JONI MACRI, NICODEMO (NIC) MACRI, and THE ESTATE OF JENA MACRI DECEASED, v. CLEMENTS AND ASHMORE, P.A., d/b/a NORTH FLORIDA WOMEN'S CARE, DAVID O'BRYAN, M.D., RACHEL DEPART, CNM, and FLORIDA BIRTH-RELATED NEUROLOGICAL INJURY COMPENSATION ASSOCIATION
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
FIRST DISTRICT, STATE OF FLORIDA
JONI MACRI, NICODEMO
(NIC) MACRI, and THE
ESTATE OF JENA MACRI,
DECEASED,
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO
FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND
DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED
CASE NO. 1D07-5818
Appellants,
v.
CLEMENTS AND ASHMORE,
P.A., d/b/a NORTH FLORIDA
WOMEN'S CARE, DAVID
O'BRYAN, M.D., RACHEL
DEPART, CNM, and FLORIDA
BIRTH-RELATED
NEUROLOGICAL INJURY
COMPENSATION
ASSOCIATION,
Appellees.
_____________________________/
Opinion filed July 16, 2009.
An appeal from the Circuit Court for Leon County.
P. Kevin Davey, Judge.
Donald M. Hinkle, of Hinkle and Foran, Tallahassee, for Appellants.
Wilbur E. Brewton, General Counsel, Kelly B. Plante, and Tana D. Storey, of
Brewton Plante, P.A., Tallahassee, for Appellee Florida Birth-Related
Neurological Injury Association; Dennis Jackson Martin & Fontela, P.A.,
Tallahassee, and Carr, Allison, Pugh, Howard, Oliver & Sisson, Tallahassee, and
Mark Hicks, Dinah Stein, and Erik P. Bartenhagen, of Hicks, Porter, Ebenfeld &
Stein, Miami, for Appellees Clement and Ashmore, P.A., d/b/a North Florida
Women’s Care, and David O’Bryan, M.D., and Rachel Depart, CNM.
ALLEN, J.
The appellants challenge a summary judgment entered for the appellees on
wrongful death claims with allegations of medical negligence.
Among other
defenses, the appellees asserted that those claims are precluded by the exclusivity
of remedy provision in the Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury
Compensation Plan, at section 766.303(2), Florida Statutes.
The appellants
maintained that the claims are allowed under the “willful and wanton” exception in
section 766.303(2). In entering summary judgment the court reasoned that the
claims could not proceed as the appellants had not pled the “willful and wanton”
exception in their complaint. But section 766.303(2) exclusivity is an affirmative
defense, which the appellants did not have to negate in their complaint, and the
court should not have entered the summary judgment.
The appellants’ civil action for wrongful death and bodily injury was based
on allegations of medical negligence in connection with the birth and ensuing
death of a child. The action was filed against the delivering obstetrician and the
attending nurse-midwife, along with the professional association which was their
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employer, and the hospital where the child was born.
The hospital was
subsequently dismissed, upon its settlement of a medical negligence claim for this
incident. Meanwhile, the wrongful death action was abated on motion by the other
defendants so as to compel the appellants to pursue relief under the Florida BirthRelated Neurological Injury Compensation Plan.
This Plan, as established at
sections
Statutes,
766.301
through
766.316,
Florida
provides
no-fault
compensation for qualifying injuries. However, only a limited recovery may be
had under the Plan, and that is made the exclusive remedy with only certain
exceptions. See §766.303(2), Fla. Stat. Furthermore, the Plan indicates that no
civil action may be pursued until determinations are made under the Plan as to
whether there is a birth-related neurological injury, as well as to other matters
affecting compensability. See §766.304, Fla. Stat.
Although the appellants did not want to seek recovery under the Plan, they
were compelled to do so before they could resume their civil action.
They
therefore filed an administrative petition seeking the necessary determinations
under section 766.309, Florida Statutes, regarding the applicability of the Plan for
the injuries sustained by the child. An administrative law judge determined that
the child sustained a qualifying birth-related neurological injury, but that the
settlement of the medical negligence claim against the hospital precluded an award
of benefits under the Plan. That ruling was made in accordance with section
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766.304, which precludes a Plan award if there has been recovery by settlement or
judgment in a civil action.
The appellants acknowledged that they were not entitled to recovery under
the Plan, and after obtaining the ruling from the administrative law judge the
appellants returned to the circuit court where the civil action remained pending.
The doctor, the nurse-midwife, and their employer subsequently moved for
summary judgment, asserting that the civil action is barred by the exclusivity of
remedy provision in section 766.303(2). The appellants pointed out that such
exclusivity is an affirmative defense which the defendants had not raised in
answering the complaint, and the circuit court denied the initial motion for
summary judgment.
Defendants thereafter submitted a supplemental answer
raising this affirmative defense, and renewed motions for summary judgment were
filed. The appellants responded by noting that section 766.303(2) exclusivity does
not pertain in situations of willful and wanton disregard, and the appellants averred
that their civil action was based on such conduct. The appellants also submitted
affidavits from an obstetrician and a nurse-midwife, who both indicated that there
was clear and convincing evidence of willful and wanton disregard in the way the
defendants handled the labor and birth.
Despite the appellants’ reliance on the willful and wanton exception to
section 766.303(2) exclusivity, the circuit court eventually entered summary
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judgment for the defendants on the wrongful death claims. In ruling for the
defendants the court observed that the appellants’ complaint had not used the
“willful and wanton” language, which the court described as an “obtuse” pleading
requirement. The court concluded that, in light of the statutory proscriptions in
sections 766.303(2) and 766.304, such an express allegation should have been
made before the administrative determination of no award under the Plan became
binding, in order for the appellants to rely on the willful and wanton exception to
the exclusivity in section 766.303(2).
As the appellants pointed out below, section 766.303(2) exclusivity is an
affirmative defense to be raised by the defendants. See Fla. Health Servs. Cntr. v.
Div. of Admin. Hearings, 974 So. 2d 1096 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007). An affirmative
defense does not ordinarily have to be anticipated in a complaint, see Shahid v.
Campbell, 552 So. 2d 321 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989), and unless raised by the
defendants could be deemed to be waived. See, e.g., Southern Mgmt. & Dev. v.
Gardner, 992 So. 2d 919 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008).
The specific allegations of
negligence in the complaint in the present case were sufficient and the appellants
did not have to negate the section 766.303(2) exclusivity which the defendants
claimed, until the defendants raised that matter as an affirmative defense. Once the
defense was properly raised the appellants asserted the willful and wanton
exception, thus complying with the ordinary requirements of civil procedure and
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also satisfying the requirements of section 766.303(2). The circuit court therefore
should not have entered the summary judgment for the defendants.
As provided in section 766.303(2), the statutory grant of exclusivity of
remedy under the Plan does not pertain when there is clear and convincing
evidence of willful and wanton disregard, if the civil action is filed prior to and in
lieu of payment of an award under the Plan (or before an award becomes
conclusive and binding). And as indicated in section 766.304, an award should not
be made under the Plan if there has been a settlement or final judgment in a civil
action. The appellants’ settlement with the hospital where the child was born thus
precludes an award under the Plan, but that does not affect the civil action against
the doctor, the nurse-midwife, and the professional association which was their
employer. The appellants suggest that the unavailability of any recovery under the
Plan, in light of the settlement with the hospital, should avoid the section
766.303(2) exclusivity without the necessity of clear and convincing evidence of
willful and wanton disregard. But that does not comport with the statutory grant of
exclusivity, which does not depend on actual recovery and instead may be invoked
as an affirmative defense upon the existence of a qualifying birth-related
neurological injury (with the provision of services by a participating practitioner)
without regard to whether an award is actually made under the Plan. See Univ. of
Miami v. Klein, 603 So. 2d 651 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992).
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And contrary to the
appellants’ argument as to the impact this might have on their constitutional right
of access to the courts, the no-fault system of compensation in the Plan is similar to
other no-fault systems which have been upheld upon constitutional challenges
based on the right of access. See, e.g., Martinez v. Scanlan, 582 So. 2d 1167 (Fla.
1991). As with those cases, even if recovery is not actually obtained under the
Plan the no-fault system of compensation therein is a reasonable alternative to the
civil recourse which might have otherwise been available.
The appellants also suggest that regardless of whether there was any willful
and wanton disregard in this case, the nurse-midwife should not be able to invoke
section 766.303(2) exclusivity if the nurse-midwife did not pay the section
766.314(4)(c), Florida Statutes, assessment for a midwife to be a “participating
physician” under the Plan. But that assessment pertains for a midwife who wants
to be independently considered as a participating physician, whereas the nursemidwife here performed services with the delivering obstetrician and was
employed by his professional association. The nurse-midwife was thus covered
under the umbrella of the doctor’s status as a participating physician. This case is
unlike Fluet v. Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Assoc.,
788 So. 2d 1010 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001), where a supervising doctor was not actually
present and directly involved at the birth, and where the parties agreed that the
midwife could not invoke the protections of the Plan. It does not appear that there
7
was any such agreement in the present case, and the nurse-midwife here may
invoke section 766.303(2) exclusivity, which the appellants might then overcome
by showing clear and convincing evidence of willful and wanton disregard.
As their final issue, the appellants argue that the defendants should not be
allowed to invoke section 766.303(2) exclusivity, as not all of those medical
providers furnished the patient with notice of participation in the Plan in
accordance with section 766.316, Florida Statutes. That enactment indicates that a
hospital and participating physicians should each provide such notice to the
obstetrical patient. In Galen of Florida, Inc. v. Braniff, 696 So. 2d 308 (Fla. 1997),
it was established that such notice is a condition precedent for invocation of section
766.303(2) exclusivity. See also Univ. Med. Cntr. v. Athey, 699 So. 2d 1350 (Fla.
1997). But unlike Galen and Athey, where there was no notice given by any
medical provider, in the present case the delivering obstetrician satisfied the
statutory requirement by furnishing the patient with the necessary notice.
Although the hospital here may not have provided its own separate notice, the
doctor’s invocation of section 766.303(2) exclusivity is not limited by the
hospital’s absence of notice. See Gugelmin v. Div. of Admin. Hearings, 815 So.
2d 764 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002). While in Gugelmin the hospital gave notice but the
doctor did not, and the present case involves the converse situation, Gugelmin
indicates that the medical provider who gave the patient notice of participation in
8
the Plan may rely on section 766.303(2) exclusivity regardless of whether another
provider failed to give the patient such notice. That approach is consistent with
this court’s ruling in Schur v. Florida Birth-Related Neurological, 832 So. 2d 188
(Fla. 1st DCA 2002), where a doctor who did not give the required notice could not
invoke the exclusivity defense, despite such notice having been provided by
another entity. In Schur the party who did not give notice was not allowed to use
another party’s notice as a means to invoke section 766.303(2) exclusivity,
whereas here the doctor is invoking such exclusivity based on the notice he gave
the patient. And the nurse-midwife here did not have to provide her own notice, as
she does not seek to establish independent status as a participating physician, and
instead provided services in connection with the doctor and is within the umbrella
of his participation and coverage under the Plan.
The circuit court should not have entered this summary judgment, as the
appellants presented a basis to allow their wrongful death claims under the willful
and wanton exception to the affirmative defense of section 766.303(2) exclusivity.
In accordance with section 766.303(2), such claims depend on clear and
convincing evidence of willful and wanton disregard. The summary judgment is
reversed and the case is remanded.
WOLF and DAVIS, JJ., CONCUR.
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