COUNCIL FOR SECULAR HUMANSIM, INC., RICHARD HULL and ELAINE HULL, v. WALTER A. MCNEIL, in his official capacity as Secretary of Corrections of Florida: PRISONERS OF CHRIST, INC., a Florida corporation; and LAMB OF GOD MINISTRIES, INC., Florida corporation
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
FIRST DISTRICT, STATE OF FLORIDA
COUNCIL FOR SECULAR
HUMANISM, INC., RICHARD
HULL, and ELAINE HULL,
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO
FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND
DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED
Appellants,
CASE NO. 1D08-4713
v.
WALTER A. MCNEIL, in his
official capacity as Secretary of
Corrections of Florida;
PRISONERS OF CHRIST, INC.,
a Florida corporation; and LAMB
OF GOD MINISTRIES, INC.,
Florida corporation,
Appellees.
_____________________________/
Opinion filed December 15, 2009.
An appeal from the Circuit Court for Leon County.
John C. Cooper, Judge.
Christine Davis Graves of Carlton Fields, P.A., Tallahassee, for Appellant.
Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Scott D. Makar, Solicitor General and Timothy
D. Osterhaus, Deputy Solicitor General, Tallahassee, for Appellee Secretary
Walter A. McNeil.
Major B. Harding, and E. Dylan Rivers of Ausley & McMullen, P.A., Tallahassee;
Eric C. Rassbach, Admitted Pro Hac Vice, The Becket Fund for Religious Liberty,
Washington, D.C., for Appellees Prisoners of Christ, Inc. and Lamb of God
Ministries, Inc.
VAN NORTWICK, J.
The Council for Secular Humanism, Inc., (CSH), Richard Hull and Elaine
Hull appeal a final judgment on the pleadings on their amended petition seeking to
have the trial court prohibit, on state constitutional grounds, appellee Walter A.
McNeil, as Secretary of the Department of Corrections, from using State funds
pursuant to sections 944.473 and 944.4731, Florida Statutes (2007), to support the
faith-based substance abuse transitional housing programs of appellees Prisoners of
Christ, Inc. (Prisoners) and Lamb of God Ministries, Inc. (Lamb of God). Count I
of the amended petition alleged that payments to these organizations constituted
payments to churches, sects, religious sects, religious denominations or sectarian
institutions contrary to the so-called “no-aid” provision in Article I, section 3 of the
Florida Constitution.1 Count II challenged the contracts which were entered into
with these faith-based institutions under the same constitutional provision. Count
III sought to bar the secretary from delegating government authority and powers to
1
Article I, section 3 of the Florida Constitution provides:
Religious freedom. - There shall be no law respecting
the establishment of religion or prohibiting or penalizing
the free exercise thereof. Religious freedom shall not
justify practices inconsistent with public morals, peace or
safety. No revenue of the state or any political
subdivision or agency thereof shall ever be taken from
the public treasury directly or indirectly in aid of any
church, sect, or religious denomination or in aid of any
sectarian institution.
2
chaplains pursuant to section 944.4731(6)(a), which requires that, prior to
placement of an offender in a faith-based substance abuse transitional housing
program, a transition assistant specialist must consult with a chaplain if an inmate
requests and is approved for placement. The trial court entered a final judgment on
the pleadings in favor of appellees on all counts.
Because we are reviewing a final judgment on the pleadings, we are required
to accept as true all well-pleaded allegations and the inferences to be drawn
therefrom. We find that in Count I the allegations state a cause of action that
sections 944.473 and 944.4731 violate the no-aid provision of Article I, section 3.
Thus, we reverse the trial court’s final judgment as to Count I. As to Count II, we
affirm the trial court’s determination that appellants lack taxpayer standing to
pursue the Count II claims because those claims did not constitute a challenge to
the government’s taxing and spending powers. Finally, with respect to Count III,
we hold that the amended petition does not state a cause of action under Article I,
section 3, based on the alleged unlawful delegation of authority to prison
chaplains. Accordingly, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further
proceedings.
Count I
CHS is a nonprofit New York corporation registered to do business in
Florida and is a Florida taxpayer.
CHS alleges that it was formed to foster
3
religious liberty by promoting the enforcement of the principle of separation of
church and state. The Hulls are Florida taxpayers residing in Leon County and
members of CHS.
Prisoners and Lamb of God are both Florida nonprofit
corporations which describe themselves as “ministries.”
McNeil, as Secretary of the Department of Corrections, entered into
contracts with Prisoners and Lamb of God under which these entities were
obligated to provide faith-based substance abuse post-release transitional housing
program services in return for which the ministries would be paid $20 per day per
prisoner assigned to the programs. In their amended petition, appellants allege that
these appellees are sectarian religious institutions which use Christian doctrine to
carry out their work with participants in the substance abuse transitional programs;
“that the faith-based component of the state-funded programs they provide
includes teaching of Christian doctrine and attempts to encourage program
participants to change their character by faith in Jesus Christ and other Christian
doctrines;” that Prisoners is a member of the Coalition of Prison Evangelists; and
that Lamb of God works in partnership with the Church in the Woods at Freedom
Ranch, a Christian church operated by John Glenn, founder of Alpha Ministries,
which appellants allege is an explicitly Christian organization. Finally, appellants
allege that sections 944.473 and 944.4731 authorize the “payment of funds from
4
the public coffers” to these “sectarian institutions” in violation of Article I, section
3.
Section 944.473(2)(a) requires inmates who meet certain criteria to
“participate in substance abuse program services when such services are
available.”
Section 944.473(2)(c) provides that “[w]hen selecting contract
providers to administer substance abuse treatment programs, the department shall
make every effort to consider qualified faith-based service groups on an equal
basis with other private organizations.”
Section 944.4731(3)(a) adds that
“contingent upon funding, the department shall enter into contracts with multiple
providers who are private organizations, including faith-based service groups, to
operate substance abuse transition housing programs . . .” Section 944.4731(3)(b)
requires that the department “ensure that an offender’s faith orientation, or lack
thereof, will not be considered in determining admission to a faith-based program
and that the program does not attempt to convert an offender toward a particular
faith or religious preference.”
In Bush v. Holmes, 886 So. 2d 340 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004) (Holmes I), this
court addressed the constitutionality of the Florida Opportunity Scholarship
Program (OSP) and held that the no-aid provision of Article I, section 3, which
mandates that “[n]o revenue of the state . . . shall ever be taken from the public
treasury directly or indirectly in aid . . . of any sectarian institution,” prohibited
5
those sectarian schools from receiving funds from the State through the OSP
voucher program provided for in section 229.0537, Florida Statutes (1999). In
Holmes I, we explained:
The constitutional prohibition in the no-aid provision
involves three elements: (1) the prohibited state action
must involve the use of state tax revenues; (2) the
prohibited use of state revenues is broadly defined, in
that state revenues cannot be used “directly or indirectly
in aid of” the prohibited beneficiaries; and (3) the
prohibited beneficiaries of the use of state revenues are
“any church, sect, or religious denomination” or “any
sectarian institution.”
886 So. 2d at 352.
Upon review in Bush v. Holmes, 919 So. 2d 392 (Fla. 2006) (Holmes II), the
Florida Supreme Court did not reach the issue addressed by this court in Holmes I.
Rather, the court held that the OSP was facially unconstitutional under the
provisions of Article 9, section 1(a) of the Florida Constitution. The Court neither
approved nor disapproved of this court’s decision in Holmes I. Holmes II, 919 So.
2d at 413. Thus, this court’s majority opinion in Holmes I, construing Article I,
section 3, remains controlling law.
In the case under review, the trial court was erroneously persuaded by
appellees that this court’s decision in Holmes I was limited explicitly to the school
context. The Holmes I decision did not limit its analysis to a “schools only”
context. On this point, we stated:
6
The Governor and the Attorney General argue that
holding the OSP [Opportunity Scholarship Program]
unconstitutional will put at risk a great multitude of other
programs and activities in which the state provides funds
for health and social service programs that are operated
by institutions affiliated with a church or religious group.
Those appellants assert that these programs range from
the use of church buildings as polling places during
elections; to the use of institutions affiliated with religion
to provide social services, such as substance abuse,
transitional housing or assistance to victims of crimes; to
the use of healthcare facilities owned by religious groups
by Medicaid recipients.
* * *
As we discuss above, nothing in the Florida no-aid
provision would create a constitutional bar to state aid to
a nonprofit institution that was not itself sectarian, even if
the institution is affiliated with a religious order or
religious organization. Unlike the sectarian schools
receiving OSP vouchers, it has been observed that the
health and social service programs and activities raised in
the appellants’ arguments, although affiliated with a
church or religion, are generally operated through nonprofit organizations that are not sectarian or, at least, not
pervasively sectarian institutions . . . The analysis of the
application of the no-aid provision to other programs is
for another time and another case involving its own
unique facts.
886 So. 2d at 362 (citations omitted).
In granting the judgment on the pleadings below, the trial court utilized an
Establishment Clause2 analysis to conclude that the subject program in this case
2
The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the United States
Constitution provides that “Congress shall make no law respecting an
7
and the contracts entered into pursuant to that program are not unconstitutional
since the language in section 944.473(2)(c), which directed DOC to consider faithbased service groups on an equal basis with other private organizations, was
merely an expression of a nondiscrimination policy that would prevent the state
from excluding groups based on religion. Examining the contracts involved, the
trial court rejected the contention of the appellants that the DOC contracts in this
case mandated adherence to Christian doctrines. The trial court reasoned that these
contracts require the contractors to ensure that state funds are used for the sole
purpose of furthering the secular goals of criminal rehabilitation and the staff of the
ministries are prevented from disparaging a client’s religious beliefs or seeking to
convert them to a particular religious faith. See, e.g., Freedom From Religion
Foundation, Inc. v. McCallum, 324 F.3d 880 (CA 7, 2003) (holding that taxpayer
group which sought to enjoin state correctional authorities from funding halfway
house that incorporated Christianity into its treatment program were not entitled to
that injunction because the funding did not violate the Establishment Clause).
The appellants’ claims in Count I are based on the no-aid provision in
Florida’s constitution, not the state or federal Establishment Clauses. Thus, we do
not address the trial court’s Establishment Clause analysis. As this court explained
in Holmes I, Article I, section 3 of the Florida Constitution is not “substantively
establishment of religion. . . .” The first sentence of Article I, section 3 of the
Florida Constitution, supra n.1, is similar.
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synonymous with the federal Establishment Clause.” 886 So. 2d at 344. While the
first sentence of Article I, section 3 is consistent with the federal Establishment
Clause by “generally prohibiting laws respecting the establishment of religion,” the
no-aid provision of Article I, section 3 imposes “further restrictions on the state’s
involvement with religious institutions than [imposed by] the Establishment
Clause.” Id. Specifically, the state may not use tax revenues to “directly or
indirectly” aid “any church, sect, or religious denomination or any sectarian
institution.” As we noted in Holmes I, 886 So. 2d at 359-360, the United States
Supreme Court has recognized that state constitutional provisions such as Florida’s
no-aid provision are “far stricter” than the Establishment Clause, Witters v.
Washington Department of Services for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 489 (1986), and
“draw[] a more stringent line than that drawn by the United States Constitution.”
Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 722 (2004).
Examining Count I of appellants’ amended petition, we conclude that
appellants have sufficiently alleged the three elements required to state a cause of
action under the no-aid provision. In passing on a motion for judgment on the
pleadings, “all well pleaded material allegations of the complaint and all fair
inferences to be drawn therefrom must be taken as true and the inquiry is whether
the plaintiff has stated a cause of action by his complaint.” Martinez v. Florida
Power & Light, 863 So. 2d 1204, 1205 (Fla. 2003) (quoting Reinhard v. Bliss, 85
9
So. 2d 131, 133 (Fla. 1956)). “The allegations of the defendant’s answer are of no
avail to him at a hearing on a defendant’s motion for decree on the pleadings.” Id.
Appellees assert that, even if Prisoners and Lamb of God are considered
sectarian institutions, paying them to provide social services to inmates under the
programs does not violate the no-aid provision. We agree that Florida’s no-aid
provision does not create a per se bar to the state providing funds to religious or
faith-based institutions to furnish social services. As we explained in dicta in
Holmes I, 886 So. 2d at 362, “nothing in the Florida no-aid provision would create
a constitutional bar to state aid to a non-profit institution that was not itself
sectarian, even if the institution is affiliated with a religious order or religious
organization.”
The inquiry here is whether the programs funded by sections
944.473 and 944.4731 and provided by Prisoners and Lamb of God are
predominantly religious in nature and whether the programs promote the religious
mission of the organizations receiving the funds.3 The appellants allege that not
only are Prisoners and Lamb of God sectarian institutions, but the programs
themselves are fundamentally carried out in a sectarian manner in violation of
3
We recognize that, as asserted by appellees, the services received by the state
under the programs here serve legitimate penological goals. Further, “[t]he
teaching of moral values, and creating a comprehensive rehabilitation program
intentionally focused on moral values and character development, need not imply
indoctrination into a religious faith.” Ams. United for Separation of Church and
State v. Prison Fellowship Ministries, 432 F. Supp. 2d 862, 875, n.12 (S.D. Iowa
2006), rev’d in part, 509 F.3d 406 (8th Cir. 2007).
10
Article I, section 3. As we stated above, at this stage of the proceedings, we must
take as true the material allegations plead in the petition and all fair inferences to
be drawn therefrom. Martinez, 863 So. 2d at 1205. It is only after the facts are
developed with respect to the purpose and effect of the faith-based programs which
are the subject of this action that these arguments can be addressed definitively.
See, e.g., Ams. United for Separation of Church and State v. Prison Fellowship
Ministries, 432 F. Supp. 2d 862 (S.D. Iowa 2006), aff’d in part and rev’d in part,
509 F.3d 406 (8th Cir. 2007) (holding after trial on the merits, faith-based prisoner
program violated the Establishment Clause).
Further, appellees urge us to find persuasive the Georgia Supreme Court’s
decision in Taetle v. Atlanta Independent School System, 625 S.E.2d 770 (Ga.
2006).
Certainly, the no-aid provision in Georgia’s constitution is virtually
identical to the provision in Florida’s constitution.4 The Taetle court held that,
when the Atlanta school system leased classroom space from a church to create a
public school kindergarten annex, it did not violate the Georgia Constitution. The
Georgia Court reasoned that the Georgia no-aid provision did not bar a political
subdivision of the state from “enter[ing] into an arms-length, commercial
4
Article I, § 11, Par. VII of the 1983 Georgia Constitution provides:
No money shall ever be taken from the public treasury,
directly or indirectly, in aid of any church, sect, cult, or
religious denomination or of any sectarian institution.
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agreement with a sectarian institution to accomplish a nonsectarian purpose.” Id.
at 771. We find the holding in Taetle consistent with our discussion in Holmes I.
886 So. 2d at 362. Significantly, however, Taetle expressly distinguished Bennett
v. City of LaGrange, 112 S.E. 482 (Ga. 1922), in which the Georgia Supreme
Court had held that under the no-aid provision the City of LaGrange cannot pay a
sectarian organization to “assume[] the care of the poor of that city . . .” Id. at 48687. As the Taetle court explained: “That is because a political subdivision of the
state cannot give money to a religious institution in such a way as to promote the
sectarian handiwork of the institution.” Taetle, 625 So. 2d at 771. These Georgia
decisions underscore the complexity of any no-aid analysis and make evident that
there is a continuum along which different cases will fall depending upon the facts
and circumstances present in those cases. See, e.g., Cmty. Council v. Jordan, 432
P.2d 460 (Ariz. 1967) (analyzing the no-aid decisions on the subject).
Appellees also argue that, if the no-aid provision bars religious entities from
participating in state contracting, it would violate the Federal Establishment and
Free Exercise Clauses. This argument was rejected in Holmes I. As we explained
in detail in Holmes I, 886 So. 2d at 362-66, the United States Supreme Court has
recognized that a state constitutional provision, like Florida’s no-aid provision, can
bar state financial aid to religious institutions without violating either the
Establishment Clause or Free Exercise Clause. Locke, 540 U.S. at 725. As the
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Court explained, “there are some state actions permitted by the Establishment
Clause but not required by the Free Exercise Clause,” id. at 719, and states are free
to “draw[ ] a more stringent line than drawn by the United States Constitution. . . .”
Id. at 722.
Because the allegations of the amended petition state a cause of action
alleging a violation of Article I, section 3, we reverse the trial court’s judgment on
the pleadings as to Count I. We emphasize that our decision here is based solely
on the pleadings.
At this stage of the proceeding, we do not address the
constitutionality of sections 944.473 and 944.4731 before the parties have been
given the opportunity to develop a factual record. See Glendale Fed. Sav. & Loan
v. State Dep’t of Ins., 485 So. 2d 1321 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986). On remand, after the
facts are developed, it can be determined whether appellants have established that
the programs operated by Prisoners and Lamb of God under sections 944.473 and
944.4731 are primarily “sectarian” in nature and effect within the meaning of
Article I, section 3, see Holmes I, 886 So. 2d at 353-54, and that “aid” within the
meaning of Article I, section 3 is being given to these ministries. Id. at 352-53.
Count II
As the trial court recognized, in Rickman v. Whitehurst, 74 So. 205, 207
(Fla. 1917), the Florida Supreme Court construed the right of citizen-taxpayers to
sue the state by requiring that, when challenging government policy or actions, a
13
taxpayer must allege a “special injury” which differs in kind and degree from that
sustained by other members of the community at large.
In Department of
Administration v. Horne, 269 So. 2d 659 (Fla. 1972), the court created an
exception to the Rickman standing rule. “[W]here there is an attack upon
constitutional grounds based directly upon the Legislature’s taxing and spending
power, there is standing to sue without the Rickman requirement of special injury.”
Id. at 663. To withstand dismissal on standing grounds, however, the challenge
must be to legislative appropriations. Id. at 663; see Philip J. Padovano, Florida
Civil Practice § 4.3 (2009 ed.) (“[T]his is a narrow exception which applies only to
constitutional challenges to appropriations; a plaintiff does not have standing to
challenge other actions of the government simply by establishing his or her status
as a taxpayer.”).
In Count II, appellants have challenged the contracts entered into between
DOC and Prisoners and Lamb of God, alleging that they require these ministries to
“provide a transitional program that includes a faith-based component resulting in
spiritual renewal” and that “the spiritual renewal is created by inculcating faith in
Jesus Christ.” In Count II, appellants assert that “[t]o the extent Florida Statutes
sections 944.473 and 944.4731 authorize the Illegal Contracts and payment of the
Illegal Contracts, those statutes should be declared unconstitutional.” They ask
that McNeil be enjoined from entering into the contracts.
14
We agree with appellees that, to the extent that Count II challenges McNeil’s
authority to enter into contracts and the performance of those contracts by the
ministries, the trial court correctly concluded taxpayer standing is not present. For,
as appellees argued below, allowing third parties to gain access to courts based
upon taxpayer standing to challenge the performance of contracts and the decision
of an executive agency to enter into a contract would be extraordinarily
burdensome and would impermissibly allow a taxpayer to interfere with State
procurement contracts. In Department of Revenue v. Markham, 396 So. 2d 1120,
1122 (Fla. 1981) (quoting Paul v. Blake, 376 So. 2d 256, 259 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979)),
the Florida Supreme Court recognized that opening the courthouse door to any
taxpayer suit would allow the filing of lawsuits “by disgruntled taxpayers, who,
along with much of the taxpaying public these days, are not entirely pleased with
certain of the taxing and spending decisions of their elective representatives.”
Thus, ordinarily, “the taxpayer’s remedy should be at the polls and not in the
courts.”
We agree with the trial court that petitioners have adequately alleged
grounds for taxpayer standing in Count I to attack the constitutionality of sections
944.473 and 944.4731, since the state was using legislative appropriations
allegedly to aid sectarian institutions. Such is not the case with Count II. The trial
court correctly ruled that standing to raise Count II is foreclosed by Markham
15
because Count II challenges the downstream performance of these contracts by the
ministries and the Department’s oversight of the contracts. We realize that the
distinctions being drawn in this case will be a minor consequence, however,
because on remand the trial court will necessarily be required to examine the
contracts as part of its inquiry into whether sections 944.473 and 944.4731 violate
Article I, section 3. To that extent, the allegations of Count II are essentially
subsumed under Count I.
Count III
In Count III, CSH and the Hulls have alleged that section 944.4731(6)(a)5
provides a “chaplain” with important government powers with respect to the
5
Section 944.4731(6)(a) provides:
(a) The transition assistance specialist and the chaplain
shall provide a list of contracted private providers,
including faith-based providers, to the offender and
facilitate the application process.
The transition
assistance specialist shall inform the offender of program
availability and assess the offender’s need and suitability
for substance abuse transition housing assistance. If an
offender is approved for placement, the specialist shall
assist the offender and coordinate the release of the
offender with the selected program. If an offender
requests and is approved for placement in a contracted
faith-based substance abuse transition housing program,
the specialist must consult with the chaplain prior to such
placement. A right to substance abuse program services
is not stated, intended, or otherwise implied by this
section.
16
placement of offenders in substance abuse transitional programs. They allege:
This delegation of government authority to a religious
official violates Article I, Section 3 of the Florida
Constitution, as it unconstitutionally substitutes the
judgment of a religious authority for the decision-making
of secular public officials. Moreover, any use of public
funds to pay the chaplain designated in Florida Statutes §
944.4731(6) similarly violates Article I, section 3 of the
Florida Constitution.
They sought “a temporary and permanent injunction preventing [McNeil] from
delegating government authority and powers to the chaplain, including, but not
limited to, the authority to be consulted prior to the placement of any offender in
faith-based substance abuse transitional housing programs.”
These allegations do not state a cause of action under either the Federal
Establishment Clause or Article I, section 3 of the Florida Constitution. Appellants
have not alleged that the acts of these chaplains establish a religion. In addition,
the state’s employment of a chaplain does not violate the Establishment Clause.
March v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983). Moreover, the mere fact that public
funds are used to pay a chaplain does not establish a cause of action under
Florida’s no-aid provision.
The individual chaplains are not a church, sect,
religious denomination or sectarian institution. Further, appellants do not allege
that that employment of a chaplain is “in aid of any church, sect, or religious
denomination or in aid of any sectarian institution.”
AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED for further
17
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
PADOVANO, J., AND BROWNING, JR., EDWIN J., SENIOR JUDGE,
CONCUR.
18
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