People v. Jones

                               NO. 5-94-0813

                                  IN THE 

                        APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

                              FIFTH DISTRICT
_________________________________________________________________

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, )  Appeal from the 
                                     )  Circuit Court of 
     Plaintiff-Appellee,             )  Jackson County.
                                     )  
v.                                   )  No. 94-CF-156
                                     )  
EDWIN A. JONES,                      )  Honorable
                                     )  David W. Watt, Jr., 
     Defendant-Appellant.            )  Judge, presiding.  
_________________________________________________________________

     JUSTICE KUEHN delivered the opinion of the court.
     Defendant took three wives.  They wed into the Islamic faith. 
Defendant believed that the teachings of the Holy Koran empowered
him to beat his wives.  So he beat all three of them.  Only two
survived.
     Defendant stands convicted by the circuit court of Jackson
County sitting without a jury of first-degree murder, unlawful use
of weapons by a felon, and two counts of aggravated battery.   He
was sentenced to natural-life imprisonment for the murder, 5 years'
imprisonment each for the unlawful use of weapons and one count of
aggravated battery, and 10 years' imprisonment for the other
aggravated battery count.  The 5- and 10-year prison sentences were
ordered to be served concurrently with one another and to be served
consecutively to the natural-life prison sentence.  Defendant
appeals his convictions and sentences.
     Defendant challenges the evidence in support of his first-
degree murder conviction.  He claims that no rational trier of fact
could have found more than involuntary manslaughter on the facts
presented.  He asks us to reduce the first-degree murder conviction
to involuntary manslaughter.
     We do not retry cases on review.  We simply determine whether
any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements
of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.  People v. Collins, 106 Ill. 2d 237, 261, 478 N.E.2d 267, 277 (1985).  We will not reverse
a guilty verdict unless the evidence, viewed in a light most
favorable to the State, is palpably contrary to the result reached. 
Collins, 106 Ill. 2d  at 261, 478 N.E.2d  at 277.
     Jeannie Boyd-Jones succumbed to massive injuries sustained as
a result of a prolonged beating administered by defendant. 
Portions of her deep body fat liquified, and the tissue died as a
result of the force applied.  Over one-third of her blood supply
permeated the internal body cavity lost to circulation as a result
of the force applied.  Her lower torso and shanks were one massive
contusion, with no portion of her frame free of visible welts and
bruises.   Jeannie Boyd-Jones was beaten to death.  Of that there
can be no dispute.
     The question is whether the evidence establishes that
defendant acted with knowledge that the beatings he inflicted
created a strong probability of great bodily harm.
     With this element of the State's case at issue, we look first
to the instrument used to inflict the beatings.  People's exhibit
number three was identified by defendant.  He admitted that the
State's exhibit was the "stick" employed to "discipline" his three
wives.  There is no question about the weapon used to inflict the
wounds that caused death.
     The "stick" was 36 inches in length and 2« inches in diameter. 
It was only slightly larger in length and slightly smaller in its
barrel than the Louisville Slugger employed by Mark McGwire.  The
trial court characterized it as a cudgel.  Over the course of 8«
hours it was applied with full force to various portions of
Jeannie's body.  At times, defendant would hold it with both hands
like a baseball bat and swing for the fences with all the force he
could muster.  The defendant is six feet two inches in height and
weighs 250 pounds.
     Of course, defendant did not swing at Jeannie continuously
during the 8«-hour "disciplinary period."  Jeannie fell in and out
of consciousness, a circumstance that on occasion brought a
respite.  Defendant had two other wives to address.  There was also
evidence of certain smoke breaks during the ordeal.  On occasion,
however, when defendant was not beating his other wives or smoking
crack cocaine, he was reviving Jeannie in order to inflict further
punishment.  At one point, as Jeannie was about to collapse and
pass out, defendant told her to "go ahead and die bitch."
     Finally, Jeannie stopped breathing.  Defendant rushed to her
side and attempted CPR.  He prayed for her to live.  His prayers
were to no avail.
     The trial court noted, in observing the size of the defendant,
the instrument he employed in the beatings, and the injuries this
deadly combination produced, that "this was nothing less than
torture."  The trial court aptly found that the 8«-hour process
literally reduced Jeannie's body tissue to a "bloody pulp."
     Defendant insisted that Jeannie's clothing obscured her
horrific bruising from his view.  He disavowed knowledge of the
harm he was producing.  On appeal, defendant points to the efforts
he made to save Jeannie and to the pleas for divine intervention
and argues that he did not possess the requisite state of mind for
murder.
     Defendant may not have actually intended to kill Jeannie. 
Despite his comment to her, he may not have actually known that his
acts would produce death.  Notwithstanding, based on his actions
and words, it was decidedly reasonable for the trial court to
conclude that defendant knew that his acts created a strong
probability of great bodily harm.  Indeed, it is unimaginable that
a man of size and strength could take an instrument that resembled
a baseball bat, employ it with full force to the body of a young
woman, persist in the activity until it produced unconsciousness,
and not expect to produce great bodily harm.  We are at a loss to
understand what defendant was thinking during the sound and fury of
his attacks with such a weapon, particularly when he saw his wife
succumb and lapse into unconsciousness.
     The evidence, when viewed in a light most favorable to the
prosecution, supports the reasonableness of the trial court's
finding that the defendant committed first-degree murder.
     Next, defendant challenges his court-appointed lawyer's
performance.  He inveighs against counsel for the failure to
procure an amir or sheik to opine about his religious faith and its
sanction of wife-beating.  The record reflects that counsel
unsuccessfully searched for such an expert.  It also reflects a
grave misapplication of any Islamic license for his conduct.
     We seriously doubt that anyone knowledgeable on Islamic
teachings would have proved helpful to this defense.  Had such an
expert been found, had he explained the righteousness of
defendant's conduct or merely explained how defendant may have
believed that his actions conformed to religious teachings, the
expert would not have changed the outcome.  The sovereign State of
Illinois has a longstanding rule of law that prohibits the engaged-
in conduct.  This society will not abide defendant's actions
regardless of the religious beliefs that may have motivated them. 
If a religion sanctions conduct that can form the basis for murder,
and a practitioner engages in such conduct and kills someone, that
practitioner need be prepared to speak to God from prison.
     Since defendant suffered no prejudice by virtue of an Islamic
expert's absence, he was not deprived of the effective assistance
of counsel under the sixth amendment.  See Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984);
People v. Albanese, 104 Ill. 2d 504, 473 N.E.2d 1246 (1984).
     Next, defendant raises the excessiveness of a natural-life
prison term.  Defendant contends that the natural-life prison
sentence is an abuse of discretion, and he points to his lack of a
substantial criminal record, his remorse soon after the beating
ended, his employment record, and his attendance of a university in
an effort to show that he is not beyond rehabilitation.
     A trial court may impose a natural-life prison sentence for
first-degree murder where the "court finds that the murder was
accompanied by exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior indicative
of wanton cruelty."  730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(1)(b) (West 1992). 
Various courts have defined brutal and heinous.  See People v. La
Pointe, 88 Ill. 2d 482, 501, 431 N.E.2d 344, 353 (1981).  We think
the statutory terminology is rather self-evident and easily
applicable here.
     In evaluating the brutality and heinousness of a crime, the
entire spectrum of facts surrounding the given incident must be
analyzed and evaluated.  People v. Hartzol, 222 Ill. App. 3d 631,
651, 584 N.E.2d 291, 306 (1991).  The brutal and heinous behavior
is found not in the defendant's state of mind, but rather from the
nature of the offense.  Hartzol, 222 Ill. App. 3d at 651, 584 N.E.2d  at 306.  The imposition of a natural-life prison sentence
rests within the trial court's discretion and will not be disturbed
on review absent an abuse of that discretion.  Hartzol, 222 Ill.
App. 3d at 651, 584 N.E.2d  at 306.
     We cannot find an abuse of discretion in the imposition of a
natural-life prison sentence for this crime.  This crime takes
domestic violence and domestic murder to a new height.  Hour upon
hour, for over eight, defendant, a man of great size and strength,
pummeled three defenseless women.
     Defendant might have achieved his goal to inflict pain upon
these women by adopting the manner employed by most wife-beaters. 
Apparently, slapping them, striking them with his fists, or simply
throwing them about would not do.  He needed a cudgel the size of
a baseball bat.  The injuries inflicted with it evidence that he
did not tread lightly with its use.
     Defendant was not content to allow nature to save Jeannie's
life.  He callously revived Jeannie from unconsciousness to heap
injury upon injury, hour after hour, until her body could stand no
more and she stopped breathing.  Defendant reduced his wife's body
tissue to a "bloody pulp."  We cannot quarrel with the trial
court's view that this murder was accompanied by exceptionally
brutal and heinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty.
     Although a sentencing judge must consider rehabilitative
potential, he need not give greater weight to rehabilitation than
to the seriousness of the offense.  People v. Reid, 160 Ill. App.
3d 491, 493, 513 N.E.2d 517, 518 (1987).  Rehabilitation does not
outweigh other considerations that are persuasive factors
warranting a severe sentence.  Reid, 160 Ill. App. 3d at 493, 513 N.E.2d  at 518.  Natural-life imprisonment is reserved for a class
of murderer who demonstrates by his conduct a capacity for
particularly brutal and heinous behavior indicative of wanton
cruelty.  It is a sentence reasonably designed to remedy the evil
of such conduct.  Society deserves protection from it.  La Pointe,
88 Ill. 2d  at 501, 431 N.E.2d  at 352-53.
     Defendant really did not show rehabilitative potential.  In
allocution, his regret rang hollow as he explained that his reading
of the Koran permitted the administration of 180 lashes.  Defendant
blamed his wife Lisa and her failure as a Muslim as the reason for
the beatings.  He castigated Jeannie's parents for disowning her
after she married a black man.  He viewed the trial and his wife's
death as a racial issue.  A fair reading of his comments
demonstrates a total lack of remorse over the death he caused and
a total lack of empathy for the feelings of the survivors.
     Defendant had prior felony convictions.  He kept handguns and
used cocaine.  This does not speak to a potential for restoration
to useful citizenship but rather speaks to a mind-set that
society's laws are simply there to be broken.
     Finally, defendant challenges the extended-term 10-year prison
sentence because it is not the most serious class of offense for
which he stands convicted.  See 730 ILCS 5/5-8-2(a) (West 1992);
People v. Jordan, 103 Ill. 2d 192, 206, 469 N.E.2d 569, 575 (1984). 
A sentence of natural-life imprisonment cannot be "extended"
pursuant to section 5-8-2 of the Unified Code of Corrections. 
People v. Young, 124 Ill. 2d 147, 162-63, 529 N.E.2d 497, 504
(1988).  Therefore, because extended-term provisions cannot apply
to defendant's natural-life sentence for murder, the extended-term
provisions can properly be applied to the next most serious offense
of which defendant was convicted--aggravated battery.  Young, 124 Ill. 2d  at 165-66, 529 N.E.2d  at 505-06.  Our supreme court
recently reaffirmed Young.  People v. Terry, No. 84156 (Ill. June
18, 1998).
     Accordingly, the judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.

     Affirmed.

     HOPKINS and GOLDENHERSH, JJ., concur.