Callis, Papa, Jensen, Jackstadt & Halloran, P.C. v. Norfolk Southern Corp.

                               NO. 5-96-0709

                                  IN THE

                        APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

                              FIFTH DISTRICT
_________________________________________________________________

CALLIS, PAPA, JENSEN,             )  Appeal from the
JACKSTADT & HALLORAN, P.C.,       )  Circuit Court of
                                  )  Madison County.
     Plaintiff-Appellee,          )
                                  )
v.                                )  No. 96-CH-253
                                  )
NORFOLK SOUTHERN CORPORATION,     )  Honorable
                                  )  David Herndon,
     Defendant-Appellant.         )  Judge, presiding.
_________________________________________________________________

     JUSTICE MAAG delivered the opinion of the court:

     The defendant, Norfolk Southern Corporation, appeals from an
order of the circuit court granting the plaintiff law firm, Callis,
Papa, Jensen, Jackstadt & Halloran, P.C. (Callis), a preliminary
injunction against the defendant.
     Dennis Astorian is an employee of the Norfolk and Western
Railway Company.  The railroad is a subsidiary of Norfolk Southern
Corporation.  Astorian is a member of the United Transportation
Union.  The terms and conditions of Astorian's employment are set
forth in a collective bargaining agreement between the railroad and
the union.  Article 60 of the agreement prescribes a procedure for
resolving what is known as a "minor dispute".  Pursuant to article
60, where conduct that might warrant discipline comes to the
railroad's attention, the railroad is permitted to hold an
investigatory hearing to determine if a company rule has been
violated and, if so, to impose discipline.  At this hearing, the
employee is permitted to be represented by a union official, but
both the employee and the railroad are barred from having attorneys
participate.
     On August 21, 1996, Astorian allegedly suffered a workplace
injury.  At some point shortly after the injury, Astorian was
allegedly told by one or more of his supervisors that if he had any
further complications with his injury, the supervisor(s) should be
contacted day or night.  On August 27, 1996, Astorian retained
Callis to represent him in an action for damages under the Federal
Employers' Liability Act (FELA) (45 U.S.C. 51 et seq. (1988)).
     At some point between the date of the injury (August 21, 1996)
and August 30, 1996, the railroad learned or at least believed that
Astorian may have consulted a nurse practitioner for treatment
related to his injuries, without first informing his supervisors. 
This alleged visit to the nurse appears to have occurred during
off-duty hours.  On August 30, 1996, as a result of the alleged
failure to inform the supervisors of the visit to a nurse, Astorian
was sent the following notice of formal investigation.
     "Dear Mr. Astorian:
          Arrange to report to the Superintendent's Office
     Conference Room, 7021 Hall Street, St. Louis, Missouri, at
     10:00 AM, Wednesday, September 4, 1996[,] for a formal
     investigation.
          The purpose of this investigation is to determine the
     facts and your responsibility, if any, in connection with your
     failure to follow instructions issued to you by Assistant
     Superintendent of Terminals G. C. Nasello at approximately
     9:30 AM on August 21, 1996[,] and instructions issued to you
     by Trainmaster R. N. Fallin at approximately 12:45 AM on
     August 22, 1996, in that you failed to inform them of your
     need for medical attention in connection with an injury which
     you sustained on August 21, 1996.
          If you desire witnesses and/or a representative of your
     organization present at this investigation, arrange
     accordingly.
          It is your responsibility to mark off with the Crew
     Management Office, if necessary, to attend this investigation.
                                        G. C. Nasello
                                        Assistant Superintendent"
     At the request of Astorian's union representative, the hearing
was postponed until September 9, 1996.  On September 4, 1996,
Callis mailed a notice to the railroad, informing it that the firm
represented Astorian.  The railroad claims that this was its first
notice that Astorian was represented by an attorney.  On September
5, 1996, Callis filed a verified complaint seeking injunctive
relief to stop the scheduled hearing.  The complaint in part
alleged the following:
          "5.  That Plaintiff, CALLIS, PAPA, JENSEN, JACKSTADT &
     HALLORAN, P.C., has determined that its client, DENNIS K.
     ASTORIAN, has a claim against the Defendant, NORFOLK SOUTHERN
     CORPORATION, a corporation, under the Federal Employer's
     Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. Sections 51-60, and intends to file
     a Complaint against this Defendant in this Court in the next
     sixty (60) days.
          6.   That Defendant, NORFOLK SOUTHERN CORPORATION, a
     corporation, was notified by a letter sent certified mail
     dated September 4, 1996, notifying Defendant of Plaintiff's
     client's representation by Plaintiff's law firm, a copy of
     which is attached as Exhibit "A".
          7.   That DENNIS K. ASTORIAN received a certified letter
     dated August 30, 1996, giving notice of an
     investigatory/disciplinary hearing set for September 4,
     1996[,] to be held by Defendant in St. Louis, Missouri.  ***
          8.   That DENNIS K. ASTORIAN's union representative, Mr.
     W. L. Duncan, requested that Defendant continue the September
     4, 1996, investigatory/disciplinary hearing and Defendant
     rescheduled the hearing for September 9, 1996.  ***
          9.   That at said hearing DENNIS K. ASTORIAN is subject
     to questioning by representatives of Defendant concerning his
     accident and injuries for which Plaintiff represents him. 
     None of the attorneys employed by ASTORIAN will be allowed to
     be present during said hearing, as ASTORIAN's sole
     representative can only be a union official.
          10.  That Defendant is thereby attempting to question
     ASTORIAN outside of the presence of his attorneys concerning
     the subject matter for which Plaintiff represents ASTORIAN in
     a separate action to be filed under the F.E.L.A.
          11.  That unless restrained by this Court, Defendant's
     representatives can and will interfere with the contractual
     relationship between the Plaintiff and its client, DENNIS K.
     ASTORIAN, by forcing ASTORIAN to either subject himself to
     questioning and provide information regarding his [F.E.L.A.]
     suit, without the assistance of counsel, or face immediate
     dismissal for failure to do so, thus causing the Plaintiff and
     its client, DENNIS K. ASTORIAN, to suffer immediate and
     irreparable harm.
          12.  That the above-mentioned actions of the Defendant
     will subject Plaintiff to irreparable injury due to the fact
     that Plaintiff has an ethical and contractual duty to
     represent its client, DENNIS K. ASTORIAN, fully and zealously,
     and to allow Defendant to interrogate DENNIS K. ASTORIAN
     outside the presence of and without the counsel of Plaintiff
     would subject Plaintiff to potential malpractice and ethical
     charges.
          13.  That Plaintiff has no adequate remedy at law given
     that to advise DENNIS K. ASTORIAN not to attend said hearing
     would subject him to immediate dismissal from service with
     Defendant.
          14.  That were Plaintiff's client to attend and subject
     himself to questioning regarding his medical care and
     treatment at this time, his choice of physician and
     communication between him and his attorney regarding
     inappropriate medical examination, would [sic] cause
     irreparable harm in that he would be subject to discipline by
     the Defendant, NORFOLK SOUTHERN CORPORATION, a corporation,
     including the possibility of termination of his employment
     which would result in further irreparable harm in loss of
     benefits to him and his family during his period of
     disability, all of which would be in violation by use of its
     contract of various portions of the Federal Employer's
     Liability Act including, but not limited to, 45 U.S.C. Section
     60 thereof."  (Emphasis omitted.)
     On September 9, 1996, the court entered a temporary
restraining order halting the investigative hearing.  On September
17, 1996, following a hearing, the circuit court entered a
preliminary injunction barring the investigative hearing.  From
this order, the railroad appeals.
     On appeal, the railroad argues that:
     1.   The circuit court erred in granting the injunction by
          basing its order on the threatened rights of Astorian
          instead of the threatened rights of the plaintiff, the
          Callis firm.
     2.   The court erred by ruling that the plaintiff had shown a
          probability of success on the merits on its claim for
          tortious interference with contract.
     3.   The court erred by ruling that the plaintiff would suffer
          irreparable injury if the railroad were permitted to
          proceed with its disciplinary hearing.
     4.   The court erred when it ruled that the plaintiff had no
          adequate remedy at law.
     "Under Illinois law, the function of an appellate court in
reviewing the issuance of a preliminary injunction is restricted
solely to a determination of whether the trial court correctly
exercised its broad discretionary powers.  [Citation.]  Substantive
issues are to be considered only so far as is necessary to
determine whether the trial court acted within the perimeters of
its authority."  Board of Trustees of Community College District
No. 508 v. Bakalis, 80 Ill. App. 3d 502, 505, 400 N.E.2d 47, 50
(1980).
     We will first consider the allegations of the complaint to
determine the nature of the cause of action that Callis has
attempted to plead.  This is also essential to an understanding of
the issues raised in this appeal.
     "Pleadings shall be liberally construed with a view to doing
substantial justice between the parties."  735 ILCS 5/2-603(c)
(West 1996).  "No pleading is bad in substance which contains such
information as reasonably informs the opposite party of the nature
of the claim or defense which he or she is called upon to meet." 
735 ILCS 5/2-612(b) (West 1996).
     Callis has generally alleged that an attorney-client
relationship exists between the law firm and Astorian.  Callis
further claims that by virtue of this relationship it has certain
contractual and ethical duties that will be compromised, made more
difficult, or rendered impossible to perform if the investigatory
hearing takes place and Astorian is unrepresented by counsel.  
     It is clear that Illinois recognizes a cause of action for
interference with the professional relationship between attorney
and client.  This tortious inference claim is based upon
interference with the attorney-client relationship irrespective of
contract.  It is the interference with the relationship which
creates the actionable tort.  A breach of contract is not an
element of the action.  La Rocco v. Bakwin, 108 Ill. App. 3d 723,
731, 439 N.E.2d 537, 543 (1982).  Interference may be present if an
attorney is prevented from performing his professional duties or if
the performance of the professional duties is simply made more
difficult or burdensome.  Restatement (Second) of Torts 766A
(1977).  
     "In Illinois, a client may discharge an attorney at any time
for any reason."  In re Smith, 168 Ill. 2d 269, 293, 659 N.E.2d 896, 907 (1995).  As such, an attorney representation agreement is
a contract terminable at will.  An action for tortious interference
with a contract terminable at will is actually one for intentional
interference with prospective economic advantage.  Fellhauer v.
City of Geneva, 142 Ill. 2d 495, 511-12, 568 N.E.2d 870, 877-78
(1991).
     The railroad relies upon George A. Fuller Co. v. Chicago
College of Osteopathic Medicine, 719 F.2d 1326, 1331 (7th Cir.
1983), for the proposition that under Illinois law an action for
intentional interference with contract requires an actual breach of
the contract or a termination of the contract or an act which
renders performance impossible.  The railroad further claims that
merely making the performance more burdensome is insufficient to
support the action.  The railroad's reliance on George A. Fuller
Co. is misplaced.  Callis's action is not for interference with
contract, but rather for interference with prospective economic
advantage.  Fellhauer, 142 Ill. 2d 495, 568 N.E.2d 870.  Even
George A. Fuller Co. recognizes that "allegations of existing
contract and breach thereof *** [are] not essential elements of
this cause of action."  George A. Fuller Co., 719 F.2d  at 1331; see
also City of Rock Falls v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 13 Ill. App.
3d 359, 363, 300 N.E.2d 331, 333-34 (1973) ("As the comment to
Section 766 of the Restatement of Torts explains, `The liability
for inducing breach of contract is now regarded as but one
instance, rather than the exclusive limit, of protection against
unjustified interference in business relations' [Restatement of
Torts 766, Comment b, at 52 (1939)]").  
     Until terminated, the relationship between attorney and client
created by a contract terminable at will is subsisting and
continues so long as the parties are satisfied.  Such a
relationship is sufficient to support an action for tortious
interference.  Kemper v. Worcester, 106 Ill. App. 3d 121, 435 N.E.2d 827 (1982).  In cases dealing with claims of interference
with the attorney-client relationship, "it is the interference with
the relationship, not the contract itself, which creates the
actionable tort."  Cross v. American Country Insurance Co., 875 F.2d 625, 629 (7th Cir. 1989).
     To prevail in such an action, a plaintiff must plead and
prove:  "(1) his reasonable expectation of entering into a valid
business relationship; (2) the defendant's knowledge of the
plaintiff's expectancy; (3) purposeful interference by the
defendant that prevents the plaintiff's legitimate expectancy from
ripening into a valid business relationship; and (4) damages to the
plaintiff resulting from such interference."  Fellhauer, 142 Ill. 2d  at 511, 568 N.E.2d  at 878.  Wrongful interference with either a
contract or a professional relationship (e.g., attorney-client) may
occur in several ways.  A person "may be physically restrained or
intimidated or be excluded from the place where the contract must
be performed ***."  Restatement (Second) of Torts 766A, Comment g,
at 19 (1977).
     Thus, we believe that Callis has properly and adequately
pleaded a cause of action under Illinois law for intentional
interference with the attorney-client relationship.  The action is
a species of the tort of intentional interference with prospective
economic advantage.
                                  ISSUE I    
     The railroad first claims that the circuit court erred because
the preliminary injunction order was based upon the rights of
Astorian rather than the rights of Callis as Astorian's attorney. 
The railroad argues that where a plaintiff seeks to invoke the
court's jurisdiction, (1) the plaintiff must have a personal stake
in the litigation (citing Weihl v. Dixon, 56 Ill. App. 3d 251, 371 N.E.2d 881 (1977)), (2) the plaintiff can assert only its own legal
rights, not those of a third party (citing Helmig v. John F.
Kennedy Community Consolidated School District No. 129, 241 Ill.
App. 3d 653, 610 N.E.2d 152 (1993)), and (3) plaintiff must show
some injury in fact to a legally recognized interest (citing In re
Marriage of Rodriguez, 131 Ill. 2d 273, 545 N.E.2d 731 (1989)).  We
agree with each of these three propositions.
     With this background, and relying on Dixon, the railroad
asserts that Callis has no stake and no cause of action cognizable
by the circuit court.  Callis responds that an attorney must
represent a client with zeal and diligence (citing In re Fox, 122 Ill. 2d 402, 522 N.E.2d 1229 (1988)), that the attorney-client
relationship places fiduciary duties on the attorney (citing
Neville v. Davinroy, 41 Ill. App. 3d 706, 355 N.E.2d 86 (1976)),
and that numerous obligations are imposed upon an attorney by the
Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct (134 Ill. 2d R. 1.1 et
seq.).
     We must analyze these arguments in light of the law we have
previously discussed.  The case at bar concerns a law firm that
claims that the defendant railroad is wrongfully interfering in the
law firm's representation of its client.  Dixon, relied upon by the
railroad, concerns an attorney that attempted in his own name to
assert the rights of unnamed clients rather than his own rights. 
The attorney in Dixon was held to lack standing.  Dixon, 56 Ill.
App. 3d at 255, 371 N.E.2d  at 884.  We agree with the Dixon court
that the attorney in that case lacked standing.  We also believe
that Callis has a protectable interest in its professional
relationship with Astorian.
     It is true that Astorian may have a cause of action in his own
right if the railroad interferes with the attorney-client
relationship.  We will discuss just such a situation later in this
decision.  But unlike the attorney/plaintiff in the Dixon case,
Callis has a cause of action of its own.  This action is brought
for the vindication of Callis's rights, not Astorian's.  We
previously discussed in this decision the allegations of the
complaint and the fact that a cause of action does exist in
Illinois for interference with the attorney-client relationship. 
While the circuit court order did discuss the "chilling" effect
that the railroad investigative hearing would have on Astorian's
pursuit of his FELA case, the court also stated at the conclusion
of the preliminary injunction hearing that it believed that the
railroad had "an alterior [sic] motive in having the investigation,
and that alterior [sic] motive, I'm quite sure has something to do
with interfering with not only Mr. Astorian, but the firm, as well,
in representing him."  This statement by the court belies any claim
that the injunction was based exclusively upon the rights of
Astorian.  To the contrary, the court expressly stated that the
railroad's continued insistence on conducting the investigative
hearing was motivated by a purpose of interfering with the
attorney-client relationship between Callis and Astorian.  For this
reason, the first issue raised by the railroad must fail.
                                 ISSUE II
     The railroad argues for its second issue that Callis failed to
show the requisite likelihood of success on the merits.  Multiple
subissues are then raised under this single issue heading.  For
clarity, we will discuss each of these claims separately.  It is
important to note the factors that must be established in order to
obtain a preliminary injunction.  The plaintiff must plead and
prove:  (1) that there is a clearly ascertained right in need of
protection, (2) that irreparable harm will result unless the
injunction is granted, (3) that there is no adequate remedy at law,
and (4) that there is a likelihood of success on the merits. 
Hartlein v. Illinois Power Co., 151 Ill. 2d 142, 601 N.E.2d 720
(1992).
     ISSUE II(A).  The railroad raises as its first subissue the
claim that Callis has no likelihood of success on the merits in a
claim for tortious interference with contract.  The railroad argues
fervently that such a claim was not pleaded nor was proof presented
to support the cause of action.  The railroad states that Callis
disavowed at the hearing in the trial court any cause of action for
interference with contract.  The railroad then dissects the
elements of the cause of action for intentional interference with
contract and argues that the pleadings in this case fail to plead
the requisite elements.  Next, it claims that in any event the
evidence failed to show that any contract was breached or
terminated.  
     As explained previously, because attorney representation
agreements are terminable at will, the cause of action at issue in
this case is not for interference with contract, but rather for
interference with prospective economic advantage.  Fellhauer, 142 Ill. 2d 495, 568 N.E.2d 870.  The railroad simply failed to address
the correct cause of action.  Instead of the plaintiff failing to
plead adequately, the railroad failed to address the applicable
cause of action.  Instead of the plaintiff's cause of action
failing due to the absence of evidence that the contract was
breached or terminated, the railroad's argument must fail because
neither breach nor termination is an element of plaintiff's cause
of action.  Fellhauer, 142 Ill. 2d 495, 568 N.E.2d 870; Cross, 875 F.2d 625.
     ISSUE II(B).  The railroad next claims that it was unaware
that Astorian was represented by counsel at the time the initial
investigative hearing was set and that this negates any claim that
it intentionally interfered with Callis's contract.  Assuming for
the sake of discussion that this is true, the railroad knew on or
about September 4, 1996, of Callis's representation and persisted
in the demand to conduct the hearing.  Callis claims that the
continued insistence on the disciplinary hearing constitutes an
interference with the attorney-client relationship and that if the
hearing occurs and Astorian is unrepresented by counsel, Callis's
performance of his obligations as an attorney will be impaired or
prevented.  As stated previously, Comment g to 766A of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts expressly provides that an exclusion
from the place of performance is one way in which interference may
occur.  This is a factual matter for the trial court to decide.  In
reviewing the grant of a preliminary injunction, we may consider
substantive issues only to the extent necessary to determine if the
trial court abused its discretion.  Bakalis, 80 Ill. App. 3d at
505, 400 N.E.2d  at 50.  We find no abuse of discretion.
     We must pointedly note at this time that, pursuant to Supreme
Court Rule 23(e), unpublished orders of the court are not
precedential and "may not be cited by any party" except for
purposes not pertinent here.  Official Reports Advance Sheets No.
15 (July 20, 1994), R. 23(e), eff. July 1, 1994.  This rule was
cavalierly violated in arguing points II(A) and II(B).  We trust
that this will not recur. 
     ISSUE II(C).  The railroad argues next that its conduct is
privileged and nonactionable.  It claims that it had a legally
protected right under the provisions of the collective bargaining
agreement (Agreement) and that its actions were "reasonable".  The
railroad cites HPI Health Care Services, Inc. v. Mt. Vernon
Hospital, Inc., 131 Ill. 2d 145, 545 N.E.2d 672 (1989), for the
proposition that certain actions are privileged even if they do
interfere with another's contractual or professional relations. 
Connaughton v. Gertz, 94 Ill. App. 3d 265, 418 N.E.2d 858 (1981),
is cited for the proposition that any "reasonable" means may be
used by a party seeking to exercise rights under a valid
preexisting contract.  If the action taken is reasonable, it will
be deemed privileged.  We have no disagreement with these
propositions.  The question is, however, whether an attempt to
interfere with an attorney's handling of a case on behalf of his
client, who is protected by the terms of the FELA, is the type of
action that should be deemed "reasonable" and privileged.  Stated
differently, should an alleged tortfeasor/defendant be granted a
privilege to engage in an activity that is designed to both
intimidate the client and prevent the client's attorney from
performing a basic duty, i.e., being present when his client is
questioned by the alleged tortfeasor/defendant?  The answer was
obvious to the trial court.  No!
     We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's conclusion
that such conduct is neither "reasonable" nor privileged.
     ISSUE II(D).  The final subissue raised is a claim that the
plaintiff's cause of action is preempted under the terms of the
Railway Labor Act (45 U.S.C. 151 et seq. (1992)).  The railroad
argues that exclusive jurisdiction to resolve "minor disputes" is
vested in the National Railroad Adjustment Board (Board).  See 45
U.S.C. 153 (1992).  It further claims that this exclusive
jurisdiction includes the interpretation of the Agreement, and it
cites Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n,
491 U.S. 299, 105 L. Ed. 2d 250, 109 S. Ct. 2477 (1989).  Any
dispute which implicitly or expressly involves an incident of the
employment relationship is claimed to fall exclusively under the
jurisdiction of the Board and the Agreement.  According to the
defendant, the action filed by Callis will require an
interpretation of the Agreement, and the action is therefore
preempted.  See Leu v. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co., 820 F.2d 825 (7th
Cir. 1987).  We disagree.  In a virtually identical case, the same
defendant as in this case, represented by the same attorneys as in
this case, made the same argument in the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Illinois.  Pratt, Bradford &
Tobin, P.C. v. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co., 885 F. Supp. 1126 (S.D.
Ill. 1994).  In that case the court ruled:
          "[T]he [Railway Labor Act] preempts only if the dispute
     arises out of the interpretation of a collective bargaining
     agreement.  See Atchison, Topeka, and Santa Fe Ry. Co. v.
     Buell, 480 U.S. 557, 562-63, 107 S. Ct. 1410, 1414, 94 L. Ed. 2d 563 (1987); Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 108 S. Ct. 1877, 100 L. Ed. 2d 410 (1988).  ***
          *** Plaintiff does not argue that the collective
     bargaining agreement confers a right to have attorneys present
     during company hearings.  Notably, the parties agree as to the
     meaning and interpretation of the collective bargaining
     agreement.  Plaintiff asserts that enforcement of the
     agreement violates the FELA, 45 U.S.C. 60, and constitutes a
     tortious interference with contract.  Section 60 provides
     criminal penalties against persons who impede the flow of
     information concerning a FELA injury claim and the crucial
     element of a tortious interference with contract claim is that
     plaintiff must prove that the agreement's prohibition on
     attorneys is unjustified.  HPI Health Care Services v. Mt.
     Vernon Hosp., 131 Ill. 2d 145, 137, Ill.Dec. 19, 23-24, 545 N.E.2d 672, 676-77 (1989).  These claims do not require
     interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement[;]
     therefore the [Railway Labor Act] does not preempt."  Pratt,
     Bradford & Tobin, P.C., 885 F. Supp.  at 1129.
     The railroad cites cases from various federal courts of appeal
for the proposition that Callis's cause of action is preempted by
the Railway Labor Act.  What the railroad fails to cite in either
its opening brief or its reply brief is the United States Supreme
Court decision in Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Norris, 512 U.S. 246,
129 L. Ed. 2d 203, 114 S. Ct. 2239 (1994).  Moreover, the Hawaiian
Airlines case was never considered by any of the authorities relied
on by the railroad.  This omission is understandable as we will
explain.
     In Hawaiian Airlines, a mechanic discovered a mechanical
defect that could cause a landing gear to fail.  The mechanic
recommended that the part be replaced.  A supervisor ordered the
part repaired instead of replaced, and the plane flew as scheduled. 
The mechanic refused to sign the maintenance record to certify as
required by federal regulations that the repair was properly
performed.  The mechanic was suspended pending a disciplinary
hearing on a charge of insubordination in violation of the
collective bargaining agreement.  (This is the same charge made
against Astorian.)  The mechanic then notified the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA).  The next day, the FAA seized the part. 
Following a disciplinary hearing, the mechanic was terminated.  The
mechanic initially appealed under the grievance procedure but then
abandoned the appeal, and he filed suit under both Hawaii state
law, alleging wrongful termination, and federal law.  The trial
court dismissed the entire action at the request of the airline,
ruling that the Railway Labor Act preempted the action.  The Hawaii
Supreme Court reversed, and the United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari.  Hawaiian Airlines, 512 U.S. at ____, 129 L. Ed. 2d  at
209-10, 114 S. Ct.  at 2243.
     The Supreme Court began its discussion by pointing out that
the Railway Labor Act was extended in 1936 to cover the airline
industry.  512 U.S. at ___, 129 L. Ed. 2d  at 208, 114 S. Ct.  at
2241.  The issue as framed by the Supreme Court was as follows:
     "The question in this case is whether an aircraft mechanic who
     claims that he was discharged for refusing to certify the
     safety of a plane that he considered unsafe and for reporting
     his safety concerns to the Federal Aviation Administration may
     pursue available state law remedies for wrongful discharge, or
     whether he may seek redress only through the [Railway Labor
     Act's] arbitral mechanism."  512 U.S. at ___, 129 L. Ed. 2d  at
     208, 114 S. Ct.  at 2241.
     The court ruled that purely factual questions about an
employee's conduct or the motives or conduct of an employer do not
require any interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement. 
512 U.S. at ___, 129 L. Ed. 2d  at 217, 114 S. Ct.  at 2248. 
Preemption occurs only if "a state-law claim is dependent on the
interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement ***."  512 U.S.
at ___, 129 L. Ed. 2d  at 217, 114 S. Ct.  at 2249.  Because the
mechanic's claims required only a purely factual determination of
a retaliatory motive for the discharge, the state-law claims were
not preempted.  512 U.S. at ___, 129 L. Ed. 2d  at 220, 114 S. Ct. 
at 2251.
     "[W]hen the meaning of contract terms is not the subject of
dispute, the bare fact that a collective-bargaining agreement will
be consulted in the course of state-law litigation plainly does not
require the claim to be extinguished ***."  Livadas v. Bradshaw,
512 U.S. ___, ___, 129 L. Ed. 2d. 93, 110, 114 S. Ct. 2068, 2078
(1994).
     In Balzeit v. Southern Pacific Transportation Co., 569 F. Supp. 986 (N.D. Cal. 1983), a railroad employee with an FELA claim
was ordered by the employer to fire his attorneys.  The employee
filed suit under state law against the railroad for emotional
distress.  In denying a motion to dismiss based on preemption, the
court ruled that because a fundamental state public policy was at
issue, no preemption occurred.
     From these authorities it is clear that Callis's state-law
claim for interference with the attorney-client relationship is not
preempted.
                                 ISSUE III
     For its third issue, the railroad alleges that Callis failed
to plead or prove irreparable harm.  Further, it claims that the
court failed to find irreparable harm.  No authority is cited for
this proposition.  The issue is waived.  134 Ill. 2d R. 341(e)(7).
     In any event, as discussed earlier, the pleadings and findings
of the court belie this claim.  The claim is without merit.
                                 ISSUE IV
     Finally, the railroad argues that the court erred in finding
that there was no adequate remedy at law.  It claims that if some
harm is ultimately proven, money damages are available.  There is
no citation to the record for this claim, and no authority is
cited.  It is waived.  134 Ill. 2d R. 341(e)(6),(7).
     In any event, the fact that an alternative remedy is available
does not mean that the remedy is adequate.  The alternative remedy
at law to be adequate must be clear, complete, and as effective as
the equitable remedy.  Alexander v. Standard Oil Co., 53 Ill. App.
3d 690, 368 N.E.2d 1010 (1977).  We find no abuse of discretion in
the trial court's ruling.
                                CONCLUSION
     For the foregoing reasons, the order of the circuit court
granting the plaintiff, Callis, a preliminary injunction is
affirmed.

     Affirmed.

     KUEHN, P.J., and GOLDENHERSH, J., concur.