Holland v. City of Chicago

                                             FIFTH DIVISION
                                             June 27, 1997






No. 1-95-2491
                                      
NORMAN HOLLAND, CARLYLE JAKOVEC,   )    Appeal from the
SALVATORE TRICOCI, THOMAS KELLY,   )    Circuit Court of
and JAMES McDONOUGH, individually  )    Cook County.
and on behalf of all others        )
similarly situated and derivatively)
on behalf of the Policemen's       )
Annuity and Benefit Fund and the   )
Firemen's Annuity and Benefit Fund )    No. 90 CH 9756
of Chicago,                        )
                                   )
     Plaintiffs-Appellants,        )
v.                                 )    The Honorable
                                   )    Dorothy Kirie Kinnaird,
THE CITY OF CHICAGO, a municipal   )    Judge, Presiding.
corporation; RICHARD M. DALEY,     )
Mayor of the City of Chicago;      )
MIRIAM SANTOS, Treasurer of the    )
City of Chicago and Trustee of the )
Policemen's Annuity and Benefit    )
Fund and Firemen's Annuity and     )
Benefit Fund of Chicago; WALTER    )
KNORR, Comptroller of the City of  )
Chicago and Trustee of the         )
Policemen's Annuity and Benefit    )
Fund and Firemen's Annuity and     )
Benefit Fund of Chicago; WALTER    )
KOZUBOWSKI, former City Clerk of   )
the City of Chicago and Former     )
Trustee of the Firemen's Annuity   )
and Benefit Fund of Chicago;       )
ERNEST WISH, City Clerk and        )
Trustee of the Firemen's Annuity   )
and Benefit Fund; RUSSELL EWERT,   )
THOMAS ALLISON, CHESTER JASKOLA,   )
Former Trustees and CHARLES R.     )
LOFTUS, RONALD R. NORRIS, GARY B.  )
HELMS, ROBERT F. RUESCHE and       )
RICHARD J. JONES, Trustees of the  )
Policemen's Annuity and Benefit    )
Fund, and JAMES T. NOLAN, FRED     )
GAWRYK, JOSEPH F. QUINN, WILLIAM   )
J. WILKINSON and JAMES T. JOYCE,   )
Trustees of the Firemen's Annuity  )
and Benefit Fund of Chicago, and   )
DONALD STENSLAND, Former Trustee,  )
all as direct and/or derivative    )
defendants; and THE RETIREMENT     )
BOARD OF THE POLICEMEN'S ANNUITY   )
AND BENEFIT FUND and THE           )
RETIREMENT BOARD OF THE FIREMEN'S  )
ANNUITY AND BENEFIT FUND OF        )
CHICAGO as direct defendants only, )
                                   )
     Defendants-Appellees.         )

     JUSTICE HOURIHANE delivered the opinion of the court:

     Plaintiffs, current or former members of the Chicago police
and fire departments, who are or will be entitled to receive
retirement benefits, brought an action against the City of Chicago
(City), various city officials, the trustees of the Policemen's and
Firemen's Annuity and Benefit Funds (hereafter Policemen's and
Firemen's Pension Funds or the Funds), and the Retirement Boards of
the Funds (hereafter pension boards or boards), seeking declaratory
and injunctive relief and damages.  The gravamen of plaintiffs'
complaint is that the City failed to report to the pension boards
the full amount of "salary" paid to plaintiffs, contrary to the
provisions of Articles 5 and 6 of the Illinois Pension Code (40
ILCS 5/1-101 et seq. (West 1994 and Supp. 1995)), thereby
decreasing plaintiffs' total vested pension benefits.  Plaintiffs
also alleged that defendants' practice of excluding certain items
of compensation from "salary" deprived plaintiffs of their due
process rights in violation of federal civil rights law.  42 U.S.C.
 1983 (1988).  
     The circuit court dismissed all of plaintiffs' claims with
prejudice either on the pleadings, pursuant to section 2-615 of the
Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 1994)), or
pursuant to the provisions of section 2-619 of the Code (735 ILCS
5/2-619 (West 1994).  Plaintiffs appeal.  155 Ill. 2d R. 301.  The
principal issue on review is whether the circuit court properly
construed the Pension Code to exclude certain items of compensation
from "salary" for purposes of calculating pension contributions and
benefits.  For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of
the circuit court.
                                  ANALYSIS
     As a preliminary matter, the Funds argue that judicial review
of certain counts of the complaint is barred because plaintiffs ran
afoul of the Administrative Review Law.  735 ILCS 5/3-101 et seq.
(West 1994).  We decline to entertain the Funds' argument as it
finds no support in the record before this court.
     As to the principal issue on appeal, plaintiff police officers
contend that the following items of compensation, negotiated under
one or more collective bargaining agreements, fall within the
definition of "salary" as used in Article 5 of the Pension Code:
duty availability allowance, uniform allowance, overtime pay,
holiday pay, optional pay for personal days, pay for baby furlough
days, final vacation pay, pay for work out of grade, and
supplemental pay for sergeants, lieutenants and captains. 
Plaintiffs also claim that a one-time lump sum payment of $1,250
made during 1989 pursuant to an arbitration award also constitutes
"salary".
     Plaintiff firefighters contend that the following items of
compensation fall within the definition of "salary" under Article 6
of the Pension Code: shift reduction allowance, clothing allowance,
overtime pay, holiday pay, final vacation pay, pay received for
acting out of classification, pay received for attending
recertification training seminars during off-duty hours, pay for
unused administrative days, training instructor incentive pay, and
a $1,250 one-time lump sum payment made during 1988.  All of these
pay provisions arise under the firefighters' collective bargaining
agreements.
     The circuit court concluded that none of the disputed
compensation items constitute "salary" for purposes of the Pension
Code.  The court noted that there was no evidence that the
legislature intended that the additional benefits firefighters and
police officers receive under their labor contracts should be
included in salary, and that "salary" means "the base salary in the
budget line item as appropriated in the municipality's
appropriation ordinance."  Plaintiffs argue that the language of
the Pension Code, the Illinois Constitution, and caselaw construing
the Pension Code require the opposite conclusion, and that pension
rights cannot be decided based on how the City and the unions label
a pay provision.  
     We agree with defendants that the circuit court correctly
construed the Pension Code.  The primary object of statutory
construction is to give effect to the true intent of the
legislature.  Kraft, Inc. v. Edgar, 138 Ill. 2d 178, 189, 561 N.E.2d 656 (1995).  Such inquiry necessarily begins with the
language employed in the statute, as this is the best evidence of
the legislature's intent.  Kraft, 138 Ill. 2d  at 189.  Where a
statute defines its own terms, those terms will be construed in
accordance with the statutory definitions.  Puss N Boots, Inc. v.
Mayor's License Comm'n of the City of Chicago, 232 Ill. App. 3d
984, 987, 597 N.E.2d 650 (1992).  Absent such definitions, the
words used in a statute will be given their plain and ordinary
meanings.  Eagan v. Chicago Transit Authority, 158 Ill. 2d 527,
531-32, 634 N.E.2d 1093 (1994).  In ascertaining the plain and
ordinary meaning of words, courts have used the dictionary as a
resource.  People ex rel. Daley v. Datacom Systems Corp., 146 Ill. 2d 1, 15, 585 N.E.2d 51 (1992).  We turn first to the provisions of
Article 5 of the Pension Code which governs policemen's annuity and
benefit funds.
                   Policemen's Annuity and Benefit Fund 
     Section 5-114 of the Pension Code defines a police officer's
"salary" as follows:
               "(a) Annual salary, provided that $2,600 shall
          be the maximum amount of salary to be considered for
          any purpose under this Act prior to July 1, 1927.
               (b)  Annual salary, provided that $3,000 shall
          be the maximum amount of salary to be considered for
          any purpose under this Act from July 1, 1927 to July
          1, 1931.
               (c)  Annual salary, provided that the annual
          salary shall be considered for age and service
          annuity, minimum annuity and disability benefits and
          $3,000 shall be the maximum amount of salary to be
          considered for prior service annuity, widow's
          annuity, widow's prior service annuity and child's
          annuity from July 1, 1931 to July 1, 1933.
               (d)  Beginning July 1, 1933, annual salary of a
          policeman appropriated for members of his rank or
          grade in the city's annual budget or appropriation
          bill, subject to the following:
               (1)  For age and service annuity, minimum
          annuity and disability benefits, the amount of
          annual salary without limitation;
               (2)  For prior service annuity, widow's
          annuity, widow's prior service annuity and child's
          annuity from July 1, 1933 to July 1, 1957, the
          amount of annual salary up to a maximum of $3,000;
          beginning July 1, 1957, for such annuities the
          amount of annual salary without limitation.
               (3)  When the salary appropriated is for a
          definite period of service of less than 12 months in
          any one year, disability benefits shall be computed
          on a daily wage basis computed by dividing the
          amount appropriated by 365.
               (e)  For a policeman assigned to a non-civil
          service position as provided in Section 5-174 from
          and after January 1, 1970, (with the hereinafter
          stated excess not considered as salary for any
          purpose of this Article for any of the years prior
          to 1970 except to the extent provided by the
          election in Section 5-174), annual salary means the
          total salary derived from appropriations applicable
          to the civil service rank plus the excess over such
          amount paid for service in the non-civil service
          position."  (Emphasis added.) 40 ILCS 5/5-114 (West
          1994).
     Plaintiffs focus on the "without limitation" language in
subsection (d)(1) and argue that the obvious meaning of this
language is that the legislature intended that all compensation, in
whatever form, be included in salary for pension purposes, as long
as the funds were budgeted and appropriated by the City.   We
disagree.  When interpreting a statute, it must be viewed as a
whole.  People v. Acevedo, 275 Ill. App. 3d 420, 425, 656 N.E.2d 118 (1995).  Thus, a particular provision must not be read in
isolation, but rather must be read in conjunction with all other
relevant provisions.  Cincinnati Insurance Co. v. Miller, 190 Ill.
App. 3d 240, 244, 546 N.E.2d 700 (1989); Acevedo, 277 Ill. App. 3d
at 425.  Plaintiffs' reading of subsection (d)(1) ignores the
preceding subsections.
     Subsections (a), (b), and (c), which define "salary" for
various time periods prior to July 1, 1933, all set a dollar cap on
the amount of salary that is to be considered for purposes of
Article 5 of the Pension Code.  Subsection (d)(1), on the other
hand, which covers the period beginning July 1, 1933, refers to
"annual salary without limitation".   Plainly this language was not
intended to enlarge the definition of salary, but rather is
indicative only that, unlike prior periods, no dollar cap applies. 
Similarly, the reference in subsection (d)(2) to "annual salary
without limitation" is in contrast to the preceding portion of
(d)(2) which refers to the annual salary, up to a certain maximum
amount, when computing prior service annuity and widow's and
child's annuity for different time periods.
     Plaintiffs also focus on subsection (e), which provides that
annual salary of officers in non-civil service positions shall be
the "total appropriations applicable to civil service rank plus the
excess over such amount paid for service in the non-civil service
position."  Plaintiffs contend that the legislature's inclusion of
excess compensation derived from the non-civil service position
provides conclusive evidence that the legislature intended police
officers to receive credit for all appropriated compensation.  We
cannot agree.  We read subsection (e) to mean only that police
officers appointed to a non-civil service position will not be
penalized by such appointment and thus receive credit for salary
attributable to their civil service rank, and any excess paid by
virtue of their non-civil service appointment.
     Plaintiffs' strained interpretation of section 5-114 fails to
take into account the unambiguous language found in subsection (d). 
Subsection (d) plainly states that a police officer's "salary" is
the "annual salary of a policeman appropriated for members of his
rank or grade in the city's annual budget or appropriation bill". 
While there is no question that the disputed items of compensation
have been duly appropriated by the City as part of the police
department's annual budget, plaintiffs cite to nothing in any of
the City's appropriation ordinances which demonstrates that such
items of compensation have been appropriated as "salary" by "rank
or grade". 
     We note that the appropriation ordinance for the City of
Chicago, Department of Police, includes a section which lists each
"position" within the police department, the number of each
position, and the "rate", i.e., "salary", attached to the position. 
There is no indication that such salary figures include any of the
disputed items of compensation.  Rather, based on the record before
this court, the rates appear to coincide with the "basic salary
schedule" set forth in the collective bargaining agreement.  We
also observe that, with one exception (that being the $1,250 lump
sum payment), all of the disputed items of compensation arise by
virtue of one or more negotiated labor contracts and that
plaintiffs cite to no provision in such contracts indicating that
these additional items are intended to be treated as "salary" for
purposes of pension contributions.  As to the $1,250 payment, the
arbitrator referred to it not as salary, but as a "signing bonus".
     Irrespective of how the various components of a police
officer's total compensation are treated in the City's annual
appropriation ordinance or in the relevant labor contracts, we are
not persuaded that the disputed items of compensation should
otherwise be included in "annual salary" for purposes of computing
pension contributions and benefits.  Jahn v. Woodstock, 99 Ill.
App. 3d 206, 425 N.E.2d 490 (1981), on which the circuit court
relied, provides some guidance.
     In Jahn, the court considered whether the term "salary", as
used in Article 3 of the Pension Code (which governs police pension
funds in municipalities of less than 500,000 inhabitants), should
be read to include insurance premiums paid by a municipality on
behalf of police officers.  The court looked to the definition of
"salary" set out in section 3-125(2) which specifically excludes
overtime pay, holiday pay, bonus pay, merit pay, or any other cash
benefit over and above the salary established in the appropriation
ordinance.  Ill. Rev. Stat. (1979) ch. 108«, par. 3-125(2) (now 40
ILCS 5/3-125.1).  The court also observed that "salary" generally
means a fixed annual or periodical payment and thus does not
typically include fringe benefits such as insurance premiums,
clothing allowance, milage, and vacation pay.  Jahn, 99 Ill. App.
3d at 209.  The court reasoned that, had the legislature intended
to include such items in "salary", it would have chosen more
inclusive statutory language.  In the absence of such language, the
court would not read the statute as including insurance premiums
within "salary" under Article 3.
     Although here we are concerned with Article 5 of the Pension
Code, we find the court's reasoning in the Jahn decision
persuasive.  There is a complete absence in Article 5 of any
language indicating an intent by the legislature to depart from the
generally accepted definition of "salary", i.e., fixed compensation
paid regularly for services (Webster's Third New International
Dictionary 2003 (1993)), to include fringe benefits and other
compensation.  A "fringe benefit" is generally defined as "an
employment benefit (as a pension, a paid holiday, or health
insurance) granted by an employer that involves a money cost
without effecting basic wage rates."  Webster's Third New
International Dictionary 912 (1993).  We believe the disputed items
of compensation are appropriately categorized as fringe benefits as
they are in addition to the regular wage.  Thus, in the absence of
statutory language indicating otherwise, such benefits are not a
component of "salary".  
     Under plaintiffs' interpretation of the statute, the
distinction between fringe benefits and salary is extinguished. 
Had the legislature intended this result, then it surely would have
used more sweeping language such as "salary, fringe benefits and
other compensation".  See Jahn, 99 Ill. App. 3d at 209.   Rather,
the legislature used the more limiting term, "salary".  We will not
presume that the legislature's choice of words was inadvertent.
     Plaintiffs contend that such a narrow reading of the term
"salary" violates the rule that pension statutes are to be
liberally construed in favor of those to be benefited, and that any
ambiguity in the definition of "salary" should be resolved in favor
of including the disputed pay provisions.  Plaintiffs rely
principally on Board of Trustees of the Policemen's Pension Fund of
the Village of Oak Brook v. Department of Insurance, 42 Ill. App.
3d 155, 356 N.E.2d 171 (1976) (hereafter Oak Brook) and Board of
Trustees of the Firemen's Pension Fund of the City of Park Ridge v.
Department of Insurance, 109 Ill. App. 3d 919, 441 N.E.2d 107
(1982) (hereafter Park Ridge).  
     We agree that the Pension Code should be liberally construed
in favor of the City's police officers, one of the statute's
intended group of beneficiaries.  Oak Brook, 42 Ill. App. 3d at
159.  This general rule, however, does not permit this court, under
the guise of statutory construction, to substitute different
provisions or otherwise depart from the plain meaning of the words
employed.  Buckellew v. Board of Education of Georgetown-Ridge Farm
Community Unit School District No. 4, 215 Ill. App. 3d 506, 511,
575 N.E.2d 556 (1991).  We find no ambiguity in the term "salary"
as used in Article 5 and thus no basis on which to construe the
statute in the fashion plaintiffs urge. 
     A review of the Oak Brook and Park Ridge cases does not change
the result.  In Oak Brook, the court considered whether certain
merit increases in pay should be included in "salary" for purposes
of Articles 3 and 4 of the Pension Code (which govern police
officers' and firefighters' pension funds in municipalities of less
than 500,000 inhabitants, respectively), despite a statutory
provision excluding merit pay or "any other cash benefit over and
above the salary established by the appropriation ordinance."  Ill.
Rev. Stat. (1973) ch. 108«, pars. 3-125(2) and 4-124 (now 40 ILCS
5/3-125.1 and 5/4-118.1, respectively).  Under the village's Merit
Pay Plan, any merit increases were added to the employee's former
salary and that total was appropriated by ordinance as the annual
salary for the employee.  Thus, the court reasoned that the pay
increase "merged" into and became the employee's salary for the
next year.  Accordingly, it could not be said that the merit pay
increases were "over and above" the appropriated salaries.  In the
case sub judice, plaintiffs fail to cite to any portion of the
City's annual appropriation ordinance from which this court could
conclude that the disputed items of compensation were added to an
officer's basic salary and, in effect, merged into and became a
part of the officer's salary for the coming year.  
     Plaintiffs' reliance on Park Ridge is equally unavailing. 
There the court considered whether a $700 payment to paramedics,
paid on a quarterly basis and designated as a "bonus" should be
considered part of "salary" for purposes of Article 4 of the
Pension Code.  Article 4 specifically excluded from salary "bonus
pay *** over and above the salary established by the appropriation
ordinance".  Ill. Rev. Stat. (1979), ch. 108«, par. 4-124 (now 40
ILCS 5/4-118.1).  The additional $700 sum was payable to paramedics
pursuant to contract on a pro rata basis upon the date they
completed training and were authorized to assume full paramedic
responsibilities.  The court reasoned that when a fireman is
certified as a paramedic, his salary includes the $700 payment and
merely labelling it a bonus did not change the legal character of
the compensation.  The court considered the general definition of
bonus as a payment "in addition" to regular wages, and concluded
that the $700 payment was not in addition to, but was part of,
regular wages because it did not abate until the paramedic assumed
inactive status.  We do not believe that the particular items of
compensation at issue here are sufficiently similar to the
paramedic bonus in Park Ridge to warrant similar treatment.
     Plaintiffs further argue that under Rock v. Burris, 139 Ill. 2d 494, 564 N.E.2d 1240 (1990), if the purpose of the pay provision
is to increase annual compensation, then it is "salary."  In Rock
v. Burris, our supreme court construed the term "salary" for
purposes of Article IV, 11 of the Illinois constitution which
prohibits members of the legislature from increasing their salary
during the term for which they have been elected.  Ill. Const.
1970, art. IV, 11.  Plainly, Rock v. Burris involved issues
totally distinct from those before this court and we find little
guidance in case law construing the term "salary" under
constitutional provisions not relevant here.
     Finally, we reject plaintiffs' contention that the circuit
court's construction of the Pension Code violates Article XIII, 5
of the Illinois constitution.  Article XIII provides, inter alia,
that membership in any municipal pension or retirement system
"shall be an enforceable contractual relationship, the benefits of
which shall not be diminished or impaired."  Ill. Const. 1970, art.
XIII, 5.  Plaintiffs argue that the City and police pension board
have violated this constitutional provision by ignoring the clear
intent and language of Article 5 and basing pension contributions
and benefits on less than an officer's entire salary.  Plaintiffs'
argument misses the mark.  There is no indication that the term
"salary" as used in Article 5 was ever intended by the legislature
to include fringe benefits and other forms of compensation other
than an officer's basic salary.  Thus, there can be no claim that
the City or pension board has somehow redefined a statutory term,
thus diminishing an officer's benefits. 
     Based on the foregoing, we find no error in the circuit
court's construction of the term "salary" under Article 5 of the
Pension Code as excluding the disputed items of compensation.  We
turn now to the provisions of Article 6 of the Pension Code which
governs the Firemen's Pension Fund.
                     Firemen's Annuity and Benefit Fund
     Section 6-163 sets forth the basis on which annuities and
pensions for firefighters will be computed:
               "Annual salary for computing annuities and
          benefits--Amount of duty disability benefit limited. 
          For age and service annuity, the minimum annuities
          prescribed in Sections 6-123 and 6-128 and for
          disability benefits, salary as defined in Section 6-
          111 shall be the basis of computation.  For
          disability pension and duty disability benefit under
          this Article, it shall be assumed that the annual
          salary of a fireman is the amount set out and
          appropriated for the rank or grade held by him in
          the annual budget or appropriation of the city ***." 
          (Emphasis added.) 40 ILCS 5/6-163 (West 1994).
     Section 6-111, in turn, provides the following definition of
"salary":
               "Subject to Section 6-211, the annual salary of
          a fireman, as follows:
               (a)  For age and service annuity, minimum
          annuity and disability benefits, the actual amount
          of the annual salary;
               (b)  For prior service annuity, widow's
          annuity, widow's prior service annuity and child's
          annuity to and including August 31, 1957, the amount
          of the annual salary up to a maximum of $3,000;
               (c)  Except as otherwise provided in Section 6-
          141.1, for widow's annuity, beginning September 1,
          1957, the amount of annual salary up to a maximum of
          $6,000."  (Emphasis added.) 40 ILCS 5/6-111 (West
          1994).
     Finally, section 6-211, entitled "Permanent and temporary
positions", provides in relevant part as follows:
               "No annuity, pension or other benefit shall be
          paid to a fireman or widow, under this Article,
          based upon any salary paid by virtue of a temporary
          appointment.  All contributions, annuities and
          benefits shall be related to the salary which
          attached to the permanent position of the fireman.
          ***
               A fireman who holds a position at the will of
          the Fire Commissioner or other appointing authority,
          whether or not such position is an "exempt"
          position, shall be deemed to hold a temporary
          position, and such employee's contributions and
          benefits shall be based upon the employee's
          permanent career service salary.  (Emphasis added.)
          40 ILCS 5/6-211 (West 1994).
     Plaintiffs again focus on only a portion of the relevant
statutory language, arguing that the phrase, "the actual amount of
salary", found in section 6-111(a), is evidence that the
legislature did not intend to exclude from salary any of the
disputed items of compensation.  The language employed in
subsection (a) is in contrast to subsections (b) and (c) which
provide, under other circumstances, that the annual salary shall be
the amount of annual salary up to a specified maximum.  Thus, the
phrase "actual salary" in subsection (a) merely indicates that the
basis of computation for the circumstances set out in subsection
(a) will be the fireman's salary without any statutory maximum,
i.e., the "actual salary."  We do not read subsection (a) as
enlarging the meaning of the term "salary".
     Plaintiffs further argue that under Quinn v. Retirement Board
of the Firemen's Annuity and Benefit Fund of Chicago, 7 Ill. App.
3d 791, 289 N.E.2d 117 (1972) all of the disputed items of
compensation must be included in "salary".  We disagree.  In Quinn,
this court considered the effect of a 1967 amendment to section 6-
163 of the Firemen's Pension Code.  Ill. Rev. Stat. (1967), ch.
108«, par. 6-163 (now 40 ILCS 5/6-163).  The amendment provided
that salary, as defined in section 6-111, shall be the basis of
computation for annuities and pensions.  Section 6-111 defined
salary as "the actual amount of the annual salary."  Ill. Rev.
Stat. (1967), ch. 108«, par. 6-111 (now 40 ILCS 5/6-111).  Prior to
amendment, section 6-163 provided that in determining annuities and
pensions, the annual salary of a firefighter was the amount set out
and appropriated in the city's budget for the rank or grade held by
the firefighter.
     Applying general principles of statutory construction, this
court held that the legislature clearly intended, by the 1967
amendment, that the minimum annuity or pension of a participant in
the firemen's pension fund would be predicated upon "the actual
amount of annual salary appropriated in the annual budget for the
particular position occupied by the participant *** rather than on
the salary of his highest attained civil service rank."  Quinn, 7
Ill. App. 3d at 797.  Accordingly, plaintiff's pension benefits
would be based upon his $30,000 annual salary as Fire Commissioner,
rather than the $14,000 annual salary he received in his highest
attained civil service rank of Division Fire Marshall.  
     There is nothing in the Quinn decision which suggests that
fringe benefits and other compensation, such as those at issue
here, were or should be included in a firefighter's annual salary
when computing pension contributions and benefits.  Rather, the
Quinn decision makes clear that it is the "annual salary
appropriated in the annual budget for the particular position
occupied by the participant" that is controlling. (Emphasis added.) 
Quinn, 7 Ill. App. 3d at 797.
     Plaintiffs fail to cite to any portion of the City's annual
appropriation ordinances which demonstrates that the disputed items
of compensation have been appropriated as "salary" for a particular
"position".  The fire department budget is set out in the
appropriation ordinance in the same manner as the police department
budget.  The budget lists each position within the fire department,
the number of such positions, and the relevant "salary" or "rate". 
There is no indication that the "salary" or "rate" figures include
the additional items of compensation at issue here.  Moreover, in
the case of the $1,250 lump sum payment, the firefighters'
collective bargaining agreement expressly provides that it is not
subject to contributions under the Pension Code.
     Without regard to how the appropriation ordinances or
collective bargaining agreements treat the various components of a
firefighters' total compensation, we find no basis on which to
conclude that the additional items of compensation should be
included in "salary" for purposes of computing pension deductions,
contributions and benefits.   With respect to a firefighter's
salary, Article 6 variously refers to (1) the "amount set out and
appropriated for the rank or grade held by [the firefighter] in the
annual budget or appropriation of the city" (40 ILCS 5/6-163); (2)
"the actual amount of the annual salary" (40 ILCS 5/6-111); (3)
"the salary which [is] attached to the permanent position of the
fireman" (40 ILCS 5/6-211); and (4) "the employee's permanent
career service salary" (40 ILCS 5/6-211).  Article 6 also refers
simply to "salary" without further modification.  E.g., 40 ILCS
5/6-123, 5/6-128.   None of these provisions evidence an intent by
the legislature to include every form of remuneration and every
item of compensation within "salary" when computing pension
benefits.  
     As stated earlier, salary is ordinarily defined as a fixed,
periodical payment for services rendered.  See Jahn v. Woodstock,
99 Ill. App. 3d at 209; Webster's Third New International
Dictionary 2003 (1993).  It does not include fringe benefits and
other forms of compensation.  As in the case of the police
officers, we believe that the additional items of compensation paid
to firefighters are properly characterized as fringe benefits and
thus properly excluded from "salary" under Article 6 of the Pension
Code.  
     Plaintiffs also advance essentially the same arguments with
respect to the firemen's pension fund as they do with respect to
the policemen's pension fund, urging a liberal construction of the
statute and conformity with various constitutional provisions.  For
the reasons already stated, we reject such arguments.  
     We note that our decision today finds support in the case law
of other jurisdictions which have been called upon to construe the
term "salary" under similar circumstances.  See City of Covington
v. Board of Trustees of the Policemen's and Firefighters'
Retirement Fund, 903 S.W.2d 517 (Ky. 1995); Hohensee v. Regan, 138 A.D.2d 812, 525 N.Y.S.2d 733 (1988);  Craig v. City of Huntington,
179 W.Va. 668, 371 S.E.2d 596 (1988); Hill v. City of Lincoln, 213
Neb. 517, 330 N.W.2d 471 (1983); Borough of Beaver v. Liston, 76
Pa. Commw. 619, 464 A.2d 679 (1983);  Hilligoss v. LaDow, 174 Ind.
App. 520, 368 N.E.2d 1365 (1977). 
     For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the circuit court
dismissing plaintiffs' claims with prejudice is affirmed.
     AFFIRMED.