People v. Williams

No. 1-94-2395

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,    )    Appeal from the
                                        )    Circuit Court of
     Plaintiff-Appellee,                )    Cook County
                                        )
                                        )
     v.                                 )    
                                        )
                                        )    
ROBERT WILLIAMS,                        ) 
                                        )                        
     Defendant-Appellant.               )    The Honorable
                                        )    Dennis A. Dernbach,
                                        )    Judge Presiding
     PRESIDING JUSTICE DiVITO delivered the opinion of the court:
     A jury found defendant Robert Williams guilty of armed
violence and possession of a controlled substance.  The circuit
court sentenced him to 18 years in the custody of the Illinois
Department of Corrections for the armed violence conviction and a
concurrent three-year sentence for the controlled substance
offense.
     On appeal, defendant contends that he was denied a fair trial
(1) by the admission of evidence, for impeachment purposes, of his
prior conviction for voluntary manslaughter; (2) by the admission
and use of testimony concerning the substance of a conversation
police had with a nontestifying citizen; and (3) by the State's
argument that the testimony of two witnesses was more credible than
defendant's because they were police officers.
     Before trial, defendant filed a motion to suppress a gun and
drugs police said they had recovered from him at the time of his
arrest.  After a hearing, the circuit court denied this motion.
     Defendant then filed a motion in limine to prohibit the State
from introducing evidence of his prior convictions for voluntary
manslaughter and violation of bail bond.  The court denied this
motion based on the supreme court decision in People v. Montgomery,
47 Ill. 2d 510, 268 N.E.2d 695 (1971).
     Defendant also asked the court to prevent the State from
introducing evidence of a conversation between police and a citizen
who did not testify at trial.  That conversation was the basis for
the police placing defendant's car under surveillance and ultimate-
ly stopping him.  The court denied this motion in limine.  It
decided that evidence of the conversation did not violate the
hearsay rule because it explained the actions of the police
officers.
     At trial, Officer Al Elizondo testified that he and his
partner, Officer Dan Kenezovich, were working as members of the
Chicago police department tactical unit on December 9, 1992.  They
were not wearing uniforms and were riding in an unmarked car.  At
approximately 10 p.m., a citizen motioned to them to stop near 3200
East 92nd Street.  
     Defendant objected to Elizondo's testimony concerning his
conversation with the citizen, but the circuit court overruled the
objection.  The court, however, gave the jury a limiting instruc-
tion:
          "Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, I am allowing
     this conversation between the defendant [sic] and the
     citizen in for a limited purpose to show the conduct of
     the police officers.  It should not be considered by you
     as evidence against the defendant in terms of his guilt
     or innocence to the charges before the Court."
The court granted defense counsel's request for a standing
objection to the conversation.
     Elizondo testified that the citizen said that a man had
approached him, had pointed a nickel-plated gun at him, and had
told him to pay his debt "or else."  The citizen stated that he
knew this man as "Bayman" but that his real name was Robert
Williams.  He described the man as a black male in his late forties
or early fifties, who weighed approximately 200 pounds, and who was
approximately 5 feet 9 inches tall.  The citizen stated that he did
not know where this man was, but he knew where the man's car was. 
     The citizen drove with Elizondo and his partner to a location
on the 3200 block of East 92nd Street.  He told the officers that
the blue 1980 General Motors car that was parked on that block
belonged to the man who had threatened him.  There was no one in
the car at that time.  The citizen refused to sign a complaint
against the man who threatened him, and Elizondo did not remember
the citizen's name because he did not write it down.  After their
conversation ended, the officers complied with the citizen's
request that they let him out of their car on the 3200 block of
91st Street.  
     After leaving the citizen, Elizondo and his partner returned
to the 3200 block of East 92nd Street and parked three-quarters of
a block behind the car the citizen had shown them.  At this time,
the car engine was running, and there was someone sitting in the
front passenger seat.  Elizondo called for assistance, and Officers
Stevenson and McDonald drove in another car to a surveillance
position one-half a block in front of the subject car.  
     After about 15 minutes, an individual matching the citizen's
description exited a building, crossed the street, and entered the
driver's side of the subject car.  Elizondo identified this
individual as defendant.  
     As defendant began to drive away, the assisting officers moved
their car to block his forward progress, and Elizondo parked his
car behind defendant's.  Elizondo approached defendant's car from
the driver's side and asked defendant to exit his car.  
     When Elizondo performed a "protective patdown search" of
defendant, he felt what seemed to be a gun in defendant's right
coat pocket.  He reached into the pocket and retrieved a .38-
caliber Rossi revolver.  The gun contained five live bullets. 
Elizondo announced that he had found a gun and handed it to one of
the assisting officers.  He then arrested defendant and placed him
in handcuffs.  
     He continued to search defendant and, in one of defendant's
pockets, he found 15 plastic bags containing a substance that
appeared to be cocaine.  Elizondo could not remember in which
pocket he found the bags.  He also found $450 in one of defendant's
pants pockets.  Elizondo also searched defendant's car, including
the area under the hood, before impounding it.  
     The assisting officers then transported defendant to the
police station.  After a female officer searched the female
passenger who had been sitting in defendant's car, the officers
released her.
     Officer Tyrone Stevenson testified that he responded to
Elizondo's call for assistance.  He explained that Elizondo had
called for "a meet in regard to the man that supposedly had a gun
and [was] threatening another individual."
     Like Elizondo, he testified that he and his partner placed
their car in a surveillance position on the 3300 or 3400 block of
92nd Street and, after about 15 to 20 minutes, they saw defendant,
who matched the citizen's description, cross the street and enter
the subject car.  Stevenson moved his car to block defendant's exit
and, after doing so, he and Elizondo approached defendant's car
from the driver's side.
     Stevenson testified that Elizondo asked defendant if he was
Bayman or Babyman, and defendant did not respond.  Defendant
responded affirmatively, however, when Elizondo asked if he was
Robert Williams.  When defendant exited the car, Elizondo performed
a "protective patdown" of defendant and found a gun with a silver
handle in one of defendant's right coat pockets.
     Elizondo handed the gun to McDonald or Kenezovich, placed
defendant under arrest, and put him in handcuffs.  After placing
defendant under arrest, Elizondo continued to search defendant, but
Stevenson did not observe this portion of the search because he
began to search defendant's car.  Elizondo also searched the car
after Stevenson left to drive defendant to the police station.
     After this testimony, there was a stipulation that, if called
to testify, Chicago police department chemist Jimmie Julian would
testify that the plastic bags recovered from defendant contained
1.52 grams of a substance containing cocaine.  The State then
rested its case in chief.
     The defense case consisted of defendant's testimony.  He
testified that, at approximately 10 p.m. on December 9, 1992, he
was visiting friends in a building at 3200 East 92nd Street.  He
drove there with his friend Kathy Minifield.  She stayed in the car
while he went into the building for 15 minutes and drank with his
friends.  He then left the building, walked across the street to
his car, and attempted to drive away, but an unmarked car blocked
his way.  There was also another unmarked car and four or five
marked cars.  There were 8 to 10 officers.
     A police officer in plain clothes ordered him out of the car. 
Defendant testified that this officer was not Elizondo.  The
officer called him Bayman, but defendant told the officer "no," his
name was Robert Williams.  He did admit at trial, however, that his
nickname was Bayman.
     An officer other than Elizondo searched him and said "look
what I found" when he reached into his inside coat pocket.  Defen-
dant did not see what the officer took out of his pocket.  He
testified that he had bought the coat he was wearing earlier that
night from a friend who needed money.  According to defendant, he
paid $10 for the coat and also gave the friend his thinner coat.
     After the officer searched him, Officer Stevenson and another
officer searched his car and pulled a shiny revolver from under the
hood.  The officers then arrested him, placed him in handcuffs, and
sat him in a police car.
     The officers gave Minifield permission to drive defendant's
car, but she could not drive it because she did not have a license. 
The officers therefore placed her in the back of the same police
car where defendant was sitting.  As they were driving, she tried
to take her rent money from defendant's pockets, but the police
stopped her.
     Defendant testified that he did not know that he was charged
with a drug-related offense until he arrived at the police station,
and he never saw the drugs at the station.  He admitted that he may
have testified at the hearing on the motion to suppress that he did
not see any drugs until he arrived at the station, but he main-
tained at trial that he did not see any drugs at the station.  He
also testified that police did not take his money from him until he
arrived at the station.
     The State presented no evidence in rebuttal.  After closing
arguments, the jury found defendant guilty of one count of
possession of a controlled substance and one count of armed
violence.  The circuit court denied defendant's motion for a new
trial and sentenced defendant to 18 years' imprisonment for the
armed violence conviction and imposed a concurrent three-year
sentence for possession of a controlled substance.
     Defendant argues that we must reverse his conviction because
the circuit court erred in allowing the State to introduce evidence
of his prior conviction for voluntary manslaughter.  In People v.
Montgomery, 47 Ill. 2d 510, 268 N.E.2d 695 (1971), the supreme
court held that a witness' prior conviction is admissible if the
conviction (1) was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of
one year, or (2) involved dishonesty or false statement, (3) unless
the circuit court determines that the probative value of the
evidence is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice.  In addition, evidence of a conviction would not be
admissible "if a period of more than 10 years has elapsed since the
date of conviction or of the release of the witness from confine-
ment, whichever is the later date."  Montgomery, 47 Ill. 2d  at 516. 
The Montgomery court emphasized that the admission of prior convic-
tions is within the discretion of the circuit court.  Montgomery,
47 Ill. 2d  at 517-19.
     In People v. Williams, 161 Ill. 2d 1, 641 N.E.2d 296 (1994)
(Williams I), the supreme court appeared to have eliminated the
first prong of the Montgomery test when it held that it was error
to admit a defendant's conviction for voluntary manslaughter
because this conviction did not relate to the defendant's credibil-
ity.  In People v. Williams, 173 Ill. 2d 48, 670 N.E.2d 638 (1996)
(Williams II), however, the supreme court stated that Williams I
did not change the Montgomery three-prong test.  The court in
Williams II explained that the Williams I holding was based on the
fact that the circuit court's comments showed that it had admitted
the prior conviction as probative evidence and had failed to
balance its probative value against the danger of unfair prejudice,
as Montgomery requires.  Williams II, 173 Ill. 2d  at 82.
     After the Williams II court explained the Williams I holding,
it held that a murder defendant's prior conviction for aggravated
battery was properly admitted.  The defendant had argued that his
prior conviction had no bearing on his credibility and was unduly
prejudicial because it suggested that he had a propensity for
violent behavior.  Williams II, 173 Ill. 2d  at 80-81.  In upholding
the admission of this evidence, however, the court reasoned that
the record showed that the circuit court was aware of the Montgom-
ery balancing test because the parties had referred to this test in
their arguments.  Although the circuit court did not articulate its
application of the balancing test, the supreme court found that
there was no reason to believe that it had disregarded this
standard.  Williams II, 173 Ill. 2d  at 83.
     In applying Williams II, we conclude that defendant's
voluntary manslaughter conviction was properly admitted in this
case.  Like the defendant in Williams II, defendant argues that his
prior conviction was improperly admitted because it was unrelated
to his credibility and because it was highly prejudicial in that it
was likely to cause the jury to think he had a propensity to commit
violent crimes.  He also complains that the circuit court erred by
failing to weigh the probative value of the conviction against its
prejudicial effect. 
     As in Williams II, however, the record supports a conclusion
that the circuit court in this case properly applied the Montgomery
balancing test.  In fact, the evidence that the circuit court did
so is stronger in this case than in Williams II.  The circuit court
in Williams II did not expressly state that it had balanced the
probative value of the prior conviction against the danger of
unfair prejudice.  In this case, however, the court did articulate
its application of the Montgomery balancing test.   
     We take this opportunity to stress, as other courts have done
before, that the balancing test required by Montgomery is no mere
formality and that trial judges should be explicit in their
application of that test.  See, e.g., People v. Jennings, 279 Ill.
App. 3d 406, 409-11, 664 N.E.2d 699 (1996); People v. Bramlett, 276
Ill. App. 3d 201, 207, 658 N.E.2d 510 (1995); People v. Elliot, 274
Ill. App. 3d 901, 911-12, 654 N.E.2d 636 (1995).
     Defendant also argues that it was error for the circuit court
to admit testimony concerning the citizen's conversation with
police because it was hearsay.  According to defendant, this
testimony was not admissible to explain the course of the police
investigation because the police testified, not just to the fact of
the conversation, but also to its contents.  
     A police officer may testify about conversations with others
to show the steps in his investigation so long as this testimony is
not used to prove the truth of the matter asserted by these other
persons.  People v. Williams, 274 Ill. App. 3d 598, 604-05, 653 N.E.2d 899 (1995).  In People v. Jones, 153 Ill. 2d 155, 606 N.E.2d 1145 (1992), for example, the court held that the substance of
police conversations with an out-of-court declarant was admissible
to explain their actions.  In Jones, the defendant was accused of
robbing a woman as she entered her car and of stealing her car. 
One police officer testified that, two nights after the robbery, he
observed two men stripping the victim's car.  He and his partner
apprehended one of the men, Frederick Colvin, but the other
escaped.  The officer identified this man as the defendant, and it
was clear from his testimony that Colvin was the source of his
information as to the defendant's identity.  It was also clear from
a detective's testimony that he had learned the defendant's name
from speaking to Colvin.  Jones, 153 Ill. 2d  at 159.  
     Like defendant in the case before us, the defendant in Jones
argued that the officer's and the detective's testimony was
inadmissible because the police described the substance of the
police conversations with Colvin.  Jones, 153 Ill. 2d  at 158-59. 
The supreme court rejected this argument.  It explained that the
substance of the police conversations with Colvin was not offered
for its truth because it would prove only the defendant's involve-
ment in the car stripping, not his involvement in the armed
robbery.  The testimony concerning the conversations with Colvin,
therefore, was admissible because it showed only how the police
came to suspect the defendant.  Jones, 153 Ill. 2d  at 160-61.
     Similarly, in People v. Williams, 233 Ill. App. 3d 1005, 599 N.E.2d 1033 (1992), a police officer testified that a man named
Hobart Buckner had told him that he had driven the defendant to a
location a block from the murder victim's apartment and had left
without the defendant after about 10 or 15 minutes.  Williams, 233
Ill. App. 3d at 1016.  This contradicted the defendant's statement
to the detective that he had left with Buckner.  Williams, 233 Ill.
App. 3d at 1008.  The court held that this testimony was admissible
to explain why the detective had sought to interview the defendant
again after previously receiving a plausible assertion of inno-
cence.  Williams, 233 Ill. App. 3d at 1017.
     In this case, the testimony concerning the substance of
Elizondo's conversation with defendant was properly admitted to
explain the steps of the officers' investigation.  Without this
testimony, it is likely that the jury would have been left with the
impression that the officers stopped defendant for no apparent
reason.  Given defendant's trial strategy of attacking the
officers' credibility, it was particularly important for the State
to offer evidence of the conversation to explain the reason for the
officers' actions.  Under these circumstances, the substance of the
conversation was not offered for its truth but to show why the
officers acted as they did.  Admitting evidence of the conversation
for this limited purpose was not a hearsay violation.  Moreover,
the circuit court properly informed the jury of the purpose of the
evidence and instructed it not to consider the evidence as evidence
of defendant's guilt.
     In determining the admissibility of the conversation, it was
the circuit court's responsibility to weigh its prejudicial effect
against its probative value.  Although the circuit court did not
articulate this weighing process, its statement that the evidence
was admissible to explain the actions of the police officers shows
that it found that the probative value of the evidence outweighed
its potentially prejudicial effect.  Under the circumstances of
this case, where defendant made police credibility a central issue
at trial, we conclude that the circuit court's decision to admit
the evidence was not erroneous.
     Moreover, even if, arguendo, the circuit court erred in
admitting evidence of the conversation, such error would be
harmless.  As the court stated in People v. Cordero, 244 Ill. App.
3d 390, 392, 613 N.E.2d 391 (1993):
     "The admission of hearsay is not reversible error if
     there is no reasonable probability that the jury would
     have acquitted the defendant if the hearsay testimony had
     been excluded [citation], such as where properly admitted
     evidence proves the same matter [citation], or there is
     overwhelming evidence of the defendant's guilt [cita-
     tion]."  
     In this case, we believe that there is no reasonable probabil-
ity that the jury would have acquitted defendant with or without
the evidence of the contents of the conversation.  Both Stevenson
and Elizondo testified that Elizondo found a gun in defendant's
coat pocket, and Elizondo testified that he also found drugs in one
of defendant's pocket.
     Defendant contradicted this testimony, but his version of
events lacked credibility.  He claimed that Elizondo did not
recover a gun from him; as a matter of fact, he said that Elizondo
did not even search him.  He admitted that an officer said, "look
what I found," but said he did not know what the officer removed
from his pocket.  He claimed that he never saw the drugs that were
found, but this claim was contradicted by his testimony at the
hearing on the motion to suppress that he saw the drugs at the
station.  Defendant's claim that he was unaware of the contents of
the coat because he had just purchased it for $10 was also
unbelievable.   According to defendant, the previous owner needed
money, yet he left 15 packets of cocaine in the coat he sold for
$10.
     Moreover, our harmless error analysis is supported by the
jury's rejection of defendant's testimony and its acceptance of the
testimony of the police officers.  If the jury had found defendant
credible, it would have had no problem rejecting the testimony
concerning the statements of the citizen.  That testimony merely
explained the reason for the police conduct, a highly relevant
matter in this case, and we find no basis for concluding that the
police officers' testimony was otherwise enhanced by the statements
of the citizen.
     Although we find that the admission of testimony concerning
the contents of the conversation was not error, we are troubled by
the State's use of this evidence in its final arguments.  The court
admitted the evidence for the limited purpose of explaining the
steps in the officers' investigation, yet the State used this
evidence as substantive evidence of defendant's guilt.
     In closing argument, the State said:
     "You heard Officer Elizondo testify.  You remember he
     testified that when he was on patrol in the 3200 block of
     East 92nd Street, he was flagged down by a citizen.  That
     citizen he had a conversation with.  That citizen did not
     want to proceed any further.  The officer told you why he
     did not want to proceed any further.
          He had just had a frightening altercation with this
     defendant.  This defendant stuck a gun in his face and
     threatened him.  
          Although that citizen did not want to get involved,
     he still gave the officer very valuable information.  He
     named the defendant not only by his real name, but by his
     street name or his nickname.  He also gave a physical
     description of the defendant.  He also described the gun
     that the defendant pointed in his face.
***
               And what does that patdown search of the defendant
     reveal?
          This .38 caliber nickel-plated revolver, same gun
     that the citizen described.  Right from his right coat
     pocket, fully loaded, five live rounds."
     In its rebuttal argument, the State also relied on the
substance of the conversation to show defendant's guilt:
          "Now isn't that queer?  That his nickname just
     happens to be the nickname that the citizen that came to
     the police said it was.
          How else would the police know about the defendant's
     nickname if not from that citizen?
          We know there was a real victim in this case, a real
     citizen who came to the police because we know the
     nickname, Bayman.  The defendant admitted it on the stand
     that is his nickname, the same name that that citizen
     gave the police."
     By arguing in this manner, the State disregarded the limited
purpose for which the circuit court had admitted the evidence of
the substance of Elizondo's conversation with the citizen.  As the
court stated in People v. White, 192 Ill. App. 3d 55, 61, 548 N.E.2d 421 (1989):  "[T]he State's remarks here are an example of
the recently recognized practice of prosecutors taking improper
advantage of the admissibility of testimony by a police officer to
explain his investigatory procedure, only to use that testimony,
once it is admitted, to impermissibly use it in closing argument." 
See also People v. Singletary, 273 Ill. App. 3d 1076, 1085, 652 N.E.2d 1076 (1995); People v. Campbell, 115 Ill. App. 3d 631, 637-
38, 450 N.E.2d 1318 (1983).  We hold that the State's repeated
references to this evidence in an effort to convince the jury of
defendant's guilt was error.
     Nevertheless, we believe that this error was harmless.  The
credibility issues in this case were well defined.  As indicated
previously, if the jury believed defendant's testimony, it would
have rejected what the police said about the unidentified citizen. 
On the other hand, the jury's acceptance of the police testimony
does not mean that it gave substantive weight to what the citizen
said.  Because the evidence against defendant was overwhelming (see
People v. Batson, 225 Ill. App. 3d 157, 166, 587 N.E.2d 549
(1992)), we do not believe that the arguments of the State
constituted reversible error.
     Defendant also urges us to find that another portion of the
State's closing argument denied him a fair trial.  He claims that
it was improper for the State to argue that its witnesses were more
credible because they were police officers.  He also contends that
it was error for the State to attempt to bolster its witnesses'
credibility by arguing that they risk their lives for people.  He
relies on the following portions of the State's rebuttal argument:
          "The question is, the only question is who is
     telling the truth.  Who do you believe?  Do you believe
     two dedicated Chicago Police Officers who put their lives
     on the line for us every night or do we believe Robert
     Williams here on his own behalf testifying on his own
     behalf, twice convicted felon?
***
               And I don't want you to believe them because they're
     police, I want you to believe them because they're
     telling the truth.  There is no reason that came out
     during the cross-examination or the direct examination or
     any testimony that shows they're not telling the truth.
          And they work hard every day to protect us.  They're
     out there every night to try to get this stuff off of the
     street for us.  Those people deserve our gratitude and
     the defendant deserves our scorn for making it so
     dangerous on the streets for us, for bringing this kind
     of violence on to the street.
          [Defense counsel]:  Objection, this is made to
     inflame the emotions of the jury.
          COURT:  Overruled."
     The State argues that defendant waived this issue for review
by failing to include it in his motion for a new trial.  At the end
of the trial, defense counsel made an oral motion for a mistrial
based on the State's closing argument, but when the circuit court
asked which of the State's comments were improper, defense counsel
responded that the State's comment that there was a "blight on the
streets of guns and drugs" was improper because this had no
connection to defendant.  Defendant's motion for a new trial
contains no reference to closing arguments.
     We agree with the State that defendant has waived this issue
for review.  It is well established that, to preserve for review an
objection to comments in closing argument, a defendant must include
the specific comments to which he objects in his post-trial motion. 
See, e.g, People v. Robinson, 238 Ill. App. 3d 48, 56, 606 N.E.2d 122 (1992).  In this case, defendant failed, not only to include
specific comments in his post-trial motion, but he also failed to
include any objection to the State's closing argument in this
motion.
     Waiver aside, we do not find error in the comments about which
defendant now complains.  A prosecutor has great latitude in making
closing arguments, and a reviewing court will uphold the circuit
court's determination as to the propriety of this argument absent
an abuse of discretion.  People v. Hine, 88 Ill. App. 3d 671, 679,
410 N.E.2d 1017 (1980).  A prosecutor may comment on the evidence,
draw legitimate inferences therefrom even if they are unfavorable
to the defendant, and comment on the credibility of witnesses. 
People v. Johnson, 149 Ill. 2d 118, 145, 594 N.E.2d 253 (1992).  
     As defendant argues, however, the State may not argue that a
witness is more credible because of his status as a police officer. 
People v. Fields, 258 Ill. App. 3d 912, 921, 631 N.E.2d 303 (1994). 
It is also improper for the State to attempt to bolster the credi-
bility of its police officer witnesses by commenting that these
officers risk their lives every day for people like the jurors. 
People v. Montgomery, 254 Ill. App. 3d 782, 795, 626 N.E.2d 1254
(1993).  
     However, in reviewing the propriety of a particular comment in
closing argument, courts will consider that comment in the context
of the entire closing arguments of both the State and the defendant
(People v. Moss, 260 Ill. App. 3d 272, 281, 630 N.E.2d 850 (1993)),
and a defendant may not claim prejudice from a prosecutor's
comments when the defendant's earlier argument invited those
comments (People v. Richardson, 123 Ill. 2d 322, 356, 528 N.E.2d 612 (1988)). 
     For example, in People v. Davis, 228 Ill. App. 3d 835, 593 N.E.2d 766 (1992), the court held that comments similar to those at
issue in this case did not deprive the defendant of a fair trial. 
The defense had challenged the officers' testimony by arguing that
the jury did not need to believe something had happened just
because an officer had said that it had.  The defense had also
argued that, although not all police officers are bad, in this
case, the police did not like the defendant.
     The prosecution then argued that the police officers would not
risk their careers, their pensions, and their reputations to frame
the defendant.  It also argued that defense witnesses had a motive
to lie because they were relatives or students of the defendant. 
Davis, 228 Ill. App. 3d at 839.  
     The Davis court held that the prosecution's comments did not
deprive the defendant of a fair trial because they were a proper
response to the defendant's trial strategy of attacking the
credibility of the police officers.  Davis, 228 Ill. App. 3d at
840-41; see also People v. Brooks, 214 Ill. App. 3d 531, 542, 573 N.E.2d 1306 (1991).
     Similarly, in this case, defendant invited the prosecution's
comments by making police credibility the central issue in the
case.  In closing argument, for example, defense counsel argued:
          "And if it doesn't make sense, then you have to
     doubt the veracity how the officer testified. And if the
     officer testified or lied and you don't believe him about
     one thing when he stood there under oath and testified,
     you have got to ask yourself, can I believe anything this
     officer says?
          Doesn't hesitate to lie once under oath, he won't
     hesitate another time to lie under oath.
          Look what is there.  Look what is not there and
     common sense tells you should be there."
As the court concluded in Davis, we hold that the prosecution's
comments in this case were not error because they were invited by
the defense strategy of attacking the credibility of the police
officers.  
     Judgment affirmed.
     TULLY, J., concurs.JUSTICE McNULTY dissenting:    
     The majority concludes that the testimony concerning the
substance of Officer Elizondo's conversation with defendant was
properly admitted to explain the steps of the officers' investiga-
tion.  In reaching this conclusion, the majority notes that if this
testimony had not been admitted, it would likely have left the jury
with the impression that the officers stopped defendant for no
apparent reason.  The majority finds significant the fact that the
circuit court instructed the jury not to consider this evidence as
evidence of defendant's guilt. 
     For the following reasons, I disagree.  In explaining an
officer s investigatory procedure, the officer may testify that he
spoke with a witness in order to gather information for his
investigation and, after his conversation, he began looking for the
defendant.  People v. Pryor, 181 Ill. App. 3d 865, 537 N.E.2d 1141
(1989).  Under the investigative procedure exception, the officer s
testimony must be limited to show how the investigation was
conducted, not to place into evidence the substance of an out-of-
court statement or conversation for the purpose of establishing the
truth of its contents.  People v. Trotter, 254 Ill. App. 3d 514,
626 N.E.2d 1104 (1993). 
     The officers' testimony here went well beyond merely explain-
ing their investigatory procedures and what prompted them to put
defendant under surveillance.  In People v. Singletary, 273 Ill.
App. 3d 1076, 1082, 652 N.E.2d 1333 (1995), for example, the
officer s testimony that a confidential informant told him that
defendant "was going to go to 2971 South Dearborn and pick up a
package of cocaine," went beyond what was necessary to explain the
officer s conduct and improperly presented the substance of his
conversation with the informant. See also Pryor, 181 Ill. App. 3d
865, 537 N.E.2d 1141 (officer's testimony that a passing citizen
flagged him down and stated that a black man who was 5 feet 7
inches tall, in his late twenties and wearing a dark, waist-length
leather jacket attempted to sell the citizen marijuana, set forth
the substance of the conversation with the citizen and was
therefore inadmissible hearsay).
      In the instant case, Officer Elizondo could have testified
that he had a conversation with the citizen and that the informa-
tion he received from the citizen prompted him to put defendant
under surveillance.  However, Officer Elizondo improperly testified
to the substance of his conversation with the citizen when he
testified that the citizen told him that he had just had an
encounter with a man who pointed a gun at him and told him to "pay
up his debt or else," and that the man was named Robert Williams
and nicknamed Bayman.  Furthermore, Officer Stevenson's testimony
that Officer Elizondo "called for a meet in regard to the man that
supposedly had a gun and threaten[ed] another individual," not only
impermissibly testified to the substance of Officer Elizondo s
conversation with the citizen, but was also double hearsay as to
what Officer Elizondo had told Officer Stevenson.  The details
provided by the officers were not necessary to explain the
officers' actions but, instead, served to bolster the officers'
testimony implicating defendant.
     The majority notes that even if the circuit court erred in
admitting evidence of the conversation, any error was harmless,
since the circuit court instructed the jury on the limited use of
this testimony and the evidence against defendant was overwhelm-
ing. The circuit court informed the jurors that the testimony as to
the conversation between the defendant and the citizen was being
admitted for the limited purpose of showing the police officer s
conduct and that it should not be considered by them in determining
defendant's guilt.  However, the majority acknowledges that in
closing argument, the State disregarded the limited purpose for
which the evidence of Officer Elizondo's conversation with the
citizen had been admitted and used it as substantive evidence of
defendant's guilt.  See Singletary, 273 Ill. App. 3d at 1085. 
Therefore, if the court's limiting instruction had any vitality
when the conversation was initially offered, it later was vitiated
by the prosecutor's use of it as substantive evidence in closing
argument.  
     I also disagree with the majority's conclusion that the
evidence against defendant was overwhelming.  A substantial portion
of the State's evidence concerned the substance of Officer
Elizondo's conversation with the confidential informant.  Without
this evidence bolstering the officers' testimony, the case is much
closer.  
     Moreover, I disagree with the majority's finding regarding 
the prosecutor's comment in rebuttal closing argument about the
credibility of the police officers.  After making a lengthy comment
regarding the officers who "put their lives on the line for us
every night" and "work hard every night to protect us," the
prosecutor concluded his argument by informing the jurors that the
officers deserve our gratitude.  These comments, although not
specifically raised in defendant's post-trial motion, amount to
plain error.  The prosecutor's comments improperly bolstered the
credibility of the police officers and attempted to arouse the
jurors' passions.  People v. Threadgill, 166 Ill. App. 3d 643, 520 N.E.2d 86 (1988) (the prosecutor improperly attempted to arouse the
fears and prejudices of the jurors by commenting that the police
officers are out there trying to protect the jurors and their
families and the jurors could either send the officers a message
that they back them up or they could turn their backs on them); 
People v. Montgomery, 254 Ill. App. 3d 782, 626 N.E.2d 1254 (1993)
(the prosecutor improperly commented that the jurors can have faith
in the system because police officers go out every day and risk
their lives for people like the jurors). 
     The majority concludes that the prosecutor s comments in
rebuttal closing argument were permissible since defendant invited
the prosecution's comments by making credibility the central issue
in the case.  Although defense counsel questioned the credibility
of the police officers, counsel did so through use of the evidence
presented at trial.  While the prosecutor, in turn, was entitled to
discuss why the police officers were more credible than defendant,
he should have done so by discussing the evidence at trial, not by
arguing that the officers should be believed because they put their
lives in danger to protect people. 
     I find that the cumulative impact of these errors denied
defendant a fair trial.  Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, I
respectfully dissent.