Katerra Davis v. Target Corporation et al
Filing
10
MINUTES (IN CHAMBERS) ORDER REMANDING ACTION TO SAN BERNARDINO COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT by Judge John F. Walter: "Parties may not expand federal jurisdiction beyond its statutory boundaries by using Initials fraudulent joinder-based removal as a re placement for a state court demurrer" Accordingly, this action is REMANDED to San Bernardino County Superior Court for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. (Made JS-6 Case Terminated.) (Attachments: # 1 CV-103 Letter of Transmittal - Remand to Superior Court) (jp) Modified on 5/4/2012 (lom). (mailed 5/4/12)
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San Bernandino County Superior Court
Case No.: CIVVS1200905
JS-6
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES -- GENERAL
Case No.
EDCV 12-566-JFW (OPx)
Title:
Katerra Davis -v- Target Corporation, et al.
Date: May 3, 2012
PRESENT:
HONORABLE JOHN F. WALTER, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Shannon Reilly
Courtroom Deputy
None Present
Court Reporter
ATTORNEYS PRESENT FOR PLAINTIFFS:
None
PROCEEDINGS (IN CHAMBERS):
ATTORNEYS PRESENT FOR DEFENDANTS:
None
ORDER REMANDING ACTION TO SAN BERNARDINO
COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT
On February 22, 2012, Plaintiff Katerra Davis (“Plaintiff”) filed a Complaint against
Defendants Target Corporation and Scott Taylor in Los Angeles County Superior Court. On April
17, 2012, Defendant Target Corporation (“Target”) filed a Notice of Removal of Civil Action (“Notice
of Removal”), alleging that this Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, having subject matter jurisdiction only over
matters authorized by the Constitution and Congress. See Bender v. Williamsport Area School
District, 475 U.S. 534, 541 (1986). “Because of the Congressional purpose to restrict the
jurisdiction of the federal courts on removal, the statute is strictly construed, and federal jurisdiction
must be rejected if there is any doubt as to the right of removal in the first instance.” Duncan v.
Stuetzle, 76 F.3d 1480, 1485 (9th Cir. 1996) (citations and quotations omitted). There is a strong
presumption that the Court is without jurisdiction unless the contrary affirmatively appears. See
Fifty Associates v. Prudential Insurance Company of America, 446 F.2d 1187, 1190 (9th Cir.
1990). As the party invoking federal jurisdiction, Defendants bear the burden of demonstrating that
removal is proper. See, e.g., Gaus v. Miles, 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992); Emrich v. Touche
Ross & Co., 846 F.2d 1190, 1195 (9th Cir. 1988).
Diversity jurisdiction founded under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) requires that (1) all plaintiffs be of
different citizenship than all defendants, and (2) the amount in controversy exceed $75,000. See
28 U.S.C. § 1332. Because Target has not met its burden of demonstrating that the parties are
completely diverse and that Defendant Scott Taylor has been fraudulently joined, this action shall
be remanded.
Initials of Deputy Clerk sr
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According to Plaintiff’s Complaint and Target’s Notice of Removal, both Plaintiff and
Defendant Scott Taylor are citizens of California. Target argues, however, that Defendant Taylor
has been fraudulently joined, and thus that his presence in the lawsuit should be ignored.
“Although an action may removed to federal court only where there is complete diversity of
citizenship, . . . one exception to the requirement for complete diversity is where a non-diverse
defendant has been ‘fraudulently joined.’” Hunter v. Philip Morris USA, 582 F.3d 1039, 1043 (9th
Cir. 2009) (quotations and citations omitted). If the plaintiff “fails to state a cause of action against
a resident defendant, and the failure is obvious according to the settled rules of the state, the
joinder of the resident defendant is fraudulent.” McCabe v. Gen. Foods Corp., 811 F.2d 1336,
1339 (9th Cir. 1987) (emphasis added). If the Court finds that the joinder of a non-diverse
defendant is fraudulent, that defendant’s presence in the lawsuit is ignored for the purposes of
determining diversity. See, e.g., Morris v. Princess Cruises, Inc., 236 F.3d 1061, 1067 (9th Cir.
2001).
“There is a presumption against finding fraudulent joinder, and defendants who assert that
plaintiff has fraudulently joined a party carry a heavy burden of persuasion.” Plute v. Roadway
Package Sys., Inc., 141 F. Supp. 2d 1005, 1008 (N.D. Cal. 2001). A claim of fraudulent joinder
should be denied if there is any possibility that the plaintiffs may prevail on the cause of action
against the in-state defendant. See id. at 1008, 1012. “The standard is not whether plaintiffs will
actually or even probably prevail on the merits, but whether there is a possibility that they may do
so.” Lieberman v. Meshkin, Mazandarani, 1996 WL 732506, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 11, 1996)
(emphasis added). “In determining whether a defendant was joined fraudulently, the court must
resolve ‘all disputed questions of fact and all ambiguities in the controlling state law in favor of the
non-removing party.’” Plute, 141 F. Supp. 2d at 1008 (quoting Dodson v. Spiliada Maritime Corp.,
951 F.2d 40, 42-43 (5th Cir. 1992)). Moreover, any doubts concerning the sufficiency of a cause of
action due to inartful, ambiguous, or technically defective pleading must be resolved in favor of
remand. See id.
The Court finds that Target has not carried its heavy burden of demonstrating that
Defendant Scott Taylor has been fraudulently joined. In her Complaint filed on February 22, 2012,
Plaintiff asserts only one claim for disability harassment against Defendant Taylor. Target claims
that Plaintiff cannot possibly prevail on this claim for relief against Defendant Taylor because: (1)
all of the actions she attributes to Defendant Taylor consist entirely of personnel management
decisions; and (2) she does not plead facts sufficient to support a prima facie claim for disability
harassment.
The Court cannot conclude at this stage that Plaintiff has no possibility of stating a claim for
disability harassment against Defendant Taylor. The Janken court explicitly stated “that liability for
harassment, which extends to ‘any person’ and hence extends to ‘individuals,’ encompasses
individual supervisory employees.” Janken v. G.M. Hughes Elecs., 46 Cal. App. 4th 55, 65 (1996).
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Taylor harassed her by, for example, “consistently belittl[ing]” her.
Complaint at ¶ 12. If these allegations are credited, Defendant Taylor could be liable for
harassment.
“Parties may not expand federal jurisdiction beyond its statutory boundaries by using
Initials of Deputy Clerk sr
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fraudulent joinder-based removal as a replacement for a state court demurrer.” See, e.g., Lizari v.
CVS Pharmacy Inc., 2011 WL 223806, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 20, 2011). Accordingly, this action is
REMANDED to San Bernardino County Superior Court for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See
28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Initials of Deputy Clerk sr
Page 3 of 3
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