Riley v. California Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation, et al.
Filing
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ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AND DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY. ***Civil Case Terminated. Signed by Judge Thelton E. Henderson on 08/20/2012. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate/Proof of Service)(tmi, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 8/21/2012)
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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SHANNON RILEY,
No. C-10-0115 TEH (PR)
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Petitioner,
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v.
ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT
OF HABEAS CORPUS AND DENYING
CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
United States District Court
For the Northern District of California
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CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION
and RANDY GROUNDS, Warden,
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Respondents.
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/
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Petitioner Shannon Riley, an inmate incarcerated at
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Salinas Valley State Prison (SVSP), has filed a pro se petition for
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a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging a
disciplinary hearing.
Doc. #1.
Respondents were ordered to show
cause why the writ should not be granted.1
Doc. #21.
Respondents
have filed an answer, along with a supporting memorandum of points
and authorities.
#35.
Doc. #32.
Petitioner has filed a traverse.2
Doc.
For the reasons set forth below, the petition for a writ of
habeas corpus is DENIED.
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Pursuant to Rule 25(d)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, the Court substitutes current SVSP Warden Randy Grounds in
place of Defendant Warden F. Gonzalez.
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Petitioner’s traverse is incorrectly titled, “Opposition to
Respondents’ Motion to Dismiss.”
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The following facts are taken from the exhibits submitted
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by Respondents and Petitioner.
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received a Rules Violation Report (RVR) for battery on an inmate
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with no serious injury.
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was placed in administrative segregation pending review of his case.
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The RVR was based upon the observations of Officer C. Riley who,
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while he was in the prison day room, observed Petitioner and
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Petitioner’s cell-mate, Inmate Huffine, hitting Inmate Strandmore in
On December 29, 2007, Petitioner
Petitioner was deemed a security threat and
United States District Court
For the Northern District of California
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the head and torso with their fists.
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returning blows.
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stop fighting, Petitioner continued to fight another inmate, Inmate
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McCalley.
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Inmate Strandmore was observed
Instead of following Officer Riley’s command to
Before Petitioner’s disciplinary hearing, he was
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interviewed by K. Sinder, an investigative employee.
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told Sinder that, on the day in question, he was breaking up a fight
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between his cell mate and Inmate Strandmore and that he was not
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battering anyone.
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Petitioner as stating,
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Petitioner
The Investigative Employee Report (IER) quotes
[T]his was not a battery on I/M Strandmore. It
was a mutual combat between my cellie and I/M
Strandmore. I stepped in to break them up.
Furthermore, had I engaged in any form of force
and violence against either I/M McCalley or I/M
Strandmore, surely I would have sustained some
form of injury such as a scratch, abrasion,
bruise or something, as my 7219 clearly shows I
sustained no such injuries what so ever, there
by proving through physical evidence I was not
engaged in any force and violence.
Resps’ Ex. 3, RVR, Part C, IER.
The IER report quotes Officer C. Riley as stating:
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When I recalled day room I/M’s Riley and Huffine
approached I/M Strandmore and started hitting
him with closed fist [sic]. I/M Strandmore
began to strike back. I ordered the inmates to
get down with no results. I fired from the 40mm
Launcher and missed. At this time I/M Riley ran
toward I/M McCalley and they began fighting. I
fired from the 40mm again and hit I/M
Strandmore. I again ordered the inmates to get
down. All inmates got down and responding staff
arrived.
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Ex. 3, IER.
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The IER includes the inmates’ answers to Petitioner’s
written questions.
Inmate Huffine stated that he had “no
United States District Court
For the Northern District of California
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information to add.”
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questions posed by Petitioner:
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Inmate McCalley answered the following
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Q: Is it true that while I/M Strandmore and I/M
Huffine engaged in a mutual combat I grabbed I/M
Strandmore in an effort to break them up?
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A: Yes.
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Q: Is it true that after I grabbed I/M Strandmore you
grabbed me?
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A. Yes.
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Q: Is it true that during this period no punches were
thrown by me at you? Nor was [sic] any thrown by you
at me, or by I/M Strandmore at me?
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A: Yes.
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Q: During the videotape interview, is it true
that you only admitted that it was a mutual
combat between you and I just to get your cellie
Funbure released?
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A: Yes.
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Inmate Strandmore answered the following questions
posed
by Petitioner:
Q: Is it true that only you and I were the two
individuals engaged in a mutual combat?
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A: Yes.
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Q: Is it true that you started the mutual combat?
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A: No comment.
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Q: Did anyone else hit or attempt to assault you?
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A: No one other than Huffine attempted to hit or
assault me.
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The RVR indicates that, at the hearing, Petitioner
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requested that Inmates Strandmore and McCalley be called as
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witnesses.
Resps’ Ex. 5, RVR -- Part C, Hearing.
The Senior
United States District Court
For the Northern District of California
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Hearing Officer (SHO) asked Petitioner if either inmate would
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provide additional information to what he provided in the IER, and
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Petitioner stated, “No, I don’t think so.”
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Petitioner’s request for witnesses on the ground that they would
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have no additional testimony to provide.
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Riley and asked him the following questions:
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Id.
The SHO denied
The SHO called Officer C.
Q: Did it appear to you that Inmate Riley was
attempting to break up the fight?
A: No, that is not what it looked like to me.
Q: Did you see Inmate Riley throw any punches?
A: Yes.
The SHO asked Petitioner if he had any questions for
Officer Riley and Petitioner said, “No.”
The SHO found, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that Petitioner was guilty of battery
on an inmate without serious injuries, based on the IER, Officer
Riley’s testimony, and the medical reports.
Id.
The SHO stated:
Inmate Riley’s defense is found to be less
creditable than that of the reporting employee.
Inmate Riley states he attempted to break up the
fight, however the CDC 7219 Medical Report of
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Injury for all inmates involved in the incident
is consistent with the reporting employee’s
written account and testimony provided during
the hearing. Inmate Strandmore sustained
swollen area to right eye area, and abrasion to
left calf area active bleeding [sic]. Officer
Riley stated he observed inmates Riley and
Huffine approached [sic] Inmate Strandmore and
began to striking [sic] him with right and left
fists, hitting Strandmore in the head and upper
torso area. . . . Officer Riley stated Inmate
Riley ran towards Inmate McCalley and began to
punch him to the head and upper torso area.
Inmate McCalley sustained abrasion/scratches and
active bleeding behind right ear,
bruise/discolored and swollen area to right eye,
this would account for his injuries. Inmate
Huffine sustained swollen area to left eye brow.
Officer Riley states that Inmate Strandmore
fought back, this would account for the injury
to Inmate Huffine. Although Inmate Riley did
not sustain any injuries the SHO finds it is
possible that no injuries may have occurred as a
result of striking and punching someone.
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United States District Court
For the Northern District of California
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Id. at 2.
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Petitioner filed administrative claims that he was denied
his right to call witnesses at his disciplinary hearing and that the
SHO improperly found that a preponderance of the evidence supported
a finding of guilt.
On September 8, 2008, after Petitioner
exhausted administrative remedies, he filed a habeas petition in the
Kern County superior court, which was denied in a written order on
November 7, 2008.
Ex. 7.
On January 27, 2009, Petitioner filed a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the court of appeal, which
issued a one-sentence denial on February 9, 2009.
Ex. 8.
On March
6, 2009, Petitioner filed a habeas petition in the California
Supreme Court alleging his due process rights were violated because
staff refused to let him call witnesses at the hearing, failed to
properly document his questions to witnesses, and the guilty finding
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was not supported by some evidence.
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Court denied the petition. Ex. 10.
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Ex. 9.
On May 13, 2009, the
On December 1, 2009, Petitioner filed the instant habeas
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petition alleging the same claims he presented in his administrative
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appeals and his state habeas petitions.
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II
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A district court may entertain a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus “in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the
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judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody
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United States District Court
For the Northern District of California
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in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United
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States.”
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Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), a district court may
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not grant a petition challenging a state conviction or sentence on
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the basis of a claim that was reviewed on the merits in state court
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unless the state court’s adjudication of the claim “(1) resulted in
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a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable
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application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by
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the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a
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decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the
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facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court
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proceeding.”
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28 U.S.C. § 2254(a).
Under the Antiterrorism and
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
“Under the ‘contrary to’ clause, a federal habeas court
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may grant the writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion
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opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law
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or if the state court decides a case differently than [the] Court
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has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.”
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Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000).
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Williams v.
A state court decision is an
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“unreasonable application of” Supreme Court authority, falling under
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the second clause of § 2254(d)(1), if the state court correctly
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identifies the governing legal principle from the Supreme Court’s
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decisions but “unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of
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the prisoner’s case.”
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Id. at 413.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2), a state court decision
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“based on a factual determination will not be overturned on factual
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grounds unless objectively unreasonable in light of the evidence
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presented in the state-court proceeding.”
Miller-El v. Cockrell,
United States District Court
For the Northern District of California
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537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003).
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determination of a factual issue made by a state court unless the
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petitioner rebuts the presumption of correctness by clear and
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convincing evidence.
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Court explained: “[o]n federal habeas review, AEDPA ‘imposes a
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highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings’ and
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‘demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the
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doubt.’”
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(2011) (citation omitted).
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habeas relief is not warranted unless the error had a substantial
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and injurious effect or influence in determining jury's verdict.
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Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993)
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The court must presume correct any
See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).
As the Supreme
Felkner v. Jackson, __ U.S. __, 131 S. Ct. 1305, 1307
Even if there is a constitutional error,
When applying these standards, the federal court should
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review the “last reasoned decision” by the state courts.
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Galaza, 297 F.3d 911, 918 n.6 (9th Cir. 2002).
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California court of appeal and Supreme Court summarily denied relief
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on Petitioner’s claims, this Court looks to the California superior
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court’s November 7, 2008 written decision denying Petitioner’s
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Avila v.
Because the
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appeal.
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Resps. Ex. 7, In re: Shannon Riley, Case No. HC10788A.
With these principles in mind regarding the standard and
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scope of review on federal habeas, the Court addresses Petitioner's
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claims.
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III
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A
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Petitioner claims that the denial of his request that
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inmates Strandmore and McCalley testify at his disciplinary hearing
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violated his due process rights.
United States District Court
For the Northern District of California
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An inmate in California is entitled to due process before
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being disciplined when the discipline imposed will inevitably affect
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the duration of his sentence.
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487 (1995).
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proceeding includes written notice, time to prepare for the hearing,
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a written statement of decision, allowance of witnesses and
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documentary evidence when not unduly hazardous, and aid to the
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accused where the inmate is illiterate or the issues are complex.
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Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 564-67 (1974).
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Clause only requires that prisoners be afforded those procedures
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mandated by Wolff and its progeny; it does not require that a prison
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comply with its own, more generous procedures.
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F.3d 1415, 1419-20 (9th Cir. 1994), abrogated on other grounds by
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Sandin, 515 U.S. 472.
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is not whether the prison complied with its own regulations, but
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whether it complied with the due process requirements established in
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Wolff.
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Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484,
The process due in such a prison disciplinary
The Due Process
Walker v. Sumner, 14
Thus, the relevant inquiry on habeas review
Id. at 1420.
The superior court, citing California Code of Regulations
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(CCR), title 15, section 3315(e)(1)(B), denied this claim on the
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ground that the inmates’ answers to Petitioner’s questions were
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included in the IER, and Petitioner stated that these inmates had
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nothing new to add.
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Resps. Ex. 7, In re Riley, HC10788A at 2.
Title 15, section 3315(e)(1)(B) of the California Code of
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Regulations provides that an inmate may request that witnesses
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attend his or her disciplinary hearing, but that the official
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conducting the hearing may deny the request if he determines that
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the witnesses have no relevant or additional information.
Here, the
United States District Court
For the Northern District of California
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RVR Report states that the SHO asked Petitioner if either of his two
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requested witnesses would provide any information they had not
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already provided in the IER, and Petitioner responded, “No, I don’t
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think so.”
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responded to the SHO in this manner.
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that his witnesses would not provide new information, the SHO
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properly denied Petitioner’s request to have them testify pursuant
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to CCR § 3315(e)(1)(B).
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state requirements, his conduct satisfies the less stringent Wolff
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due process requirement.
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and considered these witnesses’ testimony, Petitioner was not
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prejudiced by the SHO’s decision not allowing them to appear.
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even if there was constitutional error, habeas relief is not
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warranted because the decision did not have a substantial and
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injurious effect on the outcome of the hearing as required by
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Brecht.
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relief unless it had a substantial and injurious effect or influence
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in determining the outcome of the proceeding).
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Petitioner fails to point to evidence disputing that he
Given that Petitioner stated
Because the SHO met the more stringent
Furthermore, because the SHO was aware of
Thus,
See Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637 (error cannot support habeas
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Petitioner also claims that the statements of his
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questions for inmate Strandmore were not documented by the
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investigating officer.
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Strandmore would not provide any additional information at the
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hearing, Petitioner was not prejudiced by any lack of documentation.
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Thus, any error was harmless.
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However, because Petitioner stated that
See id.
Accordingly, the state court’s denial of this claim was
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not contrary to or an unreasonable application of Supreme Court
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authority or an unreasonable determination of the facts.
United States District Court
For the Northern District of California
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This claim
for habeas relief is denied.
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B
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Next, Petitioner claims that the guilty finding was not
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supported by a preponderance of the evidence.
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good-time credits does not comport with the minimum requirements of
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procedural due process in Wolff unless the findings of the prison
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disciplinary decision-maker are supported by “some evidence” in the
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record.
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must be “some evidence” from which the conclusion of the
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decision-maker could be deduced.
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entire record is not required nor is an independent assessment of
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the credibility of witnesses or weighing of the evidence.
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relevant question is whether there is any evidence in the record
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that could support the conclusion reached by the disciplinary
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decision-maker.
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applicable in criminal trials.
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the preponderance of the evidence standard that must substantiate a
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charge before guilt may be found at a prison disciplinary hearing.
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The revocation of
Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454 (1985).
Id.
Id. at 455.
There
An examination of the
Id.
The
This standard is considerably lower than that
Id. at 456.
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It is also lower than
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See Cal. Code Regs. title 15, section 3320(l).
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Petitioner’s claim that guilt was not supported by a
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preponderance of the evidence mistakes the evidentiary standard for
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a disciplinary hearing with the standard that must be found by a
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reviewing habeas court.
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process requirements, the finding of guilt by the disciplinary
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decision-maker must be supported only by some evidence.
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As discussed above, to satisfy Wolff’s due
The state court correctly identified the “some evidence”
standard as the standard for judicial review and reasonably applied
United States District Court
For the Northern District of California
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it.
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IER report, Officer Riley’s testimony at the disciplinary hearing
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and the medical reports, and that this constituted the “some
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evidence” necessary to support the finding of guilt.
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cited the following specific evidence that supported the SHO’s
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finding of guilt: the RVR stated that Petitioner was in the day room
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at the prison, that he and his cell mate were observed striking
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inmate Strandmore in the head and upper torso area with closed
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fists, that inmate Strandmore fought back, that Petitioner did not
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obey the officer’s order to stop fighting and continued to fight
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Inmate McCalley, punching him in the head and upper torso.
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the medical reports showed that Strandmore had injuries that
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supported these observations.
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reasonable determination of the facts based upon the evidentiary
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record before it.
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Ex. 7 at 1.
The state court noted that the SHO relied upon the
The court
Also,
The state court’s findings are a
Accordingly, the state court’s conclusion that some
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evidence supported the SHO’s finding of guilt is not contrary to or
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an unreasonable application of federal authority or an unreasonable
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determination of the facts in light of the state record.
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habeas relief on this claim is not warranted.
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IV
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Therefore,
For the foregoing reasons, the Petition for a Writ of Habeas
Corpus is DENIED.
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Further, a Certificate of Appealability is DENIED.
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Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases.
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has not made “a substantial showing of the denial of a
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constitutional right.”
See
28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2).
Petitioner
Nor has Petitioner
United States District Court
For the Northern District of California
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demonstrated that “reasonable jurists would find the district
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court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.”
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Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000).
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appeal the denial of a Certificate of Appealability in this Court
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but may seek a certificate from the Court of Appeals under Rule 22
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of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure.
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Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases.
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Petitioner may not
See Rule 11(a) of the
The Clerk is directed to enter Judgment in favor of
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Respondent and against Petitioner, terminate any pending motions as
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moot and close the file.
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IT IS SO ORDERED.
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DATED
08/20/2012
THELTON E. HENDERSON
United States District Judge
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