulting trust
arose when the money from the surcharges was deposited with the
county treasurer because the funds were earmarked for the benefit
of the circuit court. Article I, section 12, of the Illinois
Constitution requires that litigants' circuit court fees only be
used to support the operation and maintenance of the circuit
court. See Crocker v. Finley, 99 Ill. 2d 444, 454, 459 N.E.2d 1346 (1984). The county points out that plaintiffs offered no
evidence to rebut the presumption that the county used the money
for anything other than its constitutionally mandated purposes.
See CBS, Inc. v. Partee, 198 Ill. App. 3d 936, 948, 556 N.E.2d 648 (1990) (public officials are presumed to act in accordance
with the law). So, the county argues, the county did not retain
the $3 charge, but used it to partially discharge the county's
funding responsibility to the circuit court.
While making this argument, the county does not dispute that
the surcharges were falsely labeled "court costs" and "statutory
mailing fees." Court costs could not be recovered without a
conviction. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 25, par. 27.2(16)("The
Circuit Court Clerk shall be entitled to costs in all criminal
and quasi-criminal cases from each person convicted therein").
Plaintiffs here were not convicted. Since the evidence shows
that the fees charged were never authorized court costs, we
cannot conclude the money received was lawfully held in trust for
the circuit court. The money may have been used to partially pay
the county's obligation to financially support the circuit court,
but that use does not negate the fact that the county benefitted
to the extent that the illegal fees freed up other monies the
county would have used to fund the court.
Plaintiffs claim that if summary judgment for the county is
set aside, they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on
their motion for summary judgment. If there is no dispute as to
any material fact, and the undisputed facts support only one
inference, the only question is the legal effect of the facts,
and summary judgment should be granted. Cnota v. Palatine Area
Football Ass'n., 227 Ill. App. 3d 640, 647, 592 N.E.2d 196
(1992). Plaintiffs assert that the evidence presented at summary
judgment showed that the surcharge was unauthorized and that the
county retained the benefit of these unauthorized fees. We
agree.
The evidence establishes that the surcharges were not
legally imposed "court costs" or "mailing fees." The record
shows that named plaintiffs Don Norton and Jane Reames paid these
surcharges based on a mistake of fact induced by
misrepresentation of the $3 surcharge. The parties do not
dispute that the money collected from this surcharge was given to
the county. We remand with directions to enter summary judgment
for plaintiffs Norton and Reames.
The record reveals that the trial court deferred ruling on
plaintiffs' motion for class certification. We express no
opinion on the issue. The trial court is directed to conduct a
hearing on class certification under sections 2-801 and 2-802 of
the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-801, 2-802 (West
1996)).
We next address plaintiffs' argument that they are entitled
to prejudgment interest. Generally, prejudgment interest "is not
recoverable absent a statute or agreement providing for it."
City of Springfield v. Allphin, 82 Ill. 2d 571, 413 N.E.2d 394
(1980). But plaintiffs argue that prejudgment interest is
recoverable without statutory authorization "where a municipal
corporation wrongfully exacts money and holds that money without
just right or claim." City of Chicago v. Northwestern Mutual
Life Insurance Co., 218 Ill. 40, 44, 75 N.E. 803 (1905). See
also City of Springfield, 82 Ill. 2d at 577-78. Plaintiffs argue
that this exception should apply to the county as well.
In City of Chicago, our supreme court did not elaborate on
the standard for deciding when prejudgment interest, not
authorized by statute or agreement, is appropriate. But in City
of Springfield, the court found that, even absent statutory
authority, a court may award interest "where warranted by
equitable considerations," but not where "such an award would not
comport with justice and equity." City of Springfield, 82 Ill. 2d at 579. In reliance on City of Springfield and other Illinois
cases, we have held that prejudgment interest not statutorily or
contractually authorized may only be awarded against a defendant
who wrongfully obtained and illegally withheld funds from a
plaintiff. Calumet Construction Corp. v. Metropolitan Sanitary
District of Greater Chicago, 178 Ill. App. 3d 415, 423, 533 N.E.2d 453 (1988). At issue here is the $3 penalty exacted for
each ticket. In Norton I we held that the city and its agent
were properly dismissed from the suit--the city because
plaintiffs did not allege the city received or retained money
from the $3 penalty, Datacom because the allegations of the
complaint were insufficient to establish that Datacom received or
retained any part of the $3 penalty. Yet because of the city's
wrongful action, the county now holds the money. The issue is
whether the party who innocently receives money wrongfully
obtained by another should pay prejudgment interest. We believe
prejudgment interest in this case would not meet the justice and
equity standard expressed in City of Springfield.
Reversed and remanded.
LEAVITT, P.J., and GORDON J., concur.
December 10, 1997
No. 1-96-2684
DON NORTON, GERALD MARLATT, WILLIAM
KNACK, RUTH KNACK, JANE REAMES and ALL
OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
THE CITY OF CHICAGO, DATACOM SYSTEM
CORPORATION and COOK COUNTY,
Defendants-Appellees. )
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
) Appeal from the
Circuit Court of
Cook County
No. 88 CH 9011
Honorable
John K. Madden,
Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE CAHILL delivered the opinion of the court:
We review once again a long running dispute between plaintiffs
and the lone remaining defendant, Cook County, about the legality
of a $3 charge added to delinquent parking tickets in the City of
Chicago between 1985 and 1986.
In an earlier appeal, we reviewed the trial court's grant of
defendant's motion to dismiss against all defendants: the city, the
county, and Datacom System Corporation. See Norton v. City of
Chicago, 267 Ill. App. 3d 507, 642 N.E.2d 839 (1994) (Norton I).
We first upheld the dismissal of the city and Datacom. We then
reversed the trial court's ruling that plaintiffs' suit was an
impermissible collateral attack, finding that the record was
"unclear whether final judgments were ever entered by the traffic
court." Norton, 267 Ill. App. 3d at 510. We held that the
county's motion to dismiss under section 2-615 (735 ILCS 5/2-615
(West 1996)) of the Code of Civil Procedure rather than section 2-
619 (735 ILCS 5/2-619 (West 1996)) should not have been granted.
The trial court could not conclude, based on pleadings alone, that
final judgments had been entered in traffic court. We held that
the trial court erred in finding that the traffic court entered
final judgments where the allegations of the county's motion to
dismiss failed to establish final judgments. Norton, 267 Ill. App.
3d at 511.
On remand, the parties filed cross-motions for summary
judgment. The trial court granted summary judgment for the county.
The parties raise the following issues on appeal: (1) whether
the suit is barred by the collateral attack doctrine; (2) whether
the suit is barred by the voluntary payment doctrine; (3) whether
the county retained money wrongfully obtained from plaintiffs; and
(4) whether plaintiffs are entitled to prejudgment interest. We
reverse and remand.
The affidavits and depositions attached to the motions for
summary judgment show that, through 1986, if a city parking ticket
defendant did not pay the fine or appear in court after two
notices, the ticket was listed by the clerk of the court as
delinquent, but no default judgment was entered. If the ticket was
later paid, the county received $3 of the money collected from each
delinquent ticket. Before May, 1985, the $3 was taken from each
fine paid to the city. In 1985, the city hired Datacom System
Corporation to send demand notices and collect delinquent fines.
A $3 surcharge was added to the total fine due. The surcharge was
described on the notice as "court costs." The clerk of the circuit
court passed on the money collected from this surcharge to the
county.
The notices sent by Datacom read:
"You can obtain additional information about this
notice ONLY by writing to the address listed above or by
calling (312) 580-3400.
Our records indicate that the parking tickets listed
below have not been paid. IF YOU DO NOT PAY THE TOTAL
AMOUNT SHOWN BELOW IMMEDIATELY, THE CITY OF CHICAGO WILL
TAKE FURTHER LEGAL ACTION AGAINST YOU. This may include
preparing a verified petition in the Circuit Court of
Cook County requesting that a DEFAULT JUDGMENT in the
amount of $35 plus court costs be entered against you for
each unpaid ticket.
You can avoid this action by mailing a check or
money order in the total amount shown below. *** No
information will be given or payment accepted at Traffic
Court." (Emphasis added.)
The demand notices were revised during a law suit (Horn v.
City of Chicago, 85 C 6838 (N.D. Ill. 1988)) in which the
plaintiffs alleged that the demand notices violated their right to
due process by failing to give sufficient notice that a hearing was
available to contest their liability. See Horn v. City of Chicago,
860 F.2d 700 (7th Cir. 1988). The $3 surcharge was relabeled a
"statutory mailing fee." The revised demand notices read:
"You can obtain additional information about this
notice ONLY by writing to the address listed, by calling
(312) 580-3400, or by visiting the parking ticket
information windows in City Hall ***.
***
IF YOU DO NOT PAY THE TOTAL AMOUNT DUE WITHIN 15
DAYS, THE CITY WILL TAKE ACTION TO RECOVER PAYMENT IN A
LARGER AMOUNT, AND MAY DEMAND THE MAXIMUM FINE ALLOWED
BY LAW."
Plaintiffs here are among those who paid the surcharge in
response to the notices. Plaintiffs allege that Cook County was
unjustly enriched by collecting the surcharge.
We review a trial court's grant of summary judgment de novo.
Outboard Marine Corp. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 154 Ill. 2d 90, 102, 607 N.E.2d 1204 (1992). Summary judgment is
appropriate when there are no genuine issues of material fact and
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Purtill v. Hess, 111 Ill. 2d 229, 240, 489 N.E.2d 867 (1986).
Plaintiffs first argue that the trial court's ruling that
their suit is an impermissible collateral attack on a preexisting
judgment is barred by the law of the case. Plaintiffs argue that
in Norton I, we decided, as a matter of law, that judgments were
not entered in traffic court. We disagree.
The rule of the law of the case provides that where an issue
has been litigated and decided, a court's unreversed decision on
a question of law or fact settles that question for all
subsequent stages of the suit. McDonald's Corp. v. Vittorio
Ricci Chicago, Inc., 125 Ill. App. 3d 1083, 1086-87, 466 N.E.2d 1116 (1984). A question of law decided on appeal is binding on
the trial court on remand, and the appellate court if the case is
appealed again. Martin v. Federal Life Insurance Co., 268 Ill.
App. 3d 698, 701, 644 N.E.2d 42 (1994).
In Norton I, we held that the trial court could not conclude
from the pleadings on the section 2-615 motion to dismiss that
final judgments had been entered in traffic court. The ruling
did not resolve the issue or preclude the trial court from
reconsidering the question if the county presented evidence of
final judgments on a motion for summary judgment. On remand, the
county offered evidence not presented in Norton I. The county
offered deposition testimony explaining how the cases against
plaintiffs were disposed of by the clerk of the court. The
county's offer of evidence to show that the traffic court's
method of disposing of these cases was "tantamount" to final
judgment complied with the directions of this court on remand.
We next address the trial court's finding that final
judgments were entered in the underlying cases, precluding
collateral attack in this case.
A final judgment can only be attacked by direct appeal or in
traditional collateral proceedings defined by statute. Malone v.
Cosentino, 99 Ill. 2d 29, 32-33, 457 N.E.2d 395 (1983). Once a
judgment is final, issues that could have been raised are barred
in subsequent proceedings. Malone, 99 Ill. 2d at 33.
The county offered proof that after plaintiffs paid fines,
their cases were no longer active before the traffic court.
Although no judicial action was taken, the clerk recorded the
dispositions of paid tickets in the same way he recorded those
disposed of judicially--by removing them from the clerk's
"violator file." The county claims that the clerk's removal of
cases from the violator file amounts to a "final judgment for
purposes of closing the case." In support, the county argues
that section 27-387(b) of the Municipal Code of Chicago (Code)
authorized the clerk to "enter final dispositions on cases where
payments were mailed to the [c]lerk." Section 27-387(b) (1984)
provides:
"Upon the filing of such traffic violation
complaint in the Municipal Court of Chicago as
aforesaid, said complaint may be disposed of only by
trial in said court or other official action by a judge
of said court, including forfeiture of bail or by
payment of a fine to the traffic violations bureau of
said court." Chicago Municipal Code 27-387(b)
(repealed July 12, 1990).
We first note that the language of section 27-387(b) does not
support the county's reading. The Code does not authorize the
clerk to enter "final dispositions," but says that complaints for
traffic violations may only be disposed of by trial or "other
official action by a judge." Second, even if the clerk's
administrative action was authorized, the question of whether
that action amounts to a final judgment remains unanswered. The
county cites no case, except Stelzik v. City of Chicago, 85-CH-
7631 (Cir. Ct. Cook Co. January 21, 1986), to support the view
that disposing of a case without judicial action amounts to a
final judgment. An unpublished order of a trial court is without
precedential value. Harvard State Bank v. County of McHenry, 251
Ill. App. 3d 84, 92, 620 N.E.2d 1360 (1993).
Plaintiffs do not contest the conclusion that payment of the
tickets and the surcharge disposed of the cases before the
traffic court. But plaintiffs argue that only a judge can enter
a final judgment. See Towns v. Yellow Cab Co., 73 Ill. 2d 113,
119, 382 N.E.2d 1217 (1978)(defining "judgment" as "a
determination by the court on the issues presented by the
pleadings which ascertains and fixes absolutely and finally the
rights of the parties in the lawsuit") (emphasis added).
The only judicial action suggested by the county is an
"approval" of the clerk's system by the then chief judge of the
circuit court. The county contends that "the [r]ecord ***
establishes that [the chief judge] was aware that the clerk
entered final dispositions in parking ticket cases where fines
were mailed to the clerk and that the [c]hief [j]udge agreed to
this arrangement." The county's apparent argument is that the
court delegated the function of entering final judgments in
traffic court to the clerk. The county contends that the
Illinois Constitution, supreme court rules, and the rules of the
circuit court of Cook County empower the chief judge to do this.
Article VI, section 7(c), of the Illinois Constitution
grants the chief judge general administrative authority over his
court. Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, 7(c). Supreme Court Rule 272
provides that "[i]f no *** written judgment is to be filed, the
judge or clerk shall forthwith make a notation of judgment and
enter the judgment of record promptly." 137 Ill. 2d R. 272.
Rule 0.3 of the rules of the circuit court of Cook County
provides:
"(a) Forms of entries. The Chief Judge shall
superintend the keeping of the records of the Circuit
Court of Cook County and prescribe abbreviated forms of
entries therein of the proceedings, orders and
judgments of said court, which abbreviated forms so
prescribed shall have the same force and effect as if
said proceedings, orders and judgments were entered in
full on the records of said court in the forms
heretofore customary in courts of record of this
state." Cook Co. Cir. Ct. R. 0.3(a) (eff. October 2,
1995).
As plaintiffs note, section 7(c) of the constitution and
Rule 0.3 do not address whether the chief judge may empower the
clerk of the court to enter judgments without participation of a
judge.
A system that disposes of parking violations by an
administrator may be proper if delegated by an appropriate
statute or ordinance. See Gardner v. City of Columbus, 841 F.2d 1272 (6th Cir. 1988)(upholding an administrative procedure
established pursuant to a statute to dispose of parking
violations). But the part of the record the county relies on to
support that such a delegation took place here shows that a
deputy clerk of the Municipal Court of Chicago believed that the
clerk of the circuit court, the chief judge of the court, and the
mayor of the City of Chicago entered into an oral agreement in
1964 to add a $3 charge to delinquent parking tickets to cover
costs incurred by the clerk for collection of payments. Even if
we consider this hearsay statement, it fails to support the
county's assertion that final judgments were somehow created by
the "agreement" or that the clerk's administrative disposal of
plaintiffs' cases was "tantamount" to final judgments for
purposes of the collateral attack doctrine.
Even if we entertain a broad reading of section 27-387(b) of
the Municipal Code--that "payment of a fine to the traffic
violations bureau of said court" complies with Supreme Court Rule
272 and circuit court Rule 0.3(a), to create a judgment--that is
not what happened here. No payments were made to the "traffic
violations bureau" of the court and no authority existed to
deviate from the procedures set out in section 27-387(b).
The county next argues that the trial court's judgment may
be affirmed on several other grounds. We may affirm a trial
court's ruling on any grounds supported by the record. Gonzalez
v. Kennedy Mobil Service, Inc., 274 Ill. App. 3d 1077, 1083, 654 N.E.2d 624 (1995).
The county argues that summary judgment should be affirmed
because the plaintiffs voluntarily paid the $3 charge. The
voluntary payment doctrine provides that a payor may not recover
fees voluntarily paid, without protest, even if the fees were
illegal. Getto v. City of Chicago, 86 Ill. 2d 39, 48-49, 426 N.E.2d 844 (1981); Terra-Nova Investments v. Rosewell, 235 Ill.
App. 3d 330, 337, 601 N.E.2d 1109 (1992). But a payment is not
voluntary if (1) the payor lacked knowledge of facts upon which
to protest payment, or (2) the payment was made under duress.
Terra-Nova, 235 Ill. App. 3d at 337.
The voluntary payment doctrine does not apply when payment
is "made under duress or compulsion." See Getto, 86 Ill. 2d at
51; Geary v. Dominick's Finer Foods, Inc., 129 Ill. 2d 389, 395,
544 N.E.2d 344 (1989). Under the doctrine, a payment is made
"under duress" when the payee "exert[s] some actual or threatened
power over the payor from which the payor has no immediate relief
except by paying." Terra-Nova Investments, 235 Ill. App. 3d at
337.
The demand notices sent to plaintiffs here threatened
"further legal action," a "default judgment in the amount of $35
plus court costs," to "take action to recover payment in a larger
amount," or to "demand the maximum fine allowed by law." The
Datacom mailing directed the delinquent not to contact the
traffic court, where the delinquent parking tickets remained
pending. While threatening to obtain a default judgment, the
authors of the original demand notice state flatly, "No
information will be given or payment accepted at Traffic Court."
The county offers no legal foundation or statutory authority for
this unique restriction on a defendant in a pending case. The
county does not suggest what authority existed to allow the
authors of the demand notice to imply that the traffic court shut
itself off from communication with a traffic court defendant,
refuse to accept payments, or refuse to allow a defendant or his
attorney to file an appearance in a pending case. The demand
notice, in effect, suggests that the defendant's access to the
court system has been blocked by an intervening administrative
procedure established after suit was filed. We have found
nothing in Illinois law that would allow a government to issue
such notice and deny a defendant access to the courts.
The wording of these demand notices urged recipients to pay
the fines in lieu of steeper penalties or court action. But the
wording misrepresented the rights then available to delinquents
in their pending cases. No authority existed to announce that
"no information will be given or accepted at Traffic Court."
We are aware that in Horn v. City of Chicago, 860 F.2d 700
(7th Cir. 1988), the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals ruled on
the constitutionality of the revised notices in the context of a
Section 1983 (42 U.S.C. 1983 (1988)) action in which the
plaintiffs claimed that the wording of the unrevised notice
deprived them of due process without adequate notice of a
hearing. The plaintiffs argued that the demand notices
misleadingly implied that judgments had already been entered
against them in traffic court. Horn, 860 F.2d at 702. Reversing
the trial court, the seventh circuit found that the notices did
not "[imply] that judgment had already been entered against
plaintiffs" and were "reasonably certain to inform those
affected" that they could contest the amounts demanded. Horn,
860 F.2d at 705.
We agree with the seventh circuit that the notices did not
imply that judgments had been entered. But the seventh circuit's
analysis is not applicable here. The issue before the seventh
circuit did not require the court to address whether the notices
discouraged use of the judicial process or coerced payment. We
analyze the demand notices to decide a different issue: whether
the notices were coercive enough to render plaintiffs' payment
involuntary. We believe they were.
The county next argues that it is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law because plaintiffs, in their unjust enrichment
claim, presented no evidence that the county engaged in wrongful
conduct.
The county notes that unjust enrichment is "a condition that
may be brought about by unlawful or improper conduct *** and may
be redressed by a cause of action based upon that improper
conduct." McKay v. Kusper, 252 Ill. App. 3d 450, 463, 624 N.E.2d 1140 (1993). The county argues that they did not collect the $3
charge and cannot be vicariously liable for the alleged wrongful
conduct of the clerk of the circuit court.
The wrongful conduct rule is not absolute. Plaintiffs do
not argue that the county is vicariously liable for the clerk's
actions, but rely on a "constructive trust" theory. Whether the
clerk of the circuit court is the county's agent is not relevant.
Nor is wrongful conduct on the part of the county necessary to
impose a constructive trust. See Frederickson v. Blumenthal, 271
Ill. App. 3d 738, 740, 648 N.E.2d 1060 (1995) (recognizing that
courts have broadened application of constructive trusts beyond
those where defendant's conduct was wrongful).
Where a defendant has obtained money to which he is not
entitled, under such circumstances that "in equity and good
conscience he ought not retain it," the rightful owners of the
money can claim it through a constructive trust to avoid unjust
enrichment. Selmaville County Consolidated School District No.
10 v. Salem Elementary School District No. 111, 96 Ill. App. 3d
1062, 1066, 421 N.E.2d 1087 (1981). That the person receiving
the money acted in good faith does not prevent recovery of the
sum paid. Selmaville, 96 Ill. App. 3d at 1066; Board of
Education v. Holt, 41 Ill. App. 3d 625, 626, 354 N.E.2d 534
(1976).
The county next argues that it did not retain the $3 charge.
Although the county concedes that the money was deposited with
the county treasurer, the county maintains that the money was
held in trust for the purpose of the operation, maintenance and
benefit of the circuit court.
Where money is placed in the hands of a person to be
delivered to another, a resulting trust arises in favor of the
latter. In re Estate of Habel, 88 Ill. App. 2d 194, 202, 231 N.E.2d 616 (1967). The county argues that such a resulting trust
arose when the money from the surcharges was deposited with the
county treasurer because the funds were earmarked for the benefit
of the circuit court. Article I, section 12, of the Illinois
Constitution requires that litigants' circuit court fees only be
used to support the operation and maintenance of the circuit
court. See Crocker v. Finley, 99 Ill. 2d 444, 454, 459 N.E.2d 1346 (1984). The county points out that plaintiffs offered no
evidence to rebut the presumption that the county used the money
for anything other than its constitutionally mandated purposes.
See CBS, Inc. v. Partee, 198 Ill. App. 3d 936, 948, 556 N.E.2d 648 (1990) (public officials are presumed to act in accordance
with the law). So, the county argues, the county did not retain
the $3 charge, but used it to partially discharge the county's
funding responsibility to the circuit court.
While making this argument, the county does not dispute that
the surcharges were falsely labeled "court costs" and "statutory
mailing fees." Court costs could not be recovered without a
conviction. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 25, par. 27.2(16)("The
Circuit Court Clerk shall be entitled to costs in all criminal
and quasi-criminal cases from each person convicted therein").
Plaintiffs here were not convicted. Since the evidence shows
that the fees charged were never authorized court costs, we
cannot conclude the money received was lawfully held in trust for
the circuit court. The money may have been used to partially pay
the county's obligation to financially support the circuit court,
but that use does not negate the fact that the county benefitted
to the extent that the illegal fees freed up other monies the
county would have used to fund the court.
Plaintiffs claim that if summary judgment for the county is
set aside, they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on
their motion for summary judgment. If there is no dispute as to
any material fact, and the undisputed facts support only one
inference, the only question is the legal effect of the facts,
and summary judgment should be granted. Cnota v. Palatine Area
Football Ass'n., 227 Ill. App. 3d 640, 647, 592 N.E.2d 196
(1992). Plaintiffs assert that the evidence presented at summary
judgment showed that the surcharge was unauthorized and that the
county retained the benefit of these unauthorized fees. We
agree.
The evidence establishes that the surcharges were not
legally imposed "court costs" or "mailing fees." The record
shows that named plaintiffs Don Norton and Jane Reames paid these
surcharges based on a mistake of fact induced by
misrepresentation of the $3 surcharge. The parties do not
dispute that the money collected from this surcharge was given to
the county. We remand with directions to enter summary judgment
for plaintiffs Norton and Reames.
The record reveals that the trial court deferred ruling on
plaintiffs' motion for class certification. We express no
opinion on the issue. The trial court is directed to conduct a
hearing on class certification under sections 2-801 and 2-802 of
the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-801, 2-802 (West
1996)).
We next address plaintiffs' argument that they are entitled
to prejudgment interest. Generally, prejudgment interest "is not
recoverable absent a statute or agreement providing for it."
City of Springfield v. Allphin, 82 Ill. 2d 571, 413 N.E.2d 394
(1980). But plaintiffs argue that prejudgment interest is
recoverable without statutory authorization "where a municipal
corporation wrongfully exacts money and holds that money without
just right or claim." City of Chicago v. Northwestern Mutual
Life Insurance Co., 218 Ill. 40, 44, 75 N.E. 803 (1905). See
also City of Springfield, 82 Ill. 2d at 577-78. Plaintiffs argue
that this exception should apply to the county as well.
In City of Chicago, our supreme court did not elaborate on
the standard for deciding when prejudgment interest, not
authorized by statute or agreement, is appropriate. But in City
of Springfield, the court found that, even absent statutory
authority, a court may award interest "where warranted by
equitable considerations," but not where "such an award would not
comport with justice and equity." City of Springfield, 82 Ill. 2d at 579. In reliance on City of Springfield and other Illinois
cases, we have held that prejudgment interest not statutorily or
contractually authorized may only be awarded against a defendant
who wrongfully obtained and illegally withheld funds from a
plaintiff. Calumet Construction Corp. v. Metropolitan Sanitary
District of Greater Chicago, 178 Ill. App. 3d 415, 423, 533 N.E.2d 453 (1988). At issue here is the $3 penalty exacted for
each ticket. In Norton I we held that the city and its agent
were properly dismissed from the suit--the city because
plaintiffs did not allege the city received or retained money
from the $3 penalty, Datacom because the allegations of the
complaint were insufficient to establish that Datacom received or
retained any part of the $3 penalty. Yet because of the city's
wrongful action, the county now holds the money. The issue is
whether the party who innocently receives money wrongfully
obtained by another should pay prejudgment interest. We believe
prejudgment interest in this case would not meet the justice and
equity standard expressed in City of Springfield.
Reversed and remanded.
LEAVITT, P.J., and GORDON J., concur.
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