In re Marriage of Singleteary

THIRD DIVISION
NOVEMBER 5, 1997

1-95-3730

In Re MARRIAGE OF ) APPEAL FROM THE
) THE CIRCUIT COURT OF
STEPHEN B. SINGLETEARY, ) COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS
)
Petitioner-Appellee, )
) NO. 91 D 04278
and )
)
CHESTER L. SINGLETEARY, ) THE HONORABLE
) KAREN SHIELDS,
Respondent-Appellant. ) JUDGE PRESIDING.


PRESIDING JUSTICE COUSINS delivered the opinion of the
court:
On April 7, 1992, the trial court entered a judgment for
dissolution of marriage between the petitioner, Stephen
Singleteary, and respondent, Chester Singleteary. The judgment
incorporated a marital settlement agreement that included
provisions for child support for their child, Stephen II (Stephen
II). The agreement provided that respondent have physical
custody of Stephen and petitioner agreed to pay $864 per month or
20% of his net income, whichever amount was greater. In February
1995, petitioner filed an amended petition for modification of
child support due to a substantial change in circumstances. The
amended petition stated that there had been a substantial
increase in petitioner's income and the application of the
percentage order of the judgment would result in a child support
payment that exceeded the needs of the child and would create a
windfall to respondent. His prayer for relief asked the trial
court to modify the child support order and to enter a child

support order in a stated sum in a reasonable amount for the
support of Stephen II. The trial court found that the 20%
support order would result in an amount in excess of the needs of
Stephen II and ordered petitioner to pay $2,000 in child support
per month. On appeal, respondent contends that: (1) the trial
court erred in modifying child support, since the parties had
agreed to a valid and enforceable settlement agreement; (2)
petitioner failed to show a requisite change of circumstances to
warrant a modification of the settlement agreement; and (3) she
demonstrated sufficient support needs to warrant a $3,000-per-
month award.
BACKGROUND
Petitioner and respondent were married on July 22, 1982.
Their only child, Stephen B. Singleteary II, was born on February
22, 1985, and was six years old at the time petitioner filed a
petition for dissolution of marriage. At the time of their
divorce, respondent was employed as a banker by the First
National Bank of Chicago, earning an annual gross salary of
$55,000. Petitioner was a self-employed businessman with an
annual income of $90,000.
A judgment for dissolution of marriage was entered on April
7, 1992, which required petitioner to pay to respondent for the
support of seven-year-old Stephen II the sum of $432 twice a
month or 20% of his net income, whichever amount was greater.
Child support payments were to be determined by the following
2
formula: total income (line 23 of the 1991 United States tax form
No. 1040) minus line 18 (rents, partnership, estates,trusts,
etc.) of schedule E, minus federal and state income taxes, social
security (FICA) payments and any other medical insurance premiums
paid for the benefit of the child, minus other distributions
(year-end or otherwise), times 20% divided by 24. The child
support obligation also required that petitioner pay 20% of any
other distributions whenever received.
At the hearing on the motion for modification, petitioner
testified that, in August 1994, he became president of Diversity
Food Processing in Petersburg, Virginia. Diversity Food
Processing is a joint venture between Burger King Corporation,
Hudson Foods and SBS Processing. Diversity Food Processing is a
start-up food processing company that supplies hamburger patties
to Burger King. Petitioner owns 62% of the company.
Petitioner filed a petition to modify child support in
November 1994. Thereafter, he filed an amended petition for
modification of child support in which he alleged that there had
been a substantial increase in his annual income and that the
application of the percentage order of the judgment for
dissolution of marriage would result in a child support payment
that exceeded the needs of the child and that would create a
windfall to respondent. His prayer for relief asked the trial
court to modify the child support order and to enter a child

support order in a stated sum in a reasonable amount for the
support of Stephen II.
At the time of the parties' divorce, petitioner was employed
as president of Rayburt Systems, Inc. (Rayburt), which was a
subchapter S corporation that owned and operated Burger King
restaurants in Chicago. He was a 50% shareholder of Rayburt. He
also owned 50% of the shares of Rayburt Systems of Indiana
(Rayburt Indiana), which was a subchapter S corporation that
owned and operated Burger King restaurants in Indianapolis,
Indiana. His partner in both companies was a man named Oliver
Darton, who owned 50% of the shares of both Rayburt and Rayburt
Indiana and was president of Rayburt Indiana. Petitioner drew a
salary from Rayburt but not from Rayburt Indiana. His salary in
1992 and 1993 was $90,000.
Petitioner purchased his interest in Diversity Food
Processing by selling his Rayburt and Rayburt Indiana interests.
To purchase his interest in Diversity Food Processing, petitioner
was required by his new partners to divest himself of his
interest in his Burger King franchises and to borrow $1 million
to invest in the joint venture. He repaid the $1 million upon the
sale of his interest in the Burger King restaurants. The Burger
King restaurants owned by Rayburt Indiana and one individually
owned restaurant in Chicago were sold in 1994. The gross sale
proceeds were $1.9 million. These sales resulted in a capital
gain to petitioner in the amount of $714,654. The three Burger
King restaurants owned by Rayburt were sold in June 1995, but the
corporation had not yet been dissolved. The combined gross sale
proceeds of the Rayburt and Rayburt Indiana restaurants were
approximately $3 million. Petitioner did not know the amount of
the corporate liabilities at the time of sale and, therefore,
could not testify as to the amount of the net sales proceeds. The
sale proceeds of the Rayburt assets were deposited in the
corporation's account at South Shore Bank. Petitioner expects to
receive little or none of the net sale proceeds of Rayburt and
estimates the taxes due in September 1995, resulting from the
sale, to be between $300,000 and $350,000.
Petitioner has an employment agreement with Diversity Food
Processing that provides that his salary is $300,000 per year.
The salary amount was set by petitioner, Burger King and Hudson
Foods. The contract also provides for two potential bonuses, one
of an unstated amount and one in the amount of $100,000, which is
designated a "non-discretionary" bonus. Although the bonus is
termed nondiscretionary, it will be paid only if certain
objectives are met by the business. Petitioner's employment
agreement states that in any fiscal year that the company
achieves specific performance targets determined by the board and
based on the company's annual budget and the two-year plan, the
company shall pay to petitioner for such fiscal year, in addition
to his salary, a bonus in the amount of $100,000. If the company
does not reach a specific performance target, he will not get his
bonus. The board makes the determination as to whether the
objectives are being met and whether he will receive the bonus.
The board of directors consists of petitioner, two
representatives from Burger King, two representatives from Hudson
Foods, plus five other members. Petitioner does not control the
board in regard to issues of his compensation.
The company started production in the latter part of June
1995 and did not have revenue until July 1995. Based on the
company's projections, various cash flow analysis and profit-and-
loss statements, petitioner projects that the company will lose
anywhere between $500,00 to over $1 million and that, given that
loss, he did not believe that he would be receiving either bonus
for 1995 from Diversity Food Processing.
Petitioner receives his salary from Diversity Food
Processing on a bimonthly basis. The gross salary for the
bimonthly period is $12,500. He has a 401(k) deduction from each
paycheck of $385; a FICA deduction of $181.25; federal
withholding of $3,905.54; and state withholding of $362.20. His
total deductions are $4,833.99. Therefore, his net pay is
$7,666.01 per pay period.
When petitioner resided in Chicago, Stephen II spent two
days a week with his father. During 1995, Stephen II spent his
spring break, the month of August, and a week in June with his
father in Virginia.
In addition to child support payments, petitioner pays for
his son's camp, lessons, and club dues. He purchases educational
bonds and takes his son on annual vacations. Petitioner also
maintains medical insurance for Stephen II and pays the mortgage
on the condominium in which respondent and Stephen II reside.
The monthly mortgage payment is $794. The condominium has
various amenities, such as a 24-hour doorman, security, indoor
parking, cleaners, dentist, bank, grocery store, swimming pool,
tennis and racquetball courts, and a clubhouse. The parties and
Stephen II resided in the condominium as a family prior to the
divorce.
Since moving to Virginia, petitioner has purchased a
$430,000 home. He paid between $90,000 and $100,000 as a down
payment on the home and the mortgage is $340,000. Petitioner
leases a Porsche and purchased a 1992 Mercedes automobile with a
car allowance provided under his employment contract with
Diversity Food Processing.
Respondent testified that she has an undergraduate degree
from Indiana University and an MBA from the Kellogg School of
Business at Northwestern University. She is also a certified
public accountant. Respondent is vice president in the private
banking department at LaSalle National Bank. In 1994, her salary
was $70,000 and she earned a total income of $74,513. In 1995,
respondent's base salary increased to $72,500 and she received a
$3,000 bonus in February 1995. Her total earned income in 1995
was $75,500.
Respondent has a savings account at First Chicago Bank into
which petitioner deposits his child support. She deposits $1,000
per month into a savings account at LaSalle National Bank.
Respondent has a 401(k) plan at First Chicago in which she defers
6% of her gross salary each month. Her 401(k) savings account
has a total of $60,000. Respondent also owns 324 shares of First
Chicago stock valued at $58 per share with a total value of
$18,800.
Respondent has no mortgage or car payment for her Volvo 240
D automobile. She stated that monthly household expenses for
Stephen II and herself are limited to the following: condominium
monthly assessment, $377 per month, which includes cable and an
indoor parking space; electricity, $170 per month; telephone,
$120 per month; cellular phone, $60 per month; maid service, $130
per month; gas, $80 per month and car insurance, $100 per month.
Respondent stated that her repair bills for her car are a couple
of thousand dollars a year, which includes maintenance. She
estimates that she spends $5,200 per year on groceries and she
and Stephen II eat out twice a week at $20 to $25 per week.
Vacation expenses for the two of them are $1,200 to $1,500 per
year.
Respondent also stated that Stephen II's individual expenses
are: dry cleaning, $20 per month; piano lessons, $100 per month,
half of which petitioner pays; judo, $210 per year; basketball,
$160 per year; football, $100 per year; Kumon math instructional
program, $65 per month; public school fees, $100 per year;
clothing expenses, $2,000 to $2,500 per year; hair cuts, $10 per
cut; summer camp for one month, $100; out-of-pocket costs for
medical and dental care, $100 per year; birthday party expenses,
$500 per year; magazine subscriptions, $50 per year; books, $100
per year; birthday gifts for other people, $175 per year;
entertainment expenses for videos, pizzas, etc. $20 per week; and
Christmas presents for other people, $400 per year.
Respondent also testified that she believed that the
condominium was getting too small for her and Stephen II, and she
believed that Stephen II should be in a larger residence. She
also stated that she was not pleased with the education that
Stephen II was receiving at LaSalle Language Academy, a magnet
school, and would like him to attend a private school.
Following the hearing, the trial court, on September 22,
1995, issued its memorandum opinion. The court found that
petitioner's increase in income was a substantial change in
circumstances and warranted modification of the child support
agreement. The court further found that a 20% support order
would result in payment in excess of the needs of Stephen II and,
therefore, was not appropriate. The court balanced the needs of
the child, petitioner's resources and needs, respondent's
resources and needs, and the lifestyle the child would have had
if the parents had not separated, and ordered petitioner to pay
$2,000 per month for child support. Respondent appeals.
We affirm.
ANALYSIS
I
Respondent first contends that the support provisions in the
agreement, calling for petitioner to pay 20% of his net income to
respondent or a certain sum, are valid and enforceable.
Petitioner argues that the child support order was void and
unenforceable because it was based on a percentage.
Section 505 of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of
Marriage Act (Act) regulates child support orders:
" 505. *** (a) ***
(1) The Court shall determine the minimum amount of
support by using the following guidelines:
Number of Children Percent of Supporting Party's
Net Income

1 20%
2 25%
3 32%
4 40%
5 45%
6 or more 50%
* * *
(5) If the net income cannot be determined because of
default or any other reason, the court shall order support
in an amount considered reasonable in the particular case.
The final order in all cases shall state the support level
in dollar amounts." (Emphasis added.) 750 ILCS 5/505(a)(1),
(a)(5)(West 1992).
A first district, second division case, In re Marriage of Sheetz,
254 Ill. App. 3d 695, 627 N.E.2d 154 (1993), interpreted section
505(a) as stating that orders that state child support as a
percentage of income, rather than a dollar amount, violate the
Act, exceed the court's jurisdiction, and are void. See also In
re Marriage of Ingram, 259 Ill. App. 3d 685, 631 N.E.2d 386
(1994)(where the second district followed the Sheetz
interpretation).
Based on the above statutory provision and Sheetz,
petitioner argued at the hearing that the child support order was
void because it was based on a percentage of income. However,
recent Illinois appellate courts have declined to follow the
Sheetz interpretation. These cases have held that, although an
order improperly designates child support as a percentage of the
father's income rather than listing a dollar amount as required
by statute, the order is not void for lack of jurisdiction. See
In re Marriage of Baggett, 281 Ill. App. 3d 34, 666 N.E.2d 850
(1996)(a fifth district case); In re Marriage of Florence, 260
Ill. App. 3d 116, 632 N.E.2d 681 (1994)(a fourth district case).
These courts reason that, although a judgment that provides a
percentage rather than dollar amount may be erroneous, the
legislature did not expressly direct that child support orders
that do not set out the amount of support in dollar amounts are
void. Florence, 260 Ill. App. 3d at 121; In re Marriage of
Scott, 286 Ill. App. 3d 1056, 678 N.E.2d 1 (1996). Also, in the
first district case of In re Marriage of Liss, 268 Ill. App. 3d
919, 645 N.E.2d 341 (1994), the court examined the legislative
history of the Act and concluded that the order requiring the
father to pay $100 per week in child support or 20% of his net
income, whichever was greater, carried out the statutory goals of
the Act. Liss, 268 Ill. App. 3d at 920-23.
We agree with the jurisdictional view adopted in Florence,
Liss, and Baggett. The Act does not by its terms prohibit the
use of a percentage rate in a child support order. In the
instant case, the agreement stated that petitioner was to pay
respondent $864 per month or 20% of his net income. Although it
may have been improper to include the percentage in the
agreement, we note that the agreement also included a specific
dollar amount. Therefore, we affirm the trial court's finding
that the agreement was not void.
Petitioner argues that, although the trial court found the
provision to be valid, the agreement was, nevertheless
modifiable. We agree. The parties to a dissolution settlement
agreement may agree to make the maintenance provisions
nonmodifiable. In re Marriage of Corkey, 269 Ill. App. 3d, 392,
397, 645 N.E.2d 1384 (1995). The intention to preclude
modification must be expressly stated. Corkey, 269 Ill. App. 3d
at 397. However, provisions pertaining to child support may not
be made nonmodifiable. 750 ILCS 5/502(f)(West 1992); In re
Marriage of Falat, 201 Ill. App. 3d 320, 327, 559 N.E.2d 33
(1990). Thus, in marriage dissolution proceedings, a court is
not bound by the agreements between the parties providing for the
support of children. Falat, 201 Ill. App. 3d at 327.
In the instant case, the parties' marital settlement
agreement provided: "In the event of the failure of the Parties
to agree on such calculation and determination of child support,
either Party may petition the Court for such calculation." Also,
the parties' joint parenting agreement stated: "This Agreement
may only be modified upon a written modification signed by both
parties or upon Order of Court." Thus, notwithstanding the fact
that the law is clear that child support is modifiable, the
parties' agreements also allowed for modification for child
support.
II
Respondent contends that petitioner failed to show the
requisite change of circumstances to warrant a modification of
the agreement. Section 510(a) of the Act provides that a child
support judgment can be modified only upon a showing of a
"substantial change in circumstances." 750 ILCS 5/510(a)(West
1992). The burden of demonstrating such a substantial change in
circumstances is on the party seeking the relief. Deardeuff v.
Deardeuff, 149 Ill. App. 3d 406, 409, 500 N.E.2d 992 (1986).
Petitioner argues that he met the burden necessary to
warrant modification of the child support provision because his
income increased substantially. However, at oral argument,
respondent urged this court to hold that only an adverse change
in the noncustodial parent's circumstances is a "substantial
change of circumstances" that would warrant modification under
the Act. We refuse to do so because we believe such a holding
would go against public policy. The Act was intended to protect
the rights of children to be supported by their parents in an
amount commensurate with their income. In re Paternity of Perry,
260 Ill. App. 3d 374, 382, 632 N.E.2d 286 (1994). This would
necessarily include a modification due to an increase in income.
If a support order could be modified only due to adverse
circumstances, a custodial parent would not be allowed to seek an
increase in child support based on the noncustodial parent's
increased income. We do not believe that this is what the Act
intended. The law is clear that only some change in
circumstances of any nature that would justify equitable action
by the court in the best interests of the child is required. In
re Marriage of Heil, 233 Ill. App. 3d 888, 891, 599 N.E.2d 168
(1992).
In the instant case, petitioner's income was $90,000 at the
time of the divorce. At the time of the petition for
modification, the trial court found that petitioner's income had
increased to $300,000. Thus, petitioner's increase in income was
a substantial change warranting modification of the child support
agreement.

III
Respondent also contends that, even if petitioner met his
burden of proving a substantial change in circumstances, the
trial court abused its discretion in ordering petitioner to pay
$2,000 per month instead of the $3,000-per-month obligation he
would be required to pay under the agreement. Petitioner argues
that the trial court properly awarded $2,000 per month for child
support where Stephen II's expenses were substantially less than
$2,000 per month. We note that respondent labels the $2,000-per-
month child support a "diminishment" in the amount of the child
support because the agreement provided that the petitioner would
be obligated to pay a minimum of $3,000. However, the amount
awarded by the trial court is clearly an increase from the $864
per month that petitioner was initially ordered to pay.
After the threshold question of whether a substantial change
in circumstances has occurred is answered, then and only then may
the court determine the amount of the increase in child support.
Heil, 233 Ill. App. 3d at 890. In determining the amount of
increase in child support, the court considers the same factors
used in formulating the original amount. In re Marriage of
Lambdin, 245 Ill. App. 3d 797, 806, 613 N.E.2d 1381 (1993).
These factors include: (1) the financial resources of the child;
(2) the financial resources of the custodial parent; (3) the
standard of living the child would have enjoyed had the marriage
not been dissolved; (4) the physical and emotional condition of
the child and his educational needs; and (5) the financial
resources and the needs of the noncustodial parent. 750 ILCS
5/505(a)(2)(West 1992); Lambdin, 245 Ill. App. 3d at 806. A
petition to modify child support must be decided on the facts of
each case, and the decision rests within the sound discretion of
the trial court. Lambdin, 245 Ill. App. 3d at 807. Such an
abuse of discretion occurs only where no reasonable man would
take the view adopted by the trial court. In re Marriage of
Bush, 191 Ill. App. 3d 249, 260, 547 N.E.2d 590 (1989).
As to the award of child support, section 505(a) of the Act
(750 ILCS 5/505(a)(West 1992)) creates a rebuttable presumption
that a specified percentage of a noncustodial parent's income
represents an appropriate child support award. In re Marriage of
Freesen, 275 Ill. App. 3d 97, 105, 655 N.E.2d 1144 (1995). As we
stated earlier, section 505(a)(1) of the Act provides that, in
the case of one child, the minimum amount of child support that
the trial court should order is 20% of the noncustodial parent's
net income. 750 ILCS 5/505(a)(1)(West 1992). The trial court
found that petitioner's net income was $15,332 per month. Thus,
based on petitioner's monthly earnings, 20% of his net income is
$3,066.40 Accordingly, the $2,000-per-month child support
ordered by the trial court is actually below the statutory
guidelines.
When determining whether to deviate from the statutory
guidelines, a trial court's consideration of the factors set
forth in section 505 of the Act is mandatory, not directory. In
re Marriage of Charles, 284 Ill. App. 3d 339, 347, 672 N.E.2d 57
(1996). In addition, the trial court must make express findings
when it orders child support that is below the statutory minimum.
Charles, 284 Ill. App. 3d at 347.
When dealing with above-average incomes, the specific facts
of each case become more critical in determining whether the
guidelines should be adhered to. In re Marriage of Scafuri, 203
Ill. App. 3d 385, 561 N.E.2d 402 (1990). Where the individual
incomes of both parents are more than sufficient to provide for
the reasonable needs of the parties' children, the court is
justified in setting a figure below the guideline amount. In re
Marriage of Lee, 246 Ill. App. 3d 628, 643, 615 N.E.2d 1314
(1993). In determining the child support obligation of a high-
income parent, the court must balance competing concerns. Lee,
246 Ill. App. 3d at 643. On the one hand, child support awards
are not intended to be windfalls. Lee 246 Ill. App. 3d at 644.
On the other hand, the court must consider the standard of living
the children would have enjoyed absent parental separation and
dissolution. Lee, 246 Ill. App. 3d at 643-44. Thus, child support
is not to be based solely upon the shown needs of the child.
Freesen, 275 Ill. App. 3d at 105.
For example, in Bush, both the custodial and noncustodial
parents were physicians. The custodial parent earned $7,200 per
month and the noncustodial parent earned almost $25,000 per
month. Twenty percent of the noncustodial parent's income was
approximately $30,000 per year. Therefore, the trial court
ordered the noncustodial parent to pay into an irrevocable trust
for the child an amount equal to 20% of his net monthly income
less the cost of maintaining a life insurance policy to secure
his child support obligation and $800 to be paid directly to the
custodial spouse. The reviewing court found the use of the trust
to be improper because it appeared to be an unlawful court-
ordered inheritance. However, the court also held that, where
the individual incomes of both parents are more than sufficient
to provide for the reasonable needs of the parties' children,
taking into account the lifestyle the children would have had
absent the dissolution, the trial court is justified in setting a
figure below the guideline amount. Thus, the court remanded the
issue to the trial court for determination of a reasonable
specific monthly support amount. Bush, 191 Ill. App. 3d at 260-
62.
Also, in Lee, the appellate court upheld the trial court's
decision ordering the respondent to pay child support in an
amount below the statutory guidelines. Respondent's yearly income
ranged from $235,222 to $326,387. During the marriage, the child
enjoyed an above-average standard of living, which included
extensive travel and electronic equipment. The child also
required medical treatment for a respiratory disorder. The
petitioner earned less than $20,000 per year. The court held
that, based on the child's standard of living as well as
petitioner's inability to support the child at the same standard
of living, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
ordering the respondent to pay $3,000 per month for his 10-year-
old son. Lee, 246 Ill. App. 3d at 644.
In the case sub judice, the trial court found:
"[a] 20% support order would result in payment of a minimum
of $36,000 yearly which is in excess of the needs of this
child and therefore not appropriate. On the other hand, the
current order for $864.00 monthly does not meet his needs or
enable him to enjoy the standard of living he would have had
the marriage not been dissolved. Balancing the needs of the
child, Petitioner's resources and needs, Respondent's
resources [sic] and needs, and the lifestyle the child would
have had if the parents had not separated, the court finds
that an order for $2,000.00 per month is appropriate."
We believe that the trial court properly weighed the relevant
factors and did not abuse its discretion in awarding $2,000-per-
month for child support.
However, respondent argues that she warranted a $3,000-per-
month award because of Stephen II's increasing needs as he grows
older, including the need to enroll him in a local private school
and to relocate to a residence that is "less cramped than her
1,200-square-foot condominium." Respondent also refers to the
fact that she earns no more than a middle-class income with
limited savings, some bank stock, and an individual retirement
account, while petitioner earns at least $300,000 per year, has a
$2 million savings account, resides in a four-bedroom, $400,000
home and drives a Mercedes Benz and a Porsche.
We acknowledge the fact that petitioner earns a
disproportionately greater income than respondent. Thus, it is
only fair that he should bear the greater share of the costs of
support. However, the responsibility for the support of a child
is the joint obligation of the parents. In re Marriage of
Rogliano, 198 Ill. App. 3d 404, 413, 555 N.E.2d 1114 (1990).
Unlike the custodial parent in Lee, we believe respondent's
income is sufficient to contribute to Stephen II's needs in order
for him to live in the lifestyle he would have enjoyed had the
parties not separated.
Furthermore, the facts establish that, while Stephen II
enjoys a very comfortable lifestyle, he is not accustomed to a
lavish or extravagant lifestyle. Respondent testified regarding
expenses that are reasonably related to "lifestyle." These
expenses include, inter alia, restaurants, clothes, sports,
lessons, vacations, gifts, and entertainment. The trial court
awarded respondent over twice the amount of the original award.
Respondent argues that the trial court failed to mention food,
clothing, parking, entertainment, gift, vacation, personal
expenses, and the need to enroll Stephen II in a private school,
as well as the need to move to a larger residence. However, in
the court's memorandum opinion, the court lists Stephen II's
monthly living expenses and the court stated "[a]dditionally
there are parking, entertainment, gift, vacation and food
expenses and personal expenses for Respondent such as clothing."
It is true that as children become older, it is presumed that the
their needs escalate along with the cost of living. Lambdin, 245
Ill. App. 3d at 807. We agree with the trial court that Stephen
II's shown needs and lifestyle to which he is accustomed can be
adequately maintained on a total award of $2,000 per month.
Finally, a determination of the proper amount of child
support, and modification thereof, lies within the sound
discretion of the trial court and will not be set aside absent an
abuse of discretion. In re Marriage of Partney, 212 Ill. App. 3d
586, 590, 571 N.E.2d 266 (1991). Based on the evidence presented
at trial, we do not believe the court abused its discretion in
modifying Stephen's support obligation to $2000 per month.
For the reasons cited herein, the judgment of the circuit
court of Cook County is affirmed.
Affirmed.
LEAVITT and CAHILL, JJ., concur.