People v. Cordevant

June 19, 1998

                               NO. 5-96-0543

                                  IN THE 

                        APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

                              FIFTH DISTRICT
_________________________________________________________________

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,)  Appeal from the
                                    )  Circuit Court of
     Plaintiff-Appellee,            )  St. Clair County.
                                    )
v.                                  )  No. 93-CF-1262
                                    )
RONALD D. CORDEVANT,                )  Honorable
                                    )  Lloyd A. Cueto,
     Defendant-Appellant.           )  Judge, presiding.
_________________________________________________________________

     JUSTICE HOPKINS delivered the opinion of the court:
     Defendant, Ronald Cordevant, appeals from his conviction,
following a jury trial, of first-degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)
(West 1992)).  Defendant was sentenced to 53 years' imprisonment. 
On appeal, defendant contends that the trial court erred in failing
to appoint other counsel to represent defendant with respect to his
posttrial allegation that his attorney suborned perjury and in
failing to sufficiently examine the factual basis for defendant's
other pro se posttrial claims.  We affirm.
                                   FACTS
     Defendant was charged by indictment with the murder of his
wife, Mary Dawn Cordevant.  Prior to trial, a jury found defendant
fit to stand trial.  During the fitness hearing, Dr. John Rabun,
the State's physician expert, testified that even though defendant
was not taking Thorazine at the time of the hearing, defendant
would remain fit to stand trial even if defendant began taking
Thorazine.  Dr. Rabun explained that people are often placed on
medication that is not needed and that he had restored people to
stand trial using such medication.   
     After defendant was found fit to stand trial, he filed a pro
se motion for appointment of counsel other than the public defender
who had been representing him.  The court appointed special counsel
to represent defendant with respect to his pro se motion. 
Following a hearing, defendant's motion was denied.  The public
defender continued to represent defendant.
     At trial, eight eyewitnesses to the shooting testified on
behalf of the State, in addition to two police officers, a crime-
scene technician, a firearms examiner, a forensic pathologist, and
the victim's mother.  The testimony revealed that on December 20,
1993, at Rally's restaurant in Cahokia, defendant and Mary
Cordevant were arguing in defendant's truck, and this argument was
overheard on Rally's drive-through intercom.  Gary Francis, Gary
Donnelley, and Shanda Robertson, employees of Rally's restaurant,
testified that they heard Mary yell:  "Don't.  You don't have to do
it.  Don't do it.  Don't, don't."  They heard defendant say, "Shut
up."  Mary jumped out of the truck and began running.  Defendant,
with a gun in his hand, chased Mary and shot at her.  Mary
staggered but kept running.  Defendant caught her, picked her up by
the collar, and shot her again.  Mary attempted to brush the gun
away.  Defendant then aimed the gun at Mary's head and fired.    
     Thereafter, defendant fled the scene in his truck.  Charles 
Aligholi, an employee of Rally's, testified that he wrote down the
perpetrator's license plate, which was later identified as being
registered to defendant.  
     Against the advice of his counsel, defendant testified that he
did not shoot his wife and that, instead, her death was an
accident.  Defendant stated that he and his wife were having a
discussion outside Rally's, concerning whether Mary should go to
her mother's or not, when Mary left defendant's truck.  Defendant
said that he followed Mary and caught her.  Defendant stated that
when Mary turned to him, she had a gun in her hand, and the gun
discharged as he pushed it back to her.  Defendant asserted that
the gun discharged again as Mary fell and as defendant attempted to
seize the gun away from her.  Defendant stated he fled the scene in
his truck and disposed of the gun on a back road.  The gun was
never recovered. 
     Dr. Raj Nanduri, a forensic pathologist who performed the
autopsy on Mary's body, found six gunshot wounds, two of which were
exit wounds.  The cause of Mary Dawn Cordevant's death was a
gunshot wound that penetrated her skull. 
     The jury found defendant guilty of first-degree murder. 
Defendant's attorney filed a posttrial motion, and defendant filed
his pro se posttrial motion.  Among other contentions, defendant
alleged that his trial attorney had been ineffective at trial
because (1) counsel suborned perjury from defendant and (2) counsel
failed to seek a mistrial when a young girl, within view of the
jury, requested that the prosecutor point out the "bad man" and the
prosecutor pointed at defendant. 
     Prior to sentencing, the trial court noted that it had
reviewed counsel's and defendant's posttrial motions.  Defense
counsel indicated that arguing defendant's pro se motion could
create a conflict of interest for him.  In addition, counsel
declined the court's offer to present oral argument with respect to
his own motion.  Similarly, defendant declined the court's request
to supplement his written motion with any oral statement.  No
evidence in mitigation was presented by defense counsel.  The court
denied all posttrial motions, and defendant was thereafter
sentenced to imprisonment for 53 years.  
     Trial counsel filed a motion to reduce sentence, and defendant
filed a pro se motion to reduce sentence.  In his pro se
postsentencing motion, defendant alleged that his attorney failed
to present mitigating evidence at the sentencing hearing. 
Specifically, defendant alleged that defendant's family and friends
were not called to testify on defendant's behalf.  Defendant also
alleged that he was unfit to stand trial because the county jail
was giving him Thorazine, a psychotropic drug, during trial and
sentencing.  Defendant alleged that his trial attorney had been
ineffective for failing to inform the court and the psychologist
who testified for defendant at his fitness hearing that defendant
was taking Thorazine.
     At the postsentencing motion hearing, defense counsel noted
that since the sentencing hearing, defendant had attempted suicide
and that counsel had learned that defendant was taking psychotropic
medication.  No explanation appears in the record for the source of
counsel's knowledge that defendant was taking psychotropic
medication.  Counsel indicated, however, that he never had a bona
fide doubt concerning defendant's fitness.  Although the trial
court requested that defendant make an oral statement in support of
the motion, defendant declined to do so.  The trial court denied
counsel's and defendant's postsentencing motions.
                                DISCUSSION
APPOINTMENT OF NEW COUNSEL
Conflict-of-Interest Analysis
     Initially, defendant contends the trial court erred when it
failed to appoint new counsel to represent him once he alleged that
his attorney suborned perjury.  Defendant argues that as a result
of his subornation-of-perjury allegation, trial counsel labored
under a conflict of interest and that, therefore, the trial court
should have appointed new counsel to argue the posttrial motions. 
Defendant asks this court to vacate his sentence and remand the
cause for posttrial proceedings with directions that new counsel be
appointed.  We decline to do so.
     Defendant's posttrial allegations of ineffective assistance of
counsel do not automatically require the appointment of new
counsel.  See People v. Williams, 147 Ill. 2d 173, 251 (1991).  The
sixth amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel
includes a right to conflict-free counsel.  Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984). 
A conflict of interest, however, is not created simply because
defendant claims that his representation was ineffective.  People
v. Cook, 279 Ill. App. 3d 718, 724 (1995).  
     Defendant alleged in his posttrial motion that counsel
suborned perjury.  Defendant cites People v. Brown, 40 Ill. App. 3d
562 (1976), for the proposition that an attorney may not represent
a defendant at posttrial proceedings where the defendant has
accused his attorney of suborning perjury.  In Brown, prior to the 
sentencing hearing, the defendant alleged that his attorney
conditioned his representation of the defendant on the defendant
testifying falsely.  Brown, 40 Ill. App. 3d at 563.  At the
sentencing hearing, the court requested the State's Attorney to
investigate the matter.  Brown, 40 Ill. App. 3d at 563.  Defense
counsel denied the accusation and stated that he felt he should
withdraw.  Brown, 40 Ill. App. 3d at 563.  In response to the trial
court's inquiry, however, defense counsel stated he was willing to
represent the defendant at the sentencing hearing, and the
defendant stated he was willing to be represented by this attorney
because "sentencing is sentencing."  Brown, 40 Ill. App. 3d at 563.
     The court in Brown held that once the defendant made this
accusation known to the court and the attorney and once the court
requested an investigation into the validity of the charge, the
attorney labored under an obvious and inherent conflict.  Brown, 40
Ill. App. 3d at 564.  The court stated:
          "Here, the conflict is readily apparent.  Counsel, having
     been accused of subornation of perjury, was placed in the
     awkward position of defending himself and denying the validity
     of defendant's accusation while urging the court to consider
     defendant's good moral character in an attempt to obtain
     probation or leniency."  Brown, 40 Ill. App. 3d at 564.
     The court held that even though a dissatisfied client may
falsely accuse his attorney, the conflict arose because of the
duplicitous position counsel was placed in before the sentencing
hearing.  Brown, 40 Ill. App. 3d at 564.
     In the present case, counsel was not placed in the same
duplicitous position as in Brown.  Trial counsel was not in the
awkward position of defending himself and denying the validity of
defendant's accusations while urging the court to consider
defendant's good moral character and honesty in an attempt to
obtain leniency.  Unlike Brown, no formal complaint or
investigation was underway concerning defendant's allegations. 
Trial counsel was not requested to respond to defendant's
allegations, and counsel was not obligated to attack defendant's
truth-telling ability to protect himself.  
     Similarly, subsequent Illinois case law, while not involving
subornation-of-perjury allegations, nevertheless offers instruction
concerning defendant's allegation that trial counsel labored under
a conflict of interest.  Illinois cases have consistently found no
conflict of interest even where the defendant filed an Attorney
Registration and Disciplinary Committee (ARDC) complaint or a
lawsuit against defense counsel.  Instead, the Illinois Supreme
Court has held that it is within the judge's discretion to avoid a
defendant's attempt to delay or impede the effective administration
of justice.  See People v. Barrow, 133 Ill. 2d 226, 252 (1989); 
see also People v. Massa, 271 Ill. App. 3d 75, 82-83 (1995) (a
lawsuit or ARDC claim against a defendant's attorney does not
create a per se conflict, but it is the defendant's responsibility
to provide the court with legitimate reasons supporting his request
for new counsel); People v. Gardner, 47 Ill. App. 3d 529, 534
(1977) (it is within the trial court's discretion whether to
appoint another attorney for, if not, defendants would be
encouraged to file frivolous motions and avoid cooperating with
their court-appointed counsel).   
     Inherent in a trial judge's authority to preside over a
criminal trial is the discretion to conclude that a defendant's
pursuit of an otherwise legal right is frivolous and is merely an
attempt to frustrate the administration of justice.  See People v.
Hardeman, 203 Ill. App. 3d 482 (1990).  Here, defendant made
previous attempts to replace the public defender with outside
counsel.  The trial court had the discretion to determine that
defendant's posttrial and postsentencing allegations, made  for the
purpose of obtaining new counsel, were frivolous and were intended
to delay the effective administrative of justice.
     Furthermore, the present case is less persuasive than the
previously mentioned cases because here no ARDC complaint or civil
lawsuit was pending against counsel.  A conflict of interest
certainly did not arise merely because defendant alleged
subornation of perjury in his pro se motion.  The trial court was
correct in rejecting the automatic appointment of new counsel to
argue defendant's pro se allegations of the ineffective assistance
of counsel, including subornation of perjury, under a conflict-of-
interest analysis.    
Defendant's Underlying Allegations of Ineffective Assistance
     Defendant suggests that when the ineffective assistance of
counsel is alleged, some automatic requirement to appoint new
counsel exists.  This is not the law.  If in the sound discretion
of the trial court the allegation lacks merit or involves matters
of trial strategy, the appointment of new counsel is not required
and the pro se motion may be denied.  People v. Robinson, 157 Ill. 2d 68 (1993).  New counsel should be appointed only if the
defendant's allegation of the ineffective assistance of counsel
shows the possible neglect of the case.  Robinson, 157 Ill. 2d  at
86.  In People v. Woodson, 220 Ill. App. 3d 865, 877 (1991), the
court explained:
     "[I]t is not necessary to appoint new counsel where a trial
     judge finds the claim to be spurious[,] and such a finding
     will not be overturned on appeal unless the finding is
     manifestly erroneous."  
     Thus, we now turn to the merits of defendant's ineffectiveness
argument.  Before this court, defendant alleges that four instances
of incompetence require a reversal and a remand with the 
appointment of new counsel.  Defendant argues that trial counsel
(1) suborned perjury, (2) failed to present mitigating evidence at
sentencing, (3) failed to move for a mistrial when the prosecutor 
pointed out defendant as "the bad man" in view of the jury, and (4)
failed to inform the court and defendant's fitness-hearing medical
expert that defendant was taking Thorazine, a psychotropic drug,
during trial and sentencing.  Because the matters complained of
clearly lack merit or simply involve questions of trial strategy,
we conclude that the trial judge did not err in failing to appoint
new counsel to represent defendant.
     First, the record refutes defendant's allegation of suborned
perjury.  Defendant's testimony, that Mary's death was an accident
and that Mary had the gun in her hand as it discharged when
defendant grabbed her, mirrored his statements after his arrest
before his trial attorney was involved.  Second, trial counsel went
on record to state that defendant was testifying against his
advice.  The trial court asked defendant if he wanted to testify
against his lawyer's advice, and defendant answered in the
affirmative.  Clearly, defense counsel did not coerce defendant
into testifying falsely.  Defendant's allegation of subornation of
perjury lacks merit.  
     Next, defendant contended in his pro se posttrial motion that
his attorney was ineffective for failing to move for a mistrial
when the prosecutor, in response to a young girl's question in
front of the jury, identified defendant as the "bad man."  However,
we find that defendant has failed to overcome the strong
presumption that defense counsel's action constituted sound trial
strategy.  A motion for a mistrial would have further highlighted
the event; defense counsel's failure to move for a mistrial was a
strategic decision.  An attorney's decisions regarding trial
tactics or strategy are matters of professional judgment, to which
a review of a counsel's competency does not extend.  See
Strickland, 466 U.S. 668, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 104 S. Ct. 2052.  
     In addition, the prosecutor's affirmative answer that
defendant was a "bad man" is harmless.  Such a statement does not
rise to the level of prejudicing the defendant so that the result
of the proceeding becomes unreliable.  See Strickland, 466 U.S. 668, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 104 S. Ct. 2052.  In the present case,
defendant was seen running after and repeatedly shooting his wife
by numerous, disinterested witnesses.  Defendant himself testified
that he and his wife were arguing and that after the shooting he
fled the scene and disposed of the gun.  The jury's finding of
guilt did not rest on counsel's failure to move for a mistrial. 
Thus, the trial court correctly found no ineffectiveness on the
part of trial counsel and properly denied defendant's pro se motion
without appointing new counsel.
     Next, defendant, in his pro se postsentencing motion, faulted
trial counsel for failing to pursue mitigating evidence.  Citing
People v. Thompkins, 161 Ill. 2d 148 (1994), defendant contended
that his attorney's failure to investigate and present mitigating
evidence at sentencing constituted the ineffective assistance of
counsel.  In Thompkins, the court held that a "judge or jury in a
capital case may not refuse to consider, or be prevented from
considering, relevant mitigating evidence offered by the defense."
Thompkins, 161 Ill. 2d  at 167.  The Thompkins court noted that the
mitigating evidence proposed by the defendant would have
complimented counsel's sentencing-hearing strategy, which was to
show that the defendant's role in the offenses was subject to doubt
and did not justify sentencing the defendant to death.  Thompkins,
161 Ill. 2d  at 167.
     In People v. Tenner, another capital case, the court
nevertheless distinguished Thompkins, noting that counsel did not
ignore or fail to introduce a substantial amount of mitigation
evidence.  People v. Tenner, 175 Ill. 2d 372, 384 (1997).  The
court held that defense counsel employed a coherent strategy at the
sentencing hearing and was not ineffective in failing to take the
course suggested by the defendant, which was to obtain a mental
evaluation of the defendant and offer the evidence in mitigation. 
Tenner, 175 Ill. 2d at 383-84; see also People v. Towns, 174 Ill. 2d 453 (1996) (the supreme court found that the defendant's
allegation that his attorney was ineffective for failing to present
additional mitigation evidence was correctly held to be without
merit because the defendant failed to offer any explanation
revealing the character of the mitigating evidence or how it would
have changed the outcome).
     Decisions whether to call witnesses for the defense are
generally matters of trial strategy and are beyond the scope of
review.  People v. Kidd, 175 Ill. 2d 1, 45 (1996).  In the case at
bar, defendant's contentions failed to demonstrate counsel's
neglect or concerned counsel's decisions that were well within the
bounds of proper trial strategy. 
     Unlike the cases relied on by defendant, defendant herein was
not subjected to a capital sentencing hearing.  Similar to Tenner,
however, defendant's attorney employed a coherent strategy at the
sentencing hearing, noting 7 of 13 mitigating factors applicable in
defendant's case.  Although defendant claims that his family and
friends should have been called to testify, he does not
characterize the testimony or explain how it would have changed the
outcome of the hearing.  Instead, defendant declined to comment or
elaborate on his allegations, though he was given the opportunity
to do so by the trial court.  Accordingly, we cannot conclude that
defendant's counsel was ineffective for failing to present this
alleged mitigating evidence, and defendant's pro se motion was
properly denied without appointing new counsel.    
     Finally, defendant contended, in his pro se postsentencing
motion, that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to inform the
court or defendant's fitness-hearing expert that defendant was
taking Thorazine during trial and sentencing and was unable to
understand the proceedings.  Defendant asks that we remand the
cause to the circuit court so that additional information may be
presented about medications defendant might have been receiving at
the time of trial.  We decline to do so.  
     The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment prohibits
the prosecution of a person who is unfit to stand trial.  Medina v.
California, 505 U.S. 437, 440, 120 L. Ed. 2d 353, 359, 112 S. Ct. 2572, 2574 (1992).  To protect this due process requirement,
Illinois statutory law and case law require the trial court to hold
a fitness hearing if there is a bona fide doubt concerning a
defendant's mental fitness to understand the nature and purpose of
the proceedings and to assist in his or her defense.  725 ILCS
5/104-10 (West 1992).  
     At the time of defendant's trial, the law provided that
defendants receiving psychotropic medication were entitled to a
fitness hearing.  725 ILCS 5/104-21(a) (West 1994); see also 725
ILCS 5/104-21(a) (West Supp. 1995) (which was found
unconstitutional in Johnson v. Edgar, 176 Ill. 2d 499, 523 (1997),
and therefore was void ab initio).  Thereafter, the statute was
amended to eliminate automatic fitness hearings for defendants
receiving psychotropic medication.  Pub. Act 89-689, 90, effective
December 31, 1996.  The amended statute provides:  "A defendant who
is receiving psychotropic drugs shall not be presumed to be unfit
to stand trial solely by virtue of the receipt of those drugs or
medications."  725 ILCS 5/104-21(a) (West 1996).  
     Defendant cites People v. Kinkead, 168 Ill. 2d 394 (1995),
alleging that the law requires a fitness hearing for persons tried
and sentenced while taking psychotropic medication and that
defendant's attorney was ineffective for failing to inform the
court and defendant's fitness-hearing expert that defendant was
taking such medication.  In Kinkead, the record established that
the defendant was being treated with the antipsychotic drug
Thorazine while in jail awaiting trial.  Kinkead, 168 Ill. 2d  at
406.  The Illinois Supreme Court could not determine if the
administration of Thorazine was proximate enough to Kinkead's
guilty plea and sentencing to trigger the right to a fitness
hearing pursuant to section 104-21(a).  Kinkead, 168 Ill. 2d  at
415.  The matter was remanded for a clarification of the
circumstances surrounding defendant's use of psychotropic
medications.  Kinkead, 168 Ill. 2d  at 415.  Our supreme court
recently rendered an opinion after the remand.  People v. Kinkead,
No. 75236 (Ill. May 21, 1998).
     In this case defendant's assertion regarding the application
of Kinkead is unpersuasive.  As a threshold issue, defendant in the
case sub judice received a jury trial to determine fitness. 
Further, defendant's argument fails because he has not offered one
kernel of evidence showing the actual ingestion of Thorazine. 
Unlike Kinkead, the record in the case sub judice fails to
establish that defendant was taking any antipsychotic drug. 
Defendant asserted for the first time in his pro se postsentencing
motion that he was taking Thorazine during trial and sentencing and
that it was prescribed by the medical staff of the St. Clair County
Jail.  However, defendant failed to name, or even describe, the
physician prescribing the Thorazine, the staff members dispersing
it to him daily, or the pharmacy distributing the Thorazine to him. 
Defendant did not request the trial court to subpoena any link of
this Thorazine distribution chain.  Defendant's attorney, at
defendant's postsentencing motion hearing, asserted that it had
been brought to his attention that defendant was taking
psychotropic medication.  Yet absent from the record is any
evidence that defendant's ingestion of Thorazine was brought to
counsel's attention by someone other than defendant.  In fact,
defendant's presentence investigation report recited that defendant
stated he was not being treated for a physical illness or condition
at the time and believed his health to be good.  By virtue of
having failed to provide any information to suggest that defendant
actually ingested Thorazine, defendant has necessarily failed to
establish his entitlement to a second fitness hearing under section
104-21(a).  See Kinkead, 168 Ill. 2d  at 411 (the court noted that
"no hearing is required where the defendant's right to a fitness
hearing pursuant to section 104-21(a) is not established, as where
there is no indication that defendant was being treated with
psychotropic medication during the relevant times, and the trial
court has not otherwise abused its discretion in concluding that no
bona fide doubt of unfitness is present"). 
     The information available to the trial judge indicated that
defendant remained fit to stand trial, and trial counsel did not
neglect defendant's case by failing to request a second fitness
hearing or by failing to notify the court or the expert of
defendant's medical information.  Because defendant was previously
found fit to stand trial, he is presumed to remain fit, unless
shown otherwise.  See People v. Sanders, 61 Ill. App. 3d 566
(1978).  Defendant's trial counsel stated at the postsentencing
hearing that he had no bona fide doubt as to defendant's fitness to
stand trial.  At the pretrial fitness hearing, Dr. John Rabun
testified that defendant would remain fit to stand trial even if
medicated by Thorazine.  Defendant's testimony was coherent, as
were his various pro se motions.  Defendant demonstrated to the
trial court that he was mentally fit to understand the nature and
purpose of the proceedings and to assist in his defense.  We refuse
to remand this cause for the trial court to appoint new counsel or
conduct further investigation into defendant's claims.  
FACTUAL INQUIRY
     In the alternative, defendant contends the trial court failed
to sufficiently examine the factual basis for defendant's
ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims.  As a result, defendant
asks this court to remand this cause so that the circuit court may
conduct the required preliminary inquiry into defendant's claims
that his attorney was ineffective.  After conducting such an
inquiry, defendant requests the court to appoint new counsel if the
trial court finds merit in defendant's allegations.  Defendant
cites the supreme court decisions in People v. Nitz, 143 Ill. 2d 82
(1991), and People v. Robinson, 157 Ill. 2d 68 (1993), to allege
that his case must be remanded for further posttrial proceedings
due to the trial court's failure to adequately inquire into
defendant's pro se posttrial and postsentencing motions alleging
the ineffective assistance of counsel.  
     In Nitz, the supreme court held that the trial court should
conduct a preliminary inquiry into a defendant's allegations of the
ineffective assistance of counsel to determine whether the claim
lacks merit or pertains only to trial tactics, and if so, then no
new counsel need be appointed.  Nitz, 143 Ill. 2d  at 134.  
     In Robinson, the supreme court held that the trial court must
examine the factual matters underlying a defendant's claim. 
Although the defendant's claims may be without merit, the trial
court should afford the defendant the opportunity to specify and
support his complaints.  Robinson, 157 Ill. 2d  at 86.   
     Since Nitz and Robinson, appellate courts have generally held
that there should be some interchange or investigation by the trial
court into the underlying factual basis, if any, of the allegations
of ineffectiveness before a defendant's claim may be dismissed. 
People v. Baltimore, 292 Ill. App. 3d 159, 164-65 (1997); People v.
Parsons, 222 Ill. App. 3d 823, 830 (1991).   
     The defendant in People v. Munson asserted that the trial
court was required to make a "preliminary investigation" of his
ineffectiveness claim and that, in failing to do so, the court
erred and the cause should have been remanded for the appointment
of new counsel and a hearing.  People v. Munson, 171 Ill. 2d 158,
199 (1996).  The Illinois Supreme Court rejected the defendant's
contention, stating that the trial court made every effort to
ascertain the nature and substance of the defendant's
ineffectiveness claim because the defendant had been given two
opportunities to offer substance to his ineffectiveness claims but
he provided no facts from which the court could infer a basis in
support of his claim.  Munson, 171 Ill. 2d  at 201.  The  supreme
court concluded that the trial court committed no error in
declining to appoint new counsel to represent the defendant on his
pro se motion, and the court rejected the defendant's notion that
the cause should be remanded because the trial court failed to make
a "preliminary investigation" of his ineffectiveness claim. 
Munson, 171 Ill. 2d  at 201; see also People v. Stokes, 281 Ill.
App. 3d 972, 980 (1996) (the defendant was sufficiently
sophisticated to have addressed the trial court concerning his
claim of the ineffective assistance of counsel, but he failed to do
so, and under such circumstances the trial court did not commit
manifest error when it did not further inquire into defense
counsel's conduct during the trial); see also People v. Johnson,
227 Ill. App. 3d 800, 809 (1992) (the trial court must thwart
transparent and manipulative tactics of the defendant while
ensuring there is good cause for the defendant's complaints about
counsel).
     Unlike Robinson and Nitz, the trial court in the case sub
judice offered defendant the opportunity to specify and support his
complaints at the hearings on his posttrial motion and
postsentencing motion, but defendant chose to refrain from
argument.  Similar to Munson, the trial court made every effort to
ascertain the nature and substance of defendant's ineffectiveness
claim.  Yet defendant provided no facts from which the court could
infer a basis in support of such claim.  In addition, defendant
demonstrated his sophistication through his numerous pro se
motions.  Thus, as in Stokes, defendant was sophisticated enough to
have addressed the trial court concerning his claims of the
ineffective assistance of counsel, but he nevertheless failed to do
so.  The trial court did not commit manifest error when it did not
make any further inquiry into defense counsel's conduct during the
trial. 
     We conclude that defendant's posttrial allegations of the
ineffective assistance of counsel either were meritless or
concerned matters of trial strategy.  The trial court did not
neglect to provide defendant with an opportunity to argue his
allegations.  Without some specification by defendant to give the
trial court a gist of the claim, we refuse to determine that the
trial court was required to make any further inquiry.
     For the foregoing reasons, defendant's conviction is affirmed.

     Affirmed.

     WELCH, P.J., and CHAPMAN, J., concur.                                      NO. 5-96-0543
                                     IN THE
                          APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
                                 FIFTH DISTRICT
___________________________________________________________________________
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,)  Appeal from the
                                    )  Circuit Court of
     Plaintiff-Appellee,            )  St. Clair County.
                                    )
v.                                  )  No. 93-CF-1262
                                    )
RONALD D. CORDEVANT,                )  Honorable
                                    )  Lloyd A. Cueto,
     Defendant-Appellant.           )  Judge, presiding.
___________________________________________________________________________

Opinion Filed:                   June 19, 1998
___________________________________________________________________________

Justices:      Honorable Terrence J. Hopkins, J.
                         
               Honorable Thomas M. Welch, P.J.
               Honorable Charles W. Chapman, J.
               Concur
___________________________________________________________________________
                         
Attorneys      Robert Agostinelli, Deputy Defender, Peter A. Carusona,
for            Assistant Defender, Office of the State Appellate Defender,
Appellant      Third Judicial District, 1100 Columbus Street, Ottawa, IL
               61350
___________________________________________________________________________

Attorneys      Hon. Robert Haida, State's Attorney, St. Clair County, 
for            10 Public Square, Belleville, IL  62220
Appellee       
               Norbert J. Goetten, Director, Stephen E. Norris, Deputy
               Director, Kevin Sweeney, Staff Attorney, Office of the State's
               Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor, Route 15 East, P.O. Box 2249,
               Mt. Vernon, IL  62864
___________________________________________________________________________